Al-Maqasid according to Imam al-Shatibi A Study in Usul and Fiqh Translated from the Arabic: المقاصد عند الإمام الشاطبي [Page 1] The Book: The Objectives of the Sharia (Maqasid al-Sharia) According to Imam al-Shatibi: A Jurisprudential and Usul al-Fiqh Study Authored by: Mahmoud Abdul Hadi Faour Edition: First 1427 AH - 2006 CE Publisher: Basyouni Printing Telephone: 836014/03 Sidon - Lebanon Mahmoud Abdul Hadi Faour The Objectives of the Sharia (Maqasid al-Sharia) According to Imam al-Shatibi Study of Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence) The first edition 1427 AH - 2006 CE Basyuni for Printing Phone: 836014/03 Sidon - Lebanon In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. The introduction All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, and peace and blessings be upon our master Muhammad, and upon his family and all his companions, and upon those who follow them in goodness until the Day of Judgment. And I bear witness that there is no deity except Allah alone, with no partner for Him, and that Muhammad is His servant and Messenger. He conveyed the message and fulfilled the trust, and he bore witness to the nation and called Allah as a witness to that. He said: "O Allah, have I conveyed [the message]?" They said: Yes. He said: "O Allah, bear witness," three times they said: Yes, they bear witness for themselves, and he (peace and blessings be upon him) bears witness for them, then Allah, Exalted is He, bears witness to that. Then he (peace and blessings be upon him) joined the highest companion, and the companions after him carried the trust and fulfilled it in the best manner, and they conveyed it to those after them, and the truth appeared and falsehood perished, Islam prevailed and darkness was dispelled. Then after them came a generation that neglected the trust and thus they were lost; they exchanged fire for light, so they were burned and did not find illumination. They forgot Allah, so He made them forget themselves; they became deaf while they could hear, their eyes see but they are blind and do not perceive. They have hearts with which they desire, but they do not understand, and they are constricted in their chests. Say, "Indeed, the guidance of Allah is the true guidance, and whoever Allah guides is the rightly guided, and whoever He leads astray, you will not find for him a guiding ally." As for what follows, [Page 2] Indeed, Allah - Exalted is He - has revealed the best of speech, a Book that guides to that which is most upright, guiding thereby those who follow His pleasure to the paths of peace. He has clarified and defined the path of truth and faith, as well as the paths of misguidance and the devil, and He commanded to follow His chosen one and intimate friend, saying: { Say, "This is my path; I invite to Allah with insight, I and whoever follows me." } (1). He prohibited following the devil and warned, saying: { And do not follow the footsteps of the devil. } (2). He commanded to oppose and fight him, saying: { Indeed, the devil is to you a foe, so take him as a foe. } (3). He commanded that He alone be worshipped and that none other be worshipped, for what He has deemed good is good, and what He has deemed evil is evil, and there is no one to overturn His decree. { The judgment is only for Allah. He has commanded that you not worship except Him. } (4), { And it is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decreed a matter, that they should have any choice in their matter. } (5). The trust that Allah and His Messenger have testified we must carry is to worship Allah alone, to make people worship Him, and to bear witness to this among the people, conveying it to them and subjecting them to it, { And thus We have made you a just nation that you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you. } (6). However, Allah - Glorified and Exalted - has willed that the situation remains as it is, and He is more eloquent than any speech, for those who understand the meaning of the message, the meaning of the trust, the meaning of the testimony, and the meaning of Allah's commands and prohibitions, and what Allah has said. Exalted is He. __________ (1) Surah Yusuf, 108. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 168. (3) Surah Fatir, 6. (4) Surah Yusuf, 40. (5) Surah Al-Ahzab, 36. (6) Surah Al-Baqarah, 143. [Page 3] And indeed, it is among the things that deepen the decline, the confusion of misguidance, and the distance of error, that the eyes become dazzled by the light of fire, and the hearts that are in the chests become blind, so that the disease is imagined to be a cure, and poison is thought to be an antidote, and the liar is believed, while the truthful is denied, and the trustworthy is betrayed, while the treacherous is entrusted, and that the ignorant is listened to, and the knowledgeable are blinded to the light, and they hasten to follow the one who says: "This fire is light and that light is fire." This is because after the rule of Islam was removed from life, and the rule of tyranny was substituted for it, a group emerged that alters and distorts, attributing to the rulings of disbelief the quality of legitimacy, the legitimacy of Islam, emptying Islam of its substance and filling it with something else, new, and they invoke renewal, interpreting and changing to reconcile between the rulings of Islam and the rulings of disbelief, and they justify it as development, or under the pretext of keeping up with the times or preserving what remains. And one of them says: "Let not your eyelids flutter, O Muslims! For Islam is flexible and suitable for every time and place," and with these and other claims, Islam, in the name of Islam, is stripped of its truth and essence, and becomes something else. The distorters, in the name of renewal and development, have found the idea of interests (masalih) and objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), so they leaned on it, claiming that the Sharia came for the interests of the servants, thus reversing the truth, and instead of it being: "the interest is where the Sharia is," they claimed that "the Sharia is where the interest is." The objectives of the Sharia became a substitute for the Sharia itself. And if it is said: "O people, the Sharia, the Sharia!" [Page 4] Those whose efforts have gone astray in this worldly life while they think they are doing good – in the best of cases – said: "Leave these people alone, for they are stagnant, they do not evolve, nor do they innovate, and they do not understand reality. Indeed, there are secrets in the Sharia (law) and priorities and balances in the religion. When these texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah confront them, they become confused and evasive, they search and dig, then they take snippets and say." Among the things they said were: "The interests (masalih) and the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), al-Shatibi and the Muwafaqat of al-Shatibi, the Muwafaqat: the masterpiece of al-Shatibi, the Sheikh of the objectives." They took snippets and then had the audacity to say: "Those who confront us with the texts are still governed by the complex of the text, and they delude themselves that they are people of jurisprudence (fiqh) while others are merely literalists." What audacity is this! And what kind of jurisprudence is this! And among whom do they rush! The researcher examined these statements and opinions. The interests (masalih), and the unregulated interests (masalih mursala)! That's fine, let it be, but what you have brought forth is neither interests nor unregulated interests; it is, in the terminology of usul al-fiqh, nullified interests, contradicted by the texts, so they are, therefore, corruptions (mafasid). The objectives, the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia)! Yes, let it be, but what you have brought forth is not the objectives of the Sharia; it is your objectives, or the objectives of the sick-hearted. So where in the objectives of the Sharia does the preservation of religion become the freedom of belief and the right to change one's religion? And where in the objectives of the Sharia is the abrogation of the Sharia, so that apostasy becomes a human right, and the killing of an apostate becomes a crime? And is it in the objectives of the Sharia that the text states: { and He has forbidden usury } (1) and the objective is: usury is permissible, with time and place being sufficient for that! And where in the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) does the preservation of wealth mean the freedom of ownership, and the preservation of the intellect mean the freedom of opinion? Is this in our religion, we Muslims? __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 275. [Page 5] They said: Al-Shatibi and the new al-Shatibi, the Muwafaqat, and how much we need what is in it! Is al-Shatibi to sacrifice the religion on the thresholds of its objectives, and to dissect the belly of the Sharia at the doorsteps of public interest (maslaha)? The researcher looked into the Muwafaqat and studied it from beginning to end, and from end to beginning. It contains depth, and its author is one with intention, and it requires reflection and re-reflection; so let it be, the researcher immersed himself in it and contemplated it well. The result was that al-Shatibi is slandered by one group and misunderstood by another. In summary, al-Shatibi is innocent of what is attributed to him regarding public interests and objectives. The researcher continued studying al-Shatibi through al-I'tisam, and found that those who take him as a veil behind which they hide are, in his view, innovators. The Muwafaqat does not agree with these people, and al-Shatibi warns against them and their methodology. From here arose the motivations for researching this topic, which can be summarized as follows: 1 - Religion is a duty and a trust upon everyone who comprehends it. The researcher saw it as his duty to clarify that the objectives of the Sharia do not negate the Sharia, nor do they invalidate its rulings. If the objectives are the objectives of the Sharia, they are a branch of it, and the Sharia is the root; it is not correct for the branch to invalidate the root. There must be a confrontation with any thought or proposal that calls for disregarding the Sharia or transgressing its limits, especially if it is done in the name of Islam. 2 - Since some have clung to al-Shatibi and his Muwafaqat, attributing to him what he does not say, and what he has consistently warned against, it was necessary to clarify the reality of this matter, and that there is no basis in al-Shatibi or in the Muwafaqat for anyone who wishes to alter or change the rulings of the Sharia under the pretext of its objectives, whether with good or bad intentions. 3 - As the discussions about al-Shatibi and his ideas regarding the objectives or his theory in them increased, and about his new approach to understanding the Sharia, research was presented on this and around it, in books, on the pages of magazines and newspapers, and on television screens, and the researcher found that all of it was far from al-Shatibi and from his ideas, methodology, or innovations; he felt that he had to clarify what he sees as correct in this regard. [Page 6] And the researcher sees that this work is among the works of carrying the call, and among the works of dialogue or intellectual struggle. He asks Allah, Exalted is He, to grant this work acceptance with Him, and to bestow upon it great reward and recompense. I intended for this book to be a study of the true concept of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) according to al-Shatibi. Therefore, its subject is an analytical study of al-Shatibi's ideas, particularly what he has written in the book al-Muwafaqat. This book is an analytical study of the texts of al-Muwafaqat. In this study, I relied on the edition that was prepared by the two scholars Muhammad al-Khidr Hussein from Tunisia and Muhammad Hasanein Makhlouf. It consists of four volumes in two volumes, where the first scholar prepared the first and second volumes, and the second scholar prepared the third and fourth volumes. Thus, whenever I refer to or cite al-Muwafaqat, I have referred to this edition, and if I refer to another, I will note that. I have not provided biographical information about the figures in this book except briefly and where I found it necessary, such as the figures who are frequently cited. I have extracted all the verses that appeared in the book. I have also extracted all the hadiths mentioned in it in a concise manner, relying on the CD of the Noble Hadith Encyclopedia program, produced by Sakhr Company, second edition, which contains the nine books of hadith (mentioned in the list of sources and references), and it relies on global numbering. Whenever I did not find sufficient information in this program, I indicated the book or books from which I derived it, mentioning the name of the book, its edition, the hadith number, the volume, and the page. I have not included any statement or opinion of al-Shatibi without substantiating it with a text or texts from him, even if this opinion had been clarified in a previous chapter, in order to maintain the completeness of the chapter's unity and its independence as much as possible. Often, I have provided more than one text to indicate al-Shatibi's position or opinion, in order to prevent misinterpretation of his statements. [Page 7] I have structured this book or this study with an introduction, followed by a definition of al-Shatibi and his era, then ten chapters and a brief conclusion, followed by indexes of the noble verses and the honorable hadiths, sources and references, and then the contents of the book. Chapter One: The Introduction to the Emergence of the Idea of the Objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia). It contains an introduction to the emergence of the science of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) and its development, along with three sections: the first on qiyas (analogy), the second on the pathways of the cause and its conditions, and the third on the pathway of the relationship and suitability, which are necessary for entering the discussions of usul al-fiqh, qiyas, and ta'leel (causal reasoning). In particular, the pathway of the relationship and suitability serves as a prelude to the idea of the objectives of the Sharia. Chapter Two: The Emergence of the Idea of the Objectives of the Sharia. It contains a brief presentation of the emergence of the idea, followed by three sections on how it originated and developed among the scholars of usul before al-Shatibi, which forms a prelude to the idea of the objectives according to al-Shatibi. Chapter Three: The Criteria for the Objectives According to al-Shatibi. It contains three sections, the first and second on the preliminaries and criteria, then the references and foundations that al-Shatibi deemed necessary for understanding his book (al-Muwafaqat), and the third section on the results and the concept of benefit (maslaha) and harm (mafsada) according to al-Shatibi. Chapter Four: The Intention of the Legislator in Establishing the Sharia Initially and in Establishing it for Understanding. It discusses the types of the legislator's objectives, which are four, and the statements of al-Shatibi and his methodology in understanding the two types: the first being the establishment of the Sharia initially, and the second being its establishment for understanding. Chapter Five: The Intention of the Legislator in Establishing the Sharia for Obligatory Acts and in the Subjection of the Obligated to Its Rulings. It discusses the statements of al-Shatibi and his methodology in understanding the two types: the third being the establishment of the Sharia for obligatory acts, and the fourth being the subjection of the obligated to the rulings of the Sharia. Chapter Six: The Objectives of the Obligated. It contains a prelude and three sections explaining the impact of intention or objective in the actions of the obligated, the impact of agreement or disagreement between the intention of the legislator and the intention of the obligated in action, and an explanation of legal tricks (hiyal) and al-Shatibi's stance on them. [Page 8] Chapter Seven: Al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding the Sharia. It contains three sections explaining al-Shatibi's methodology in establishing the rules and principles solely through induction. His methodology in understanding the Sharia and deriving rulings in general, as well as his methodology and views on understanding the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This is one of the most important applications of his ideas in the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia). Chapter Eight: Ijtihad and Taqlid. This chapter discusses al-Shatibi's views on ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), taqlid (following a legal school), and fatwa (legal opinion) and the criteria for each, as well as the qualified mujtahid (jurist) and its conditions. It is similar to the previous chapter in terms of its importance as it is a result of his ideas on the objectives of the Sharia, and it includes a section on the principle of the consequences of actions according to him. Chapter Nine: Applying the Idea: Three General Principles. This chapter explains the application of his idea of induction and establishing principles through the study of three general principles in three sections. The first: on the principle of public interest (maslaha) that is not explicitly stated, the second on the principle of istihsan (juridical preference), and the third on the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i), which includes a discussion on the principle of harm. Chapter Ten: The Idea of Maqasid According to Al-Shatibi: Presentation and Discussion. It contains three sections, the first presenting his idea and highlighting its foundation and pillars briefly. The second and third sections discuss al-Shatibi's idea and methodology through examining its foundation and pillars. Introduction to Al-Shatibi and His Era Introduction to Al-Shatibi: He is Abu Ishaq Ibrahim ibn Musa ibn Muhammad al-Lakhmi al-Gharnati, known as al-Shatibi(1), one of the scholars of the Maliki school in al-Andalus. He became known as al-Shatibi due to his ancestry from Shatiba, and his family sought refuge in Granada after the fall of Shatiba to the Christians. Al-Shatibi lived his entire life in Granada during the eighth century of the Hijra. There is some disagreement regarding his birth and death, but it is generally accepted that he died in the year 790 AH - 1388 CE. This is based on one of his students, Abu Yahya ibn Muhammad ibn Asim, who composed the book Al-Muwafaqat in six thousand verses, mentioning the date of his death, saying (in verse): __________ (1) Ahmad Baba al-Tanbukti, Nail al-Ibtihaj bi-Tatwir al-Dibaj, p. 46, in the margin of Al-Dibaj by Ibn Farhun, 1st ed., Dar al-Saada, Egypt, 1329 AH. [Page 9] Until his life came to an end ... in the year ninety to seven hundred(1) Ahmad Baba al-Tanbukti said: "He passed away on Tuesday in the month of Sha'ban in the year 790, and I have not come across his date of birth, may Allah have mercy on him."(2) As for his birth, there is no verified statement regarding it. The Tanbukti, whose book is considered one of the most precise references for his biography, states that he did not come across the date of his birth. Dr. Hamadi al-Abidi has favored the view that his birth was around 730 AH based on the fact that he was a close friend and peer of the minister Ibn Zamrak, who was born in 733 AH, and based on his understanding that al-Shatibi was young in 756(3). As for Professor Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, he preferred in his introduction to the book Fatwas of al-Shatibi(4) that al-Shatibi was born before the year 720 AH, based on the fact that the death of his earlier teacher Abu Ja'far Ahmad ibn al-Zayyat was in the year 728 AH. Therefore, at the very least, al-Shatibi must have been young at that time, and he referred to this matter in his introduction to the book al-Ifadat wa al-Inshadat(5). __________ (1) Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, verification and commentary on the book of al-Ifadat wa al-Inshadat by al-Shatibi, p. 32, 2nd ed., 1406 AH, 1986 CE, Al-Risalah Foundation, Beirut. (2) al-Tanbukti, Nail al-Ibtihaj, p. 46. (3) Hamadi al-Abidi, al-Shatibi and the Objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), p. 12, 1st ed., 1412 AH - 1992 CE, Dar al-Qutayba, Beirut and Damascus. (4) This book is not by al-Shatibi, but was published by Professor Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, and it contains the fatwas of al-Shatibi from his two books: al-Muwafaqat and al-I'tisam. (5) See: Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, his commentary on the "Al-Irfadat wa al-Inshadat" by al-Shatibi, p. 17, footnote number 2. [Page 10] The more likely view is that of Professor Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, and his argument in this regard is sound. As for Dr. al-Ubaidi's statement, it holds no weight. The friendship between Ibn Zamrak and al-Shatibi does not prevent one from being twenty years older than the other or more. Furthermore, there is no evidence that al-Shatibi was young in the year 756 AH. This statement is a confusion between his two reports, number 66 and number 67, where he mentioned in one of them the date of the death of his earlier teachers, and in the other that he was young, but the two reports are different and unrelated to each other(1). His Era: Al-Shatibi lived in the city of Granada(2) during the time of the Nasrid kings, in the state of Banu Nasr, which at that time did not enjoy stability, primarily due to the Christians' attempts to eradicate Islam in Andalusia. To illustrate the conditions of the era in which al-Shatibi lived and to shed light on the features of this period, it is useful to refer to historical milestones in the lives of Muslims in Andalusia. The Islamic state in Andalusia was founded by Abd al-Rahman ibn Muawiya ibn Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, nicknamed the Falcon of Quraish. He was known as Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil because he was the first of the Umayyad princes to enter Andalusia after fleeing and escaping from the Abbasids(3). He entered Cordoba in the year 139 AH, as a conqueror, and then he established the foundations of the state, independent from the caliphate, but he did not call himself caliph. The Abbasids attempted to reclaim Andalusia in the year 149 AH but failed. __________ (1) See: al-Shatibi, al-Ifadāt wa al-Inshādāt, report number 66, and report number 67, p. 143, which is the source mentioned earlier, edited by Professor Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan. (2) Al-Fayruzabadi said in al-Qamus al-Muhit: Granada: "And the correct form is: Aghranata. Its meaning is: the pomegranate, in the Andalusian dialect," p. 877, Dar al-Ma'rifah and Dar al-Mu'ayyid, supervised by Muhammad Na'im al-Arqousi, 1415 AH - 1994 CE. (3) Ibrahim al-Sharifi, Islamic History, p. 149, 2nd ed., Nofal Foundation - Beirut, 1391 AH - 1971 CE. [Page 11] Charlemagne, the king of the Franks, attempted, in collaboration with the rulers of the Spanish cities, to eliminate the emirate of Abd al-Rahman, but he failed. Abdul Rahman revitalized and developed his emirate, encouraging the sciences and arts, agriculture, and industry, so that Cordoba became the capital of Al-Andalus. The civil and architectural manifestations were evident through its mosques, institutes, palaces, and gardens. Development continued after him, and the civilization of Al-Andalus was reflected in the active intellectual and cultural movement. Cordoba received special attention in terms of urban development, beauty, the construction of hospitals, houses of knowledge, and places of worship. Sciences and knowledge spread, seminars and intellectual and philosophical discussions were held, translation flourished, and Al-Andalus thrived, enjoying security and stability. Many Spaniards embraced Islam, and among them emerged writers who contributed to the spread of the Arabic language(1). Then weak princes succeeded to the rule, and weakness spread within the body of the state for sixty-two years, until Abd al-Rahman al-Nasir took power in the year 300 AH. During his reign, al-Andalus reached its golden age, prosperity prevailed, and urban, agricultural, and industrial projects were realized, in addition to the mosques, schools, and hospitals that were established. Palaces were built, streets were illuminated with lanterns, lush gardens spread, and students from all over al-Andalus came to study in its institutes and universities. The wealth of the country increased, and the state's resources multiplied. A great deal was spent, and much was saved. Abd al-Rahman al-Nasir's rule lasted fifty years, from 300 to 350 AH, and he called himself caliph(2). Abd al-Rahman al-Nasir was succeeded by his son al-Hakam, who ruled for 16 years, during which he focused on the development of the country. He was then succeeded by weak rulers who handed over the governance to others, leading to its loss, and the ambitious seized power from them, resulting in the fall of the caliphate in the year 417 AH. Small states emerged in the cities, and their rulers were known as the kings of the factions. __________ (1) Ibrahim al-Sharifi, Islamic History, p. 153. (2) See: the same reference: p. 154 - 155. [Page 12] These conditions of division, weakness, conflict, and ambitions encouraged the Christian states in the north to pounce on the Muslims. And when the danger intensified in Andalusia and the kings of the taifa (small kingdoms) were unable to repel the attack of the Christian kingdoms that united in northern Spain, al-Mu'tamid ibn Abbad, the king of Seville, sought help from the Almoravids, the rulers of Morocco. Their forces crossed into Andalusia and inflicted a crushing defeat on the armies of the Christian kingdoms at the Battle of Zallaqa in the year 479 AH - 1086 CE. The assistance of the Almoravids and their overwhelming victory played a crucial role in saving Andalusia and maintaining the Islamic presence there. Once the danger subsided, the Muslim princes returned to infighting and disputes over power, and the contagion spread to the rulers of Morocco, leading to discord among them and weakening their authority. The Christian rulers in northern Spain seized the opportunity and prepared armies to invade the southern states, resulting in the fall of all of them except for Granada, which remained steadfast like a towering mountain. The fall of Córdoba occurred in the year 634 AH - 1236 CE, and Seville in the year 646 AH - 1248 CE (1). __________ (1) See, Ibrahim al-Sharifi, p. 157. [Page 13] During this time, one of the kings of the taifa states emerged, namely Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Hud, who was titled Amir al-Muslimin Sif al-Dawla, the one who relies on Allah. He controlled a number of important Andalusian cities, including Cordoba and Granada. In the year 635 AH - 1238 CE, Ibn Hud passed away, and Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Yusuf ibn Nasr, known as Ibn al-Ahmar (1), appeared, the founder of the Nasrid dynasty, and he declared himself the Amir of southern Andalusia, making Granada the capital of his state. This was in the year 635 AH - 1238 CE (2). The era of Muhammad ibn al-Ahmar was characterized by the strengthening of his state and the growth of its wealth. The Nasrids stood against the armies of the northern Christians, repelling them with determination and faith. Granada became the center of the Muslims and their major stronghold in Andalusia after the kingdoms and states fell before the attacks of the Christian kings who united to eradicate Islam. The Muslims were expelled from their lands and paid tribute to the infidels, yet the Islamic presence in Andalusia continued for more than two and a half centuries after Muhammad ibn Yusuf ibn Nasr (Muhammad ibn al-Ahmar), nicknamed al-Shaykh al-Ghalib bi-Allah, managed to establish and strengthen his state in southern Andalusia (3). __________ (1) Ibn al-Ahmar's lineage goes back to Sa'd ibn Ubadah, the Ansari Khazraj companion. See: History of Morocco and Andalusia, previously referenced with a citation to Subh al-A'sha in the Art of Composition by al-Qalqashandi, 5/260. (2) See: History of Morocco and Andalusia from the 6th century AH to the 10th century AH, authored by Dr. Ahmad Audat, Dr. Shahada al-Natour, Dr. Jamil Baydoun, and Mr. Muhammad Muhasina. Dar al-Amal for Publishing and Distribution, Irbid, 1st edition, 1410 AH - 1990 CE. (3) See: Ibrahim al-Sharifi, Islamic History, p. 157. And History of Morocco and Andalusia, p. 2. [Page 14] However, this state was unable to protect the Muslims in Andalusia, so cities and fortresses fell, which aroused the ambitions of the Christians who tried to eliminate Granada, but they could not, and Granada grew stronger(1). Granada became a refuge for Muslims fleeing from the advance of the Christians since the establishment of the Nasrid state. Al-Maqri says: "When the Franks seized most of the lands of Andalusia, its people migrated there, and it became the desired city"(2). During the era of Granada, there were three powerful Christian kingdoms: Portugal, Aragon, and Castile, with the latter being the strongest of these kingdoms. Each of these kingdoms was individually stronger than Granada. They united their forces and sought assistance from others, launching crusades against Granada, and were able to achieve some victories, yet they did not accomplish their objectives. Then the Crusader forces gathered and attacked Granada, and the Muslims sought assistance from Morocco, and events and wars took place in which the Muslims achieved a tremendous victory in the year 674 AH. The conflict continued, and in the year 718 AH, the Castilians attacked Granada and advanced upon it with the help of the English. The Muslims sought assistance from the Marinids in Morocco, and they responded. The Muslims were able to achieve victory and defeat the Franks in a battle near Granada(3). The confrontations between the Muslims and the Spaniards continued, and the Muslims were defeated in a naval battle in the year 740 AH - 1339 CE, in which forces from Aragon, Castile, and Portugal participated. A battle occurred in the year 741 AH, which was the Battle of Tarifa, in which the Muslims used cannons that fired flames for the first time, but they lost the battle. The Crusaders, when victorious in a battle, committed the most heinous atrocities against the Muslims(4). __________ (1) See: The History of Morocco and Andalusia, the previous reference, p. 162. (2) Abu al-Abbas Ahmad al-Maqri, Nafh al-Tayyib fi Ghusn al-Andalus al-Ratib, 1/148, 7 volumes, edited by Ihsan Abbas, 1st edition, Dar Sader - Beirut. (3) See: History of Morocco and Andalusia, p. 165. (4) See: The History of Morocco and Al-Andalus, p. 169. [Page 15] And the Spaniards began to wreak havoc and destruction in the lands of Andalusia. Despite all this, Granada remained strong, and peace treaties were concluded between the Muslims and the Spaniards, including a peace treaty with Pedro IV in the year 736 - 789 AH, 1336 - 1387 CE. Security and peace prevailed in the realms of the Kingdom of Granada, and it flourished. Despite the Spaniards' attempts to divide the properties of Granada, they failed(1). In the year 867 AH, Gibraltar fell into the hands of the Castilians, which was a severe blow to the Muslims, and the arrival of supplies from Morocco to Al-Andalus came to a halt(2). And the rule of Granada was taken over in the year 887 AH - 1482 CE by Muhammad ibn Ali, nicknamed Abu Abdullah al-Saghir, who agreed to surrender Granada in the year 897 AH - 1492 CE to the monarchs of Castile and Aragon, and he departed to Morocco. Thus, the Islamic state in Andalusia came to an end, and it was said about this Abu Abdullah al-Saghir (the light): Weep like women for a kingdom that was lost... You did not preserve it like men. The political situation: This was a reference to historical milestones and events that the Muslims of Andalusia went through. These events explain the migration of the al-Shatibi family to Granada. They also clarify the political situation of the time of al-Shatibi, but there are events that shed greater light on the political situation of the time of al-Shatibi, that is, the eighth century of the Hijra. __________ (1) See: the same reference, p. 172. (2) See: the same reference, pp. 172 - 174. [Page 16] Lisan al-Din ibn al-Khatib (1) said: "After al-Ghalib, by the command of Allah, the founder of the state, his son and namesake Sultan Abu Abdullah took over, and his reign lasted until he died in 701 AH. After him, his son and namesake Abu Abdullah Muhammad took over, but he was deposed on the day of Eid al-Fitr in 708 AH, and he died in Shawwal of 711. After him, his brother Nasr Abu al-Juyush took over, but his situation became chaotic, and he sought power from his uncle's son Sultan Abu al-Walid Ismail, who seized the governor's house on the second of Dhul-Qi'dah in 713 AH. Nasr was deposed and moved to the city of Wadi Ash, where he died in 722 AH. The reign of Sultan Abu al-Walid continued until the 23rd of Rajab in 725, when he was attacked by his cousin along with a group of his relatives, and they killed him at his door. Their efforts were in vain, and they were all killed that day. His son Muhammad took over and continued until Dhul-Hijjah of 734, when he was killed at the foot of Jabal al-Fath by his troops from the Maghreb. After him, his brother Abu al-Hajjaj Yusuf took over, and his reign lasted until the day of Eid al-Fitr in 755" (2), and he was killed during his prayer (3). __________ (1) He was a minister in the Nasrid state. (2) Hamadi al-Abidi, Objectives of Islamic Law, p. 31. Referencing: Lisan al-Din ibn al-Khatib, al-Lamha al-Badriya, pp. 33, 34, edited by Muhyiddin al-Khatib, 1st ed., al-Salafiyya Press, Cairo, 1374 AH. (3) The same source. [Page 17] "Then Sultan Muhammad V, known as al-Ghani Billah, assumed the emirate and continued from 755 AH to 793 AH. His rule faced bloody events during this period. He was subjected to a coup in the year 760, after which he fled to Morocco and returned in 763. Granada experienced three successive coups during these three years: the first in the month of Ramadan in the year 760, which ended with the flight of Sultan al-Ghani Billah to Morocco and the ascension of his brother Ismail II in his place. The second coup occurred in Sha'ban in the year 761, in which Ismail II was killed and the murderer, Abu Said al-Barmikh, who was his sister's husband, took the throne. The third coup in Jumada al-Thani in the year 763 resulted in the return of al-Ghani Billah to his throne, and al-Barmikh was killed by the King of Castile."(1) Some sources indicate that al-Barmikh was addicted to hashish, and this vice spread among the people openly, and poems were composed about it.(2) __________ (1) The same reference, p. 31. (2) The same reference, p. 32. [Page 18] The tongue of Lisan al-Din Ibn al-Khatib speaks of the tyranny of the Bermejo and his consumption of the people's wealth, saying: "He was a tyrant (1), devouring the fodder and pasture, and by eliminating the crops, he deprived the means of prosperity, opened the doors of calamity, and permitted some taxes (2), giving a little and then withholding (3). Days did not pass before he returned to his tyranny (4) and oppressed the subjects with his evil, burdening them with the need to tether their horses after drowning their provisions for his soldiers" (5). Economic Condition: From what has been mentioned, it is evident that there was a rise followed by a decline in the state of Al-Andalus, which is reflected in the emergence and growth of the state, then its decline and fall. This is also evident in the growth of wealth and the increase in spending and saving, followed by a worsening of need, which was witnessed during the era of al-Shatibi. Professor Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan states: "We learn from a text directed to al-Shatibi that Muslims needed some essential resources, and some questioned: Does this need permit them to sell to the disbelievers what they had been prohibited from selling to them because it strengthens them? The text of the question is: Is it permissible for the people of Al-Andalus to sell items that the scholars prohibited selling to the people of war, such as weapons and others, due to their necessity for essentials in other matters like food and clothing, or is there no difference between the people of Al-Andalus and others in the lands of Islam?" (6). __________ (1) A colloquial Egyptian term used for the rabble who live by plunder; see: Hamadi al-Abidi, Maqasid al-Sharia al-Islamiyya. Footnote, p. 32. (2) Makkasa in selling means to collect money, and the tax (maks) refers to deficiency, injustice, and coins that were taken from sellers of goods in the markets during the pre-Islamic era; al-Firuzabadi, al-Qamus al-Muhit, p. 742. (3) Akadda and iktadda: to hold back. A well that is kuddud: its water can only be reached with effort. The same source, p. 402. (4) Al-Qayn: the male slave, and al-Qayna: the female slave. Al-Taqin: adornment. The same reference, p. 1582. (5) Hamadi al-Abidi, Maqasid al-Sharia al-Islamiyya, p. 32, referring to: Nafadat al-Jarab fi Alalat al-Ightirab, 2/183. (6) Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, Investigation and Commentary on the Iftadat and Inshadat of al-Shatibi, p. 13. [Page 19] He points to the food shortage, saying: "As indicated by another inquiry, the food shortage drove them to exploit the maritime resource, but the charter of the ships was made without the wage being known at the time of the contract. They wondered: how could this be when the situation in the Andalusian region is not hidden, or its need for food, and most of its food now comes from the sea, and many of the people of the region seek to cause the establishment of a ship or to buy one, yet they are prevented from that by the chartering in the aforementioned manner, while the situation in the homeland is not concealed and the necessity is evident" (1). Among the indicators of economic weakness is the state's inability to meet the needs of the people and its need to impose taxes. This is evident in the differing opinions of the scholars, as due to the political conditions and external wars, a financial crisis befell the state. The government of Granada consulted the jurists regarding the permissibility of imposing additional taxes on the people of the kingdom to meet the mobilization for combat, but they refrained from that. However, al-Shatibi deviated from their consensus and issued a fatwa permitting it, saying: "If we appoint an obeyed Imam, in need of increasing the soldiers to defend the borders and protect the kingdom that spans vast territories, and the treasury is empty while the needs of the soldiers rise to what is insufficient for them, then it is permissible for the Imam, if he is just, to impose on the wealthy what he deems sufficient for them in wealth until the treasury's funds become apparent. Then he has the discretion to impose that on the crops, fruits, and other things so that the specification of people does not lead to estrangement of hearts, and this occurs rarely in many cases such that it does not harm anyone and achieves the intended goal" (2). __________ (1) Same reference, p. 14. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 2/380. Edited by Abdul Razzaq al-Mahdi, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 2nd ed., 1418 AH - 1998 CE. [Page 20] The reports indicating the loss of wealth and savings in Andalusia are numerous, and this situation that the economic condition has reached indicates a decline and deterioration, but does not indicate famine. Therefore, these conditions do not prevent the existence of wealth and luxury in society. Professor Abu al-Ajfan says: "Despite this tumultuous situation, a kind of extravagance spreads, along with a penchant for jewelry among the wealthy elite, and an artistry in adornment and extravagance in the forms of ornaments among women, as well as a passion for music that becomes widespread even in the shops frequented by the youth"(1). Scientific Condition: The level of scholarship and the prevailing cultural climate in Granada during the life of al-Shatibi was good and flourishing, and it did not decline significantly and suddenly except with the fall of Granada and its submission to its enemy. However, it is noted that this level gradually declined in accordance with the political situation. Whenever the rulers had a vision of expansion and the spread of Islam, this was followed by the dissemination and expansion of Islamic sciences, along with a cultural movement. Wherever the rulers exerted effort to maintain stability or the existing situation within their borders, and to maintain a steady level of influence and interaction, this condition was followed by stagnation. This means that the movement of scientific production and the cultural movement in society would stabilize. This was the case in Granada, had it not become a destination and gathering place for scholars coming from all parts of Andalusia, which led to an interaction that affected scientific, intellectual, cultural, industrial, and artistic activity. __________ (1) Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, commentary and annotation on the "Irfadat wa al-Inshadat" of al-Shatibi, pp. 14, 15, referencing the "Lamhah al-Badriyah" of Ibn al-Khatib, pp. 28, 29. [Page 21] Professor Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan said: "As for the cultural climate that Granada experienced during the life of al-Shatibi, it was relatively flourishing, as the tradition of scientific interest continued, and scholars engaged in enriching the reservoir of knowledge with their writings and research, while the chain of hadith and the narration of books of knowledge and the documentation of the programs (1) of the scholars persisted" (2). Education and authorship were active, and two large scientific institutions were established in Granada: the Great Mosque and the Nasrid School. Authorship covered various branches of empirical, legal, and philosophical sciences. Professor Abu al-Ajfan states: "Thus, the scientific movement was flourishing until the late eighth century, indicating a strength that was able to resist the period of decline that was seeping into Andalusia and pushing it toward its inevitable fate. The thinkers and scholars of Andalusia during this turbulent time made attempts at reform and healing divisions, called for jihad, instilled a spirit of determination in souls, and raised awareness of the looming danger" (3). __________ (1) Programs: "A type of record that includes the scholars of its authors and what they took from them in narrations, and what they read to them from books, or it includes the scholars of a particular scholar whom another person undertook to gather and mention what was taken from them." See: Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, his edition of the Book of Programs of al-Majari, p. 59, and the book is by Abu Abdullah Muhammad al-Majari al-Andalusi, who died in 862 AH, 1st ed., 1984, Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, Beirut - Lebanon. (2) See: Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, his edition of the Al-Irfadat wa al-Inshadat of al-Shatibi, p. 15. (3) The same reference, p. 17. [Page 22] He also said: "Industries flourished in this kingdom that the inhabitants mastered and inherited from their ancestors who built the most magnificent civilization in the Andalusian peninsula. Among these were the manufacturing of weapons, silk and woolen fabrics, ceramic vessels, various types of paper and leather. The export of these industries provided income and stimulated commercial activity. The southerners and other nations with close economic ties to Andalusia had commercial establishments in Granada, and Granada entered into trade treaties with the Republic of Genoa and the Kingdom of Aragon" (1). This atmosphere witnessed a surge in the pursuit of knowledge and in scientific and jurisprudential dialogue and discussion, and its results appeared in the enthusiasm for authorship and research, with the names of scholars shining brightly and their works becoming well-known. At the forefront of each field were prominent figures such as Ibn al-Fakhar al-Biri in the sciences of language, Ibn al-Saigh and Abu Hayyan in the science of grammar in particular, Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi in the science of usul (principles of jurisprudence), Ibn Jazi and Ibn Asim in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), Ibn al-Khatib and Ibn Zamrak in literature and politics, Ibn Hudhayl the Wise in philosophy, and many others besides them (2). __________ (1) Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, in his work on the sewer program, p. 15, referring to the end of Andalusia, Muhammad Abdullah Anan, 1st ed., Egypt, 1949. (2) Hamadi al-Abidi, al-Shatibi and the Objectives of the Sharia, pp. 47-50, referring to: Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour, Isn't the dawn near?, p. 79, 1st ed., Tunisian Distribution Company. [Page 23] However, there is a matter that should be pointed out, which is that this flourishing in terms of science and culture does not necessarily indicate health and the continuation of progress. Indeed, Andalusia has gone through periods of scientific and cultural, civilizational and societal flourishing, and this situation in the eighth century is a remnant of that prosperity; it is a continuation of past progress. This is evidenced by the fact that Granada fell before the end of the ninth century, and that Muslims in Andalusia were gradually losing their authority and power. Therefore, it is noted that this advanced scientific and cultural state is limited to the explanation and preservation of existing knowledge, as evidenced by stagnation and lack of interaction with what is beyond the borders. New writings were nothing more than commentaries and summaries, and the high scientific level is a relative level, resulting from comparisons with the level of surrounding countries, whether in Europe or the Maghreb. However, in comparison to the situation in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Hijra, it indicates stability and stagnation in the legislative aspect. What confirms these conditions is the absence of any school of thought in Granada other than the Maliki school. Al-Shatibi said: "For the writings of the Hanafi school are as if they do not exist in the Maghreb, as are the writings of the Shafi'i school and others from the people of the schools."(1) Cultural community climate: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/273. [Page 24] Thus, the society of Granada witnessed a proliferation of sciences and knowledge, along with a multitude of scholars, which is a relatively advanced state. However, the important difference lies in the direction of the society in its cultural and scientific movement, which was one of regression and decline. This situation led to what al-Shatibi indicated regarding the spread of innovations (bid'ah) and closure, such that opposing or non-dominant opinions were not accepted even if supported by legal evidence, and to issuing fatwas based on blind imitation, applying the statements of jurists or the established rules of the school without delving into their foundations. Therefore, al-Shatibi depicts the state of affairs through the hadith: "Islam began as something strange and will return as something strange as it began, so blessed are the strangers" (1), and he speaks of the masters of ignorance, sectarian fanaticism, and the exaggeration in glorifying others besides Allah. He holds the scholars accountable for this ignorance, as they issue fatwas for the ruler according to his desires, or for their relatives or followers, and who alter rulings under the pretext of facilitation or necessity. Below are a number of statements that depict some of these conditions: __________ (1) Narrated by Muslim in the Book of Faith, no. (370). See: Sharh Muslim by al-Nawawi, 2/354, edited by Sheikh Khalil Mamoun Shihah, 1st ed., 1414 AH - 1994 CE, Dar al-Ma'rifah - Beirut, and narrated by Ibn Majah in the Book of Trials: (3986), and by al-Tirmidhi: (2630). [Page 25] Al-Shatibi says: "When I wanted to adhere to the straight path, I found myself a stranger among the majority of the people of my time"(1). He also says: "I hesitated between following the Sunnah on the condition of opposing what people were accustomed to... I saw that destruction in following the Sunnah is salvation, and that people will not avail me anything from Allah... The Day of Judgment arose upon me, and blame poured upon me, and the arrows(2) of reproach were directed at me, and I was attributed to innovation and misguidance, and placed in the ranks of the ignorant and the foolish... At times, I was accused of opposing the allies of Allah... and at times, I was accused of opposing the Sunnah and the community"(3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 1/18. (2) Fawwaq: to shoot. Al-Fayruzabadi said: "We shot upwards: to cast." Al-Qamus al-Muhit, p. 1187. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 1/18-21. [Page 26] He says: "Indeed, some people have strayed due to neglecting the evidence and relying on men, thus departing from the path of the Companions and the Followers, and they followed their desires without knowledge, leading them away from the straight path" (1). He mentioned examples of this, including: "The opinion of the blind followers of an Imam who claim that their Imam is the Sharia, to the extent that they are averse to attributing any virtue to any scholar other than their Imam. So when someone reaches the level of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) and speaks on issues without being linked to their Imam, they criticize him and direct arrows of criticism at him, considering him among those who have deviated from the path (2), and those who have separated from the community without any evidence from them, but merely based on popular habit. Imam Baqi ibn Makhlad encountered this type of people when he entered Andalusia coming from the East, to the extent that they made him an outcast in the courtyard and marginalized him... Among them is the opinion of the Nabat (a sect) in these times who turned away from studying the knowledge they intended to discuss and act upon, then returned to following some of the shaykhs from whom they learned in their youth, a time when one is likely to lack scrutiny of the one from whom they take knowledge or to be negligent of the one from whom they received it. They then elevated those shaykhs to the highest degrees of perfection and attributed to them what they have been attributed in error, or they understood from them without verification or inquiry into the authenticity of the reported issue, and they rejected all that was transmitted from the earlier generations that is true and correct... So reflect, O people of understanding, on the state of relying on a man for fatwa (legal opinion) without seeking the legal evidence, but merely for immediate interest. May Allah protect us from that by His grace" (3). __________ (1) The same source, 1/537. (2) The path: the main road. See: al-Firuzabadi, al-Qamus al-Muhit, p. 347. (3) al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 2/538-542. [Page 27] He said in al-Muwafaqat: "Many of the followers of the jurists give fatwas to their relatives or friends that they do not give to others, following their own interests and desires or the interests of that relative or friend" (1). He also said: "Some of them might justify this in situations where they claim necessity and urgent need, based on the principle that necessities permit the prohibited, thus taking what aligns with their interests" (2). Al-Shatibi established this position regarding these circumstances as a point of contention between him and the scholars of his time, to the extent that he was accused of the aforementioned charges and others. He expressed this, as has been shown, and among his expressions is also his saying (al-Basit): "I have been afflicted, O people, with a variety of trials ... from whom I have to manage until it nearly destroys me. To avert harm, not to seek a benefit ... so sufficient for me is Allah in my intellect and in my religion" (3). Dr. Hamadi al-Abidi says: "There were violent confrontations between al-Shatibi and those jurists to whom he directed his criticism and warned people against. Whenever he issued a fatwa permitting something, they issued a fatwa prohibiting it, and whenever he issued a fatwa prohibiting something, they issued a fatwa permitting it" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/73. (2) The same source, 4/81. (3) See: al-Tanbakti, Nail al-Ibtihaj, p. 49. (4) Hamadi al-Abidi, Al-Shatibi and the Objectives of the Sharia, p. 38. [Page 28] Al-Shatibi's dispute was led by one of his teachers, Abu Said ibn Lub (1), who was known for his leniency in issuing fatwas. Al-Shatibi referred to this in one of his statements, noting that leniency was something students learned from their teachers. He said: "And he said (2): I wanted to alert you to a principle in fatwa that is very beneficial and well-known among the traditions of scholars, which is that they did not impose strictness on the questioner when he came seeking a fatwa" (3). He then said: "Before this session, various issues regarding the statements of Malik and his companions were overwhelming me, but after that session, Allah illuminated my heart with the light of those words, and the darkness of those issues was lifted all at once; all praise is due to Allah for that" (4). However, he later changed his position on leniency and the fatwas of his teacher, leading to disputes and a fierce attack against him, along with numerous accusations directed at him. For example, this statement from al-Muwaq (5): "Look at the belittlement of this al-Shatibi and his denial of the chief of scholars, Ibn Lub, whose fatwas we follow in matters of belief, permissible and forbidden, and his school of thought regarding necessary oaths and other rulings on blood, marriages, and divorce" (6). This atmosphere had a significant impact on al-Shatibi's thought and his call, leading to his book al-I'tisam being a clarification of these ideas and similar ones, as well as a response to them. The Muwafaqat established principles for regulating the methodology of thinking and deduction. __________ (1) He will be mentioned when discussing al-Shatibi's teachers. (2) That is: Sheikh Abu Said ibn Lub. (3) See: al-Shatibi, al-Irfadat wa al-Inshadat, p. 152, statement number: 75. (4) The same source. (5) He is Muhammad ibn Yusuf ibn Abi al-Qasim, known as al-Muwaq al-Andalusi al-Gharnati, who died in 897 AH at an old age. See his biography in Nail al-Ibtihaj by al-Tanbukti, p. 324. (6) Hamadi al-Abidi, al-Shatibi and the Objectives of Sharia, p. 21, referring to: (Sunan al-Muhtadin) by al-Muwaq, manuscript number 7785, National Library, Tunisia. [Page 29] And indeed, this picture reflects the era of al-Shatibi: political turmoil and coups within, military attacks and Crusader threats from abroad, ongoing wars and the fall of Islamic cities, and the Muslims' flight to Granada after being expelled from their lands, constantly seeking assistance from the Muslims in Morocco while maintaining fragmentation and division into small states, all of which foreshadow a bleak fate for the Muslims in those lands. This fate is confirmed by the absence or weakness of political thought and the lack of interest among scholars in politics. For example, there is nothing in al-Shatibi's extensive and important works that indicates his concern for political conditions except in terms of issuing fatwas to the people not to sell to the disbeliever what he could use against them, or regarding the permissibility of imposing taxes on the people out of necessity. Therefore, when the Christians were unable to control Granada due to the latter's reliance on the Marinid state in Morocco, they plotted and took control of Gibraltar, the only outlet for supplying the Muslims, and this occurred in the year 867 AH - 1462 CE(1). This made it easier for them to eliminate the Muslims in Granada, and then to completely eradicate the Muslims in Andalusia in the year 897 AH - 1492 CE. This indicates a lack of political thinking, which is a sign of decline and degradation, regardless of the scientific and economic level of the state. __________ (1) The Muslims should have exerted every effort to regain Gibraltar, as its loss was a precursor to their complete expulsion from Andalusia. They originally entered it only through Gibraltar. But to which rulers do we refer? How similar today is to yesterday! [Page 30] The lack of political thought is a harbinger of the end of any state and the destruction of any nation, no matter how powerful it may be (1). It goes without saying that political thought cannot exist without the existence of political theory, system, and legislation upon which this thought and thinking are based. However, even if laws, systems, and legislations exist—as is the case—if there is no thought regarding responsibility for the nation and its issues and the management of its affairs based on these laws and legislations—this is political thought—then their existence is equivalent to their non-existence. The Sheikhs of al-Shatibi: Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi benefited from scholars who were among the finest scientific centers in the Maghreb during his time. Among these scholars were those who settled in Granada, being from its people, and some who came from the land of Morocco to settle there or to carry out certain tasks (2). Among his Granadian teachers: __________ (1) There is no clearer evidence of this than the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate, which was a vast state, an Islamic state possessing the correct creed and the greatest thought in the world, and Muslims being the most willing to sacrifice. Their land is fertile, rich, and beautiful. Likewise, the wealthy states in the Gulf quickly lost their wealth to their enemy and became feeble states that cannot move without permission from their enemy. And here is the Islamic nation, with all its peoples, in a lamentable state of backwardness despite the enormous wealth beneath the earth and on its surface, despite the vast numbers of degree holders in various fields of knowledge, and despite its large population and the tremendous sacrifices it makes. (2) See: Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, in his edition of the book Al-Irfadat wa al-Inshadat by al-Shatibi, p. 20. [Page 31] 1 ـ Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn al-Fakhar al-Biri, who passed away in 754 AH. His student Ibn al-Khatib says about him: "The imam unanimously acknowledged for his leadership in the Arabic language, opened upon by Allah, in terms of memorization, knowledge, engagement, transmission, and guidance, with no hope for anyone else to match him. He was one of the best reciters in al-Andalus in terms of recitation and performance. Al-Shatibi adorned this teacher of his with (Our great master, the significant scholar) (1)" (2). 2 ـ Abu Ja'far Ahmad al-Shuquri, the jurist, grammarian, and expert in inheritance who taught in Granada the book of Sibawayh, the laws of Ibn Abi al-Rabi', the summary of Ibn al-Banna, the Alfiyyah of Ibn Malik, the rules of instruction, and the al-Mudawwana al-Kubra (3). 3 ـ Abu Sa'id Faraj ibn Qasim ibn Ahmad ibn Lub al-Taghlibi, who passed away in 782 AH. He was the mufti of Granada and the preacher of its mosque, and a teacher at its Nasiriyah school (4). Al-Shatibi presented to him the abridgment of Abu Amr ibn al-Hajib in a single session and permitted him to narrate it from him (5). Some of his disputes with al-Shatibi have been previously mentioned. 4 ـ Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ali al-Balansi al-Awsi, who passed away in 782 AH. He is the author of a tafsir (exegesis) and a book on the ambiguous verses of the Qur'an (6). 5 ـ Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Abi al-Hajjaj Yusuf ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Yahsubi, known as al-Lushi, and al-Shatibi granted him a general authorization with a condition (7). Among his visiting teachers: __________ (1) See: Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, in his verification of the book Al-Ifadāt wa al-Inshādāt by al-Shatibi, p. 20, and see: al-Tanbukti, Nail al-Ibtihaj, p. 46. (2) See: Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, the same reference, p. 21, and see al-Shatibi, Al-Ifadāt wa al-Inshādāt, p. 98, benefit number: 17. (3) The same place. (4) The same place. (5) The same place, and see: Al-Majari, Program of Al-Majari, p. 118. (6) The same place. (7) The same place, and see: Al-Majari, Program of Al-Majari, p. 119. [Page 32] 1. Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Muqri (the grandfather), known as al-Muqri al-Kabir, who passed away in the year 759 AH. Al-Shatibi attended his lectures at the Grand Mosque, which he delivered in the presence of prominent students and scholars of Granada in the year 757 AH. This is the date of his arrival in Andalusia as an ambassador (1). 2. Abu al-Qasim Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Sharifi al-Husayni al-Sabti, the judge of the community who passed away in Granada in the year 760 AH. He was the head of linguistic sciences and the commentator on the Muqadimah of Hazm al-Qartajani (2). 3. Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Sharifi al-Tlemceni, the most knowledgeable of his time (3). 4. Abu Ali Mansur bin Ali bin Abdullah al-Zawawi, a jurist and scholar, from whom al-Shatibi studied the Mukhtasar of the End of the Pursuit and Aspiration in the Sciences of Usul (principles of jurisprudence) and Jadal (debate) by Imam Abu Amr ibn al-Hajib, all of which was studied for understanding and reflection, and he granted him a general authorization with its conditions (4). 5. The sun of the imams, Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Marzouk al-Khatib al-Tlemceni, who passed away in Cairo in the year 781 AH. Al-Shatibi heard from him in sessions at the Nasiriyah school and the Grand Mosque the two books of the Sahih of Imam al-Bukhari and the Muwatta of Imam Malik ibn Anas as narrated by Yahya ibn Yahya, and he granted him authorization for these two books and for everything that carries a general authorization with its conditions (5). 6. Abu Ja'far ibn al-Zayyat, who was among the shaykhs of the Sufis, and others from whom he met and benefited (6). Students: __________ (1) Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, in his edition of the book Al-Ifadāt wa al-Inshādāt by al-Shatibi, p. 22, and see: Al-Majari, Al-Majari Program, pp. 119 - 122. (2) Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, in his edition of the book Al-Ifadāt wa al-Inshādāt by al-Shatibi, p. 23. (3) See footnote number 1. (4) See footnote number 2. (5) The same source. (6) See: the same reference, pp. 24 - 26. [Page 33] Among his most important students are three prominent figures: Abu Yahya Muhammad ibn Asim, his brother Abu Bakr the judge, and Abu Abdullah Muhammad al-Bayani. The aforementioned brothers come from a well-known scholarly family in Granada. Abu Yahya was a scholar, an eloquent speaker, a literary writer, and the inheritor of his teacher al-Shatibi's position. He was also a hero of jihad and was martyred in the noble battlefields in the year 813 AH. Judge Abu Bakr was a jurist (faqih), a scholar of legal theory (usuli), and a hadith narrator (muhaddith) to whom people turned for fatwas. Among his writings is the "Tuhfat al-Hukam," which has received attention in terms of explanation, commentary, and study. He also composed verses on the principles of jurisprudence, grammar, inheritance, and recitations. He summarized his teacher al-Shatibi's book "al-Muwafaqat" and named his summary "Nail al-Muna in Summarizing al-Muwafaqat" (1). He passed away in the year 829 AH (2). Another of his students was Abu Ja'far Ahmad al-Qassar, the Andalusian from Granada. Al-Shatibi would review some issues with this student while composing his book "al-Muwafaqat," discussing them with him and then recording them (3). Among his students was also Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Abdul Wahid al-Majari, who passed away in the year 862 AH, the author of the program. He mentioned in his program that al-Shatibi was one of his teachers, stating: "I recited the Alfiyyah of Ibn Malik from memory to him, and he narrated it to me from his teacher, the eminent scholar Abu Abdullah al-Biri." He noted that he learned from him the book of Sibawayh, the summary of Ibn al-Hajib, and the Muwatta of Imam Malik, along with the chains of narration to their authors (4), and he heard some of the "al-Muwafaqat" from him (5). His scholarly status: __________ (1) Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, in his verification of the book "al-Irfadat wa al-Inshadat" by al-Shatibi, p. 26. (2) See: Hamadi al-Abidi, "al-Shatibi and the Objectives of the Sharia," p. 108, referring to: "Nafh al-Tayyib" by al-Maqri, 5/21. (3) Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, in his verification of "al-Irfadat wa al-Inshadat" by al-Shatibi, p. 26. (4) See: al-Majari, "Program of al-Majari," pp. 116 - 122. (5) The same source. [Page 34] Al-Shatibi was one of the distinguished scholars of his time, known for his rejection of fanaticism, rigidity, and blind imitation. He was also steadfast in his opinions, intelligent, pious, and knowledgeable, which indicates the independence of his character and the depth of his thought. This earned him the animosity of the rigid and provoked the traditionalists of his era. The reputation of al-Shatibi spread during his lifetime and transcended the borders of Andalusia. His books indicate the breadth of his knowledge in every branch of the sciences, whether in philosophy and the principles of religion, or in logic and the principles of jurisprudence, or in the sciences of language and the various branches of Islamic law. He himself pointed to this when he said: "Since the time my mind was opened to understanding, and I directed my pursuit towards knowledge, I have examined its intellectual and legal aspects, its principles and branches. I did not limit myself to one type of knowledge over another, nor did I single out one category from among its types... Rather, I plunged into its depths like a skilled swimmer, and I advanced in its fields with the boldness of the courageous... Being oblivious to the words of the speaker and the reproach of the reproacher, and turning away from the rejection of the rejecter and the blame of the blamer until the Most Generous, Most Compassionate Lord bestowed upon me an understanding of the meanings of the Sharia that I had not anticipated... From there, my soul was strengthened to walk in His path as much as Allah made easy for me, so I began with the principles of religion in action and belief, then with its branches built upon those principles" (1). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 1/17. [Page 35] His student al-Majari said about him: "The Sheikh, the Imam, the renowned scholar, a unique fabric and the only one of his era" (1). Imam Ibn Marzouk al-Hafid said about him: "The Sheikh, the professor, the jurist, the accomplished Imam, the righteous scholar" (2). Ahmad Baba al-Tanbukti translated him in Nيل الابتهاج, describing him as: "The Imam, the accomplished scholar, the exemplary, the great memorizer, the diligent mujtahid" (3). He said: "He was a foundational scholar (usuli), a commentator (mufassir), a jurist (faqih), a hadith scholar (muhaddith), a linguist (lugawi), an eloquent speaker (bayani), a steadfast debater (nazar), pious, righteous, ascetic, and a Sunni. He was an absolute Imam, a meticulous researcher, an adept dialectician in the sciences, one of the distinguished and verified scholars, and one of the great Imams who were proficient and trustworthy. He had a firm foundation and supreme leadership in the sciences of jurisprudence, principles, exegesis, hadith, Arabic, and others, with thoroughness and verification... on a solid foundation of righteousness, jurisprudence, thoroughness, and piety" (4). His Works: Al-Shatibi has significant works, the most important of which are two: al-Muwafaqat and al-I'tisam, both of which are published. Some of his works have not reached us, and his writings indicate a vast knowledge and comprehensive understanding, as well as precision and insight, self-confidence and independence, the ability to investigate and verify, the pursuit of rare and overlooked matters, and integrity in seeking truth and correctness, while avoiding fanaticism and rigidity. He attempted to renew and revive Islamic thought, discarding impurities that had attached to it and correcting deviations that had occurred. Al-Shatibi's works are: __________ (1) Al-Majari, Program of al-Majari, p. 116. (2) Al-Tanbukti, Nيل الابتهاج, p. 47. (3) The same source, p. 47. (4) The same location. [Page 36] 1 - The Muwafaqat. It is the most famous of his books and the deepest in content. He titled it: "The Title of Defining the Secrets of Obligation," and then he proceeded to refer to it as "the Muwafaqat." Through it, he attempted to establish a methodology for articulating the principles and deriving the branches. Therefore, it is a book on the principles (usul). If we consider al-Shatibi's (may Allah be pleased with him) intended meaning of the term principle or principles, it is more accurate to say that the book is about the principles of the principles, and this will become clear - if Allah wills - in the explanation of his idea regarding the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), which is the subject of this book. Much has been said about the Muwafaqat, but only a little of this is correct, and it contains ambiguities that cannot be resolved or understood in terms of the true intended meaning except through extensive review and connecting the texts in various places. The book is available in several editions and has been edited by several scholars, the most prominent of whom is Dr. Abdullah Daraz. It is published in four volumes. Al-Shatibi (may Allah be pleased with him) divided it into five sections: the first is on the scientific introductions needed as a prelude to the other sections; the second is on rulings and what relates to them, whether from the address of obligation or the address of status; the third is on the objectives; the objectives of the Legislator and the objectives of the obligated; the fourth is on the legal evidences, which are the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas); and the fifth is on the rulings of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), taqlid (following a jurist), and fatwa (legal opinion), and on the conditions of the mufti (the one giving the fatwa) and the mustafti (the one seeking the fatwa). [Page 37] There has not been sufficient attention given to the book or its content that matches some of the praise and commendation it has received since the time of al-Shatibi until now. As for the time of al-Shatibi and his students, the main point is that some of his students heard parts of it from him or in his presence. One of his students, namely the judge Abu Bakr ibn Asim, summarized the book and named his summary: "Nail al-Muna in the Summary of the Muwafaqat" (1). His brother Abu Yahya ibn Asim composed it in six thousand verses and named his composition: "Nail al-Muna from the Muwafaqat" (2). As for the summary, I have not found any mention of its existence today. As for the composition, there exists a manuscript of it in the Escorial Monastery under number 1164. He began his composition with the following lines (the rajas): Praise be to Allah, who by His grace ... has spread in the prescribed matters the secret of His wisdom And has prepared minds for guidance ... in accordance with the address and the obligations Then he said: Knowledge is the most worthy of what time requires ... and its books are the trusted companion And the source that is sweet and abundant ... and among the most important of them is the Muwafaqat By our master, the distinguished scholar ... that is Abu Ishaq, the son of al-Shatibi For it is a book of good objectives ... beyond which there is no goal for the seeker And he had named it with the title ... and chose, from a vision, that second name And I have heard some of it from him ... and from him in my visits to him But my disagreement with it was ... only a small amount that is not sufficient Until he said: And making for it among the attributes ... (Nail al-Muna from the Muwafaqat) Its count does not exceed in writing ... six thousand of the composed And here I am with what I intended to bring ... presenting the ruling of the preliminaries __________ (1) See: Hamadi al-Abidi, al-Shatibi and the Objectives of the Sharia, p. 108. (2) See: the same source, and see: Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan, in his edition of the Tafsir and Insha'adat of al-Shatibi, pp. 31, 32. [Page 38] And I ask for success and assistance ... in this matter from our Lord, Exalted is He. This composition was created in the year 820 AH(1). The author did not mention his name, and therefore attributing it to Abu Yahya is not certain(2). What draws attention to the lack of care is that this system is still in manuscript form and has not been fully printed. As for the attention of contemporary scholars to the book (al-Muwafaqat), Abu Ubaidah Mashhoor bin Hassan Al-Salman mentioned in his introduction to his commentary on (al-Muwafaqat) that he came across three abridgments of the book: The first is: "Al-Marafiq 'ala al-Muwafiq" by Mustafa bin Muhammad Fadl bin Mamin, who passed away in 1328 AH - 1910 CE. It is a poem with a brief explanation, and this poem was printed along with its explanation in 1324 AH in Tunis(3). The second is: "The Summary of the Muwafaqat" by Ibrahim ibn Tahir ibn As'ad al-Azhim (died 1377 AH - 1957 CE). It is a manuscript in two parts with the author's family(4). The third is: "Clarifying the Issues in the Summary of the Muwafaqat" by Muhammad Yahya ibn Umar al-Mukhtar ibn al-Talib Abdullah al-Walati al-Shanqiti, who passed away in the year 1330 AH - 1912 CE(5). __________ (1) See: Hamadi al-Abidi, al-Shatibi and the Objectives of the Sharia, pp. 31, 32. (2) Abu Ubaida, his commentary on the Muwafaqat, 1/31. (3) The same source, 1/33. (4) Abu Ubaidah, his commentary on al-Muwafaqat, 1/35, 36, referring to the A'lam by al-Zurqali, 1/44. (5) The same reference, 1/36. [Page 39] Another aspect of the attention given to the book is its printing and commentary. Abu Ubaida, mentioned earlier, referred to five editions (1). The first was in 1302 AH - 1884 CE at the Tunisian State Press. The second was in 1327 AH - 1909 CE, where the first part was printed in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia. The third was in 1341 AH - 1922 CE in Egypt, with commentary by the two scholars Muhammad Khidr Hussein and Muhammad Hassanein Makhlouf, where the first commented on the first and second parts, and the second commented on the third and fourth parts. The fourth was in Egypt with commentary and verification by Sheikh Abdullah Daraz. The fifth was in Egypt with verification by Muhammad Muhyi al-Din Abdul Hamid. Thus, the edition verified by Abu Ubaida himself is the sixth edition. In addition to this, there have been books and articles discussing the book al-Muwafaqat, the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), and al-Shatibi (2). Most of them appear in this book through references to or discussions of them. 2 - Al-I'tisam. Al-Shatibi authored it after al-Muwafaqat, but did not complete it; it consists of two parts and its subject is innovations (bid'ah). No one has written anything like it in this regard - and Allah knows best - and people have relied on it in this subject to this day. The importance of this book comes from several aspects, including its comprehensiveness regarding types of innovations, and the immense ability of al-Shatibi to penetrate into the depths of the soul and understand its motivations, as well as the depth and precision that allows for distinguishing between similar or intertwined matters, such as distinguishing between public interest (maslaha) and preference (istihsan), and distinguishing each from innovations. __________ (1) The same reference, 1/57, 58. (2) Despite all these editions and commentaries, and books and articles, the researcher has not found any commentary or study on the true idea of al-Shatibi regarding the objectives of the Sharia, or on his innovations and contributions in this topic. [Page 40] The seriousness of al-Shatibi is evident in the two mentioned books through his precision and his clarification of the intended meaning of any term he uses, as well as his thoroughness and elaboration on this meaning. This includes the intended meaning of innovation (bid'a) and his examination of the sects, the meaning of what is permissible (mubah), and his establishment of criteria and boundaries for what is necessary, what is needed, what is commendable, or what is supplementary, along with his extensive explanation of what constitutes a concession (rukhsah) and what does not. In the book al-I'tisam, he frequently applies the principles he previously established in al-Muwafaqat. 3 - The Book of Majalis. This is a commentary on the book of sales from Sahih al-Bukhari. Al-Tanbukti states that it contains benefits and investigations that only Allah, Exalted is He, knows (1). 4 - Sharh al-Khalasah. This is a book on grammar, in which he explains Ibn Malik's Alfiyyah in four large volumes. Al-Tanbukti said about it: "I do not know of any work that has been composed on it that matches it in research and investigation" (2). 5 - The Title of Agreement in the Science of Derivation. Dr. Hamadi al-Abidi said: "It is a book, as its title indicates, in the science of morphology and the jurisprudence of language, and it is likely similar to the book al-Khasais by Ibn Jinni. He has taken it from his references in his commentary on Ibn Malik's Alfiyyah, and some references mention that this book was lost while the author was still alive" (3). 6 - Usul al-Nahw. Dr. al-Abidi said: "It is a book on the rules of language, including grammar and morphology, which is limited to the essential rules that are indispensable, and he has made it for students of this science. It is said that it was also lost" (4). 7 - Al-Ifadat wa al-Inshadat. This is a book in which the author mentions some news and events that occurred with him or that he is aware of, which may be beneficial to mention. He also mentions some events in which poetry is recited. This book is printed with the investigation of Professor Muhammad Abu al-Ajfan. __________ (1) Al-Tanbukti, Nail al-Ibtihaj, p. 48. (2) Same source. (3) Hamadi al-Abidi, Al-Shatibi and the Objectives of the Sharia, p. 98. (4) Same reference, p. 99. [Page 41] A book titled "Fatwas of al-Shatibi" has also appeared, which is not authored by him, but rather compiled by some researchers who gathered a number of al-Shatibi's fatwas and opinions scattered throughout the books al-Muwafaqat and al-I'tisam(1). ________________ Chapter One An Introduction to the Emergence of the Idea of Objectives of the Sharia It contains an introduction and three sections: Section One: Qiyas (analogy). Section Two: The Paths of Reason and Their Conditions. Section Three: The Path of Analogy and Correspondence. Chapter One An Introduction to the Emergence of the Idea of the Objectives of the Sharia Introduction to the Emergence and Development of the Science of Usul al-Fiqh (principles of jurisprudence): Imam al-Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him) is considered the first to define the principles of deduction and organize them into general and comprehensive rules. Al-Zarkashi said: "Al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) was the first to compile a work on the principles of jurisprudence. He authored the book al-Risala, the book of the Rules of the Qur'an, the book of the Differences of Hadith, the book of the Invalidity of Istihsan (preference), the book of the Gathering of Knowledge, and the book of Qiyas" (2). Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra said: "Indeed, al-Shafi'i was worthy of being the first to document the rules of deduction" (3). Before al-Shafi'i, the jurists would exercise ijtihad (independent reasoning) without having clear boundaries for deduction before them; rather, they relied on their understanding of the meanings of the legal texts, their reasons, and what their texts and objectives implied. __________ (1) See: the same reference, pp. 99-100. (2) See: Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit fi Usul al-Fiqh, 1/7. (3) Muhammad Abu Zahra, Usul al-Fiqh, pp. 13-16. [Page 42] Then, after Imam al-Shafi'i, works in this science continued to emerge, and some disagreed with him on the principles, while others disagreed with him on the branches and related matters without disagreement on the principles themselves. Some agreed with him and followed him in his principles and branches and what relates to them. The principles referred to here are the sources of legislation or its general proofs, which are the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra states: "In truth, the jurists of the four schools did not disagree with al-Shafi'i regarding the proofs he established, which are the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and analogy. These principles are agreed upon, and any additions to them are a matter of disagreement between him and most of them" (1). As for those who opposed him, they are the Zahirites and the Shi'a. The Zahirites reject all forms of analogy (2) and rely only on the apparent meanings of texts, while the Shi'a have a significant disagreement as they consider the sayings of the Imams to be a legal proof akin to the Book and the Sunnah. The words of the Imams, in their view, specify the legal texts. As for the Hanafis, Malikis, and Hanbalis, their principles align with those of al-Shafi'i, albeit with differences in details (4). Those who followed al-Shafi'i in his principles and details, and embraced his opinions, are his followers who were active in the science of usul al-fiqh and produced numerous works in it. __________ (1) The same source, p. 17. (2) See: Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, 8/515, authored by Abu Muhammad Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Ali ibn Hazm al-Zahiri. 384 AH - 456 AH. Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah. Beirut. 1st ed. (4) The same reference, p. 367 - 368, and Muhammad Abu Zahra, Usul al-Fiqh. p. 16. [Page 43] Books have been authored on the methodology of al-Shafi'i in the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) that were and still are the foundation and support of this science. The most significant works known from the ancients are three books: the "Al-Mu'tamad" by Abu al-Husayn Muhammad ibn Ali ibn al-Tayyib al-Basri al-Mu'tazili, who passed away in 436 AH. The second is the book "Al-Burhan" by Abdul Malik ibn Abdullah al-Juwayni, who passed away in 478 AH. The third is the book "Al-Mustasfa" by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, who passed away in 505 AH. Then came Abu al-Husayn Ali, known as al-Amidi, who passed away in 631 AH. He compiled these books and added to them in his book "Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam." A similar endeavor was undertaken by Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, who passed away in 606 AH. He compiled these books and added to them in his book "Al-Mahsool." After these scholars came al-Zarkashi, who passed away in 784 AH. He gathered the aforementioned books and others from the writings of the ancients, amounting to over two hundred (1), and compiled them in his book "Al-Bahr al-Muhit fi Usul al-Fiqh." Among the most significant books of usul for the Hanafis is "Usul al-Bazdawi" by Fakhr al-Islam Ali ibn Muhammad al-Bazdawi, who passed away in 482 AH, and "Usul al-Sarakhsi" by Imam Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abi Sahl al-Sarakhsi, who passed away in 490 AH. With the development of the science of usul from al-Shafi'i to these scholars, two matters are observed: First: The growth and diversification of this science, and the emergence of branches, details, restrictions, and exceptions to the principles and rules. Second: The influence of theology (kalam) and logic on these branches, and the emergence of logical reasoning in establishing arguments, examples, and proofs. Thus, a theoretical approach emerged that seeks to establish the rules and to detail and explain the principles of the school in order to support it, even if this did not have an effect on independent reasoning (ijtihad) and deduction (istinbat) (2). __________ (1) See: al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr al-Muhit fi Usul al-Fiqh. 1/40. (2) See: Introduction by Dr. Muhammad Hasan Hayto to his edition of the book: "Al-Mankhul min Ta'liqat al-Usul" by the Proof of Islam al-Ghazali, pp. 1-12. Dar al-Fikr, Damascus, 2nd ed., 1400 AH - 1980 CE. [Page 44] The scholars of usul (usul al-fiqh) among the Hanafis distinguished themselves by not advocating for a particular school in the principles, but rather supporting a school in the branches. Hence, it was said that the paths of usul branched into two ways: The first: the method of the jurists, which refers to the method of the Hanafis. The second: the method of the theologians, which refers to the method of the Shafi'is, Malikis, and Hanbalis. Then after that arose what is called the method of the later scholars, which refers to the approach of the scholars who combined both methods in their books. Dr. Muhammad Hassan Hayto says: "This 'Epistle' was the first book compiled in the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and thus the imams and scholars continued to explain it and draw light from it"(1). He then says: "Many works were authored on it, and compilations were refined, and the paths of researchers in it branched into two methods: The first method is that which is known as the method of the theologians, and they are the Shafi'is and the majority. The second method is that which is known as the method of the jurists, specifically the Hanafis(2). Then he said: "The method of the theologians: this was concerned with clarifying issues and establishing principles, and it tends towards rational argumentation as much as possible, abstracting the foundational issues from the jurisprudential branches, similar to the scholars of theology"(3). Then he said: "The method of the jurists: this is more relevant to jurisprudence and more suitable for the jurisprudential branches, establishing the foundational principles based on what has been transmitted from the branches by their imams, claiming that these are the principles that those imams observed when they derived those branches.."(4). After that, Dr. Hito mentions some of the most important books that combine the two methods, such as (The Collection of Collections) by Imam Taj al-Din al-Subki, and (The Certainty of Authenticity) by the scholar Muhibb al-Din ibn Abd al-Shakur(5). __________ (1) The same reference, p. 6. (2) The same place. (3) The same place. (4) The same reference, p. 7. (5) See: the same reference, p. 12. [Page 45] And the method of the later scholars, in my view, was nothing but an influence from the followers of the jurists' method through the approach of the theologians, by relying on the principles of logic and theology in the foundational discussions. It was not a third method as much as it was a drift towards logical and theological means in debates and responses, and as much as it was attempts to encompass the various opinions that were in agreement, similar, or contradictory in comprehensive books, in eras when the science of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) knew no creativity except in compilation, explanation, abbreviation, annotation, arrangement, and classification. The situation remained stagnant until al-Shatibi came and examined this great legacy and made his reformist attempt to reconcile between the two methods, the method of the jurists and the method of the theologians. The most notable difference between the two approaches appears in the discussions of the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), particularly in the topics of analogy (qiyas), reasoning (ta'leel), and the pathways of reasoning. This difference will be clearly manifested in the first and second chapters of this book. It will also show how the idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) emerged as a result of this difference through the efforts of Imam al-Juwayni (may Allah have mercy on him), and how it subsequently became a part of the discussions in the science of Usul al-fiqh. The idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) is based on the premise that the Sharia was established for the benefit of the servants in both realms, this world and the Hereafter. The benefits of the Hereafter are attaining the pleasure of the Merciful (Ar-Rahman), achieving bliss and gardens, and being saved from punishment and the Fire. As for the interests of this world, they are what a person strives to attain or preserve, or to avert and protect oneself from, for the sake of their livelihood, and this is according to what Allah has created in them and determined from their characteristics and needs. Most scholars have agreed that the interests of this world are based on five matters that serve as the foundations or necessities to which all interests return, namely the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and wealth. The rulings of the Sharia (Islamic law) lead to the preservation of these interests. [Page 46] And since these interests (masalih) are the results of the Sharia (Islamic law) or are intended by it, some scholars have argued that these interests are the causes (illal) of the Sharia. Others have maintained that they are objectives (maqasid) and not causes. This difference has had its impact on the foundational studies (usul al-fiqh) among the imams of jurisprudence, as well as on the concept of the objectives of the Sharia in the thought of Imam Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi. Al-Shatibi (may Allah have mercy on him) held that the objectives of the Sharia are its causes, but the establishment of a purpose as a legal objective requires legal evidence. Al-Shatibi had a methodology in this matter that distinguished him from his predecessors, through which he sought to reconcile between the differing opinions, and hence the name of his book: al-Muwafaqat. In order to understand the reality of this disagreement regarding the reasoning based on interests, and the difference in how an interest is considered a legal interest, or how an objective is deemed a legal objective, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of a cause in the Sharia and how it is established, along with its conditions and pathways. The reasoning of a legal ruling based on an interest that the jurist sees as intended by the ruling is reasoning in a sense or description that he deems appropriate or suitable to be intended by the Legislator. From here, the disagreement among the imams emerged regarding the issue of reasoning based on the appropriate description. Is the appropriateness of the description evidence of it being a cause, that is, is appropriateness a pathway among the pathways of the cause? The answer to this question is the root of the differing opinions among the imams. Therefore, it is also necessary to understand the meaning of appropriateness, and whether it is evidence of the cause, or a condition for it, or neither? And what is the difference between the two? [Page 47] The appropriateness of a description to serve as a cause for a ruling or an objective intended by the legislator varies according to the perspectives of the scholars and jurists. What one jurist claims to be appropriate may be opposed by another who argues that it is not appropriate. This is based on the differing understandings, perceptions, and intellects of people. Therefore, there must be a legal criterion to indicate whether the description is appropriate or not. Claiming the appropriateness of a description without a legal proof of its appropriateness is merely an imagination. Thus, the appropriateness is referred to as "ikhala." Some have described it as an inner imagination, meaning it is a personal internal feeling of the individual, and this is not a legal proof. This will become clear in its appropriate context later. If it is established after legal consideration that the description is appropriate in reason or imagination but is legally rejected, then it is dismissed and is termed as "nullified." If it is established that it is legally accepted, then it is termed as "considered," meaning it is confirmed to be legally valid. However, the manner in which the consideration of the description or meaning is established to be appropriate and valid for reasoning, or in other words, to be a legally recognized interest (maslaha) for justifying the ruling, has remained a point of contention among scholars. The disagreement regarding appropriateness as a method of reasoning is, in essence, a disagreement regarding how to consider the description. If the meaning of consideration is that the legal evidence indicates a certain matter, then it is legal based on that, and there is no dispute about this. However, the contested consideration, which is the crux of the disagreement, means that the ruling aligns with a certain interest or an appropriate description, and thus a cause is claimed. Therefore, to understand the idea of reasoning based on interest and the concept of objectives (maqasid) according to al-Shatibi, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of consideration or the meaning of the ruling's alignment with the appropriate description in legal terminology. Especially since al-Shatibi came to mediate between the two parties, affirming the idea of reasoning based on the considered appropriateness after setting conditions that may make it acceptable to those who oppose reasoning based on it. This will be detailed when discussing his methodology. [Page 48] Indeed, those who reject reasoning based on the appropriate description rely on the fact that reasoning requires evidence; a description does not establish a cause unless it appears in one of the legal pathways for causation, and this is not a matter of dispute. However, they believe that the appropriateness is not a pathway for causation, meaning it is not evidence for it but rather a condition for it. If the appropriate description does not have a legal evidence indicating its validity or nullification, then it is considered unsubstantiated and has no proof. As for those who reason based on the appropriate description, they rely on the idea that appropriateness in itself is a pathway for causation. The fact that a description is appropriate is evidence of its causative nature, provided that there is no evidence indicating that it is nullified. Since this claim requires evidence, its proponents have sought to establish that the default in rulings is reasoning, and to make this claim a foundational principle (qawa'id) of jurisprudence. If a legal evidence indicates the causative nature of a certain description, then it is the cause. If we do not find evidence for that, then reasoning must be based on some description even if it does not appear in a pathway, based on that principle. Thus, the absence of reasoning contradicts the default. From here, the legitimacy of reasoning based on the appropriate description arises, and appropriateness becomes a pathway for causation. Here, the disagreement has shifted to a dispute over this principle, where those who accept it have built upon it, and those who reject it have dismissed the consideration that the reasoners have proposed. From here, al-Shatibi came to establish the principle of reasoning with absolute certainty, and to lay down a new methodology for how to consider the description, and consequently for how to regard the description as an objective and a cause. This is the methodology of beneficial induction - in his view - which will be clarified and detailed in its appropriate context. [Page 49] Add to this another issue, which is that considering a certain description as a public interest (maslaha) and thus a legal objective (maqsad) and a reason for legislation is only for the purpose of building the legislation upon that. The reason is one of the pillars of analogy (qiyas), and analogy has other pillars, including the origin, which is the legal ruling that is being reasoned. The existence of the ruling and the existence of its reason leads to giving the same ruling to another incident that does not have a text, based on that reason or interest. However, in the matter of reasoning based on public interest, those who advocate for public interest may see benefits or harms in certain incidents that require a ruling, but without finding an origin or ruling to base it on. So, giving the ruling here based on the existing interest or harm in the incident without finding an origin to base it on—does this fall under analogy or is it something else? The existence of the origin is a pillar of analogy, and its absence invalidates the process of analogy. This is another issue that has posed a barrier for those who advocate reasoning based on public interests. Here, a disagreement arose among those who reason based on public interests; some called this matter analogy based on the premise that if a specific interest does not have an origin to be based on, there are origins for the category of interest. Others did not consider this a form of analogy but rather termed it: reasoning (istidlal). This matter will also be clarified in detail in its appropriate place. It is generally held among the usul scholars that this is not analogy but rather reasoning, and more specifically, it is public interest (istislah) or unregulated public interest (maslaha mursala). The term reasoning is broader than unregulated public interests as it is also applied to preference (istihsan), presumption (istishab), and others that do not have a specific or direct evidence regarding the matter, but rather rely on a principle that is not specific to the issue, just as those who reason based on appropriate measures rely on the principle of the origin in the reasoning of rulings, and just as it is also relied upon in some jurisprudential matters based on the principle of presumption. [Page 50] This introduction does not aim to explain and clarify these foundational terms, which will be addressed in full in this chapter and the next. Rather, its purpose is to indicate that in order to fully grasp the concept of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) according to al-Shatibi, one must understand the emergence of the concept of objectives among the usuliyyin (foundational scholars) who preceded him, and one must also be familiar with the meanings of some terms and foundational concepts related to analogy (qiyas) and its discussions. While some of these terms may require only a basic understanding, others necessitate deeper exploration and insight. For this reason, this chapter serves as an introduction to the concept of objectives in general, and subsequently to the concept of objectives according to al-Shatibi in particular. Therefore, the discussions in this chapter will introduce analogy, its cause, its pillars, its conditions, and its pathways. It will elaborate on the pathway of suitability, and on the meaning of the alignment of the ruling with public interest (maslaha) or description, which is consideration (i'tibar) and its categories. It will also clarify the meaning of inference (istidlal) and the meaning of unregulated public interest (maslaha mursala). Throughout and after this, the differences among the usuliyyin on these issues will be presented, which will reinforce what has been mentioned earlier and illustrate how the concept of objectives emerged, how al-Shatibi's idea of objectives was new and different from those that preceded it. The first section Analogy The concept of analogy and its discussions: Analogy in language means estimation. It is said that one measures something by another if he estimates it by it, such as estimating distance in meters when measuring it, or weight in pounds when measuring it. It is stated in Lisan al-Arab: "To measure something by something means to estimate it by its example" (1), and it is said: "And to measure something means to estimate it; it is a linguistic variation of measuring" (2), and it is said: "You compared between two things if you measured between them" (3). __________ (1) Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab 6/187, Dar Sader, Beirut (2) The same source. (3) The same source. [Page 51] In the legal terminology, many phrases have been mentioned in the definition of qiyas (analogy), the most famous of which is the statement of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri: "Qiyas is the attainment of the ruling of the original in the branch due to their similarity in the reason for the ruling according to the mujtahid (jurist)"(1). Al-Amidi mentioned the definition of Judge Abu Bakr al-Baqillani: "Qiyas is the carrying of a known upon another known in establishing a ruling for both or denying it from both by a common factor between them"(2). These definitions and others have not escaped criticism and the arrows of critique. Some of the imams of usul (principles of jurisprudence) from the Shafi'i school have stated that the most solid of them is the definition of the aforementioned judge. Al-Zarkashi said(3): "The scholars among us have chosen it"(4). However, al-Amidi mentioned a definition of qiyas as: "It is the equality between the branch and the original in the reason inferred from the ruling of the original"(5), and he commented, saying: "This phrase is comprehensive and sufficient for the purpose of others"(6). __________ (1) Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, the Mu'tazili, Al-Mu'tamad fi Usul al-Fiqh, 2/195, introduction by Sheikh Khalil al-Mays, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1st ed., 1403 AH - 1983 CE. (2) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam 3/167. Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, edited by Sheikh Ibrahim al-Ajuz. (3) Al-Zarkashi: Muhammad ibn Abdullah Badreddin al-Zarkashi, born and died in Egypt 745 - 794 AH. He was buried in the small Qaraafa. He is originally from the Turks, belongs to the Shafi'i school, and was nicknamed al-Zarkashi because he learned the art of decoration in his youth, and he was also called al-Minhaji because he memorized the Minhaj al-Talibin of Imam al-Nawawi. See in his biography: Introduction to the editing of his mentioned book, vol. 1. (4) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr al-Muhit fi Usul al-Fiqh 4/6, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut, Lebanon, 1st ed., 1421 AH - 2000 CE, edited by Dr. Muhammad Muhammad Tamer. (5) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam 3/171. (6) The same source. [Page 52] The discussions on qiyas (analogy) branch out in the foundational books of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) to establish it as a principle and source of legislation, then to respond to its deniers and refute their arguments and doubts, followed by defining it, categorizing it, and clarifying its pillars, with detailed research on each pillar regarding its conditions and the validity of its consideration. Among its most important discussions are the cause (illah), its conditions, its pathways, its proof, and the objections raised against it. Al-Juwayni (1) says: "Qiyas is the basis of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) and the origin of opinion, from which jurisprudence and the methods of Sharia branch out... Whoever understands its sources, categories, valid and invalid forms, what objections are acceptable and what invalidates them, and comprehends their ranks in clarity and obscurity, and knows their pathways and locations has encompassed the essentials of jurisprudence" (2). Qiyas is categorized based on its clarity or obscurity, or based on the type of its cause in terms of its evidence or pathway, whether it is a text, a hint, or an inference. Its authority: Qiyas is considered one of the agreed-upon sources of legislation, although some have denied it. Al-Zarkashi said: "The author of al-Qawati' stated: All the imams from the Companions and the Followers, as well as the majority of jurists and theologians, have agreed that legal qiyas is a fundamental principle of Sharia, used to derive rulings for which there is no textual evidence" (3). __________ (1) Al-Juwayni: He is Imam Abdul Malik ibn Abdullah ibn Yusuf ibn Muhammad ibn Abdullah ibn Hayawayh al-Juwayni al-Naysaburi, known as Abu al-Maali, and he was titled Imam al-Haramayn. He was a Shafi'i scholar, lived from 417 to 478 AH, and his biography is found in numerous sources. See: The introduction of the editor to the book Al-Burhan, pp. 23-35, referring to: Wafayat al-A'yan 2/341, and Tabaqat al-Shafi'iyya 5/165. (2) See: Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh 2/485, paragraph: 676-677, edited by Abdul Azim Mahmoud al-Dib, Dar al-Wafa for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution, Mansoura, 3rd edition, 1412 AH - 1992 CE. (3) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr al-Muhit fi Usul al-Fiqh 4/14. [Page 53] The deniers of it have acknowledged some of its types, but they have not gone beyond them as a form of analogy. Al-Zarkashi said: "And Abu Bakr al-Sirafi stated in his principles: 'The deniers of analogy are as if they have denied the naming, otherwise they acknowledge it'" (1). And al-Shawkani said: "Then know that the deniers of analogy did not claim to disregard everything that is called analogy, even if its cause is explicitly stated or it is definitively established with the absence of a distinguishing factor; rather, they made this type of analogy indicated by the evidence of the original, included under it" (2). And al-Amidi said: "This is also the view of the predecessors among the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them), the Followers, al-Shafi'i, Abu Hanifa, Malik, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and most of the speaking jurists. The Shi'a, al-Nizam, and a group of the Mu'tazila of Baghdad, such as Yahya al-Iskafi, Ja'far ibn Mubashshir, and Ja'far ibn Harb, argued against the rational acceptance of it" (3). The Zahiri (literalist) school also rejected it, and Ibn Hazm expressed this trend clearly in his book: Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam in its eighth volume (4). __________ (1) The same source, p. 17. (2) See: al-Shawkani, Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Muhammad, Irshad al-Fuhul ila Tahqiq al-Haqq min Ilm al-Usul, p. 204, Dar al-Fikr - Beirut. (3) See: al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, 3/272. (4) "As for the Zahiris, they reject all analogy and rely only on the apparent texts. Even what is called clear analogy is not considered by them to be analogy; rather, they consider it a text. Their consideration of the text is merely a consideration of the apparent text. The leader of this school is Abu Sulayman Dawud ibn Khalaf al-Isfahani, who died in the year 270 AH. He was originally a Shafi'i and learned his sciences from the companions of al-Shafi'i, then he abandoned the Shafi'i school and chose for himself a specific school that relies only on the text, and it is called the Zahiri school. Among them is Imam Ibn Hazm, who was promoted by some people and presented in a favorable light, leading to an interest in his books, even though they are inferior to the books of other jurisprudence and usul in terms of legal research and reasoning." [Page 54] The proponents of qiyas (analogy) have cited evidence from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, as well as the consensus of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) on the authority of qiyas and its status as a source of legislation. These evidences are discussed in the foundational books of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), and it is not our topic to address them here(1). The pillars of analogy (qiyas): It has pillars that are not valid without them, which are the original case that is being compared, the ruling of the original case indicated by the Sharia, and the branch that is compared to the original. The reason for the ruling of the original case, which is a description present in the original, and by its presence in the branch, the ruling can be extended from the original to the branch. Al-Amidi said: "When the meaning of analogy (qiyas) is known, it consists of four pillars: the original case (asl), the branch case (far'), the ruling of the original case, and the common characteristic (wasf al-jami')"(2). It is essential for all four pillars to be present for the analogy to be valid. Al-Zarkashi said: "The original case, the branch case, the reason (illah), and the ruling of the original case must all be mentioned in the analogy"(3). His conditions: It has conditions that must be met for it to be valid, and its conditions are the conditions of its pillars. The aim here is not to elaborate on the discussions of analogy (qiyas), but rather to mention some of these conditions as examples of these discussions, and to provide further detail on the rationale (illah) and its conditions, which are necessary in the research. One of the conditions of the original (asl) - for example - is that it should not be derived from another, meaning that it should not be a branch in another analogy. If it is a branch, then it is not more deserving of being analogized to than its original(4). One of the conditions for the branch (far') is that the reason ('illah) present in it must share in the reason of the origin (asl); otherwise, it is not possible to extend the ruling of the origin to the branch(5). One of its conditions is that its ruling is not explicitly stated, for there is no analogy (qiyas) in a ruling when there is a text regarding it(6). __________ (1) For example, see: Al-Burhan by al-Juwayni, vol. 2; Al-Ihkam by al-Amidi, vol. 3; Al-Bahr al-Muhit by al-Zarkashi, vol. 4; Al-Mahsul by al-Razi, vol. 5; and others. (2) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 3/171. (3) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit 4/67. (4) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam 3/174. Al-Amidi mentioned this condition among the conditions for the ruling of the origin. (5) The same source, p. 219. (6) The same source, p. 221. [Page 55] One of the conditions for the ruling of the original (asl) is that it must be a legal ruling (hukm shar'i), because the purpose of analogical reasoning (qiyas) on the original is to ascertain the legal ruling(1), and because the subject matter is legal analogy, not logical or rational analogy. The latter is one of the means of knowledge in rational matters, and it is not a pathway to know the ruling of the Sharia, neither through certainty nor conjecture. What is being sought is the ruling of Allah, Exalted is He, and there is no way to it except through textual evidence. Another condition is that the evidence for the establishment of the ruling of the original must be a legal evidence.(2) It is also a condition that there should be no deviation from the norms of analogy, such as the number of units of prayer (rak'ahs), the estimation of the amounts of zakat, and the limits and expiations, as they are not rationally understood. An example of this is the acceptance of the testimony of al-Hakim alone, which is an exception to the rule(3), as well as the allowances for travel and wiping over the socks.(4) Another condition is that the cause (illah) must be established through one of the evidences that indicate it, which are referred to as the pathways of the cause.(5) As for the conditions of the cause, we will address them in the second section of this chapter. The cause: __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, p. 173. (2) The same source, p. 174. (3) Imam Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti said in his book (Al-Itqan fi Ulum al-Quran): "Ibn Ashtah narrated in the Musahif from al-Layth ibn Sa'ad who said: The first to compile the Quran was Abu Bakr, and it was written by Zaid. People would come to Zaid ibn Thabit, and he would not write a verse except with the testimony of two just witnesses. The last verse of Surah Bara'ah was not found except with Khuzaymah ibn al-Thabit, who said: Write it down, for the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) made his testimony equal to that of two men." 1/60, Dar al-Fikr - Beirut. (4) See Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 3/175 - 176, and for more details on these conditions, see: Al-Ihkam by Al-Amidi, vol. 3, Al-Mahsool by Al-Razi, vol. 5, Al-Mustasfa by Al-Ghazali, vol. 2, Irshad al-Fuhul by Al-Shawkani, and Al-Bahr al-Muhit by Al-Zarkashi, vol. 4. (5) See: the previous footnote. [Page 56] The cause (illah) is a pillar of analogy (qiyas) and is not valid without it. It is the common description between the original case (asl) and the branch case (far') that allows for the transfer of the ruling from the original to the branch. Al-Zarkashi said: "The cause: it is a condition for the validity of analogy, as it brings together the original and the branch" (1), and he said: "The majority of the scholars of analogy among the jurists and theologians hold that the cause is necessary in analogy, and it is a pillar of analogy that cannot stand without it" (2). This is the legal cause. The term "cause" is a shared term between the rational cause (illah 'aqliyya) and the legal cause (illah shar'iyya), and it has linguistic and technical connotations. In terms of language, it is mentioned in Lisan al-Arab: "The cause (al-'ilal) and the ailments (al-'alal): the second drink, and it is said: drinking after drinking successively; it is said: he drank (alal) after he quenched his thirst (nahal)" (3), and it is also mentioned: "The man suffers (ya'il) from illness, and he suffers (ya'lu) from the ailments of drinking" (4). Al-Zarkashi said: "The cause in language is said to be a name for what changes the ruling of a thing upon its occurrence, derived from the ailment which is the disease, because its effect on the ruling is like the effect of the cause on the essence of the sick person" (5), and he said: "It is said that it is a transfer of the ruling from the original to the branch, like the transition of the cause from health to illness" (6). He also said: "It is said that it is derived from the ailments after quenching, which is the repeated drinking of water again and again, because the jurist in extracting it revisits the matter after consideration, and because the ruling is repeated with the repetition of its existence" (7). As for the technical definition in legal terminology, that is, the cause of legal analogy, there are five opinions: "The first is that it is the identifier of the ruling, meaning that it has become a sign of the ruling; if the meaning is found, the ruling is found" (8). "The second is that it is the cause of the ruling in the sense that the legislator has made it obligatory in itself" (9). __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit 4/101. (2) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit 4/101. (3) Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab 11/467. (4) The same source. (5) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit 4/101. (6) The same source. (7) The same source. (8) The same source. (9) The same source, 4/102. [Page 57] "The third: it is that which necessitates the ruling by itself and not by the decree of Allah, which is the view of the Mu'tazila based on their principle of rational good and evil." (1) "The fourth: it is that which necessitates by custom, and this was chosen by Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi." (2) As for the fifth view, it is: "the motivator for legislation in the sense that the description must encompass a valid interest that is intended by the legislator in establishing the ruling." (3) As for the first view: that it is the identifier, meaning a sign of the ruling, there is no doubt that the cause is an identifier of the ruling and a sign of it, as it is a description that exists in the original. However, this is not sufficient for identification or application, and it will become clear when mentioning the conditions of the cause that the cause, which is a pillar in analogy (qiyas), is not sufficient for it to be merely a sign or indicator. There must be in this sign or indicator or description something that makes it suitable for reasoning or indicative of it. For example, the smell of wine is a sign of it, but it is not suitable for reasoning with it, unlike intoxication, as it has an additional element that makes it suitable for reasoning, provided that all other conditions of the cause are met. Al-Amidi, for example, uses the term indicator in relation to the cause, but he does not mean a mere indicator. He says: "The rational cause necessitates the ruling by itself and not by designation, whereas the legal cause is in the sense of an indicator or sign or in the sense of a motivator." (4) He also says: "They disagreed on the permissibility of the cause in its original meaning being that of a mere indicator, and the preferred view is that the cause in its original meaning must be that of a motivator, meaning it must encompass a valid wisdom that is intended by the legislator in establishing the ruling; otherwise, if it were merely a descriptive characteristic without wisdom, but a mere indicator, then reasoning with it in its original sense would be impossible." (5) __________ (1) The same place. (2) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/102. (3) The same place, and the meaning of valid interest is that the description is appropriate and indicative of reasoning. (4) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 4/283 - 284. (5) The same place, 3/180. [Page 58] As for the second opinion: that it is self-evident in itself, meaning that the legislator has made it self-evident, I do not see it differing from the meaning of the motivator. The statement that the legislator has made it self-evident means that it has come within a legal framework or is indicated by a legal proof, and the statement that it is self-evident means that it includes what makes it suitable for reasoning. This is the same meaning as the motivator itself as it has been defined. Wherever it is mentioned in the words of the imams that it is in this sense, it is an indicator, the intended meaning is that it is an indicator in the usage of the theologians and not the jurists, as it is known that the legal proofs from the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah are, for the theologians and the usulists, indicators of the rulings, while for the jurists, they are proofs of them. In this sense, al-Amidi said: "The rational cause necessitates the ruling by itself and not by designation, whereas the legal cause is in the sense of an indicator or a sign or in the sense of a motivator" (1). Al-Zarkashi said: "It is divided into rational: which does not become a cause by the designation of a designator but by itself, and it is self-evident and does not change with time like the movement of the mover, and legal: which has become a cause by the designation of a designator" (2). He then said: "The legal causes are only called causes metaphorically or broadly; otherwise, in reality, the cause is what necessitates the ruling by itself, which is the rational cause, while that which necessitates it by another is not a cause in the view of the theologians but is an indicator of the ruling" (3). As for the third opinion: that it is self-evident for the ruling by itself and not by the designation of Allah, this is the opinion of the Mu'tazila and aligns with their doctrine of rational good and evil, and that Allah must act in accordance with what is best and legislate what is best. Al-Zarkashi said: "The Mu'tazila and those who agreed with them among the jurists have greatly restricted this, claiming that His actions are constrained by wisdom and limited by the aspect of what is beneficial" (4). __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, 4/283 - 284. (2) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/103. (3) The same source. (4) The same source, 4/112. [Page 59] As for the fourth opinion: it is that which is necessitated by custom, and it is the view of Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi in (al-Mahsool). Its essence is that the actions and rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, are not to be rationalized. This is based on theological premises and on the notion that rationalization implies that Allah is complete in purpose, which is certainly refuted. Accordingly, for him, the cause does not hold in the sense of being necessitated by itself nor in the sense of being a motivator. The meaning of necessitated by custom is that Allah has established things in such a way that whenever this occurs, that occurs, as if we say, whenever eating occurs, satiety occurs, or whenever retribution occurs, preservation occurs. Thus, it is necessary to presume the occurrence of satiety with eating or the occurrence of preservation with retribution. This presumption is not a matter of rationalization but rather a matter of the custom running in this way. This will be documented in the third discussion of the third chapter. This statement is refuted because rationalization in analogy (qiyas) does not mean rationalizing the actions of Allah concerning His essence, but rather it is rationalization of the legal ruling based on what the legislator has established as a cause. Al-Zarkashi said: "Know that the doctrine of the Ahl al-Sunnah is that His rulings, Exalted is He, are not rationalized, in the sense that He does not do anything for a purpose, nor is He motivated by anything to do something. Rather, He, Exalted is He, is capable of bringing about benefits without their causes and eliminating harms without their motivators" (1). He also said: "Some of the later scholars stated: It has become well-known among the theologians that the rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, are not rationalized, and it has become well-known among the jurists that rationalization exists and that the cause is in the sense of a motivator. Many people mistakenly think that it is the motivator for the legislation, leading to a contradiction between the statements of the jurists and those of the theologians. This is not the case, and there is no contradiction; rather, the intended meaning is that the cause motivates the action of the obligated person. An example is the preservation of lives, which motivates retribution, which is the action of the obligated person ruled by the law. Thus, the ruling of the law has no cause or motivator" (2). He then said: "And Allah has established the custom that retribution is a cause for preservation" (3). __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit 4/112. (2) The same source, 4/113. (3) The same location. [Page 60] As for the fifth opinion: it is that it is the motive for legislation. Its meaning is that the described attribute, in addition to being an indicator or sign of the ruling, is not merely a sign devoid of any meaning; it encompasses a benefit (maslaha) that is suitable for which the legislator may have enacted the ruling. The assertion that it is a benefit suitable for justification does not mean that it has become an independent cause by itself, but rather that it is valid to be a cause if its other conditions are met. The first of these conditions is that it must come in one of the paths of causation (1). This is the concept of causation in legal terminology. The term causation is used in the terminology of grammarians to refer to what is called a cause in language, which is not a cause in analogy. An example of this is the "lam" of purpose in language, as the cause that follows it is not a cause in the original analogy. Al-Razi said: "Indeed, He, Exalted is He, said: { And We have certainly created for Hell many of the jinn and mankind } (2), and by consensus, that cannot be an objective... like the poet's saying: 'Prepare for death and build for destruction,' and the 'lam' here is not for purpose... I say: The people of language have stated that the 'lam' is for justification, and their statement is a proof. If that is established, it must be said that it is a metaphor in these instances" (3). The term causation is sometimes used for certain meanings in the sense of metaphor, which are not causes in analogy, such as the reason, the basis, and others. Al-Shawkani said: "And causation has names that differ according to different terminologies, such as reason, indicator, motivator, necessitator, impulse, carrier, basis, evidence, necessitating factor, obligatory factor, and influencer. The scholars have agreed that there must be evidence for the cause" (4). __________ (1) Paths of justification: This will be discussed in the next section. (2) Surah Al-A'raf, 179. (3) Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Al-Mahsool fi Usul al-Fiqh 5/140, edited by Taha Jaber Al-Alwani, Dar Al-Resalah, 2nd ed., 1412 AH - 1992 CE. (4) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 207. [Page 61] Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the cause (illah), which is a cornerstone in analogy (qiyas), by defining the terms that are frequently used in the books of usul (principles of jurisprudence) in the sense of cause or with the term cause metaphorically, which are not actually causes, leading to the misconception that they are the cause of analogy, such as the term reason (sabab) and the term criterion (manat). Reason (sabab): It is said in Lisan al-Arab: "A reason is anything that one uses to reach something else, and in another version, anything that one uses to intercede for something else, and it has been caused to it, and the plural is reasons. Anything that one uses to reach something is a reason, and I made so-and-so a reason to so-and-so in my need, and a means and a conduit" (1). This is the linguistic meaning. As for the legal terminology, it is a sign or indicator that defines the existence of the legal ruling. Al-Zarkashi said: "In Sharia, most scholars say it is the apparent, defined description that the evidence of the hearing indicates to be a defining factor for the legal ruling" (2), and he added: "Like making the decline of the sun a defining factor for the obligation of prayer... like the decline for prayer and the sighting of the crescent in Ramadan for the obligation of fasting, and like the minimum threshold (nisab) for zakat" (3). The fact that the reason is a defining factor for the legal ruling means that the ruling exists with its presence but not by its existence. The presence of the sun in the sky is a sign that indicates the entry of the time for the noon prayer and the existence of the ruling of the noon prayer, which is obligation. Similarly, the crescent of Ramadan is a sign that indicates the entry of the month of Ramadan and the existence of the legal ruling, which is the obligation of fasting. Likewise, the crescent of Shawwal indicates the existence of the holiday and the obligation to break the fast, and the existence of the minimum threshold for zakat is a sign of the existence of the ruling, which is the obligation of zakat. All of these are mere signs or indicators and do not contain a rational meaning that can be used for reasoning. The sun in the sky is suitable for indicating the existence of the ruling but is not suitable for reasoning the ruling of prayer, and the same applies to other examples. __________ (1) Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab 1/458. (2) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit 1/264. (3) Same source. [Page 62] The description being a defining characteristic of the existence of the ruling, meaning that the cause is indeed a cause, is a legal matter that requires evidence from the Sharia. Therefore, it has been defined as: "The evidence of the text indicates that it is a defining characteristic of the legal ruling." The rationale (illa) has what the cause has; it is also a sign or indication that identifies the existence of the ruling. However, it is more than that, as it encompasses a rational meaning. Thus, the rationale is a cause, but not every cause is a rationale. An example of this is theft, which is an identifying sign of the existence of the ruling that mandates cutting off the hand, and adultery is an identifying sign of the existence of the ruling that mandates flogging or stoning. So, theft was a cause, and adultery was a cause, but the arrangement of the punishment for the act includes a wisdom that is suitable for reasoning with it. The description was not merely an abstract sign devoid of a rational meaning; it was not just a cause but rather a rationale(1). __________ (1) It should be noted here that theft, adultery, and other prescribed punishments, although they are rationales, cannot be used for analogy (qiyas) because the rationale here is not a description in the place to which the ruling was given, meaning it is not part of the place, but rather the whole place itself. If we want to extend the ruling of theft or adultery to another place (i.e., to a branch), it can only extend to theft or adultery. The ruling is then taken from the generality of the text and not by analogy. The incident that receives the same ruling is considered a root and not a branch. These rationales are called limited rationales because they do not extend to a branch. They are called rationales because they contain the meaning of a rationale. [Page 63] Therefore, the reason can sometimes be a cause, but it should be noted that there is a difference between them in legal terminology. The reason exists for the ruling to be present at it, not by it, whereas the cause exists for the ruling to be present at it and by it. Both can be so (i.e., a reason or a cause) by the designation of the legislator. If the term "cause" is used for the reason without it being a cause, meaning the element of analogy, this is a case of linguistic metaphor and not that it is a cause that justifies the rulings. Al-Amidi said: "The preferred view is that the cause must be, in essence, a motivator, meaning it must include a valid wisdom that is intended by the legislator in establishing the ruling. Otherwise, if it were a description without wisdom, merely an indication, then justifying rulings by it in essence is impossible" (1). He also said: "What they mentioned regarding the impossibility of justifying by the descriptive characteristic is only valid if it is said that justifying by the descriptive characteristic means the motivator" (2). The connection between Al-Amidi's statements above indicates that he permits the use of the term "cause" for mere indications even if they are not the element of analogy. Moreover, it should be noted after distinguishing between the cause and the reason in legal terminology that the cause in legal terminology is a reason in the linguistic sense. The fact that the cause is the motivator for the ruling or the reason for the ruling means that it leads to the ruling, which is the meaning of the ruling encompassing a rational meaning, or a meaning valid to be intended by the legislator in establishing the ruling (3). Maqsad: Maqsad in the language is the name of the place of connection, and connection means hanging. It is said in Lisan al-Arab: "To connect something means to hang it. The connection is what is hung" (4). It is also said: "It is said: something was connected to it, meaning it was hung on it." Quraq bin Qays al-Asadi said (the long): __________ (1) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam 3/80. (2) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam 3/80. (3) And see what Al-Zarkashi mentioned regarding the distinction between the cause and the reason in Al-Bahr al-Muhit 4/104 - 105. (4) Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab 7/418. [Page 64] "A land where my amulets were tied upon me, and the first land that touched my skin is its dust."(1) The term "manat" has been used in the discussions of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) in the same linguistic sense. Sheikh Jamal al-Din al-Asnawi(2) said: "The 'manat' is the name of the place of attachment, and 'attachment' means hanging and sticking. Habib al-Ta'i said: A land where my amulets were tied to me, and the first earth that touched my skin was its dust. Any amulet that is tied to me. When the ruling is linked to the cause and is dependent on it, it is called a point of reference (manat) (3). The reason that is the cornerstone of analogy (qiyas) is not the legal basis (manat), nor is the legal basis the reason, but when the ruling that is based on reasoning is linked to its reason and dependent upon it, it is called a legal basis. This is a figurative term. Al-Zarkashi said: "The legal basis is the reason." Ibn Daqiq al-Eid said: "Their expression of the legal basis for the reason is a matter of linguistic metaphor, because when the ruling is dependent upon it, it is like a tangible thing that is attached to something else; thus, it is a metaphor in the sense of likening the abstract to the tangible. This has become established in the terminology of jurists to the extent that nothing else is understood when it is mentioned in general."(4) __________ (1) The same location. The mentioned house has been attributed to Ruqa' bin Qays al-Asadi, while Sheikh Jamal al-Din al-Asnawi attributed it to Habib al-Ta'i, as explained below. (2) He is: Jamal al-Din Abu Muhammad Abdul Rahim bin al-Hasan bin Ali bin Umar bin Ali bin Ibrahim al-Qurashi al-Umari al-Shafi'i al-Asnawi. The Sheikh of Islam and the master of the eminent imams, the head of the Shafi'is in the Egyptian lands. A jurist (faqih), a scholar of principles (usuli), a poet (arudi), and a grammarian (nahwi). He was born in Asna, a town in Upper Egypt, in the year 704 AH and died in Cairo in the year 772 AH. He was prayed upon three times due to the large number of mourners. See: his biography at the beginning of the first volume of Nihayat al-Sul in the explanation of Minhaj al-Usul, with the marginal commentary of Nihayat al-Sul by Sheikh Muhammad Bakhit al-Muti'i, Al-Alam al-Kutub. (3) Al-Asnawi: Nihayat al-Sul 4/138. (4) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit 4/227. [Page 65] The basis of the ruling, based on what has been mentioned, is the subject of the ruling, that is, the place or reality to which the ruling pertains. For example: buying is permissible and usury is forbidden. The fact that the action is a sale is the subject of permissibility or the basis of permissibility in this action, and the fact that the action is usury is the subject of prohibition or its basis. Similarly, sheep are lawful and pigs are forbidden; thus, the fact that something is sheep is the basis of permissibility, while the fact that it is a pig is the basis of prohibition. And the basis in the aforementioned examples is not the cause, and the mentioned rulings are not based on a cause at all. In rulings that are based on a cause, since the ruling is linked to its cause, the term "basis" (manat) is used to refer to the cause metaphorically, which may mislead one into thinking that the cause is truly the basis; hence, this clarification is necessary. The usul scholars (usuliyyun) have differed regarding the reasoning behind rulings. Some have held that the original principle in rulings is reasoning, and that reasoning applies to all rulings, although in some rulings reasoning is suspended due to the inability of the jurist to grasp the cause, such as the number of units of prayer, the estimation of shares, obligations, expiations, and others. Others have rejected this reasoning, stating that a ruling is not to be reasoned unless its cause is established by legal evidence (1). Those who adhere to the principle of reasoning in rulings are those who have used the term "basis" to mean "cause." An example of this is the text mentioned about al-Zarkashi earlier. Since all rulings have causes according to this group, the basis of the ruling is its cause for them. This means that one must search in the basis of the ruling for a description that is suitable for reasoning, to link the ruling to it. This description becomes the cause of the ruling and its basis, and from here arose expressions among this group such as "refining the basis" (tanqih al-manat) and "deriving the basis" (takhrij al-manat), in addition to the expression "establishing the basis" (tahqiq al-manat). Establishing the basis: __________ (1) This disagreement and the debate surrounding it will be addressed later in detail and with documentation. [Page 66] Al-Amidi said: "Since the cause (illah) is the subject of the ruling and its basis, the examination and ijtihad (juridical reasoning) in it is either in establishing the basis, refining it, or deriving it. As for establishing the cause, it is the examination of the existence of the cause in individual cases after knowing it in itself... as in the direction of the qibla, for it is the basis for the obligation to face it... and the determination of this direction as the qibla in cases of ambiguity is presumed through ijtihad and examination of the indicators" (1). He also said: "Like justice (adalah), for it is the basis for the acceptance of testimony... as for whether this witness is just, it is presumed through ijtihad" (2). He stated: "Like the intoxicating strength (shidda al-mutriba), for it is the basis for the prohibition of drinking wine; thus, the examination of its presence in the beverage is the establishment of the basis" (3). Accordingly, establishing the basis is the process of verifying whether the reality corresponds to the reality for which the ruling was given or not. The ruling is the obligation to face the qibla, and the subject of the obligation is facing the qibla. Verifying the direction of the qibla is the establishment of the basis, and it is known that the direction of the qibla is not the cause of the ruling, that is, of the obligation. Likewise, the description of justice in a witness; the legislator has stipulated that the witness must be just, and verifying his justice for the acceptance or rejection of his testimony is the establishment of the basis. Similarly, the intoxicating strength, if it is intoxication, for intoxication is the basis for prohibition, and verifying whether something is intoxicating or not is the establishment of the basis. Refining the basis: Al-Amidi said: "As for refining the basis, it is the examination and ijtihad in determining what the text indicates as a cause without specification, by eliminating what has no relevance in consideration from the accompanying descriptions" (4). __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam 3/264 - 265. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) The same source. [Page 67] Since the basis of the ruling is the reality or the subject to which the ruling pertains, and since the rulings are reasoned—according to those who say that reasoning is the original basis for rulings—there must be a description in the subject that is suitable for reasoning, and for this reason the ruling was established. The other descriptions in the subject have no effect on the ruling. An example of this is the prohibition of alcohol. The fact that something is alcohol is the basis for its prohibition. Considering that reasoning is the original basis for rulings, there must be a reason for the ruling that is one of the descriptions of alcohol, meaning it is a description in the basis. If we look at descriptions such as liquidity, color, or smell, we find that they are not suitable for prohibition. However, if we consider the description of intoxication, we find it suitable for prohibition, making it a valid reason—according to them—. The process of establishing that other attributes have no effect on the ruling is called the refinement of the legal basis (tanqih al-manat). This is the meaning of what al-Amidi stated above. Al-Asnawi said: "The refinement of the legal basis means clarifying what the legislator has linked the ruling to, that is, what he has associated it with and made it contingent upon, which is the cause."(1) The extraction of the legal ruling: Al-Amidi said: "As for the extraction of the legal ruling (takhrij al-manat), it is the consideration and ijtihad in establishing the reason for the ruling indicated by the text or consensus without its cause. This is similar to the ijtihad in establishing that the intoxicating severity is the reason for the prohibition of alcoholic beverages."(2) Al-Zarkashi said: "As for the extraction of the legal ruling (takhrij al-manat), it is the juristic effort (ijtihad) in deriving the reason (illah) for the ruling indicated by the text or consensus without addressing its reason at all"(3). It is a process of establishing or identifying the description present in the legal ruling's basis, which is the reason for the ruling. This is unlike refinement (tanqih), which is the establishment of the unsuitability of descriptions for reasoning, so that only one description remains, thus becoming the reason without establishing it, but based on the premise that the original reasoning is through a description, and there is none other than it, so it becomes the reason. The second section The paths of reasoning and their conditions Introduction: __________ (1) Al-Asnawi, Nihayat al-Sul 4/138. And see: al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit 4/227. (2) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 3/265. (3) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit 4/227. [Page 68] The cause (illah) is a comprehensive description that connects the original (asl) and the branch (far'). There are many comprehensive descriptions, but not every comprehensive description is suitable for reasoning (ta'lil). Therefore, there must be a legal evidence (dalil shar'i) to consider the description in reasoning. Likewise, the intended meaning of the cause is the legal cause. Nothing can be considered legal unless it is established through a legal means, that is, indicated by the Sharia. Accordingly, the intended meaning of the paths of the cause (masalik al-'illah) is its evidences, that is, the legal evidences indicating that the description is a cause. Al-Zarkashi said: "The paths of the cause: that is, the ways indicating the cause" (1). He also said: "Know that it is not sufficient in analogy (qiyas) to merely find the comprehensive description in the original and the branch. Rather, there must be evidence that supports it in consideration. The evidences are of three types: consensus (ijma'), text (nass), and inference (istinbat)" (2). Al-Shawkani said: "The scholars have agreed that there must be evidence for the cause" (3). Abu al-Husayn al-Basri said: "The path of the legal cause is only the Sharia; we say this because the path of the legal cause is how its ruling is established and its effect in it. For example, its ruling is established with it in the original and is negated with its absence, and it is known that this depends on the Sharia because its ruling and the way it is established according to the cause are only obtained through the Sharia" (4). __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/165. (2) The same source. (3) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 207. (4) Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, al-Mu'tamad fi Usul al-Fiqh, 3/249. [Page 69] Similarly, the description may come in one of the paths of reasoning (ta'lil), but it is not suitable for extending the ruling based on it, because the description must have conditions for it to be considered a reason (illah) or for the ruling to be extended based on it (1). For example, Allah, Exalted is He, says: { Establish the prayer at the decline of the sun } (2), and He says: { That they may witness benefits for themselves } (3). The "lam" in both texts is for reasoning, and the path of reasoning here is the text. However, the descriptions that come after the "lam" are not suitable as reasons for analogy, as the decline of the sun in the first verse is merely an indication; it is a cause but not a reason for the obligation of prayer. The testimony of benefits in pilgrimage is a result that may or may not occur, and it is not a suitable reason for the obligation of pilgrimage. Thus, the descriptions in the two verses do not mean the motivator. For a description to be a motivator, it must include a wisdom that is intended by the legislator in enacting the ruling, which is one of the conditions of the reason. Therefore, even if the reason appears in one of the paths of reasoning, it is not considered so until its conditions are met. Al-Shawkani said: "It has twenty-four conditions" (4). Al-Amidi mentioned under the title "On the Conditions of the Original Reason" twenty issues (5). The books of usul (principles) are filled with mentioning and discussing them. Below are some paths of reasoning and their conditions to the extent necessary to understand the concept of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) according to al-Shatibi, based on what has been clarified in the introduction to this chapter that the objectives of the Sharia for him are its reasons. Paths of reasoning: The first path: consensus (ijma). This is like the consensus of the Companions on the fact that childhood is a reason for establishing guardianship over a minor in establishing the guardianship of marriage by analogy to the guardianship of property. (6) __________ (1) See: Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam. 3/179. (2) Surah Al-Isra, 78. (3) Surah Al-Hajj, 28. (4) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 207. Al-Zarkashi elaborated on these twenty-four conditions in his book Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/119 - 140. (5) See: Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam, 3/179. (6) See: the same reference, 3/222. [Page 70] The second approach: the explicit text (1). This is when a proof from the Book and the Sunnah is mentioned for the reasoning with a term that is designated for it in the language, without needing any further consideration or inference. It is of two types: The first type: what is explicitly stated as the description being a reason for the ruling, such as stating explicitly that the reason for the ruling is such and such, or that the cause of its legislation is such and such (2), or stating explicitly what implies that according to the linguistic usage, like his saying - peace and blessings be upon him -: "I had prohibited you from storing the meat of the sacrificial animals for the sake of the drafters." (3) And like his saying - peace and blessings be upon him -: "The permission to enter is made for the sake of sight." (4) And like His saying, Exalted is He: { For that reason, We decreed upon the Children of Israel } (5). Thus, the phrase (for the sake of such and such) or (for the reason of such and such) is explicit in mentioning the reason. __________ (1) See: the same location. (2) See: al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, 3/222. (3) Narrated by Muslim from Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) in the Book of Sacrifices, Chapter on the prohibition of eating the meat of sacrificial animals, (3643), and Abu Dawood (2429), and al-Nasa'i (4355), and Malik in al-Muwatta (918), and Ahmad in al-Musnad (23115). (4) Narrated by al-Bukhari (5772), and al-Tirmidhi (2633), and Ahmad (21737). (5) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 32. [Page 71] The second section: What has been mentioned with a letter from the letters of reasoning, such as "lam" (ل), "ki" (كي), "in" (إن), and "ba" (ب). As for "lam," it is like His saying, Exalted is He: { so that there will be no argument for the people against Allah after the messengers } (1). This indicates reasoning by the description that the "lam" has entered upon, as the scholars of language have stated that it is for reasoning. As for "ki," it is like His saying, Exalted is He: { so that it will not be a state of wealth among the rich from you } (2). And as for "in," it is like the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) regarding the martyrs of Uhud: "Wrap them in their blood, for they will be resurrected on the Day of Resurrection with their veins gushing blood, their color like blood and their scent like musk" (3). And as for "ba," it is like His saying, Exalted is He: { a reward for what they used to do } (4). Al-Amidi said: "These are the explicit forms of reasoning, and when they occur, it is necessary to believe in the reasoning unless evidence indicates that reasoning was not intended, in which case it would be a metaphor for what was intended by it. This is the case with 'lam,' as if one were to say: 'Why did you do such and such?' and he replies: 'Because I intended to do so.' And as in the saying of someone: 'I pray for Allah' and the poet's saying: 'Prepare for death and build for destruction.' The intention of the action does not suffice to be a reason for the action or its purpose. Likewise, the essence of Allah, Exalted is He, cannot be a reason for prayer, nor can death be a reason for birth, nor can destruction be a reason for building. Rather, the reason for the action is what motivates the action, which are the things that can serve as motivators" (5). This means that reasoning with what has a letter of reasoning requires that it be a suitable description. __________ (1) Surah An-Nisa, 165. (2) Surah Al-Hashr, 7. (3) Narrated by al-Nasa'i (1975). (4) Surah As-Sajda, 17. And Surah Al-Ahqaf, 14. And Surah Al-Waqi'a, 24. (5) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul Al-Ahkam, 3/224. As for his statement in the text: "It is necessary to believe in reasoning," I do not find it precise; it is more accurate to omit the word "belief," so that the text reads: "Reasoning is necessary" or "The ruling must be reasoned," as the matter pertains to speculative legal rulings and juristic preference. [Page 72] "The third approach: what indicates causation through indication and allusion" (1). This is what the evidence indicates in a suggestive manner rather than explicitly. That is, the text indicates the cause by its implied meaning rather than its literal wording. It is divided into two categories: The first: that the implied meaning indicates causation, whether it is a concept of agreement or a concept of disagreement. This is like His saying, Exalted is He: {Indeed, the alms are for the poor and the needy and those employed to collect them and for bringing hearts together} (2). The implication is that those who are not among these mentioned have no right to the zakat, and these descriptions are suitable for causation; therefore, they serve as causes. The bringing together of hearts is a reason for giving zakat, and if this quality is removed, the right to zakat is also removed. The same can be said for their being poor, needy, or workers collecting it. This category corresponds to the first category of the explicit text indicating causation, but that is from the literal meaning while this is from the implied meaning. The second: "that the causation is necessary from the meaning of the term by its placement, not that the term indicates causation by its placement" (3). In this case, the text may not have a concept of agreement or disagreement, and it may have a concept but does not indicate causation. However, the presence of a certain term or condition makes causation necessary from this placement, that is, from the association with this term or condition. It has several cases: __________ (1) The same location. (2) Surah At-Tawbah, 60. (3) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam, 3/224. [Page 73] Among them: the arrangement of the ruling based on the description with the conjunction "fa" (ف) indicating consequence and causation in the words of Allah or His Messenger or the narrator from the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him): As for the words of Allah, it is as in His saying: {And as for the thief, the male and the female, amputate their hands} (1). And as for the words of His Messenger, it is like his saying (peace and blessings be upon him): "Whoever revives dead land, it is his" (2). And his saying: "You have control over yourself, so choose" (3). And as for the words of the narrator, it is as in the saying: "The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) forgot in the prayer, so he prostrated" (4). Al-Amidi said: "In all these instances, it indicates that what the ruling is arranged upon with 'fa' is a reason for the ruling, because 'fa' in the language is indicative of consequence" (5). Thus, 'fa' does not imply causation linguistically. However, its presence indicates that the ruling occurs following the description, and the arrangement of the ruling following the description serves as a reminder that the description was a cause for the ruling, meaning a reason for its legislation, thus it becomes a cause. Causation is necessary for this arrangement, that is, for the arrangement of the ruling based on the description with 'fa', which provides a concept suitable for causation. __________ (1) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 38. (2) Narrated by Bukhari, in the chapter "Whoever revives dead land, it is his," and also reported by Abu Dawood (2671), Malik (1230), and Ahmad (13753). (3) This is from Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) in the story of Barira. In this meaning, there are narrations in Ahmad, Muslim, Abu Dawood, al-Tirmidhi, and others. See: al-Shawkani, Nail al-Awtar, 6/153, Dar al-Qalam - Beirut. (4) Reported by al-Tirmidhi (361), who said: This is a good strange hadith, and by al-Nasa'i (1219), Abu Dawood (875), and Ahmad (4128). (5) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/224. [Page 74] And among them is that the legislator differentiates between two matters in ruling by mentioning a characteristic; this indicates that this characteristic is the reason for the differentiation. If it had not been mentioned, the differentiation would not have existed, and the ruling would have included both matters. This is like His saying, Exalted is He: { And do not approach them until they are pure } (1). The legislator's differentiation between the two matters, purity and menstruation, in the permissibility of approaching them indicates the reason for the prohibition, which is menstruation. This differentiation is based on the term of limitation (until). And like the saying of the Prophet - peace and blessings be upon him -: "Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, and salt for salt, equal for equal, hand to hand; if these types differ, then sell as you wish, provided it is hand to hand" (2). The legislator's differentiation between the two matters, which are the same kind and their difference, in the permissibility or prohibition of selling these types indicates the reason for the prohibition, which is the sameness of the kind. __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 222. (2) Narrated by Muslim from Ubadah ibn al-Samit, in the Book of Musaqah, Chapter on Currency Exchange (2969), (2970), and by al-Tirmidhi in the Book of Sales, Chapter on What Has Been Reported Regarding Wheat for Wheat Equal for Equal (1161), and by al-Nasa'i in the Book of Sales, Chapter on Selling Wheat for Wheat (4484), and by Abu Dawood in the Book of Sales, Chapter on Currency Exchange (2907), and by Ahmad in the Book of the Chains of Narrators, Chapter on the Musnad of Abu Sa'id al-Khudri (11040). As for al-Bukhari, he mentioned four types in the Book of Sales, Chapter on What is Mentioned in Selling Food and the Like, and the Chapter on Selling Barley for Barley, but he did not mention silver or salt (1190) and (2028). There is a narration from Muslim by Abu Sa'id al-Khudri: "... whoever adds or seeks to add has engaged in usury, the giver and the taker are the same in this" (2971). [Page 75] One example of this approach is when the legislator mentions a description that is appropriate alongside the ruling, such as his saying (peace and blessings be upon him): "The judge should not rule while he is angry"(1). This indicates that anger is a reason that prevents judgment due to the confusion of thought and disturbance of state it causes(2). The judge's role is to render judgment, and his sitting is for the purpose of judgment; thus, if he is prevented from judging in a certain state, this indicates that this state is the reason for the prohibition. This section corresponds to the second section of the two divisions of the explicit text's indication of reasoning, but that is from the stated meaning (manṭūq) and this is from the implied meaning (mafhūm). These three paths: consensus (ijma), textual evidence (nass), and indication and hint (tanbih wa imā') are agreed upon among the jurists. As for the subsequent paths, they are subject to disagreement; the proponents of the method of the theologians among the usuliyyin, specifically the Imams of the Shafi'i school, accept and defend them. Conversely, the proponents of the method of the jurists among the usuliyyin, namely the Hanafis, reject them. The Shafi'i scholars refer to the reasons that come with these three pathways as the stated reasons (al-‘ilal al-mansusah), while the reasons that come with the other pathways that will follow are referred to as the inferred reasons (al-‘ilal al-mustanbatah). As for the Hanafi scholars, they mean by the inferred reasons (al-‘ilal al-mustanbatah) the reasons that come specifically with the pathways of indication and hinting, while the stated reasons (al-‘ilal al-mansusah) for them are those that come with the pathways of consensus (ijma) and text (nass). The fourth approach: exploration and division. Some usul scholars have advocated for it. It is based on the premise that the foundation of rulings is reasoning. Its meaning is that the observer must thoroughly investigate all the attributes that could potentially be the reason for the ruling—based on the assumption that every ruling must have a reason. This is the exploration, then he examines these potential attributes one by one and establishes that they are not the reason for the ruling except for one of them, which is the division. Thus, the attribute that remains is the reason. __________ (1) Narrated by al-Bukhari, in the chapter "Can a judge rule or give fatwa while angry" (6625), and by Muslim in the chapter "The dislike of a judge ruling while angry" (3241), and by al-Tirmidhi (1254) who said it is good and authentic, and by al-Nasa'i (5326). (2) See: al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/230. [Page 76] This approach establishes the cause by negating what is besides it, rather than by examining it. Al-Zarkashi said: "It is linguistically the act of testing, and from it is the probe that is used to test the wound, which is called the 'mismar'. It is named this way because the observer of the ailment divides the attributes and tests each one of them to see whether it is suitable for the cause or not?"(1). Those who assert that the basis of rulings is the reasoning behind them differ on the validity of this approach. As for those who reject this view, they do not adopt this method. Al-Sarakhsi said: "The evidence that the existence of a proof of invalidity in other attributes does not establish the validity of the attribute claimed by the reasoner in legal matters is that there are some rulings in the Sharia that are not based on reasoning at all. Thus, the existence of evidence for the invalidity of other attributes does not negate the possibility of evidence for the invalidity of this attribute"(2). Al-Zarkashi said: "Ibn al-Hajib transmitted in his discussion on the division and classification the consensus of the jurists that a ruling must have a reason."(3) The fifth approach: analogy and consideration. This is also based on the principle that the original basis for rulings is reasoning. This approach and its details, especially the meaning of consideration (i'tibar) and its types, have a fundamental relationship with the concept of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) according to al-Shatibi. Therefore, it will have - if Allah wills - a separate discussion. __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/200. And see also: al-Ihkam by al-Amidi. 3/233. And al-Mahsul by al-Razi. 5/217. And Irshad al-Fuhul by al-Shawkani, p. 213. (2) al-Sarakhsi, Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Abi Sahl, Usul al-Sarakhsi. 2/232, Dar al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, edited by Abu al-Wafa al-Afghani. (3) al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/111. [Page 77] The sixth approach: the approach of analogy (shabah). Its definitions have varied, and much has been said about it. Al-Shawkani said: "Analogy (shabah), which some jurists call inference (istidlal)..." Ibn al-Anbari said: "I do not see a more obscure issue in the matters of usul (principles) than this." They have disagreed on its definition; al-Juwayni said: "It cannot be defined." Others said: "It can be defined"(1). Al-Ghazali said: "The meaning of analogy is the association of the original and the branch by a description, while acknowledging that this description is not a cause (illa) for the ruling, unlike the analogy of the cause, which is an association based on what is the cause of the ruling. If the usuliyun (principles scholars) did not intend to include this type of analogy in their discussions, I do not know what they meant, and how they distinguished it from pure analogy (tard) and from similarity"(2). Al-Juwayni said: "Analogy does not correspond to the ruling in the manner of kinship; it is distinct from pure analogy, as pure analogy is a mere ruling that is not supported by meaning or similarity"(3). He then elaborated, stating in summary: "The analogy of similarity is the resemblance of the branch to the original in a way that strongly suggests the inclusion of the branch with the original, without the emergence of a cause that necessitates the inclusion. An example of this is the inclusion of ablution (wudu) with dry ablution (tayammum) in the requirement of intention (niyyah), for there is no suitable meaning in either ablution or dry ablution that necessitates the inclusion of one with the other. Nevertheless, the observer finds within himself a strong feeling of the correctness of the inclusion and an inclination towards it, even if he cannot articulate the cause of the analogy. Thus, the analogy of similarity is not a mere ruling but rather a following of conjecture. Al-Juwayni cited al-Shafi'i's expression regarding the issue of including ablution with dry ablution, intending thereby to indicate that al-Shafi'i relied on similarity without being able to articulate the cause, saying: 'Two purifications; how can they be separated?'(4). The statement of the one who said: 'Whoever's divorce is executed, his repudiation is executed' is considered an analogy of similarity(5). __________ (1) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul. p. 220. And see: Al-Mahsool by al-Razi, vol. 5. (2) Pure analogy (tard): meaning that whenever the description is found, the ruling is found. (3) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa. 2/311. (4) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan. 2/527. Paragraph: 725. (5) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan. 2/527. Paragraph: 725. [Page 78] Al-Amidi cited an opinion from Qadi Abu Bakr al-Baqillani, who said: "Qadi Abu Bakr went to interpret it by analogy of indication, which is the combination of the original and the branch in a way that does not suit the ruling but necessitates what suits the ruling" (1). He then chose another meaning, which is what is below the suitable and above the rejected, and said: "Perhaps the basis for calling it a resemblance (shabah) is this meaning" (2). He said: "An example of this is al-Shafi'i's statement regarding the issue of removing impurity: 'Purification intended for prayer is not valid without water, for the commonality is purification, and its suitability for specifying water after investigation is not apparent'" (3). He stated that this is what most of the scholars have concluded (4). The seventh method: rejection and opposition. It is based on the principle of reasoning. Rejection (tard) is the existence of the ruling in all cases where the description exists, provided that the description is neither suitable nor resembling (shabah) (5). For if it were suitable, it would return to the method of analogy and suitability. And if it were resembling, it would return to the method of resemblance. Opposition (aks) is the negation of the ruling with the negation of the description, and both rejection and opposition are referred to as circularity, meaning that the ruling revolves with the description in existence and non-existence (6). Al-Amidi said: "There has been disagreement about this; a group of usul scholars have gone to the view that it indicates that the description is a cause... and what the scholars among us and others hold is that it does not imply causation, neither definitively nor probabilistically, and this is the preferred view" (7). Al-Juwayni considered it a method and regarded opposition as a condition in the rejected description (8). __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/258. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) The same source. (5) See: al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul. p. 220. And see al-Mahsool by al-Razi, vol. 5. (6) The same source, p. 219. For details on this method, see: Irshad al-Fuhul and al-Burhan by al-Juwayni, vol. 2. (7) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/260. (8) See: al-Juwayni, al-Burhan. 2/548, paragraph: 800 and beyond. [Page 79] ________________ ******** The eighth method: the principle of correlation (al-tard) and some usul scholars have argued that correlation without the condition of contrariety is a cause. Thus, correlation becomes a method for them. Al-Razi stated this in al-Mahsool. He said: "What is meant by it (i.e., correlation) (1) is the description that is not known to be suitable or necessitating the suitable if it is present with the description in all cases differing from the place of dispute, and this is what is meant by correlation and continuity"(2). Al-Juwayni rejected it. Those who rejected the method of correlation and contrariety also rejected the method of correlation as it is more deserving of that. Al-Amidi said: "And if it is known that correlation and contrariety do not serve as evidence for causation, then correlation by itself is more deserving of not being evidence"(3). Al-Zarkashi said: "Correlation: and it is not meant by it that the cause does not get negated, for that is the claim of contrariety, but it is meant that its cause is neither suitable nor effective"(4)... And those who say that correlation and contrariety are not evidence, in the case of correlation not being evidence, it is more so from the first perspective... and those considered by the scholars to hold that reliance on it is invalid because it is a form of nonsense, Imam al-Haramayn said: And the judge went to extremes in condemning those who believe in linking God's judgment to it"(5). He said: "Ibn al-Sam'ani said: And Abu Zayd named those who consider correlation as evidence and continuity as proof of the validity of causation 'the Hushawiya of the people of analogy.' He said: And these are not counted among the jurists"(6). Al-Ghazali said: "Correlation must be rejected by every analogist"(7), this is his statement in al-Mustasfa, but in Shifa al-Ghalil his statement differs(8). On the conditions of the cause: __________ (1) What is in parentheses is from the researcher. (2) Al-Razi, al-Mahsool. 5/221. (3) Al-Amidi, al-Ahkam. 3/263. (4) The meaning of effectiveness will be explained later. (5) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/221 - 222. And see: Irshad al-Fuhul. p: 221. (6) The same source. (7) See: Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa. 2/318. (8) See: Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, Shifa al-Ghalil in clarifying doubts and illusions and methods of reasoning p. 306 - 310, edited by Hamad al-Kubaisi, al-Irshad Press - Baghdad, 1st ed., 1390 AH - 1971 CE. [Page 80] They agreed that the cause (illa) must be indicated by the Sharia. This is to be understood through one of the paths of reasoning (ta'leel). This matter has been clarified in what has preceded. 2- The reason (illah) must mean a motivating factor and not merely an indicator. Al-Amidi said: "They differed on the permissibility of the reason in the original sense being merely an indicator, and the preferred view is that the reason in the original sense must mean a motivating factor, that is, it must include a valid wisdom intended by the Legislator in enacting the ruling. Otherwise, if it were merely a descriptive characteristic without any wisdom, but merely an indicator, then reasoning based on it in the original sense is impossible"(1). This matter has been clarified previously in the explanation of the meanings of the reason. 3- The reason (illa) must be effective in the ruling. Al-Zarkashi said: "In mentioning the conditions of the reason: the first is that it must be effective in the ruling; if it does not affect it, it cannot be considered a reason... Thus, al-Mawardi and al-Ruyani mentioned it, and what they mean by effectiveness is suitability. Better than their expression is the saying of Professor Abu Mansur: that its description must be one that is valid for linking the ruling to it"(2). He also said: "Some have permitted reasoning based solely on the indicative evidence (al-amara al-tardiyya). The truth is the opposite, and it must include a ruling that motivates the obligated person to comply and serves as a valid witness for linking the ruling to it."(3) He said: "The judge (al-Qadi) stated in (al-Taqrib): the meaning of the cause (illa) being effective in the ruling is that it is judged that the jurist's (mujtahid) presumption is that the ruling is present when it is established due to it and not due to anything else"(4). There is an important disagreement regarding the condition of effectiveness and its meaning between the Shafi'is and the Hanafis, which I will mention in its place, if Allah wills. __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/180. (2) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit. 4/119. (3) The same place. (4) The same place. [Page 81] 4- It must be a clear and defined description. Clarity and definition are the opposites of ambiguity and obscurity. The obscure and unstable cannot be used for reasoning. An example of this is the hardship of travel, which is not defined; therefore, it was not considered in the hardship of the porter and the baker in the city, making travel a defined description that includes the unstable wisdom of hardship. Thus, reasoning based on hardship is not valid, but travel is correctly counted as a cause that includes the reason. Al-Amidi said: "Most scholars have held that it is impermissible to reason a ruling based solely on wisdom that lacks a defining characteristic, while a minority have permitted it" (1). He said: "We know that the legislator only permitted ease in long travel to alleviate the defined hardship of long travel to a specific destination and did not link it to the hardship itself because it is something that fluctuates and varies. For this reason, he did not permit the heavily burdened porter in the city, even if it is assumed that his hardship exceeds that of the traveler every day by a mile, even if he is in utmost comfort and ease, because that is something that varies and fluctuates" (2). 5- It must be free from any legal evidence against it. Al-Zarkashi said: "It must be free from its condition, meaning that it should not be contradicted by a text or consensus, because analogy (qiyas) is a branch of it and is only used in its absence; thus, it cannot be a negation of it. If either of the two contradicts it, it is invalid" (3). 6- The reason must be consistent. Al-Zarkashi said: "It must be consistent, meaning that whenever it exists, the ruling exists" (4). If it exists and the ruling does not exist, it means that it is not a reason. __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/180. (2) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, p. 181. (3) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/122. (4) The same source. [Page 82] 7- The reason (illah) must be transitive. This means that the ruling extends from the original case to the branch. Everyone agrees on the validity of this condition for the soundness of analogy (qiyas). However, they differ on the validity of the reason if it is not transitive. Some of the usul scholars consider the description a reason for the original case even if the ruling cannot be extended to a branch by analogy. Others prohibit considering it a reason on the basis that there is no benefit in reasoning with it. The benefit of the reason is the transference of the ruling from the original case to the branch. Al-Amidi said: "Everyone agrees that the transitivity of the reason is a condition for the validity of analogy, and on the validity of the limited reason(1), whether it is explicitly stated or agreed upon. They only differ on the validity of the limited reason if it is neither explicitly stated nor agreed upon, such as the reasoning of the Shafi'i school regarding the prohibition of usury (riba) in the two currencies based on the essence of their value(2)"(3). And Shams al-A'imma al-Sarakhsi said: "The disagreement is regarding the condition of transitivity, and our position is that reasoning with a text in a way that does not allow for transference is not permissible at all. According to al-Shafi'i, this reasoning is permissible, but it does not constitute analogy. He permitted reasoning with the text on usury in gold and silver based on their value, even if it does not transfer. We do not permit that, and our position is that the ruling of reasoning is the transference of the ruling of the original case to the branches"(4). __________ (1) The limited reason refers to the description that has been established as a reason for the ruling of the original case, and cannot be transferred to a branch, such as theft being a reason for cutting off the hand; the text indicates reasoning for the ruling of the original case with it. However, there is no branch to which the ruling can be transferred by analogy based on the commonality of the reason. Applying the ruling of cutting off the hand in another context is based on the indication of the text, that is, by the generality of the text and not by analogy. Among the related disagreements among the analogists here is another disagreement, which is whether the evidence for the reason is the reason itself or the evidence of the address that indicated it and the reason? The Shafi'is and the theologians went with the former, while the Hanafis went with the latter. (2) See: Footnote number 4, page 61 of this book. (3) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/192. (4) Al-Sarakhsi, Usul al-Sarakhsi. 2/158 - 159. [Page 83] 8- That a single ruling should not have two causes simultaneously in one scenario. Al-Amidi said: "There is a disagreement regarding the permissibility of attributing a single ruling in one scenario to two causes simultaneously; some have prohibited this absolutely... while others have permitted it absolutely... and some have differentiated between the stated and inferred causes, permitting it in the stated causes and prohibiting it in the inferred ones... The preferred view is that of the first opinion" (1). And al-Zarkashi said: "It is permissible to attribute a single ruling to different types based on different causes for one person by consensus, such as attributing the permissibility of killing Zayd for his apostasy, and Amr for retribution, and Khalid for adultery" (2). He also said: "The Prophet explicitly stated different causes, each of which is independent in permitting blood, as he - peace and blessings be upon him - said: 'The blood of a Muslim is not lawful except in one of three cases: disbelief after faith, or adultery after chastity, or killing a believer unjustly'" (3) (4). It appears from the texts of the imams that there is a prohibition against attributing a ruling to two causes, and the consensus reported, as mentioned by al-Zarkashi, does not pertain to the cause by which analogy (qiyas) is established. The causes mentioned in the hadith are all limited causes, so a branch cannot be analogized to a root through them, and the application of the ruling in any case is based on the evidence of the text and not on analogy. Or the attribution may be understood in the sense of an indicator rather than a motivator. Al-Zarkashi, when presenting the differing opinions regarding attributing more than one cause, said: "The permissibility is absolute, which is the correct view and the view of the majority, as the judge said in al-Taqrib, and then he said: 'And based on this, we say, considering that the causes are signs and indicators of the rulings, not causes that necessitate them'" (5). __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/208. (2) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/156. (3) Narrated by Muslim (3175), and Bukhari (6370), and narrated by Abu Dawood in the Book of Blood Money (3903), and al-Tirmidhi in the Book of Trials (2084), and al-Nasa'i (3953), and Ahmad (1328). (4) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/156. (5) The same source, 4/157. [Page 84] As for the distinction between the specified cause (illa mansusah) and the inferred cause (illa mustanbatah), it is based on the fact that the specified cause, as in the above hadith, is called a cause even if it is a cause for the ruling of the original only, meaning it is a limited cause. The prohibition regarding the inferred cause is because the inferred cause is based on the principle of reasoning, not on the evidence of texts or consensus. Accordingly, the establishment of a second cause is considered a refutation of the first cause. 9- Among the matters they differed on is the permissibility of specifying the cause. Al-Amidi said: "They differed on the permissibility of specifying the inferred cause; most of the followers of Abu Hanifa, Malik, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal permitted it, while most of the followers of al-Shafi'i prohibited it. It has been said that this is reported from al-Shafi'i. Then, those who permit its specification agreed on the permissibility of specifying the specified cause, and they differed on the permissibility of specifying the inferred cause if there is no impediment or loss of condition in the place of deviation. Most prohibited it, while a minority permitted it. Those who prohibit the specification of the inferred cause differed on the permissibility of specifying the specified cause."(1) The most important factor in this difference, in general, is the difference in terminology regarding the meanings of specified and inferred. Those who consider the specified cause to be that which comes through one of the two paths of text or consensus permit the specification of the specified cause and consider it akin to the specification of other texts. These individuals consider the inferred cause to be that which comes through the path of indication and hint, and they differ on the permissibility of specifying it, rejecting all other paths. __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/194. [Page 85] As for those who associate the following rationale with the method of indication and hinting at the specified rationales, like those that come through the method of text or consensus, they argue about the difference in the permissibility of specifying the stipulated ones due to the disagreement in specifying those that come through the method of indication and hinting. The derived rationale according to this group is the rationale that comes through all other methods such as analogy (qiyas), opposition (al-‘aks), examination and division (sabr wa taqsim), and similarity (munasaba) and resemblance (shabah), and they do not permit specifying it. They assert that the specification of the derived rationale is not permissible, because the failure to consider the described attribute through these methods is akin to nullifying the attribute or akin to its non-establishment altogether. This is due to the lack of confidence in these methods in the first place. Thus, the branching of disagreement in this issue and the confusion in the transmission from the imams is attributed to the differing intentions behind the terminologies, and this is something that should be noted when studying the books of the imams of usul (usul al-fiqh) concerning analogy and rationale. Al-Zarkashi said: "Know that the cause (illa) is either rational (aqli) or textual (sam'i). The rational cannot be restricted by the consensus of scholars of reasoning... They only differed regarding the textual, which can either be derived (mustanbata) or explicitly stated (mansusa). If it is derived, then al-Mawardi and al-Ruyani firmly asserted that it cannot be restricted in the sense that the cause does not remain a proof beyond the specific ruling due to the invalidity of relying on it." (1) 10- One of the conditions of the derived reason ('illa) is that it should not invalidate its original source. This condition applies only to derived reasons and not to those explicitly stated. Al-Amidi said: "The derived reason must not be from the ruling that it is based upon in a way that invalidates the ruling from which it was derived. This is like the reasoning for the obligation of a sheep in the case of zakat due to fulfilling the needs of the poor, as this would negate the obligation of the sheep, and the negation of the original ruling from which it was derived necessarily invalidates the derived reason, as its validity depends on its consideration in that context."(2) __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit. 4/122. (2) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/215. [Page 86] And since this condition is a condition for the derived (mustanbata) rulings only, it means that the specified cause (illah) can invalidate the original ruling, and indeed this is the essence of reasoning (ta‘leel) itself. The cause is what the ruling was established for, and its removal means the removal of the ruling, which is the meaning of invalidation here. Therefore, the consensus on this condition in the derived rulings indicates a lack of confidence in reasoning based on it, and this is only because all paths of the derived rulings are based on the principle that reasoning is fundamental in rulings. This, in turn, leads the jurist (faqih) to search for a strong cause in his view, so if he finds that reasoning with this theoretical cause leads to the removal of the ruling with the removal of the cause, he will abandon reasoning based on it. An example from al-Amidi above is clear in this; reasoning for the obligation of zakat based on providing for the poor implies the cancellation of the obligation of zakat if there are no poor people, which negates the original obligation of zakat, thus invalidating reasoning based on this description. Al-Zarkashi said: "If it is derived, the condition is that it does not invalidate the original or invalidate part of it, so that it does not lead to abandoning the preferred (rajih) for the less preferred (marjuh), as the presumption derived from the text is stronger than that derived from derivation, because it is a branch of this ruling, and the branch does not invalidate its origin; otherwise, it would necessitate returning to itself in invalidation."(1) 11- One of the conditions of the cause ('illa) is that it should not be the same as the subject of the original ruling (hukm al-asl); if it were so, the application of the ruling in other cases would not be by analogy (qiyas) and these cases would not be branches (furu') but rather a direct application of the text, and these cases would be the basis (manat) of the ruling. The cause of the original ruling would then be limited. __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/137. And al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul. p. 208. [Page 87] Al-Amidi said: "Most scholars have stated that the condition for the cause of the original ruling is that it should not be the subject of the original ruling nor a part of its subject. Others have permitted it, and the preferred view is to differentiate, which is that it is impermissible in the original but permissible in the part."(1) He also said: "If the cause were specifically the subject of the original ruling, then the cause would be limited... Yes, this is only possible if the cause of the original ruling is not transitive."(2) He added: "As for the part, it is not impermissible to use it as a cause due to the possibility of the generality of the original and the branch."(3) Al-Zarkashi said: "If it is transitive, meaning it exists outside the original, it is required that the causation in the subject be only a part of it. It cannot be imagined to be transitive, unlike the limited, where this is permissible."(4) The Third Topic The Path of Analogy and Appropriateness Introduction: Previously, the concept of appropriateness was mentioned as a condition of the cause, which is a pillar in analogy (qiyas). Some of the usul scholars have made it a distinct path of causation with its own conditions. The following discusses the topic of appropriateness, its conditions, and its categories. The reasoning based on the appropriate description is founded on the principle that the original rulings are based on reasoning. If the Sharia indicates the cause through explicit or implicit text, consensus, or by deduction through hints and indications, then that is sufficient. If it does not indicate, one must search for the most suitable description for reasoning. The most suitable is the one that is most appropriate, provided that the Sharia does not indicate its rejection or abrogation. The appropriate description is one that results in a benefit or harm depending on whether the ruling is a command for action or a prohibition against it. However, determining the appropriate beneficial description in the ruling is influenced by the jurist's perspective on what constitutes benefit and what constitutes harm, as well as their view on the issue of goodness or badness in actions. A jurist may perceive a benefit that later, upon examination and research, turns out to be a harm, and vice versa, or that the Sharia has abrogated or invalidated it, or that there is something more beneficial and more appropriate for reasoning. __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ahkam. 3/179. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/140. [Page 88] This has led to details and restrictions in defining the appropriate (munasib) and its conditions among the usuliyyin (scholars of Islamic jurisprudence), resulting in expressions such as recognized public interest (mashlaha mu'tabara), abrogated public interest (mashlaha mulghah), remote public interest (mashlaha mursala), and legislatively accepted public interest (mashlaha murtada shar'an), as well as the objectives of creation (maqasid al-khalq) and the objectives of the Legislator (maqasid al-shari'). There was also a division of the appropriate into real rational and imaginary persuasive. "The first is that which, the more one investigates and examines it, the more its appropriateness is confirmed, while the second is that which is initially imagined to be appropriate, but when subjected to research and scrutiny, its appropriateness falls away and reveals itself to be without substance" (1). Furthermore, it was divided into necessary (daruri), need-based (hajji), and improvement-based (tahsin). Al-Zarkashi said: "The categories of the appropriate in terms of reality and persuasion are divided into real and persuasive. The real is divided into what occurs in the realm of necessity, the realm of need, and the realm of improvement" (2). He then said: "As for the persuasive, it is that which initially appears to be appropriate, but upon thorough investigation, it turns out otherwise" (3). Clarifying the meaning of ikhalah and munasibah: It is noted in the context of the texts of the imams of usul that some of them use the terms ikhalah and munasibah interchangeably, while others differentiate between them. Al-Amidi says: "The fifth approach in establishing the cause is ikhalah and munasibah" (4), and al-Shawkani states: "Munasabah: it is expressed as ikhalah, public interest, inference, and consideration of objectives, and its extraction is called the derivation of the basis (takhrij al-manat), which is the essence of the book of qiyas (analogy) and its area of ambiguity and clarity. The meaning of munasibah is the specification of the cause merely by presenting the appropriateness without any defects, neither by text nor otherwise, and munasibah in language means compatibility, and the appropriate (munasib) is that which is compatible" (5). __________ (1) See: al-Ghazali, Shifa al-Ghalil, p. 132. (2) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/188. (3) The same source, 4/192. (4) Al-Amidi, Al-Ahkam, 3/236. (5) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 214. And see: Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/186. [Page 89] As for Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, he distinguishes between them. For him, "ikhalah" (الإخالة) is a descriptive term that can be imagined by the observer as a reason for the coming of the ruling. "Munasabah" (المناسبة) is the established fact that the description leads to the benefit or to what the Legislator intends. Thus, "ikhalah" is the claim of the description that leads to the coming of the ruling in accordance with the benefit, while "munasabah" is the emergence and establishment of the causal relationship between the description and the benefit that follows from it, as descriptions are signs and indicators of the ruling, and rulings have come for the sake of benefits. The establishment of the relationship between the description and the ruling makes the description a motivator. He says: "If a ruling is established in a matter that is agreed upon, and the extractor claims that it is justified by a description he has presented, he is required to substantiate his claim regarding the original matter... If a claimant asserts that the meaning he has presented is a cause for the ruling, this claim is devoid of proof in that the determination of causes is not permissible as previously discussed in the refutation of the rejecters. There must be an appearance of a reason in the mind of the extractor that necessitates the imagination of a specific meaning in its establishment, and he is required to present it" (1). Then he said: "What the scholars have relied upon and what the esteemed Abu Ishaq has accepted is the establishment of the cause of the original matter by considering its 'ikhalah' and its 'munasabah' with the ruling, while being free from impediments and invalidators and conforming to the principles" (2). He said: "If it is said: If the one who establishes a cause presents an acceptable reason in 'ikhalah', it is accepted, and it is said to him: Not every 'mukhil' (مخيل) is a cause, and not every public interest (maslaha) is an acceptable reason in rulings, from where do you claim that what you have presented is of the kind that can be relied upon? For 'ikhalah' is divided, and the reasons for public interest are absent, and the Sharia does not see the ruling as connected to all of them, and the narrators have not documented the paths of conjectures for the Companions and their directions. So if the claim of connection to every benefit is invalidated and it is not clear to us what the predecessors relied upon, how does the very 'ikhalah' indicate anything?" (3). Then he said: "If 'ikhalah' appears and the meaning is free from invalidators and the presumption is strong, then that is certainly of the kind that the predecessors relied upon" (4). Then he said: "If it is said: Then 'ikhalah' with safety is what indicates. We say: No, but if 'ikhalah' is established and the 'munasabah' is apparent and the invalidators are removed, then that aligns with the path of the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them" (5). __________ (1) Al-Juwayni, al-Burhan. 2/524. Paragraph: 756. (2) Al-Juwayni, al-Burhan, p: 526. Paragraph: 759. (3) The same source, 2/527. Paragraph: 759. (4) The same location. (5) The same source, p: 528. Paragraph: 762. [Page 90] The observer of these statements will understand the meaning of "ikhalah" and "munasaba." "Ikhalah" means the claim of a descriptive attribute as a cause. However, this - as he said - is a claim that must be proven, and the way to prove it is through the emergence of the appropriateness of the description and the removal of invalidating factors. His statement: "The ikhalat are divided" means that the attributes that can be claimed are numerous and varied; some are valid while others are nullified, so this alone is not sufficient. Even if it is said that this description contains a public interest (maslaha), this is also not enough. His statement: "The avenues of istislah (public interest) are negated" and his statement: "Not every istislah is an accepted avenue" mean that merely having the description be a public interest or containing a public interest is not sufficient to establish its validity for reasoning. From here, his meaning of "munasaba" is understood, which is that the described attribute - being a public interest - must have a public interest that is accepted by the Sharia. Or that the establishment of the ruling based on that description necessitates the realization of that public interest logically. As for the first, which is that the public interest is accepted by the Sharia, this is what he means by the term "removal of invalidating factors." Therefore, the meaning of "munasaba" can only be the necessity or establishment of the realization of the public interest from the establishment of the ruling based on the description. This establishment occurs through a preponderance of evidence and does not require certainty. This meaning is confirmed by his statement: "If the ikhalah appears and the meaning is free from invalidating factors and there is a preponderance of evidence, then this is among what the early scholars have certainly related."(1) Al-Razi said: "People have mentioned two things in defining appropriateness: the first is that it leads to what is in accordance with human benefit in terms of acquisition and preservation, and it may be expressed as acquisition by bringing benefit and preservation by repelling harm... The second is that it is compatible with the actions of rational individuals in customs. It is said: this pearl is suitable for this pearl, meaning their combination in a compatible string, and this robe is suitable for this turban, meaning their combination is compatible."(2) Then he said: "The first definition is the statement of one who attributes the rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, to the rulings and public interests, and the second definition is the statement of one who rejects it."(3) __________ (1) The same source, p. 527. Paragraph: 759. (2) Al-Razi, al-Mahsool. 5/157 - 158. (3) The same location. [Page 91] If we scrutinize the two definitions, we will find them practically intertwined. The second means that the benefit (maslaha) is typically associated with the ruling, so the benefit is contingent upon the relationship between the cause and the effect, and this association serves as a reason for justifying the ruling based on the description(1). This is not a justification for the actions of Allah, while the first definition implies – in his view – a justification for the actions of Allah, which he rejects(2). Al-Ghazali said: "Establishing the cause by demonstrating its suitability to the ruling and being satisfied with mere suitability in establishing the ruling is a matter of disagreement. It arises from the fact that what is meant by suitability is that which aligns with the objectives of benefits (masalih) such that if it is added, it becomes coherent. An example of this is our statement: 'Wine is prohibited because it removes reason, which is the basis of obligation, and this is suitable.' Not like saying: 'Because it produces foam' or 'Because it is preserved in a container,' for that does not correspond"(3). He said: "As for the benefit, it originally refers to bringing about a benefit or averting harm, and we do not mean that. For bringing about benefit and averting harm are the objectives of creation and the welfare of creation in achieving their objectives. Rather, we mean by benefit the preservation of the objectives of the Sharia, and the objectives of the Sharia concerning creation are five: to preserve their religion, their lives, their intellect, their lineage, and their wealth. Thus, everything that entails the preservation of these five foundations is a benefit. And everything that undermines these foundations is a harm, and averting it is a benefit. When we use the term 'suitable' and 'appropriate' in the Book of Qiyas (analogy), we mean this category"(4). This clarifies what he means by benefit, which is what has been established as valid in Sharia. This aligns with what is found in al-Juwayni's works. It also agrees with what is found in al-Amidi regarding the definition of suitability, as will be discussed later. __________ (1) However, it should be noted that al-Razi rejects the notion of cause and effect because, in his view, this is a justification for the actions of Allah. Rather, he states that Allah has made things occur alongside one another. Likewise, he considers benefits to be correlated with actions, not one being the cause of the other. Or that benefits are correlated with rulings. His detailed statement will come in the third section of the second chapter. (2) Al-Razi, al-Mahsool. 5/157 - 158. (3) Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa. 2/297. (4) Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/286. [Page 92] Al-Amidi says: "Abu Zayd said: 'The appropriate (munasib) is a term for that which, if presented to the intellects, would be accepted by them' (1). However, he saw that this definition, although linguistically accurate, is insufficient in the realm of proving the cause (illah). He said: 'There is no way for the debater to prove it against his opponent in the context of discussion, for the opponent may say: This is something my intellect has not accepted, so it is not appropriate for me, even if the intellect of another has accepted it' (2). This points to the differing concepts among people regarding what is appropriate and what is not. Therefore, Al-Amidi's definition includes what Al-Juwayni elaborated on regarding the necessity of proving the correlation of the benefit (maslaha) with the linking of the ruling to the description, and that the benefit must be legally acceptable or something that is suitable to be intended by the legislator; this condition prevents disagreement in the consideration of what constitutes a benefit and what constitutes a harm (mafsada). He said: 'The truth of the matter is that the appropriate is a clear, defined description from which it follows that the arrangement of the ruling in accordance with it results in what is suitable to be intended by the legislation of that ruling, whether that ruling is negation or affirmation, and whether that intended outcome is the attainment of a benefit or the prevention of a harm' (3). Al-Zarkashi reported from Ibn al-Hajib al-Maliki: 'The appropriate is a clear, defined description that logically results from the arrangement of the ruling upon it what is suitable to be intended from the attainment of a benefit and the prevention of a harm. If the description is hidden or not defined, its concomitant is considered, which is the presumption, for the unseen does not inform the unseen, like travel due to hardship' (4). Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi said: 'And its meaning is that the establishment of the ruling is followed by a benefit' (5). Al-Qarafi said: 'The appropriateness is what entails the attainment of a benefit and the prevention of a harm' (6). __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ahkam. 3/237. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) See: Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit. 4/187. (5) Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, Rawdat al-Nazir wa Jannat al-Manazir. p. 268, edited by Saif al-Din al-Katib, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi - Beirut, 1st ed., 1401 AH - 1981 CE. (6) Shihab al-Din al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih al-Fusul fi Ikhtisar al-Mahsol. p. 391. Dar al-Fikr, Cairo. [Page 93] The other definitions in various books of usul (principles of jurisprudence) do not deviate from what has been mentioned above. It is noted about these definitions that their fundamental pillar is that it must logically follow from linking the ruling to the description that a benefit is achieved or a harm is averted. Some have added, particularly the scholars of usul from the Shafi'i school, that the attainment of benefit or the averting of harm must be something that is suitable to be intended by the legislator. This excludes the possibility that the suitable is purely a rational benefit, meaning a benefit that is not supported by a legal ruling, in addition to the requirement that it must be free from invalidators. As for the definitions that restrict the suitable description to being apparent and precise, this is for the sake of its suitability for reasoning, as one of the conditions of a reason is that it must be an apparent and precise description, regardless of the method by which it is derived. Categories of suitability: The suitable description is divided according to the strength and weakness of the suitability and according to its consideration or lack thereof. As for the strength and weakness of the suitability, it is divided into two types: imaginary persuasive and real rational. The first is the description that, the more one examines it, the weaker it becomes, leading to its suitability being dismissed. The second is the description that, the more one researches it, the stronger and clearer it becomes, and it has three levels: necessities, needs, and embellishments. Each of these levels has its complements(1). From the perspective of consideration and lack thereof, the suitable is divided into considered, unconsidered, and abrogated. Al-Shawkani said: "Know that the suitable is divided according to the testimony of the Sharia to its compatibility and effect, or lack thereof, into three categories: either it is known that the Sharia has considered it, or it is known that it has abrogated it, or neither is known"(2). 1- Considered: The term "considered" is used in relation to two meanings: the first is the description or meaning that is indicated by a legal evidence; this description or meaning is supported by a text or legal evidence, thus it is considered. This is agreed upon for reasoning by the analogists. __________ (1) See: Al-Mahsool by al-Razi, 5/159, and thereafter, and Irshad al-Fuhul by al-Shawkani, p. 215, and Shifa al-Ghalil by al-Ghazali, p. 132, and Al-Bahr al-Muhit by al-Zarkashi, 4/192. (2) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 217. [Page 94] The second: What is considered is the description that has been affirmed by a ruling but not by a text or evidence. In other words: what is considered is what has been established in accordance with a ruling or rulings. In a third expression, it is the description that can be imagined in a ruling of the established rulings supported by legal evidence. This meaning is what is intended here. Al-Amidi said: "The description is either considered in the view of the legislator or it is not considered; if it is considered, its consideration is either by text, consensus, or by arranging the ruling in accordance with it in a case of text or consensus" (1). Al-Shawkani said: "What is meant by consideration is to bring forth the ruling in accordance with it, not to explicitly state it or allude to it; otherwise, the cause would not be derived from the correlation, which is what is meant by their saying that it has been affirmed by a specific origin. Al-Ghazali said in Shifa al-Ghalil: The meaning of the affirmation by a specific origin for the description is that it is inferred from it in that the ruling has been established legally in accordance with it" (2). For example: in the ruling of the non-inheritance of the murderer, the meaning of treating contrary to the intended purpose is observed; based on the fact that the murderer, by killing his ancestor, intends to obtain the inheritance or hasten it, and treating him contrary to his intention is a meaning present in the ruling, this meaning (treating contrary to the intended purpose) is a considered meaning. The legal ruling is the witness to this meaning, or it can be said that this meaning, which has not been indicated by a text or consensus, has come with a ruling in accordance with it. This is the meaning of consideration, which is different from the consideration that is indicated by a text or consensus regarding the description or meaning. The latter has no disagreement, unlike the testimony of the ruling for the description or the coming of a ruling in accordance with the description, regarding the acceptance of this consideration there is significant disagreement. Types of consideration: If the consideration is for the very description present in the ruling or its basis, it is a consideration for the very description or its particularity in the ruling. If the consideration is for a description broader than the description present in the ruling or its basis, it is a consideration for the generality of the description or its genus in the ruling. __________ (1) Al-Amidi, Ahkam. 3/246. (2) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul. p. 217. [Page 95] An example of this is the prohibition of alcohol. The ruling is based on the description of intoxication, and if consideration is directed towards the description of intoxication, it is a consideration of the essence of the description in the prohibition. Therefore, it cannot be compared to the impairment of reason by narcotics because it is not intoxication, but it can be compared to nabidh (fermented drink) because it is intoxication. And if consideration is directed towards the description or meaning of the impairment of reason, it is broader than intoxication and includes the impairment of reason by alcohol, narcotics, and others. It is a consideration of the generality of the description or its genus, and narcotics can be compared to it. This is the consideration of the genus of the description in the ruling. Al-Amidi said: "This is like the meaning of intoxication, for it is suitable for the prohibition of nabidh, and the essence of intoxication has been established in the prohibition of alcohol, while the effect of its genus has not been demonstrated in its essence." (1) Another example is the description of hardship in the concession of travel; it is a suitable description supported by the rulings of shortening prayers, combining prayers, and breaking the fast while traveling. If the consideration in these concessions is for the hardship of travel, it is a consideration of the essence of the description or its particularity in the ruling. And if the consideration is for the generality of hardship or exhaustion or difficulty, it is a consideration of the generality of the description or its genus because hardship has types, such as the hardship of travel, the hardship of work, the hardship of jihad, the hardship of menstruation, and others. However, if the consideration is for a ruling that is broader than the ruling that supports the description, it is a consideration of the description in the generality of the ruling or in its genus. An example of this is the consideration of the description of siblinghood from both parents in precedence in inheritance over siblinghood from the father. The ruling here is the guardianship of inheritance, and the description is the precedence of siblinghood from both parents over siblinghood from the father. Thus, the consideration of this description in the guardianship of inheritance is a consideration of the description in the essence of the ruling. The consideration of the description in the generality of guardianship leads to comparing the guardianship of marriage to the guardianship of inheritance, where siblinghood from both parents is given precedence in the guardianship of marriage. The generality of guardianship encompasses the guardianship of inheritance and the guardianship of marriage. This is a consideration of the description in the generality of the ruling. __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/246. [Page 96] If the consideration is for a description that is broader than the description to which the ruling has testified, and for a ruling that is broader than the ruling that has testified to the description, then it is the consideration of the genus of the description in the genus of the ruling. An example of this type is what al-Amidi mentioned: "The consideration of the genus of the common hardship between the menstruating woman and the traveler in the genus of alleviation, for the specific hardship of the menstruating woman is not the same as the specific hardship of the traveler, but rather of its genus, and the specific alleviation for the traveler by the omission of two units of prayer is not the same as the alleviation for the menstruating woman by the omission of prayer, but rather of its genus" (1). Accordingly, the consideration in the testimony of the ruling to the description has four types (2): 1- Consideration of the specific description in the specific ruling. 2- Consideration of the genus of the description in the specific ruling. 3- Consideration of the specific description in the genus of the ruling. 4- Consideration of the genus of the description in the genus of the ruling. Types of what is considered: __________ (1) The same source, 3/247 - 248. (2) See: al-Ihkam by al-Amidi, 3/246 - 249. And al-Bahr al-Muhit by al-Zarkashi, 4/193 - 194, and other foundational books of usul. [Page 97] If the consideration is for the essence of the description in the essence of the ruling, then it is the influencing factor, and there is a detailed explanation. As for the three categories, which are the consideration of the essence in the genus, the genus in the essence, and the genus in the genus, if there are parallels that testify to the description, meaning other rulings in which the consideration of the description appears, it is called a suitable description. If there are no parallels, meaning the description is only testified to by one ruling, it is called strange. Al-Ghazali said: "The suitable is divided into what aligns with the meanings of the Sharia and corresponds with its actions in considering the meanings, and into what is strange that has no genus" (1). He also said: "As for the suitable, we mean that its genus is influential in that ruling even if its essence is not known in that ruling in another place" (2). Accordingly, the considered suitable is divided into three categories: influential, suitable, and strange. A - Influential: __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, Shifa al-Ghalil. p. 148. (2) The same source: p. 149. He said in Al-Mustasfa: "And the presumption has ranks, and the strongest is the influential... followed by the suitable, and then the suitable that does not align. It also has degrees, even if it is weak, but it varies according to the strength of the suitability, and it may lead to the presumption of the jurists in some cases, so it cannot be definitively invalidated, and the degrees of suitability cannot be precisely defined at all. Rather, each issue has its own taste that the jurist should consider." 2/305. The strength or weakness of the suitability has led to the division of the suitable into real and rational, and to placing the description in ranks, the strongest of which is the necessary, followed by the needful, then the embellishing. [Page 98] Al-Shawkani says: "The appropriate is either influential or non-influential. The non-influential is either suitable or unsuitable. It can be strange, transmitted, or abrogated." Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 218. Al-Ghazali said: "The appropriate is divided into influential, suitable, and strange... The meaning of being influential is that its effect is evident in the ruling by consensus or text, so there is no need for the appropriateness" (1). Al-Amidi said: "If it is considered by a text or consensus, then it is the influential one" (2). This means that, according to al-Ghazali, the appropriateness is not a condition for the description that establishes its influence or causation by text or consensus. The reasoning based on the influential is considered one of the strongest types of analogy. Al-Ghazali said: "Analogy is of four types: the influential, then the appropriate, then the similar, then the extension. The lowest of these is the extension, and every proponent of analogy must reject it. The highest is the influential, and every denier of analogy must accept it" (3). Al-Shawkani said: "The influential is that the text or consensus indicates that it is a cause that shows the effect of the essence of the description in the essence of the ruling or its type in its type" (4). Thus, the influential is the description that has been established by evidence to have an effect in the ruling; its consideration is not merely a matter of the ruling coming in accordance with it or the ruling testifying to it, but rather its consideration is akin to the testimony of the text or consensus. __________ (1) Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa fi Ilm Usul al-Fiqh, 2/297, Al-Matba'a al-Amiriya, Bulaq, Egypt, 1322 AH. (2) Al-Amidi, Al-Ahkam, 3/247. (3) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, 2/318. (4) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 218. [Page 99] The influential factor (mu'athir) according to the usuliyyin (jurisprudents) of the Shafi'i school and in the principles of theologians (mutakallimin) in general is a counterpart to the appropriate (mulayim) and the strange (gharib), unlike the usuliyyin of the Hanafi school. The latter have made influence a condition of the cause (illa), and therefore do not accept the path of appropriateness (munasaba) at all; rather, appropriateness for them is a condition for reasoning (ta'leel) based on description (wasf). Thus, they do not accept merely the consideration of the description as a testimony (shahada) for the ruling (hukm) but require the testimony of the text (nass), which they refer to as justice (adala), meaning the justice of the description and its suitability for reasoning. The term appropriate (mulayim) in their texts does not mean what others among the theologians intend; rather, they mean exactly what others refer to with the term appropriate (munasib). Al-Ghazali said: "Know that the influential factor is accepted by consensus among those who advocate analogy (qiyas), and Abu Zayd al-Dabusi restricted analogy to it, saying: only the influential factor is accepted. However, he provided examples of the influential factor, indicating that he accepted the appropriate but also called it an influential factor" (1). The meaning of this text is that the Hanafis accept only the influential factor. __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa. 2/299. This statement by Al-Ghazali, that Al-Dabusi accepts the appropriate and calls it an influential factor, indicates that the Hanafis reason based on the appropriate, which is strongly rejected by the Imams of Hanafi jurisprudence. [Page 100] Al-Bazdawi said: "Justice (adl) for us is the effect. And by effect, we mean what has an effect in the Sharia"(1). The commentator on the principles of al-Bazdawi in Kashf al-Asrar said: "The Sheikh explained in some of his writings with this phrase: And by influence, we mean that the nature of that description has an influence in establishing the nature of that ruling in the case of the ruling, either indicated by the Book or by the Sunnah or by consensus. That is, the effect of this description is established by these proofs. Some of the usuli scholars mentioned that the highest types of influential analogy (qiyas) are"(2). He cites the saying that the influential is the highest type of analogy attributed to some usuli scholars and not to himself. He states that the influential has four categories: the specific in the specific, the specific in the general, the general in the specific, and the general in the general(3). Meanwhile, al-Ghazali distinguishes between the influential and the appropriate: "The difference between them is that the influential is that which has shown the effect of its essence in the essence of the disputed ruling by consensus or text in the place of dispute or outside of it... As for the appropriate, we mean that its genus is known to be influential in the genus of that ruling"(4). Thus, the influential according to al-Bazdawi is divided into these four categories, while according to al-Ghazali, the influential is one of the four categories. This disagreement applies to the imams of usul from the Shafi'i and Hanafi schools. B - The Suitable: __________ (1) The pride of Islam al-Bazdawi, The Foundations of the Pride of Islam al-Bazdawi. 3/512, edited by Abdullah Mahmoud Muhammad Omar, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya - Beirut, 1st edition, 1418 AH - 1997 CE, printed with its commentary: The Unveiling of Secrets, by Ala al-Din al-Bukhari. (2) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar 'an Usul Fakhr al-Islam al-Bazdawi, 3/512, see: the previous footnote. (3) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar 'an Usul Fakhr al-Islam al-Bazdawi, p. 513. (4) Al-Ghazali, Shifa al-Ghalil, p. 148 - 149. [Page 101] It is a suitable description supported by many rulings, or at least two rulings: one ruling that demonstrates the consideration of the specific description in the specific ruling, and another ruling or rulings from which it is inferred that the description has been recognized in the ruling or its genus, or its genus in the genus of the ruling. However, it should be noted here the difference between the Imams of the Hanafi school and others, all of whom mentioned these types. The Hanafis did not permit the generalization of the description or ruling based solely on the existence of evidence for it in other rulings; rather, they stipulated that the effect of the description or its genus must be established by legal evidence and not merely by the occurrence of the ruling in accordance with it. Just as they required that the essence (ayn) in the essence must be impactful, they also required impact in all types of consideration. And just as they did not see the occurrence of the ruling in accordance with the description as indicative of reasoning, they also did not see any indication of generalization or categorization in the abundance of evidence. Al-Bazdawi said: "Justice for us is the effect" (1), and the commentator in Kashf al-Asrar said: "As for the reference to the principles, it does not lead to modification, and the utmost that can be said is that the texts are in agreement with the description, resulting in an abundance of parallels, but abundance of parallels does not confer strength to the description" (2), and he said: "Because the description is a cause for a legal ruling just as the ruling is, it cannot be established except by legal evidence" (3). Thus, what is appropriate is what has been established regarding the consideration of the genus of the description in the essence of the ruling or in its genus, or the essence of the description in its genus. The disagreement regarding it is in the establishment of consideration. If the establishment is by evidence, it is agreed upon among the analogists; if it is by the testimony of the ruling to the description and the existence of parallels for it, then there is much disagreement regarding it. __________ (1) Al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazdawi. 3/512. (2) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 3/513, and the reference to the principles means presenting the description that has evidence for it in a ruling to other rulings that support it, and it is said based on that that its consideration or the consideration of its genus has been recognized in the Sharia. (3) The same source. pp. 509 - 510. [Page 102] Among its examples is the permissibility of combining the two prescribed prayers (salat) due to hardship. The ruling on the permissibility of combining during travel supports the description of hardship, and the permissibility of combining them in a settled place during rain also supports the description of hardship. The hardship of rain and the hardship of travel are two types of hardship that fall under the category of hardship, and considering hardship here is a consideration of the category of the description without evidence, but only through the extrapolation of rulings. It has been said that this example has its own complexities(1). It is also exemplified by the exemption from the two rak'ahs (units of prayer) for the traveler due to hardship, and the exemption from making up prayers for the menstruating woman due to hardship. Thus, the consideration of general hardship here is a consideration of the category of the description. This example also has its own complexities(2). C - The strange (ghareeb): This is a suitable description, whose consideration has appeared in a single ruling. The scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) from the Shafi'i school have deemed it valid for reasoning, while the Hanafi school has rejected it. Al-Amidi said: "The legislator must have considered the particular description in a particular ruling without showing the consideration of its essence in the generality of that ruling in another agreed-upon origin, nor its genus in that same ruling, nor its genus in its genus, nor has it been indicated that it is a cause by text or consensus, neither explicitly nor implicitly, such as the meaning of intoxication" (3). He then said: "If we were to assume the absence of texts indicating that intoxication is a cause, it would not be considered by text either, and this is the suitable strange which is disputed among the analogists, and some have denied it, though their denial is not well-founded as it leads to suspicion regarding reasoning" (4). __________ (1) See: al-Ansari, Abdul Ali Muhammad bin Nizam al-Din, Fawatih al-Rahmut Sharh Muslim al-Thabut, 2/265, printed with al-Mustasfa by al-Ghazali, the Amiriya Press in Bulak, Egypt, 1322 AH. (2) See: al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 217. And see: al-Ghazali, Shifa al-Ghalil, p. 149. (3) Al-Amidi, al-Ahkam, 3/247. (4) The same source. [Page 103] Al-Ghazali said: "As for the strange (gharib) that has not shown its effect or its suitability to the type of actions of the legislator, an example of this is our saying: 'Wine is prohibited because it intoxicates,' thus in its meaning, every intoxicant is included, although the effect of intoxication has not appeared in another context, yet it is suitable. This is an example of the strange if it were not for the indication provided by His saying: { Indeed, Satan only wants to cause between you animosity and hatred through intoxicants } (1). Another example is our saying that a woman who has been divorced three times during the illness of death inherits because the husband intended to evade her inheritance, which is opposed by the opposite of his intention, analogous to the killer, for he does not inherit because he hastens the inheritance, thus it is opposed by the opposite of his intention. The reasoning for the killer's deprivation is a reasoning based on a suitability that does not align with the type of actions of the Sharia, as we do not see the Sharia in another context addressing its type, so its suitability remains merely strange. If the deprivation were reasoned by his transgression through killing and this were made a punishment for the aggression, it would be a reasoning based on a suitable correlation that is not effective, for the crime itself, although its effect appears in punishments, does not show its effect in deprivation from inheritance" (2). It is noteworthy here that the reality of the strange suitability and its examples among those who affirm it, such as al-Amidi and al-Ghazali, as has been clarified, is the same reality and examples of the remote suitability among those who affirm it, as will be shown. Al-Amidi mentioned as an example of the strange suitability: "Considering the type of hardship shared between the menstruating woman and the traveler in the type of alleviation, for the specific hardship of the menstruating woman is not the same as the specific hardship of the traveler, but rather of its kind, and the specific alleviation for the traveler by dropping two units of prayer is not the same as the alleviation for the menstruating woman by dropping prayer, but rather of its kind" (3). __________ (1) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 91. (2) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa. 2/298. This text is useful - if examined closely - for distinguishing between the effective, the suitable, and the strange. (3) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam. 3/247 - 248. [Page 104] Al-Shawkani mentioned an example of the strange (ghareeb) by saying: "Considering the type of description in the type of ruling, such as the reasoning for the punishment of drinking being eighty lashes, as it is a presumption of slander due to it being a presumption of accusation, it is necessary to establish it in its place by analogy (qiyas) to seclusion (khalwa), as it is a presumption of illicit sexual intercourse, thus it is established in its place."(1) The scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) among the Shafi'is have stated that the strange analogy (al-qiyas al-ghareeb) is valid for reasoning. Al-Amidi said: "Some have rejected it, and their rejection is not justified because it provides a presumption for reasoning"(2). Al-Ghazali said: "As for the strange analogy, this is a matter of ijtihad (independent reasoning), and it does not seem unlikely to me that this may prevail in the presumption of some mujtahids (jurists), nor is there a decisive proof indicating the invalidity of their ijtihad"(3). As for the Hanafis, they rejected it and dismissed every avenue of analogy altogether. This is a type of statement from their imams: "As for imagination... it is a false matter because it is merely a form of conjecture, as imagination and conjecture are one and the same, and conjecture does not avail against the truth at all. It cannot be said that conjecture is considered in the Sharia in terms of the obligation to act upon it like the report of a single narrator or analogy, for we say that what is considered is that which has a definitive proof establishing its obligation to act upon it, not mere conjecture. There is no proof here establishing its consideration in the Sharia, so it must be disregarded."(4) 2- The annulled: __________ (1) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul. p. 218. This same example was mentioned by al-Razi as an example of the appropriate (munasib) mursal (transmitted without a chain of narrators). (2) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 3/247. (3) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa. 3/247. (4) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 3/518. [Page 105] It is a description that has not been established by a ruling of consideration, and the consideration has appeared for its opposite. Al-Asnawi said: "The appropriate description is of three types: the first is that the legislator (shari) disregards it, meaning that he presents the branches in opposition to it, and there is no doubt that it is not permissible to use it for reasoning" (1). He then said: "This is like the obligation of fasting for two months as expiation for sexual intercourse during the day in Ramadan for the owner, even though it is more effective in restraining him than emancipation, but the legislator has disregarded it by making emancipation obligatory from the outset, so it cannot be considered" (2). Al-Amidi said: "The appropriate description that has not been established by any original consideration in any way, and yet its disregard and the legislator's disinterest in it have appeared in a particular case, is something that has been agreed upon to be invalidated and cannot be relied upon" (3). He then cited the same example mentioned above from Al-Asnawi. Al-Shatibi said: "What the law has rejected cannot be accepted, for the appropriateness does not necessitate a ruling by itself; rather, this is the view of the proponents of rational improvement" (4). He then cited the same example mentioned above, attributing it to Al-Ghazali, and said: "This is appropriate because the purpose of the expiation in the law is deterrence, and the owner is not deterred by emancipation but is deterred by fasting, and this fatwa is invalid" (5). 3- The mursal (6): __________ (1) Al-Asnawi, Nihayat al-Sul 4/91. (2) The same source, and the obligation of emancipation is taken from his saying - peace and blessings be upon him - to the man who said to him: "I had sexual relations with my wife during Ramadan," he said to him: "Free a slave." He said: "I cannot find one." He said: "Fast for two consecutive months." He said: "I cannot bear it." He said: "Feed sixty needy people." Bukhari (1801), (2410), Muslim (1870), (1871), Tirmidhi (656) who said: it is good and authentic, and Ahmad (10270). (3) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam 3/249. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-I'tisam 2/374. (5) The same source. (6) The closest linguistic meaning of the term mursal here is what is mentioned in Lisan al-Arab: to send something is to release it and neglect it. 11/285. However, the intended meaning here is not the linguistic meaning but the terminological meaning in the principles of jurisprudence. [Page 106] It is a description that is appropriate, the consideration or rejection of which is unknown. It has been referred to as public interest (maslaha) that is not explicitly stated, as well as implicit reasoning and public interest (istislah). Some scholars of usul (usul al-fiqh) have included it among the discussions of reasoning. Al-Zarkashi said: "The discussion on analogy has already been addressed, regarding the appropriate matters that the Lawgiver has either considered or rejected. The discussion here pertains to what is unknown, meaning what the Lawgiver has remained silent about in terms of consideration and disregard, which is referred to as public interests that are not explicitly stated and is called implicit reasoning. For this reason, it is termed 'not explicitly stated,' meaning it has neither been considered nor rejected. Imam al-Haramayn and Ibn al-Sam'ani referred to it as reasoning, while al-Khwarizmi expressed it in al-Kafi as public interest (istislah). He stated that the meaning of public interest is the preservation of the objectives of the Sharia by preventing harm to the creation. Imam al-Ghazali explained it as finding a meaning that suggests a ruling suitable for it rationally, while there is no agreed-upon basis, and the reasoning is applicable here. Ibn Burhan explained it in al-Awsat as not being based on a general or specific principle, and there are differing opinions on it" (1). The meaning of the implicit reasoning has differed among scholars of usul, and opinions have conflicted regarding its acceptance or rejection. The majority hold that it is not suitable for reasoning. Dr. Mustafa al-Bagha stated: "The words of the scholars of usul almost converge on the fact that the claim of public interest is a matter of disagreement, and the prevailing opinion is that it is not suitable for reasoning since there is no evidence for its consideration, and only Imam Malik (may Allah have mercy on him) has adopted this view" (2). __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/377. See also: Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 241, and al-Mustasfa, 1/284, and al-Ahkam, 4/361. (2) Mustafa Dhib al-Bagha, The Impact of Disputed Evidence in Islamic Jurisprudence, p. 43, Dar al-Imam al-Bukhari - Damascus. [Page 107] The transmission of the scholars' statements on this matter without verifying the intended meaning for each of them has led to conflicting reports. Dr. Muhammad Hasan Hayto said: "Know that the issue of the use of the mursal (transmitted) evidence has encountered much confusion, leading to conflicting reports and divergent opinions"(1). The attribution of this opinion to Imam Malik (may Allah be pleased with him) is well-known, and it has been attributed to him in an unregulated manner. Some have attributed it to the Shafi'is and the Hanafis, while others have attributed it only to the Shafi'is without the Hanafis. Some have claimed its presence in all schools of thought, while others have agreed on its rejection and denied its attribution to Malik (may Allah have mercy on him). Below are some of those reports: Al-Juwayni said: "Al-Shafi'i and most of the companions of Abu Hanifa went to rely on reasoning even if it does not stem from an agreed-upon ruling in principle"(2), while al-Amidi took the opposite view and said: "The appropriate reasoning is the unqualified... and the jurists from the Shafi'is, Hanafis, and others have agreed on the prohibition of relying on it, which is the truth"(3). Al-Qarafi said: "What is unknown in this matter is the unqualified public interest (maslaha murasala) that we advocate, and upon investigation, it is general in the schools of thought"(4). The transmitted statements from al-Ghazali have posed difficulties, as he said: "Whoever seeks public interest has legislated just as whoever approves has legislated"(5). He also said: "Any public interest that returns to preserving a legal objective known to be intended by the Book, the Sunnah, and consensus is not outside these principles, but it is not called analogy (qiyas) rather it is called unqualified public interest (maslaha murasala)... If we interpret public interest as preserving the objectives of the Sharia, then there is no basis for disagreement regarding it, rather it must be definitively established as evidence"(6). __________ (1) Muhammad Hasan Hayto, his commentary on the selected excerpts from the commentaries on the principles of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. (2) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan 2/721. Paragraph: 1130. (3) al-Amidi, al-Ihkam. 4/394. (4) Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih al-Wusul. p. 394. (5) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, 1/286. (6) The same source, 1/315. [Page 108] And there are conflicting reports about Imam Malik (may Allah be pleased with him). Al-Shatibi said: "He elaborated on it as one who is deeply immersed in understanding the meanings of public interest (maslaha), while considering the intention of the Lawgiver so that he does not deviate from it or contradict any of its principles, to the extent that many scholars found many aspects of his elaboration objectionable, claiming that he had removed the yoke and opened the door to legislation, and how far removed he was from that! May Allah have mercy on him." (1) Al-Juwayni said about him: "It was seen that he established interests far removed from the usual interests and known meanings in the Sharia, and this led him to innovate killing and taking wealth based on interests that he presumed to exist, even if he did not find a basis for those interests in the principles. Moreover, there was no stopping at that; rather, his opinion was whatever he saw fit, and he was free from the burdens of suspicion and ulterior motives." (2) Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi said: "It has been reported that Malik said: It is permissible to kill a third of the people for the benefit of the two-thirds." (3) In contrast to these statements, there are those who deny this attribution to Imam Malik. Al-Shawkani said: "A group of Malikis denied what was attributed to Malik regarding this opinion, including al-Qurtubi, who said: Al-Shafi'i and most of Abu Hanifah's companions went to not rely on it, which is also Malik's position. He said: The Imam of the Two Holy Sanctuaries (Imam al-Haramayn) was bold in what he attributed to Malik regarding excess in this principle, and this does not exist in Malik's books or in any of his companions' books." (4) Al-Amidi said: "The appropriate transmitted report... The jurists from the Shafi'is, Hanafis, and others have agreed on the prohibition of relying on it, which is the truth, except for what has been reported about Malik that he holds this view, despite his companions denying it. And if the transmission is correct from him, it is more likely that he did not say this regarding every interest, but rather regarding those interests that are necessary and universally established." (5) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 2/388. (2) Al-Juwayni, al-Burhan, 2/721. Paragraph: 1128. (3) Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, Rawdat al-Nazir wa Jannat al-Manazir, p. 150. (4) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 242. (5) Al-Amidi, al-Ahkam, 4/394. [Page 109] Dr. Hito says: "As for attributing the statement to Malik with this type of indirect reasoning, it is a disputed attribution"(1). Dr. Hito has proven the error of attributing many statements to Imam Malik (may Allah have mercy on him)(2). This amount of contradiction is due to the differing meanings of "the transmitted (al-mursal)" among the conflicting parties and the narrators. The term "the transmitted" has been used to mean that which has not been known to be abrogated or disregarded entirely, meaning it has not been witnessed by any ruling. It has also been used to mean something that is appropriate or strange. As for the first meaning: everyone has agreed to reject it. This is what is meant by denying its attribution to the Shafi'is and the Hanafis and by denying it from Malik. As for the second meaning: the majority rejected it, and those who accepted it stipulated that it must be appropriate. It was reported that there is consensus on its rejection if it is strange. Some said it could be accepted, and the details are as follows: As for whether it is sent (marsool) in general, here are some opinions on it: Al-Amidi said: "The interests (masalih) are divided according to the testimony of the Sharia into those that are recognized and those that are annulled, and those that have neither recognition nor annulment. The latter is referred to as the unqualified suitable (al-munasib al-mursal)... This category is uncertain between the two aforementioned categories, and its classification into one of them is not more valid than the other. Therefore, it is prohibited to use it as evidence without a recognized testimony that indicates it belongs to the category of the recognized rather than the annulled."(3) Al-Zain al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam said: "Likewise, there is no ruling except for Him (i.e., for Allah), so His rulings are derived from the Book, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), sound analogies (qiyas), and accepted proofs. No one has the right to deem something good (istihsan) or to employ public interest (maslaha mursala), nor to follow someone whom he has not been commanded to follow."(4) __________ (1) Hayto, his introduction to the selected comments on the principles, margin. p: 354 - 365. (2) The same place. (3) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, 4/160. (4) Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam, The Principles of Rulings in the Interests of the People, p. 304, Al-Rayan Foundation - Beirut, 1410 AH - 1990 CE, revised new edition. [Page 110] Al-Ghazali said: "Istislah (public interest) is not a fifth root in itself, but whoever seeks istislah has legislated just as whoever deems something good has legislated" (1). He also said: "This is one of the illusory roots, for whoever thinks it is a fifth root has erred, as we have referred the public interest to the preservation of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), and the objectives of the Sharia are known through the Book (Qur'an), the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet), and consensus (ijma). Thus, any public interest that does not return to the preservation of an objective derived from the Book, the Sunnah, and consensus, and is among the strange interests that do not align with the actions of the Sharia, is invalid and discarded. Whoever resorts to it has legislated just as whoever deems something good has legislated" (2). Similarly, it is well-known among the Hanafis that they reject and dismiss every method of analogy as a root. They reject the analogy even if it is considered valid, as they require an effect. Ibn Humam al-Din al-Iskandari, the Hanafi, said: "This category known as istislah (public interest) is rejected, as there is no evidence for its consideration, and it is a legal evidence, thus it must be rejected" (3). It is well-known among their scholars that they say: "No evidence, no consideration." Al-Ansari said: "Istislah (public interest) is a proof according to Malik (may Allah have mercy on him), while the preferred view among the majority of scholars and jurists is its rejection. Our argument is: there is no evidence without consideration from the legislator, even if it follows the dictates of reason, and this cannot be accepted from one who advocates analogy" (4). Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi said: "This is called istislah (public interest) and we do not call it qiyas (analogy) because qiyas refers to a specific root, and the correct view is that it is not a proof because it is known from the legislator that the preservation of blood is paramount in every way. Therefore, mutilation was not legislated even though it is the most effective deterrent and punishment, nor was killing for theft or drinking alcohol legislated. If a ruling is established for the sake of one of these interests, it is not known that the Sharia preserves that interest by establishing that ruling; it would be an imposition of the Sharia based on opinion and a ruling based on pure reason" (5). __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, 1/315. (2) The same source, 1/310. (3) Ibn Humam al-Iskandari, printed with his commentary Taysir al-Tahrir by Amir Badshah, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah - Beirut, 3/315. (4) Al-Ansari, Fawatih al-Rahmut, 2/266. (5) Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, Rawdat al-Nazir wa Jannat al-Manazir, p. 150. [Page 111] Mujd al-Din ibn Taymiyyah said: "The public interests (masalih mursala) cannot be used as a basis for rulings. This was stated by al-Baqillani and a group of theologians" (1). Ibn al-Hajib al-Maliki said: "The public interests are interests that do not have a foundational basis in the Sharia, even if they align with the principles of public interests and are accepted by reason" (2). He then said: "We have no evidence, so it must be rejected, as in the case of istihsan (juridical preference)" (3). Similarly, al-Fakhr al-Razi rejected them if they are understood in this sense, stating that they are rejected by consensus, even though he is among those who accept public interests, which indicates that he does not mean by 'public interests' what is universally accepted. He said: "A suitable reason that does not correspond to or have a specific foundational basis is thus rejected by consensus, and an example of this is the deprivation of the murderer from inheritance, opposing his intended purpose if we assume there is no text regarding it" (4). We find the same position with al-Shatibi; if it is understood in the broad sense of 'public interests', he clarifies that what is thus understood is invalid and constitutes legislation by reason, and he conveys that this public interest is rejected by consensus. He states: "The suitability does not necessitate a ruling by itself; rather, this is the view of the proponents of rational improvement. However, if the meaning becomes clear and we understand from the Sharia that it should be considered in deriving rulings, then we accept it, for what we mean by public interest is what is understood to be taken into account in relation to people regarding public interests and the prevention of harms in a way that reason cannot independently grasp. If the Sharia does not support that meaning, but rather rejects it, it is thus rejected by the agreement of the Muslims" (5). __________ (1) Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Maswada, p. 450. Edited by Muhammad Muhyi al-Din Abdul Hamid, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi - Beirut. (2) Ibn al-Hajib, the commentaries of al-Taftazani and al-Jurjani on the Mukhtasar al-Muntaha al-Usuli. 2/389. Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya - Beirut. (3) The same source. (4) Al-Razi, al-Mahsool. 5/167. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam. 2/374. [Page 112] He said: "As for the reasoning behind prohibiting killing for inheritance, the application of the opposite of the intended purpose is to be estimated if there is no text in accordance with it. This reasoning is not established in the actions of the Sharia by obligation nor by its compatible matters in such a way that there exists a recognized type for it; thus, it is not valid to use it as reasoning nor to base a ruling upon it by consensus. Such a thing is legislation from the one who claims it, and it cannot be accepted" (1). Based on these texts, especially from those who adopt the concept of public interest (maslaha), it becomes clear that inferring from the mursal (unattributed hadith) does not mean inferring from the public interest; this implies making reason a legislator, which is unanimously rejected. Therefore, the meaning of the mursal for those who accept it can only be understood as either compatible or strange. This matter is confirmed by what we find among some of the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) who divide the mursal itself into nullified, strange, and compatible. This means that the mursal which may be accepted or disputed is that which is strange or compatible. Al-Ansari said: "The mursal is divided into what is known to be nullified by text or consensus... and into what is not known. If no one knows in it one of the considerations of compatibility based on its type or its kind in the type of ruling or its kind in the specific ruling, but it is also not known to be nullified, then it is the strange mursal, which is called the public interests (masalih mursala). If one of the considerations of compatibility is known in it, then it is the compatible mursal" (2). Al-Ghazali said: "The difference among the jurists regarding the strange compatible: that which does not fit, and the compatible: that which does not have a specific origin is what is referred to - in the language of jurists - as mursal reasoning, meaning relying on the compatible, interest-based meaning that appears in the branch without citing a specific origin" (3). He said: "As for the strange compatible - that which does not fit and does not have a specific origin - this is rejected: there is no known disagreement in it" (4). __________ (1) The same source, p. 375. (2) Al-Ansari, Fawatih al-Rahmut. 2/301. (3) Al-Ghazali, Shifa al-Ghalil: p. 188. (4) The same source. [Page 113] Al-Shawkani said: "Ibn al-Hajib stated in his Mukhtasar al-Muntaha: 'The non-accepted (hadith) is the mursal (unattributed report); if it is strange or its abrogation is established, it is rejected by consensus. If it is appropriate, Imam al-Ghazali explicitly stated its acceptance and mentioned that Malik and al-Shafi'i held this view, while the preferred opinion is its rejection. Al-Ghazali conditioned its acceptance on the necessity of the public interest (maslaha) being certain and comprehensive'" (1). He also said: "The strange (hadith) that is not appropriate is unanimously rejected" (2). The transmission of consensus on the rejection of the strange (hadith) contradicts what was previously reported from al-Ghazali and al-Amidi, where al-Ghazali said: "The appropriate strange (hadith) is a matter of ijtihad (independent reasoning)" (3). Al-Amidi said: "Some have denied it, and their denial is unfounded because it leads to conjecture through reasoning" (4). The conflicting statements regarding the strange (hadith) stem from differing interpretations of its meaning. In fact, al-Ghazali himself, who stated the possibility of its acceptance, is the same one who reported its rejection without disagreement. However, he clarified his intent each time; he rejected it if it meant mursal, and stated its acceptability if it meant that it was supported by a ruling. __________ (1) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 218. (2) The same source. (3) This was previously clarified under the title: The Strange, pp. 85 - 87 of this book. (4) The same source of this book. [Page 114] Al-Razi said: "A suitable analogy that does not have a specific foundational evidence to support it, meaning that it considers its genus within its genus, but there is no foundational evidence indicating the consideration of its specific instance within its specific instance, and this is what is known as public interest (maslaha) that is not specified."(1) Then he said: "An example of the effect of the genus within the genus is the reasoning for rulings that do not have specific foundational evidence, such as when Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) considered drinking as equivalent to slander, treating the presumption of something as equivalent to its actual instance, analogous to treating seclusion with a woman as equivalent to having sexual intercourse with her in terms of prohibition."(2) This same example was mentioned by al-Shawkani as an example of a strange analogy.(3) Thus, the mursal (transmitted without a chain of narration) according to those who accept it is either strange or suitable; it does not have a specific origin that testifies to it, nor has it ever had a witness to its origin. As for what is mursal in general, it is rejected without dispute. The appropriate strange (ghareeb) is rejected by al-Shatibi. He does not suffice with the testimony of one origin or a few origins to affirm the consideration of the type, but rather he requires that many origins testify to it, to the extent that it reaches certainty in his view. He says: "It must be compatible with the actions of the Sharia, which means that there exists for that meaning a type that the legislator has considered in general without specific evidence, which is the general reasoning known as the unqualified public interest (maslaha mursala)"(4). He also says: "Every legal origin that does not have specific textual evidence and is compatible with the actions of the Sharia, and whose meaning is derived from its evidences, is valid and can be relied upon and referred to if that origin has become certain by the totality of its evidences... and this falls under the general reasoning that was adopted by Malik and al-Shafi'i"(5). __________ (1) Al-Razi, Al-Mahsool. 5/167. (2) The same location. (3) See p. 86 of this book. This example also contradicts what has been reported about the consensus on rejecting the strange analogy. Its interpretation is that al-Razi does not consider this example to be of the strange kind; rather, he regards it as appropriate. He has an argument for this that is not the subject of our discussion. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-I'tisam. 2/375. (5) The same source, 1/16. [Page 115] As for what was previously quoted from al-Qarafi: "Upon investigation, it is general in the schools of thought." If what he meant by public interest (maslaha) or the appropriate cause (al-munasib) is the meaning we are searching for, then the statements mentioned above decisively refute his claim. It should be noted here - even though this is not our topic - that the public interest (maslaha) which is general in the schools of thought and accepted by consensus is not that which has no specific ruling, but rather that which has no specific text, while being supported by general or comprehensive evidence that includes it under its categories or parts without being explicitly mentioned. In this sense, it includes, for example, the compilation of the Qur'an that was done by Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (may Allah be pleased with him) and the codex that was compiled by Uthman ibn Affan (may Allah be pleased with him), and the documentation of the registers that was done by Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him)(1). These matters and similar ones fall under general or comprehensive evidences such as: "What is necessary for the obligation to be fulfilled is itself obligatory," and "There should be no harm nor reciprocating harm," and "The default ruling of things is permissibility unless there is evidence for prohibition," among others. All these actions are unqualified by specific or particular evidence that states the incident explicitly, but they are included under general or comprehensive evidence. This meaning is what al-Shatibi intended as he clarified in al-I'tisam and al-Muwafaqat(2). Conditions of the appropriate description: Those who advocate for the path of appropriateness have set two conditions for reasoning based on the appropriate description: First: The description must be considered. That is, the ruling that is being reasoned must have that description present in it. In other words, the ruling must be in accordance with it. __________ (1) See: al-Ansari, Fawatih al-Rahmout. 2/301. (2) We will dedicate a discussion later - if Allah wills - to al-Shatibi's intended meaning of public interests. [Page 116] The second: It must be free from opposition and nullification. This means that the description should not be annulled. Nullification is the text that states the cancellation of the description, as in the fatwa regarding fasting for two consecutive months for the sultan who engaged in sexual relations during the month of Ramadan. As for opposition, it refers to the existence of another ruling or rulings that contradict or oppose the description. This is similar to the concession for breaking the fast and combining the two obligatory prayers while traveling for the indulgent king. These rulings opposed the description of hardship. Therefore, those who reason based on the appropriate must present the description against the principles, meaning against the rulings, to clarify its lack of opposition. Al-Bazdawi said: "Justice for us is the effect... Some of al-Shafi'i's companions said that his justice is based on being capable, then presenting it against the principles as a precaution for its safety from contradiction and opposition. Some of his companions said rather that his justice is based on presenting it against the principles, and if no principle contradicts or opposes it, it becomes just. It must be presented against two or more principles. According to the first view, it is permissible to act upon it before presentation, and according to the second, it is not permissible because it becomes a proof through it. According to the first opinion, it became a proof by being capable" (1). Then he said: "As for presenting it against the principles, it does not achieve the adjustment" (2) meaning according to him. The commentator in Kashf al-Asrar said: "The contradiction of the description: nullifying itself by an effect, text, or consensus that contradicts it, or presenting a case where the ruling deviates from the description. The opposition of the description: presenting another description that necessitates a contradiction to what that description required without addressing the description itself. The meaning of presenting the description against the principles is that it is compared with the laws of Sharia; if it matches and is free from nullifications and impediments, then the principles have testified to its validity and it has become a proof" (3). ________________ ******** Chapter Two The Emergence of the Idea of the Objectives of Sharia It contains a brief overview of the emergence of the idea, and three sections: Section One: The arguments that led to the idea of objectives. Section Two: The emergence of the idea of the objectives of Sharia. Section Three: The introduction to the idea of objectives according to Imam al-Shatibi. Chapter Two __________ (1) Al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazdawi. 4/513. (2) The same source, p. 519. (3) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar. 3/514. [Page 117] The Emergence of the Idea of the Objectives of the Sharia A brief overview of the emergence of the idea: I will present below a brief overview of the emergence of the idea, followed by a detailed explanation and documentation from the statements of the imams and their arguments, starting from where I left off in the previous chapter, namely the disagreement regarding the concept of suitability, whether it is a method of reasoning or not. It has been clarified - previously - the meaning of suitability, and that some of the imams adopted it as a method of reasoning - standing on its own - and set conditions for it, thus categorizing suitability into sections. Some others rejected its status as a method and considered it a condition for the validity of reasoning by description through any method used. Some made it a condition in certain methods but not others. The scholars of the Shafi'i school state that the suitable description in the ruling is one that is related to the presumption of being a reason, and presumption is applicable in legal matters; therefore, the method of suitability must be followed. The imams of the Hanafi school counter this by asserting that not all presumptions are legal, and they require that the description be influential for the reasoning to be accepted. If we take rulings such as the prohibition of usury or the obligation of zakat on certain wealth but not others, or the prohibition of men wearing gold and silk but not women, or the prohibition of using gold and silver utensils for food, the intellect seeks suitable descriptions in these rulings or the wisdom behind them. Those who advocate the method of suitability argue for reasoning based on these rulings. Those who oppose it consider this reasoning to be arbitrary without evidence, akin to mere opinion. They require that the description be influential, meaning that its effect must be established by evidence. Those who adopt this method have delved deeply into their research and elaborated on it in defense of it and others as well, such as the method of analogy. The debate intensified, particularly regarding the topic of the unspecific suitability or inference. [Page 118] As a result of this debate, al-Juwayni came up with the idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), which form the criteria for appropriate description. The assertion of an objective or objectives for the Sharia and the attachment of the appropriate description or meaning to this objective strengthens the reasoning based on description, as this allows for the application of the appropriate description according to the objectives of the Sharia. Or as his student al-Ghazali later expressed it, that the public interest (maslaha) should follow the established interests, which are the five universal principles. However, this idea did not negatively or positively affect the principles of those who reject this approach, namely the esteemed Hanafis. Therefore, we find them mentioning it by saying: "And they said." The idea of the objectives of the Sharia and reasoning based on the appropriate description necessitated another discussion. This is that the original principle in legal rulings is reasoning. Therefore, whatever does not have its reason established by the agreed-upon methods among most jurists, such as text, consensus, indication, and hint, must have a reason established for it if possible. If the ruling allows for reasoning, it must be reasoned. Al-Amidi elaborated on this principle, the disagreement regarding it, and the evidence for each group in his book al-Ihkam, while al-Razi discussed it in al-Mahsool, where al-Amidi affirmed the principle of reasoning, and al-Razi declared it invalid, even though he accepts analogy (qiyas) and reasoning and supports the approach of appropriateness. The reality of the matter— as will become clear— is that what al-Razi definitively deems invalid is reasoning concerning the essence of Allah, and I have referred to the meaning of reasoning according to him in the previous chapter(1). Then al-Shatibi came with his Muwafaqat, where he referred in the book of objectives— from his book al-Muwafaqat— to al-Razi's position and his rebuttal, affirming reasoning for the actions and rulings of Allah— Exalted is He— and that this is definitive. He said: "We have inferred from the Sharia that it was established for the interests of the servants, an inference that al-Razi and others do not dispute... If the inference indicates this and is beneficial for knowledge in such a matter, then we conclude that the matter is consistent in all details of the Sharia"(2). __________ (1) See p. 51. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/2 - 3. [Page 119] This amount of disagreement, like that between al-Razi and al-Shatibi, is where the former asserts the invalidity of the principle of reasoning, while the latter asserts its validity and its presence in all details of the Sharia. He firmly states that al-Razi is mistaken by saying: "Induction is something that neither al-Razi nor anyone else disputes," emphasizing the importance of the principle of reasoning and its significance for the method of suitability and for the use of general evidence. Therefore, it is necessary to address this principle with sufficient detail. It should be noted that there is a significant difference between the methodologies of al-Amidi and al-Shatibi regarding reasoning. There is also a distinction between al-Shatibi's concept of public interests (masalih) and harms (mafasid) and the concept of those who preceded him who spoke of reasoning based on public interests and harms. The following will clarify and document what we have presented. First Topic The arguments that led to the idea of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) The evolution of the debate from the method of suitability to general evidence: We previously discussed suitability as a method of reasoning. We covered the categories of suitable descriptions and their conditions, as well as the disagreement regarding them. The suitable description, according to those who advocate it, must be considered valid in Sharia, and its validity is established by the coming of a ruling in accordance with it. Thus, the ruling that attests to the description serves as a principle, and the description itself is the reason, making reasoning based on suitability akin to analogy (qiyas). [Page 120] And since this appropriate description is a hypothetical description and there is no evidence from the Sharia to indicate that it is a cause, those who do not accept the method of appropriate reasoning rejected the reasoning by the appropriate description altogether. On the other hand, most of those who reason by the appropriate description rejected reasoning by the transmitted (marasil) and the strange (gharib), and they spoke of the suitable (mulayim): which has been supported by many rulings, or at least two rulings. From the existence of evidence for the description and its abundance, they argued that the strength of the appropriate description comes from the fact that the rulings of the Sharia have been in accordance with it, or have testified to it, or that this description or meaning aligns with the principles of legal interests (masalih shar'iyya). Thus, a new issue arose, which is that considering this description in reasoning does not return to a specific origin, and consequently, it is not part of analogy (qiyas) because the existence of an origin is a pillar in analogy, and the origin is absent here. Hence, the expressions of unregulated interest (maslaha mursala) and unregulated reasoning (istidlal mursala) arise, which refers to a meaning that does not have a specific origin but whose meaning aligns with the principles of the Sharia (1). And what indicates this matter is what al-Juwayni mentioned in the types of analogy, where he said: "Legal consideration, and its categories (2): __________ (1) For example, al-Shatibi said: "Every legal origin that does not have a specific text supporting it and is suitable for the actions of the Sharia and whose meaning is derived from its evidence is valid and can be relied upon if that origin has become established by its collective evidence." Then he said: "This includes the type of unregulated reasoning that Malik and al-Shafi'i relied upon, for although it does not have a specific origin supporting the branch, it has a general origin supporting it." Al-Muwafaqat 1/16. As for his statement that the witness is a general origin that is established, it indicates that he does not suffice with mere abundance of witnesses but requires a beneficial abundance that leads to certainty. (2) The numbers: 1, 2, 3, 4, from the researcher, indicating that analogy in this classification has four categories. [Page 121] 1 - The inclusion of the unspoken matter with that which is explicitly stated and the differing with the agreed upon due to its similarity in meaning(1). 2 - Or the suspension of a ruling in a manner that is suggestive of it, appropriate to it in the context of the Sharia, while referring it back to an original where the ruling is established according to consideration. 3 - And linking a ruling as we have mentioned(2), without the observer finding an original with an agreed ruling that testifies to it, and this is what is called: inference (istidlal). 4 - And likening something to specific similarities that it encompasses without the obligation of it being suggestive of appropriateness, which is called analogy of resemblance (qiyas al-shabah)(3). These are the avenues of consideration in the Sharia"(4). The focus here is on the second and third categories, where the second refers to the path of appropriateness, stating: "while referring it back to an original where the ruling is established according to consideration," while the third states: "without the observer finding an original with an agreed ruling that testifies to it," and it is termed inference. Although inference is not analogy since it does not fulfill all its conditions, there is a closeness between them in that inference is linking a ruling in a manner according to the statement of al-Juwayni above; therefore, it is included in the categories of analogy, just as the first category is counted among the categories of analogy due to the inclusion of the unspoken matter with that which is explicitly stated. __________ (1) This category does not hold up to being called analogy, as there is no analogy of a branch to an original; rather, the unspoken matter takes the ruling of the stated one by the indication of the word, and it is not analogy. This is akin to the concept: what is understood from the word in a place other than the place of utterance. See: al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 3/63. This is like His saying, Exalted is He: { So do not say to them [even] "uff" } [al-Isra 23], thus hitting is prohibited because it is more deserving of prohibition than expressing annoyance towards them, this is from the concept because it is understood from the address and is not from the utterance of the address. This is not an analogy of hitting to annoyance, rather it is more deserving of the ruling than annoyance, and it is from the indications of language. See: al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 3/64. (2) As we have mentioned: that is, as we mentioned in the previous point, meaning: in a manner suggestive of it appropriate to it in the context of the Sharia, but it lacks the original. (3) We mentioned this category in the discussion of the paths of reasoning. pp. 65 - 66. (4) Al-Juwayni, al-Burhan. 2/514. Paragraph: 730. [Page 122] The meaning of reasoning (istidlal):(1) As has been clarified, the intended meaning of reasoning here is not its linguistic connotation, but rather it is a term that contrasts with inference (istinbat) and has emerged as a subject and influence in the science of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), incorporated into its discussions under the influence of logic and theology. The one who reasons - in this sense - does not derive a ruling based on the indications of texts, but rather imagines certain meanings that he sees as appropriate and proposes them, relying on the possibility of their acceptance by the Sharia in his view and the absence of any evidence that negates them. Therefore, we find al-Juwayni differentiating between the second and third categories mentioned earlier, stating in the first of them: "By referring it to an established origin in which the ruling is in accordance with the view," and in the second: "Without the observer finding an established origin with a consistent ruling that testifies to it, and this is what is called reasoning." __________ (1) It is mentioned in Lisan al-Arab by Ibn Manzur: "And the proof (dalil): what one uses to reason. The proof is the indicator - and it has guided him to the path, guiding him with indication and evidence, and the opening is the highest." 11/248. [Page 123] Al-Shawkani said in his definition of reasoning: "In their terminology, it is that which is neither a text, nor consensus, nor analogy" (1). He then said: "They differed regarding its types; it was said that there are three: the connection between the two rulings without specifying a reason, otherwise it would be analogy. The second: the presumption of continuity (istishab). The third: the legislation from before us. The Hanafis stated this. Among its types, there is a fourth type which is juristic preference (istihsan). The Malikis stated that among its types there is a fifth type which is the public interest (maslaha) that is not specified" (2). He said: "The public interest... was mentioned by a group of scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) in the discussions of reasoning, and for this reason, some called it the unrestricted reasoning, and Imam al-Haramayn and Ibn al-Sam'ani referred to it as reasoning" (3). Al-Amidi said: "As for its meaning in language, it is a verbal noun derived from seeking evidence and the guiding path to the desired, and as for in the terminology of jurists, it is sometimes used to mean mentioning the evidence, whether the evidence is a text, consensus, analogy, or otherwise, and it is sometimes used to refer to a specific type of evidence... which is an evidence that is neither a text, nor consensus, nor analogy... and it has various types" (4). He then mentioned types that are all related to logic and the method of arranging premises and deriving conclusions (5). Thus, reasoning is a type of evidence that is neither a text, nor consensus, nor analogy. What is meant here is the public interest, which resembles analogy and the method of suitability in that it connects a ruling to a suitable meaning, and it is not analogy and differs from suitability in that there is no original source that supports the meaning, but the meaning exists in many legal branches. __________ (1) Al-Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, p. 236. (2) The same source. (3) The same source, p. 241. (4) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, 4/361. (5) The same source, 4/361 - 366. [Page 124] It has been established previously that the appropriate analogy (al-mursala) in the method of analogy is not an absolute analogy; rather, it refers to what is considered valid. So why is there a distinction between them, and why is the reasoning not counted as a form of analogy (qiyas)? In other words, how can it be said that the valid appropriate meaning in reasoning, which links the ruling to it, does not have an original source (asl), while it is said that this meaning is applicable in many rulings? Can one of these rulings not be considered an original source, and the description or appropriate meaning within it be regarded as a cause, thus making the matter a case of analogy? The answer is: Yes, reasoning is based on the justification by an appropriate description, but it differs from the method of analogy in that this meaning is not derived from a specific ruling. If we were to relate it to a specific ruling, it would be analogy. However, when claiming an appropriate description in a specific ruling, it does not hold, as there may be other descriptions in the ruling that are more appropriate than it. Thus, it is not correct to justify the ruling by this meaning while neglecting what is more appropriate. This applies to other rulings as well. Therefore, it is said: there is no specific original source that supports it. Meanwhile, the valid meaning in reasoning, even if its existence or the strength of its appropriateness is weaker than others in each individual ruling, the abundance of its presence in the rulings leads to a stronger consideration of it, and it may make it an original source or a principle in legislation, rather than merely a cause in the ruling. When examining numerous rulings, it is noted that it is not specifically present in any one of them, but the observer feels that it is an original source or is realized in these meanings through their convergence. For this reason, reasoning does not revert to analogy or to the method of analogy, even though it is based on justification, because it lacks one of the pillars of analogy, which is the original source. [Page 125] The appropriate meaning in deriving a specific ruling from a principle may be considered an analogy (qiyas), but the existence of other rulings that support that meaning makes it a foundational principle in legislation. This, according to those who accept it, is stronger than analogy. For this reason, al-Shatibi said: "Every legal principle that does not have a specific text to support it and is compatible with the actions of the Sharia and whose meaning is derived from its evidences is valid and can be relied upon, provided that this principle has become established through its collective evidences. Because the evidences do not necessarily have to indicate certainty about the ruling in isolation without the addition of others to them, as previously mentioned. This is because that is nearly impossible. This includes the unqualified reasoning (istidlal al-mursal) that Malik and al-Shafi'i relied upon, for although it does not have a specific principle to support the branch, it has a general principle that supports it, and a definitive general principle may equal a specific principle and may even surpass it depending on the strength or weakness of the specific principle" (1). Al-Juwayni said: "I take those causes as my refuge and make the arguments close to them, even if they are not their specific instances, so that they are as if they are principles. The reasoning is considered valid. Considering meaning by meaning is preferable to considering form by form in a comprehensive sense" (2). Therefore, those who accept it responded to those who rejected it and said that it leads to reliance on reason and the wisdom of philosophers, stating: even if it does not have a supporting principle, it leads to reliance on reason and the wisdom of philosophers if we pursue it in an unregulated manner. If it is regulated by Sharia guidelines, then it is legitimate. These beneficial meanings, even if they do not have recognized meanings supporting them, are close to or similar to them. And even if they do not have specific principles supporting them, they are based on established foundational rulings, and even if those meanings are not established, their foundations are. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/16, and al-Shatibi's condition of certainty for considering the meaning is specific to him and his methodology. (2) Al-Juwayni, al-Burhan, 2/726, paragraph: 1142. [Page 126] Al-Juwayni said: "Al-Shafi'i and most of the followers of Abu Hanifa (may Allah be pleased with him) went to rely on reasoning even if it does not stem from an agreed-upon ruling in principle, but he does not permit deviation, distance, or excess; rather, he allows the suspension of rulings based on interests that he sees as similar to the recognized interests in agreement and to the interests based on established, firm rulings in the Sharia" (1). Al-Ghazali said: "Any interest that relates to the preservation of a legal objective known to be intended by the Book, the Sunnah, and consensus is not outside these principles; however, it is not called analogy (qiyas) but rather a remote interest (mursala). For analogy is a specific principle, and the fact that these meanings are intended is known not by a single proof but by many proofs that are countless from the Book and the Sunnah, and indications of circumstances and various signs, which is why it is called a remote interest. If we define interest as the preservation of the objectives of the Sharia, there is no room for disagreement about it; rather, it must be affirmed that it is a proof" (2). As an example of this, the meaning of preserving wealth, even if there is no specific ruling attesting to it—according to some observers—there are many rulings whose meanings return to the generality of this meaning. The prohibition of theft, the punishment for it, the prohibition of looting, embezzlement, and fraud, the prohibition of betrayal in the work of partners, the prohibition of extravagance and waste, the restriction of the foolish, the prohibition of misappropriation, the prohibition of consuming wealth unlawfully, the encouragement to fulfill trusts and to announce lost property, and others, all can indicate this general meaning and that it is considered in these rulings. This is stronger than relying on the ruling of the prohibition of theft—for example—to argue for the preservation of wealth as a reason of analogy and relevance in the path of relevance. Therefore, they made the preservation of wealth a principle that is observed and relied upon in legislation. Below is a statement of the arguments of both parties regarding the position on relevance and reasoning, and their rebuttals. Evidence of those who advocate for relevance and reasoning: __________ (1) The same source, 2/721. Paragraph: 1130. (2) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa. 1/311. [Page 127] The heated debate between those who accept and those who reject the approach of suitability and reasoning has led to the emergence of the concept of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) and its clarification. I will summarize below the evidence of those who advocate for it, then I will substantiate it with texts from the imams and subsequently clarify the responses of the refuters to show how the idea of the objectives emerged. Below are their arguments in summary: 1 - They stated that the texts and their meanings are insufficient for issues and events. And that no event is devoid of a ruling from Allah, Exalted is He, attributed to the Sharia of Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him). Therefore, it is necessary to provide reasoning for the rulings, and thus the principle in rulings is reasoning. This necessitates reasoning based on what is appropriate, and it requires a disciplined continuation in pursuing meanings. What does not have its reason established through the pathways of text, consensus, indication, and allusion, if an appropriate meaning appears in it, then it must be reasoned with unless it is abrogated or opposed. 2 - They said that the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) would elaborate on understanding the meanings of public interest (maslaha), and those who came after them followed this practice, without establishing criteria for what should be followed and what should not be followed from these meanings. This indicates the validity of this elaboration, provided that these meanings and interests are derived from the sources of the Sharia. The evidence is established in the actions of the Companions. 3 - They said that the appropriate descriptions and meanings, and those similar to them, are matters that relate to conjecture regarding their causes. The legal rulings are derived from conjecture, so the reasoning based on appropriateness is thus legal, as is the evidence. Below are the texts that indicate this: Al-Juwayni said: "As for al-Shafi'i, he said: 'We know with certainty that no incident is devoid of the ruling of Allah, Exalted is He.'"(1) And he said: "The previous imams did not leave any incident, despite the multitude of issues and the abundance of judgments and fatwas, without the ruling of Allah, Exalted is He... Based on this, we know that they - may Allah be pleased with them - proceeded in establishing rulings with confidence in their applicability to incidents, actively seeking to affirm them in what arises and occurs."(2) __________ (1) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan. 2/723, paragraph: 1133. (2) Al-Juwayni, al-Burhan. 2/723, paragraph: 1133. [Page 128] He said: "If the sources of evidence were limited to the texts and the meanings derived from them, the door of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) would not be wide enough, for the texts and their attributed meanings do not constitute more than a room from the sea of the Sharia. If those who came before had not relied on meanings in situations they had not encountered before, their abstention from issuing rulings would have exceeded their engagement, and this, if it coincided with a confirmation, would leave no room for the deniers of inference to be unsettled" (1). He said: "Then al-Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him) supported this by saying: Whoever examines the conditions of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them), who are the role models in reasoning, will not find any one of them in the councils of deliberation establishing a principle or deriving a meaning and then building a case upon it. Rather, they delve into various opinions without regard to whether the principles existed or not. Therefore, if the vastness of ijtihad is established, and it is impossible to limit what is vast to the texts, and in addition to that, the scholars among the Companions did not concern themselves with seeking the principles, all of this leads to the conclusion of inference" (2). __________ (1) The same source. (2) The same source, 2/723 - 724. Paragraph: 1134. [Page 129] He said: "It has become clear to us that they - may Allah be pleased with them - in the long ages and extended periods did not confine themselves to fixed opinions, but rather they would engage in reasoning as those who do not see a limit to the avenues of opinion, and they viewed the paths of consideration as not restricted. Then the later generations would follow the earlier ones and did not concern themselves with mentioning limited avenues that could not be exceeded. Thus, we know by necessity of reason that they were receiving meanings and benefits from the sources of the Sharia that they relied upon in incidents where there were no texts. If they presumed something and their opinion was not contradicted by a principle from the principles of the Sharia, they would apply it, and it became clear that they were not seeking certain knowledge but were content with presuming something as knowledge"(1). Al-Ghazali said: "There is no way to limit oneself to the influential factor because what is sought is the predominance of presumption. Whoever examines the analogies (qiyas) of the Companions - may Allah be pleased with them - and their juristic efforts knows that they did not condition every analogy on the cause being known through text and consensus"(2). He said: "We have not seen from the consensus of the Companions - may Allah be pleased with them - anything other than following the predominant opinion, and they did not specify the types of predominance of presumption nor did they distinguish one type from another"(3). Al-Amidi said: "If it is established that the rulings were legislated for the interests of the servants, then if we see a legislated ruling that entails a matter of public interest (maslaha), it must either be that this is the objective of legislating the ruling, or it is something that has not been made apparent to us. It cannot be what has not been made apparent to us, otherwise the legislation of the ruling would be merely an act of devotion, which contradicts the principle(4) as previously established. Therefore, it remains that it is legislated for what has been made apparent. And if this is presumed, then it must be acted upon, because presumption is obligatory to follow in the Sharia."(5) Al-Razi said: "We say: the relationship (munasaba) provides an indication of causality, and it is obligatory to act upon this indication."(6) Responses of the Refuters of the Method of Appropriateness and Induction: __________ (1) The same source, 2/527, paragraph: 760. (2) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa. 2/299. (3) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, p. 301. (4) And that the basis of rulings and their reasoning. (5) Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam 3/250. (6) Al-Razi, Al-Mahsool. 5/172. [Page 130] The Hanafi scholars rejected the approach of analogy, in addition to the evidence, and deemed it invalid as it does not yield a legally acceptable presumption. Below are some texts they use to refute the aforementioned proofs: As for the texts and their meanings not being sufficient for the issues and occurrences, since the texts are finite and the occurrences are infinite, the former cannot draw from the latter like a drop from the ocean. Sheikh Muhibullah ibn Abd al-Shakur said: "This is what is called public interest (maslaha mursala), which is considered a proof by Malik, while the preferred view among the majority is to reject it. Our argument is: there is no proof without consideration, even if it follows the path of reason. They said: First: If consideration were not taken, many occurrences would be left unaddressed. We say: we deny the necessity of this conclusion because the generalities and analogies are comprehensive. Furthermore, the absence of a specific proof serves as a basis for permissibility (1). Second: The Companions were content with considering public interests. We say: rather, they only considered what they were aware of regarding the type or nature of it (2). The commentator on al-Tahrir, Ibn Humam al-Iskandari, a Hanafi, said: "This category known as public interest (maslaha mursala) is preferred to be rejected, as there is no proof for consideration, thus it must be rejected. They said: many occurrences would be left unaddressed. We say: we deny the necessity of this conclusion, meaning we do not concede that the absence of consideration leads to occurrences being devoid of rulings, as the generalities and analogies are comprehensive. Even if it were absent, the negation of every specific proof entails that its ruling is original permissibility, meaning if in a particular incident there is no source from the four evidences, one acts according to a general principle established in the Sharia by consensus, which is original permissibility, as it is the default for things (3). __________ (1) That is, the default for things is permissibility unless there is evidence for prohibition. (2) Al-Ansari, Fawatih al-Rahmout. 2/266. (3) Amir Badshah, Taysir al-Tahrir on al-Tahrir, 3/315, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya - Beirut. [Page 131] As for what they said regarding the principle that the basis of rulings is reasoning, if a reason is not established by text, consensus, or indication and hint, and the suitability is apparent, then reasoning must be applied. The Hanafi scholars have also rejected this. Imam Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari said: "The criterion of distinction is a condition for us just as it is a condition for them. However, for them, the criterion of distinction is the cause, while for us it is the effect... But we need, before that, that is, before clarifying the distinction and beginning the reasoning, to establish evidence that the original matter we want to reason about is a witness, that is, it is reasoned in the present case and is not limited to its instance, but its ruling extends to others, just as the ruling established from the two paths extends to the pierced navel by consensus, so reasoning may be applied to it after the evidence has been established that it is a cause, because the original in the texts, although it is reasoning, is established through the apparent, and we have found from the texts that are not reasoned by consensus, and it is possible that this specific text is among that group, so it is not permissible to rely on that principle and impose it on others with this possibility" (1). Al-Bazdawi said: "We do not accept the argument based on the principle that reasoning is fundamental in the texts, but it is necessary to establish evidence that this specific text is indeed reasoned" (2). As for their claim that the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) reasoned based on suitable descriptions and beneficial meanings and that they built rulings on meanings close to beneficial meanings, they rejected it. Al-Ansari said: "They also said: The Companions were content with considering benefits, and they were not denied, thus it became consensus. We say: Their being content with it is disputed. Rather, they only considered as causes what they were aware of regarding the consideration of its type or its kind in the type of ruling or its kind. This requires you to conduct an investigation until the reality becomes clear to you" (3). __________ (1) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar. 3/436. (2) Al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazduri. 3/438. (3) Al-Ansari, Fawatih al-Rahmut, 2/266. [Page 132] As for their statement that the appropriate description or inference leads to conjecture, and that conjecture is applicable in legal matters, they also rejected it. Al-Bazdawi said: "As for imagination, it is a false matter because it is mere conjecture without any reality, and it is internal and does not serve as evidence against the opponent nor as a legal proof" (1). He also said in Kashf al-Asrar: "As for imagination... it is a false matter because it is merely a form of conjecture, as imagination and conjecture are one and the same, and conjecture does not provide anything of truth. It cannot be said that conjecture is considered in the law in terms of the obligation to act upon it like the report of a single narrator or analogy, for we say that what is considered is that which has a definitive proof for its obligation to act upon it, not mere conjecture, and there is no proof here for its consideration in the law, thus it must be disregarded" (2). Al-Ansari said: "Contrary to the Hanafis, who do not accept imagination at all, because although it may lead to conjecture, it is not binding according to what the legislator has established... And if it does not lead to the conjecture of the legislator's consideration, it is not a legal proof; rather, it is merely a product of the mind and thus not considered. Perhaps this is what al-Nasafi meant, that it is mere conjecture, meaning it is not the conjecture of the legislator's consideration, so it does not provide anything of truth. If you say: 'Imagination certainly leads to conjecture and consensus has been established on the consideration of conjecture,' he said: 'The consensus on acting upon conjecture is only on the condition that it is - that is, conjecture - legal and derived from the law, and a conjecture for the consideration of the legislator'" (3). He also said, quoting Imam al-Nasafi: "The fact that the description is imaginative, meaning it evokes in the heart the imagination of correctness: it does not provide anything of truth, and its utmost is to be like inspiration. It is not a valid proof" (4). The second section The emergence of the idea of the objectives of the Sharia The intensification of the debate: __________ (1) Al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazdawi. 3/518. (2) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar 3/518. (3) Al-Ansari, Fawatih al-Rahmut, 2/301. (4) The same source. [Page 133] This debate between the two parties, one presenting evidence and the other refuting it, weakens the position of those who adopt the approach of analogy (qiyas) and reasoning. Their weak position can be summarized in one point, which is that considering a specific description in a particular ruling and claiming it as a cause is an arbitrary judgment without evidence. Consequently, it relies on mere rational conjecture, which is not a legal conjecture. This leads to the weakness of their position in reasoning, as it is based on considering appropriate descriptions in numerous rulings. The refuters said: "The utmost that can be said in this regard is that the texts may align with the description, resulting in numerous parallels, and with numerous parallels, strength in the description is not achieved." (1) __________ (1) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar. 3/513. [Page 134] This debate led to further research, reflection, and deepening of understanding. Al-Juwayni (may Allah have mercy on him) defended the approach of analogy (qiyas) and the use of reasoning, accusing those who rejected them of a lack of understanding of these principles. He responded to the claim that it rules without evidence and relies on reason, stating that this only applies to those who do not follow al-Shafi'i's (may Allah be pleased with him) method in this regard. He said about Abu Hanifa (may Allah be pleased with him) and his companions: "In general, they have neither a little nor a lot of knowledge of the principles of jurisprudence. If one of them establishes a ruling for a matter, we will refute it in the details of the branches, for their companion did not base his rulings on principles, but rather he issued them based on what came to him. Thus, whoever among his companions wants to organize his rulings according to a principle will find himself contradicting in the details of the branches" (1). He also said: "As for Abu Hanifa, we do not deny his sharp intellect and the quality of his mind in grasping the nature of transactions and the ranks of governance. He is excellent in this field and adept at formulating issues well, but he is not knowledgeable about the principles of the Sharia, which for him are divided into an origin he is ignorant of or has overlooked and forgotten, and another that he adhered to and understood. He approached the categorization of chapters as one who did not draw from the foundations. It is remarkable that he did not take care to gather reports and narrations to base his issues upon, but rather he connects the branches based on what he sees and then seeks support from what he reaches in agreement" (2). __________ (1) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan. 2/587. Paragraph: 784. (2) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan. 2/748. Paragraph: 1180. This statement from al-Juwayni (may Allah have mercy on him) can only be seen as an unjust accusation against Abu Hanifa (may Allah have mercy on him) and his companions. My aim here is not to discuss this accusation, but I will quickly point out its fallacy. It is refuted by the very text that affirms the sharp intellect of the greatest Imam and the quality of his mind. Furthermore, we have not found what al-Juwayni claimed, that Abu Hanifa's companions have neither a little nor a lot of knowledge of the principles, but rather we found them, like others, to be leaders and scholars, and they are the ones who were called jurists (fuqaha) in contrast to the theologians (mutakallimun). As for the claim that Abu Hanifa is not knowledgeable about the principles... etc., it is countered by the stability of the school and the acceptance of the community over hundreds of years. Were it not for the fact that the school is based on principles and foundational rules and systematic reasoning, it would have faded away and would not have lasted even a single generation. The fact that the science of the principles of jurisprudence was not established with its rules, limits, and conditions until the time of Imam al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) and afterward does not harm Abu Hanifa (may Allah have mercy on him). If it were harmful to him, it would also be harmful to the Companions, the Followers, and all the Imams before him, which is not the case. We do not think there is any reason for this injustice from al-Juwayni except the intensity of the debate and the strength of the arguments of his opponents, which narrowed his perspective and blocked his avenues of reasoning, prompting him to attack his opponents in opinion. Therefore, we see him saying what he says about Abu Hanifa and his companions (may Allah be pleased with them), and we will see some of that regarding Malik and his companions (may Allah be pleased with them), and we will see him praising al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) greatly. [Page 135] The strong arguments of the followers of Abu Hanifa (may Allah be pleased with him) may have led al-Juwayni to further research and delve deeper until he presented the idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) in the form that we will explain, and thus it is presumed that he was the first to articulate it in this manner. Al-Juwayni discusses the claim that reasoning is a form of adjudicating opinion in the Sharia, saying: "As for what the judge(1) mentioned regarding the matter being beyond regulation and resorting to the dissolution and returning the matter to the opinions of those with sound minds, this only applies to Malik (may Allah be pleased with him) and his followers if what has been narrated about him is correct"(2). He said about Malik (may Allah have mercy on him): "His opinion establishes benefits that are distant from the usual benefits and the known meanings in the Sharia, and this led him to innovate killing and taking wealth based on benefits that are likely to be required, even if he did not find a basis for those benefits in the principles, and there is no stopping at that; rather, the opinion is his, whatever he sees fit, and it is detached from the suspicions and interests"(3). He then said: "We say to Malik (may Allah have mercy on him): Is it permissible to rely on every opinion? If he refuses, we find no reference to settle upon except for the approximation that al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) accepted, and if he did not mention regulation and stated that what has no text or basis is returned to unregulated opinion and the approval of those with intellect, this is indeed a great intrusion and a departure from regulation"(4). Then he said: "This is a difficult position that no believer would dare to take, and its course is to return the matter to the minds of the wise and the judgments of the judges, and we are certain that the matter is contrary to that... If what Malik (may Allah be pleased with him) said—if it is correct—were permissible, the wise during the time of Khosrow Anushirvan would have taken justice and governance(5) as their criterion, and this leads to chaos that cannot be independently managed. If Malik (may Allah have mercy on him) and his followers approach the opinion from the established principles in the Sharia, then what they have brought forth is the doctrine of al-Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him)"(6). __________ (1) The judge: Abu Bakr al-Baqillani. (2) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan. 2/725, paragraph: 1138. (3) The same source, p: 721, paragraph: 1128. (4) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan, 2/725 - 726, paragraphs: 1139 - 1141. (5) Governance: The king governs his subjects with governance. And to govern the people is to take care of them. And to manage wealth is to rectify and govern it. Al-Fayruzabadi, Al-Qamus Al-Muhit p: 1244. (6) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan, 2/725 - 726, paragraphs: 1139 - 1141. [Page 136] Therefore, al-Juwayni criticizes those who rely on inference, and he emphasizes the need to adhere to established principles in the Sharia. He said: "As for al-Shafi'i, he is the most knowledgeable of Allah's creation regarding the principles of the Sharia and the most precise in them, and the most astute and quick-witted in deriving them and applying them appropriately and arranging them in their ranks... However, his time was short and his opportunity limited... and he passed away at just over fifty, and that period did not allow for more than the mastery of the principles therein, so it was easy for his companions to build upon them"(1). He said: "If it is asked: What is the meaning of the approximation that you attributed to al-Shafi'i? We say: This is the crux of the matter, and we say: There are established principles with known reasons that the jurists have agreed upon, and al-Shafi'i said: I take those reasons as my refuge and I make the inferences close to them even if their specific instances are not present, so that they are as if they are, for example, principles and the inferences are considered based on them, and considering the meaning by meaning in approximation is preferable to considering one form by another in a comprehensive sense"(2). He said: "Al-Shafi'i and most of the companions of Abu Hanifa (may Allah be pleased with them both) went to rely on inference even if it did not stem from a unanimously agreed-upon ruling in principle, but he does not permit distance, excess, or extremism; rather, it is permissible to link rulings to interests that he sees as similar to the recognized interests in agreement and to the interests based on rulings that are firmly established in the Sharia"(3). He also said: "Not every public interest (maslaha) is an accepted face."(4) __________ (1) The same source, p. 749, paragraph: 1182. (2) The same source, p. 726, paragraph: 1142. (3) The same source, 2/721, paragraph: 1130. (4) The same source, p. 527, paragraph: 760. [Page 137] Among this is the statement of his student al-Ghazali: "As for public interest (maslaha), it originally refers to bringing benefit and repelling harm, and we do not mean that. For bringing benefit and repelling harm are the objectives of creation and the welfare of creation in achieving their objectives. Rather, we mean by public interest the preservation of the objectives of the Sharia, and the objectives of the Sharia concerning creation are five: to preserve their religion, their lives, their intellect, their lineage, and their wealth. Everything that involves the preservation of these five foundational principles is considered public interest, and everything that jeopardizes the preservation of these five foundational principles is considered corruption, and repelling it is public interest. When we use the terms 'appropriate' and 'suitable' in the book of analogy, we mean this category" (1). He said: "The fact that these meanings are intended is known not by one proof but by many countless proofs... And if we define public interest as the preservation of the objectives of the Sharia, there is no room for disagreement on it, and it must be established as a proof" (2). This defense of the approach of appropriateness and the idea of inference led to the emergence of the concept of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) in the hands of al-Juwayni. It was later crystallized by his student al-Ghazali, based on texts such as: "Considering the meaning by the meaning in approximation," "interests similar to the recognized interests by consensus," "interests based on established and fixed rulings in the Sharia," and "intended meanings known not by one proof but by many countless proofs from the Book and the Sunnah" (3). The classification of rulings according to their outcomes or their public interests: The assertion of these objectives is based on presenting the Sharia, that is, its rulings, in a manner that highlights its care for public interests. In other words, it is based on adapting the Sharia in a way that supports the claim of the validity of considering appropriateness, whether it is a specific analogy in a ruling or a general one. __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa. 1/286. (2) The same source, 1/311. (3) See the texts mentioned above from al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali. [Page 138] It is redundant to mention, after it has become clear, that Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (may Allah have mercy on him) was the first to attempt to establish the validity of reasoning by appropriate description through the adaptation of the Sharia for the purpose of examining it in light of its objectives of public interest (maqasid al-sharia) - and Allah knows best - where he categorized the rulings according to their purposes or objectives or meanings into five categories. The matter later evolved, at the hands of the supporters of this methodology, into three categories along with their complements, which are the necessities, the needs, and the embellishments, along with the complements of each. He stated under the title: "On the classifications of the causes and principles": "What these individuals have mentioned are the principles of the Sharia(1). We categorize it into five categories: "One of them is what is rationally understood and is a foundation. The rational meaning of it leads to a necessary matter that must be adhered to, and this is akin to the ruling of the Sharia regarding the obligation of retribution (qisas) at its proper time, as it is justified by the preservation of the sanctity of blood and the deterrence against aggression towards it. When the observer who derives rulings clarifies this in the foundation of retribution, he can apply it and extend it to where the foundation of this meaning is realized, which facilitates the justification of its origin... It has also been established in the Sharia that when the foundations are firmly established, there is no need to seek the realization of its meaning in individual cases."(2) He said in this section: "And it is that which is based on necessity"(3). This section is what was later referred to as the necessities, which are the essential universals: the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. __________ (1) The term "principles of Sharia (usul al-sharia)" here refers to the legal rulings, as a legal ruling that is reasoned is a principle upon which analogical reasoning (qiyas) is based, and it is one of the pillars of qiyas. Likewise, if it is a subject of inquiry and examination to understand its objective or reason. (2) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan. 2/602, paragraph: 901. (3) The same source, p. 604, paragraph: 906. [Page 139] "The second type: that which pertains to public need and does not reach the level of necessity. This is like the validation of rental agreements, which are based on the pressing need for housing while being unable to own it and the reluctance of its owners to provide it as a loan. This is a clear need that does not reach the level of necessity prescribed in sales and others" (1). Al-Juwayni has classified sales under the first type. This section is what has been termed the rank of needs. "The third type: that which does not pertain to an urgent necessity or a public need, but it indicates an objective in seeking a virtue or in negating its opposite. It is permissible for this category to include the purification from ritual impurity and the removal of filth" (2). This section is what has been termed the improvements. "The fourth type: that which is not based on need or necessity, and the attainment of its objective is explicitly recommended from the outset" (3). This section resembles the third in that it does not rely on necessity or public need and is considered recommended. It differs from it in that the third is supported by innate inclinations such as cleanliness, and its attainment does not fall outside the first and second types, such as the writing of a contract by a slave and his meeting with his owner regarding his ownership, which goes against the principle that the slave is owned by the master" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 2/602, paragraph: 902. (2) The same source, p. 602, paragraph: 901. (3) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan, p. 603, paragraph: 904. (4) The same source, paragraph: 904, and see p. 616, paragraph: 931. [Page 140] "The fifth category: that which does not present any meaning at all to the jurist (mustanbit), nor any necessity or need or encouragement towards a virtue. This is very rarely the case. For if it is impossible to derive a specific meaning, it does not prevent one from conceiving a general one. An example of this category is purely physical acts of worship. They do not relate to any defensive or beneficial purposes. However, it may be said that the continuity of these acts maintains the worshippers' flexibility in adhering to the rules of submission, and the renewal of the covenant through the remembrance of Allah, Exalted is He, serves as a deterrent against immorality and wrongdoing. This applies in general, and when the discussion in this category reaches determinations such as the number of units of prayer (rak'ahs) and similar matters, the one making the analogy (qiyas) does not hope to derive a meaning that necessitates the determination in matters whose origins cannot be analogized" (1). Al-Razi referred to this classification in Al-Mahsool, following al-Juwayni in it (2). After al-Juwayni, scholars began to classify the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) into three categories: necessary, need-based, and complementary. Each category has its own supplements or complements. This does not mean the elimination of some of the five categories mentioned by al-Juwayni, but rather their inclusion within the three. __________ (1) The same source, p. 604, paragraph: 905. (2) Al-Razi, Al-Mahsool 5/ 159 - 162. [Page 141] Al-Amidi said: "The purpose of the legislation of rulings... cannot be anything other than being among the necessary objectives (maqasid al-daruriyyah) or not among the necessary objectives. If it is among the necessary objectives, then it is either a fundamental principle or not a fundamental principle. If it is a fundamental principle, it pertains to the five objectives that no community or law has ever neglected, which are: the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and wealth. The preservation of these five objectives is among the necessities and represents the highest ranks of appropriateness. The limitation to these five types is based on reality and the knowledge of the absence of any necessary objective outside of them in practice... And if it is not a fundamental principle, it is the supplementary aspect that complements the necessary objective, such as the emphasis on preserving intellect by prohibiting even a small amount of intoxicants that lead to larger quantities... And if the objective is not among the necessary objectives, it is either something that people need or something that people do not need. If it is something that people need, then it is either a fundamental principle or not a fundamental principle. If it is a fundamental principle, it is the second category that pertains to additional needs, such as the authority of a guardian to marry off a minor not due to a necessity that compels it, but out of need... And if it is not a fundamental principle, it is the supplementary aspect that serves as a completion and fulfillment of the second category, such as observing compatibility and the customary dowry in the marriage of a minor, as it leads to the continuity of marriage and the fulfillment of its objectives... And if the objective is not among the additional needs, it is the third category, which pertains to improvement and adornment and the observance of the best practices of customs and transactions, such as depriving slaves of the capacity to bear witness, as a slave is of lower status and rank because he is subjugated to the owner and occupied with serving him, thus it is not befitting for him to hold the position of testimony due to its honor and great significance, following what people are accustomed to and consider among the virtues of customs" (1). Such a classification of the objectives of rulings is based on two matters: __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ahkam. 3/240 - 241. [Page 142] The first: The reality of people as individuals and as a community. A person is in need, and these needs can be divided into these categories. Some of them must be secured or fulfilled and satisfied, and if they are not satisfied, it leads to death or to a significant corruption of life and relationships. Some of them, if not satisfied, cause the person to suffer from hardship, difficulties, and distress. And some, if not satisfied, do not lead to this or that, but they are what the soul inclines towards or what the body requires. Based on this reality, a person is driven to satisfy and fulfill these needs. This drive increases and strengthens according to the intensity of the need. And since a person is a social being, and everyone is driven to achieve satisfaction and is keen on it, they need a system or law that organizes the relationships between people and the ways of satisfaction, clarifying for each of them their rights, powers, restrictions, and obligations. By nature, a person views what fulfills their needs or satisfies their instincts, or what leads to that, as a benefit or interest, and views what corrupts their fulfillment of needs and satisfaction of instincts or prevents them from that, and what causes them pain or leads to that, as a corruption and harm. The second: An examination of the rulings of Islam and the conditions of the societies in which Islam was applied shows that Islam came with commands and prohibitions that lead to the satisfaction of these needs in varying degrees, which results in the security of the individual and their tranquility, as well as the security, prosperity, and advancement of society. [Page 143] However, this presentation of the Sharia (Islamic law) serves to indicate what the application of the Sharia leads to for the individual and society, and it indicates that bringing about benefits and averting harms are results, or among the results, of applying the Sharia. Therefore, the objection and response to those who adopt the path of suitability and reasoning, and this methodology in considering the description or the beneficial meaning, remains the same; rather, this argument may provide them with further evidence for their rebuttal. It is necessary, according to the Hanafi (school of thought), to establish that these results or benefits are intended by the legislator, and this can only be proven by a legal evidence. Furthermore, the objective of the legislator in the ruling is a result of its application; so is the result of the ruling or its cause a reason for it? Thus, the matter has remained a subject of significant contention and debate. Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi said: "The correct view is that this is not a proof because it is not known from the legislator that he preserves lives by every means; therefore, mutilation was not legislated even though it is the most effective deterrent and warning, nor was killing legislated for theft or drinking alcohol. If a ruling is established for a benefit among these benefits, it is not known that the Sharia preserves that benefit by establishing that ruling, as it would be placing the Sharia based on opinion and ruling by pure reason." (1) For example, cutting off the hand of the thief leads to the reduction or elimination of theft, and it leads to the preservation of wealth, which is one of the essential objectives. However, this objective, which is the preservation of wealth, does not serve as a reason for cutting off the hand of the thief, because the usurper, the embezzler, and the fraudster are not punished by the Sharia, even though this objective exists in the prohibition of embezzlement, usurpation, and fraud. __________ (1) Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi, Rawdat al-Nazir wa Jannat al-Manazir. p: 150. [Page 144] Therefore, this idea - the idea of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) - has not negatively or positively affected the principles of the Hanafi school (madhhab). Al-Ansari said: "The Hanafis do not accept the concept of istihsan (juridical preference) at all, because although it may lead to a presumption, it is not binding on the legislator (Shari) according to what it indicates. It is also not presumed that the legislator has established it for the sake of the many exceptions, as in cases of known cancellation, such as arduous crafts, which are more suitable for alleviation than the hardship of travel. However, the legislator considered the former and disregarded the latter. As for the public interests (masalih mursala), they are also suitable, but they have not been considered in the Sharia. If they do not lead to a presumption of the legislator's consideration, they are not a legal proof but rather a product of the whims of the mind and thus are not considered. Perhaps this is what Nasafi meant, that there is no presumption of the legislator's consideration, which does not contribute anything to the truth. If you say: istihsan certainly leads to presumption and consensus has been established on the consideration of presumption, he said: the consensus on acting upon presumption is only on the condition that it is - that is, the presumption - legally established from the direction of the Sharia and a presumption according to the legislator" (1). As for what the proponents of the argument have said regarding the idea of maqasid, that the meaning has led to many rulings in accordance with it, it is stronger than analogy (qiyas) and serves as a basis for legislation. They have referred to the testimony of the rulings as being in accordance with the principles or conforming to the principles, but the Hanafis have also rejected this. The commentator on the principles of al-Bazdawi said: "As for the texts being in accordance with the description, it results in a multitude of similarities, and with the multitude of similarities, strength in the description is not achieved" (2). __________ (1) Al-Ansari, Fawatih al-Rahmut 2/301. (2) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar 3/512, and the intended modification refers to the establishment of the effect of the description. [Page 145] Thus, the disagreement remained as it was, returning to the dispute over how to consider wisdom (hikmah), public interest (maslaha), or objectives (maqasid). Those who reject reasoning based on appropriate descriptions see this consideration as a mere imaginary notion or a mental obsession, a conjecture that is not supported by the sacred law, and therefore has no validity. From here, the arguments of those who justify based on objectives emerged, asserting that reasoning is a legal necessity and that it is the foundation of rulings. Accordingly, reasoning based on beneficial meanings is not mere arbitrariness but rather a legal conjecture because it is the foundation; otherwise, the ruling would be merely an act of devotion, which contradicts the principle. This is the subject of the next section. Section Three An Introduction to the Idea of Objectives (Maqasid) According to al-Shatibi A brief overview of this section: The main topic of this section is the principle of reasoning, that is, the assertion that the foundation of rulings is reasoning. Some jurists have relied on the idea that the Sharia is based on bringing about benefits and preventing harms in order to establish certain pathways in reasoning, particularly the pathway of appropriateness. Establishing this reasoning necessitated proving several issues: First: ... proving that Allah, Exalted is He, does not act except for a purpose or wisdom, and His legislation is a result of His actions, thus establishing that the legal rulings are reasoned. Since some legal rulings cannot be expected to have known reasons, such as numbers, quantities, and shares, it cannot be said that rulings are reasoned; rather, it should be said that the foundation of rulings is reasoning. Second: ... that wisdom must be a benefit and not a harm, and the benefit either pertains to Allah, Exalted is He, or to the servant. Allah, Exalted is He, is free from benefits and harms, so the benefit must pertain to the servant. [Page 146] The third: ... If we find a legal ruling that entails a certain benefit, the assertion that Allah - Exalted is He - legislated this ruling for this benefit is a conjecture, and Allah has commanded us regarding conjecture, so this conjecture is legal, and the reasoning based on this benefit is legal reasoning. The debates regarding the first and second issues have led to theological discussions related to the creation of actions and attributes. Some, like al-Amidi, for example, argued that the rulings are justified by the benefits of the servants and that this is based on occurrence and consensus. The Mu'tazila also held this view, asserting it as a necessity. Al-Razi firmly rejected the notion of justifying Allah's actions and rulings, and he established the justification of benefits for the rulings without needing a foundational justification. Then came al-Shatibi, who countered al-Razi's position and firmly established the justification of actions and rulings in all details of the Sharia, but in a manner different from that adopted by his predecessors in order to prove this principle. Thus, we are faced with three different approaches to establishing the justification of rulings by means of wisdoms and benefits: the first is that of al-Amidi, the second is that of al-Razi, and the third is that of al-Shatibi. As for the approach of the Mu'tazila, its subject is not analogy (qiyas) or objectives (maqasid), but rather the necessity of doing what is best in relation to Allah, which is a rejected claim because Allah does what He wills and decrees what He wants, and His actions and decrees are the measure and cannot be compared to anything. As for the third issue, which is that Allah - Exalted is He - has commanded us regarding conjecture, and whether this ruling is legislated for this benefit is a legal or non-legal conjecture, the opinions on this have been clarified in the previous discussion, and they will be referenced here to the extent that the research necessitates. [Page 147] Evidence of those who affirm the principle of reasoning: A group of the imams of usul (principles of jurisprudence), after dividing the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) into necessities, needs, and enhancements, sought to establish evidence for this reasoning. Al-Amidi said under the title (Establishing evidence that suitability and consideration are proof that the description is a reason): "The rulings were legislated for the interests of the servants. As for the fact that they were legislated for objectives and purposes, this is indicated by consensus and reason. The consensus is that the jurists are unanimous that the rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, are not devoid of wisdom and purpose, even if they differ on whether this is by way of obligation, as the Mu'tazila said, or by way of agreement and occurrence without obligation, as our companions said. As for reason, it is that Allah, Exalted is He, is wise in His creation. The consideration of purpose in His creation must either be obligatory or not obligatory: if it is obligatory, then it is not devoid of purpose; and if it is not obligatory, then acting for the purpose is closer to being in accordance with reason than acting without purpose. Thus, the purpose is necessarily inferred from His actions, and if the purpose is necessary in His creation, then the rulings are from His creation, and they are for a purpose and objective. The purpose must either return to Allah, Exalted is He, or to the servants. There is no way to the former due to His transcendence above harm and benefit, and because it contradicts consensus, so only the latter remains." (1) __________ (1) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 3/250. It is noteworthy in this text and similar ones that the establishment of the principle of reasoning has shifted the discussion of the reason from the meaning that the legislator has made a reason for the ruling to discussions related to the essence of Allah. [Page 148] Then he said: "Moreover, the rulings are what the Messenger brought, and they were a mercy to the worlds due to His saying, Exalted is He: { And We have not sent you except as a mercy to the worlds } (1). If the rulings were devoid of wisdom that returns to the worlds, they would not be a mercy but rather a punishment, as the obligation of adhering to them would be mere toil and hardship. Also, His saying, Exalted is He: { And My mercy encompasses all things } (2). If the legislation of the rulings concerning the servants was not for a wisdom, it would be a punishment, not a mercy for the reasons mentioned. Furthermore, his saying, peace and blessings be upon him: "There is no harm and no harming in Islam" (3). If the obligation of the rulings were not for a wisdom that returns to the servants, then their legislation would be pure harm, and that would be contrary to Islam, which is against the text" (4). Then al-Amidi concluded with the result, saying: "And if it is established that the rulings were legislated for the interests of the servants, then if we see a legislated ruling that entails a beneficial matter, it must either be that this is the objective of legislating the ruling, or that which is not apparent to us. The objective cannot be that which is not apparent to us; otherwise, the legislation of the ruling would be mere obedience, which is contrary to the principle, as previously established. Therefore, it remains that it is legislated for what has become apparent. If this is presumed, then it must be acted upon, because presumption is obligatory to follow in the Sharia, and this is indicated by the consensus of the Companions on acting upon presumption and the obligation to follow it in legal rulings" (5). __________ (1) Al-Anbiya, 107. (2) Al-A'raf, 156. (3) The hadith: "There is no harm and no harming" was narrated by Ibn Majah (2331) and (2332), Ahmad in the Musnad (2719), and Malik in the Muwatta (1234). It is authentic due to the abundance of its supporting evidence, and the addition in "Islam" is from the narration of al-Tabarani in al-Awsat. See: Nasb al-Rayah by al-Zayla'i, 4/386. (4) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 3/250. (5) The same source. [Page 149] After that, al-Amidi began to respond to the objections that arise against this approach in reasoning and to the issues he presented within that context, particularly his statement that Allah does not legislate except for a purpose and an objective. Then, assuming the acceptance that Allah does not legislate except for a purpose and an objective, how can it be established that this presumed wisdom of the jurist is indeed the same as the intended objective of the legislator in the ruling? He said: "If it is said: We do not concede that the legislation of rulings necessitates the wisdom and the objectives, because the legislation of rulings is the work of Allah, Exalted is He, and His work either necessitates wisdom and objectives, or it does not. The first is impossible for seventeen reasons" (1). He then presented the objections to the necessity of rulings for wisdom and objectives and refuted them one by one (2). The debate on these issues is entirely outside the framework of the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) and falls within the realm of logic and discourse. Below are examples of these objections and the responses to them: The first objection as presented by al-Amidi: "There are two positions regarding the actions of servants: one position states that the actions of servants are created by Allah, Exalted is He, and the other position states that they are created by the servants themselves. Whoever claims that they are created by Allah, Exalted is He, must accept that He is the creator of disbelief, sins, and all kinds of evils, while there is no wisdom or purpose in creating these things. And whoever claims that they are created by the servants, then they are created for them through Allah's creation of the ability for them to do so, and His creation of the ability that necessitates these matters is also not for a wisdom" (3). The second objection: "If His action necessitated wisdom, then why did He cause the deaths of the prophets and grant respite to Iblis, and why did He necessitate the eternal punishment of the people of Hell in the Fire, due to the lack of wisdom in that?" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 3/251. (2) The same source, 3/251 - 256. (3) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, 3/251 - 256. (4) The same location. [Page 150] And al-Amidi's response to these two objections is: "From three aspects: The first: That ability (qudra) only pertains to creation and existence, and nothing else; disbelief (kufr) and types of sins and evils are related to disobeying the prohibition of the Lawgiver, and that is not related to ability in any way. The second: Even if we concede that all of that is created by Allah, we do not claim that wisdom (hikmah) necessarily accompanies His actions absolutely, so that it applies to every created thing; rather, we only claim that in matters where wisdom can be considered, which is possible in everything except for types of evils and sins, and we do not claim that categorically, but rather apparently. The third: Even if we concede that wisdom necessarily accompanies His actions absolutely, we do not concede the impossibility of that in the cases they mentioned, as it is possible that what follows from them has a ruling that only the Lord knows."(1) Among the examples of these objections is: "The sixteenth: that wisdom is sought only in the case of one whose soul inclines towards bringing benefit or repelling harm, and the Lord, Exalted is He, is free from that." The seventeenth: Wisdom is sought in the actions of one whose actions, if devoid of wisdom, would incur blame and be considered frivolous. And the Lord is exalted above that, as He is the one who acts in His dominion as He wills and chooses, without being questioned about what He does. As He, Exalted is He, said: { He is not to be questioned about what He does, but they will be questioned }(2), and even if His actions do not necessarily entail wisdom, that is what is sought"(3). Al-Amidi responded to these last two objections: "Regarding the sixteenth objection, it is denied what they mentioned about the consideration of wisdom; rather, wisdom is sought in an action where, if wisdom were found in it, it would not be prohibited, but rather it would generally occur." And regarding the seventeenth [point], what they mentioned is only necessary in the case of one for whom it is obligatory to consider wisdom in their actions, and the Exalted One is not like that, according to what is indicated in our theological writings."(4) The evidence of the refuters: __________ (1) The same source, 3/254. (2) The Prophets, 23. (3) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam 3/254. (4) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, 3/256. [Page 151] Thus, the establishment of the principle of causation (ta'leel) by this group was only through theological discussions about the essence of God. Therefore, we see another group that decisively rejects this principle, even though it accepts analogy (qiyas), causation, inference, and the method of suitability. Among the most famous of these is Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. He said: "The suitability implies the presumption of causation, and presumption is (3) acted upon"(1). He also said: "It has been established that suitability implies causation while being certain that the actions of Allah, Exalted is He, are not subject to causation"(2). Al-Razi attempted to prove the reasoning through the method of suitability, mentioning two approaches in this regard. The first is the method or the evidence presented by al-Amidi. He mentioned it and then returned to it to refute it. As for the second, he affirmed it and supported it. He said: "The relationship (al-munasaba) indicates the presumption of causality, and this presumption must be acted upon. The first premise(3) is established from two angles: the first(4): that Allah - Exalted is He - legislated the rulings for the benefit of the servants, and this is a benefit, thus there arises a presumption that Allah - Exalted is He - legislated it for this benefit. These are three premises that must be proven with evidence. As for the first premise, its evidence is established through various angles"(5). What is meant by his statement: "As for the first premise" is his statement that Allah - Exalted is He - legislated the rulings for the benefit of the servants, which refers to the essence of causation. He then presented six angles to prove this premise, which do not differ from what al-Amidi presented, but in a more detailed manner(6). __________ (1) Al-Razi, Al-Mahsool, 5/172. (2) The same source, 5/178. (3) The first: that is, the first introduction, which is that the relationship (munasaba) provides a presumption of causality. (4) That is: there are two ways to establish that the relationship (munasaba) provides a presumption of causality, and the first way will be mentioned below. It is noteworthy that he mentions this way and then refutes it. (5) Al-Razi, Al-Mahsool 5/172. (6) The same source, 5/172 - 175. [Page 152] He said: "These six aspects indicate that the Exalted One has not legislated the rulings except for the benefit of the servants. Then people differed after that: as for the Mu'tazila, they explicitly stated the reality of this position and uncovered its meaning, saying: It is reprehensible for Allah, Exalted is He, to commit what is wrong, and to act in vain; rather, His actions must encompass a purpose of benefit and aim. As for the jurists, they assert that He, Exalted is He, legislated the ruling for this meaning and for this wisdom, and if they heard the term 'aim', they would declare the speaker a disbeliever, even though the only meaning of that 'lam' (ل) is the aim. Moreover, they say: 'Although it is not obligatory for Allah, Exalted is He, to consider the interests, He does not act except in what is beneficial for His servants, as a favor and kindness, not out of obligation.' This is the discussion regarding the establishment of this premise." (1) As for al-Razi's refutation of the principle of reasoning behind rulings and interests, it comes in a lengthy discourse, of which we will mention some. He said: "His statement: The specification of a particular case with a specific ruling must have a reason, and that reason cannot return to Allah, Exalted is He, so it must return to the servant. We say: Either you claim that specification must have a specific reason or you do not claim that; in either case, you cannot assert that the rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, are based on interests." (2) He then presented a lengthy argument to refute the claim of reasoning behind the rulings of Allah, and all of this discussion pertains to the essence of Allah, Exalted is He. __________ (1) Al-Razi, al-Mahsool, 5/176. (2) The same source, p. 180. [Page 153] And he concluded by saying: "It has been established that the reasoning behind God's rulings (Exalted is He) based on public interests (maslaha) is invalid. This statement, while being an objection to what they have said, is also a definitive indication starting from the issue. Through this, the invalidity of all the arguments they relied upon becomes evident, as they are speculative proofs, while what we have mentioned is a conclusive argument. Then we say: If what you have mentioned indicates that the reasoning behind God's actions (Exalted is He) based on public interests is valid, then we have conclusive evidence that prevents it, which comes from the following aspects:" (1) He then mentioned these aspects, all of which pertain to the essence of God and have no connection to the science of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence). Among these aspects he mentioned: "The first: that He is the Creator of the actions of the servants, and this prevents the claim that He - Exalted is He - takes into account the interests."(2) "The second proof: that it is not permissible to justify the actions of Allah - Exalted is He - and His rulings by interests (masalih), is that if one is able to disbelieve but not able to believe, it would necessitate compulsion (jabr), and this undermines the consideration of interests."(3) "The third evidence: that there has been an obligation imposed that is beyond one's capacity, and this prevents the assertion of taking into account public interests (maslaha)."(4) Thus, all the aspects or proofs that he presented up to the last one, which is the eighth, where he said: "As for God (Exalted is He), since He is entirely free from interests and harms. Then we see that what predominates in His actions is that which does not serve the interests of creation, how can it be presumed that His actions and rulings are motivated by interests?!" (5). __________ (1) The same source, 5/182. (2) The same place. (3) Al-Razi, Al-Mahsool, 5/186. (4) The same place. (5) The same source 5/193. I intended by presenting the arguments and objections of both al-Amidi and al-Razi to demonstrate that such a discussion is a logical and theological inquiry that falls outside the framework and objectives of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), and that including it within usul al-fiqh is unjustified; rather, it is resorted to by those whose arguments are weak. [Page 154] Although al-Razi rejected the very concept of causation, he affirmed the method of analogy in a different way. He said, after mentioning the first argument in explaining that analogy implies a presumption of causation, which he mentioned and then refuted, "The second argument in explaining that analogy implies a presumption of causation is that we concede that the actions and rulings of Allah cannot be attributed to motives and purposes. Nevertheless, we claim that analogy implies a presumption of causation, and the explanation is as follows: The belief of Muslims is that the rotation of celestial bodies, the rising and setting of stars, and their remaining in their forms and lights are not obligatory. However, since Allah - Exalted is He - has established a habit of keeping them in a constant state, it is no wonder that they will remain tomorrow and the day after with these characteristics. Similarly, the falling of rain during humid clouds, the feeling of fullness after eating, the quenching of thirst after drinking, and burning upon contact with fire are not obligatory, but since the habit has been consistent with these occurrences, it is no wonder that a presumption close to certainty arises regarding their continuity in their patterns. The result is that the repetition of something many times leads to the presumption that whenever it occurs, it will occur only in that manner. Once this is established, we say: When we contemplate the laws, we find that rulings and benefits are closely related, and neither can be separated from the other, which is evident after the establishment of the conditions of the laws. If this is the case, then the knowledge of the occurrence of one necessitates the presumption of the occurrence of the other, and vice versa, without one being a cause for the other or a motive for it(1). Thus, it is established that analogy is a proof of causation, while it is certain that the rulings of Allah - Exalted is He - are not attributed to purposes"(2). Thus, despite the disagreement between these two groups regarding the very concept of causation, they both agree on attributing causation to the appropriate description, in contrast to those who reject the method of analogy. Does the concept of causation necessitate the method of analogy? __________ (1) This confirms what was previously mentioned about the meaning of causation according to him; see: p. 51 and p. 99. (2) Al-Razi, al-Mahsool 5/179. [Page 155] The group that does not adopt the approach of analogy does not make this approach necessary for the basis of reasoning, and this is evident from the arguments that were previously clarified when discussing their rejection of the analogy approach. Among these is that if it is established that this is a public interest (maslaha), then establishing that the ruling was legislated by Allah for the sake of this public interest requires evidence. Otherwise, the presumed conjecture here is not the legal presumption that is applied in legal matters, which they have described as mere fantasies of the hearts and whims of the minds. Furthermore, even if the basis of reasoning is established, it has also been established that some rulings are not reasoned. The ruling in question may belong to this category, that is, unreasoned, so it cannot be said to be reasoned except with evidence supporting it. Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari said: "Because the original principle in texts is reasoning, although it is established through apparent means, we have found texts that are unanimously agreed upon as being unreasoned, and it is possible that this specific text is among that group, so it is not permissible to rely on that principle and impose it on others with this possibility" (1). Al-Bazdawi said: "Thus, we do not accept the argument based on the principle that reasoning is fundamental in texts; rather, it is necessary to provide evidence that this specific text is indeed reasoned" (2). __________ (1) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 3/436. (2) Al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazdawi 3/438. [Page 156] Al-Ghazali mentioned something of these arguments regarding this matter, saying: "As for the strange appropriateness, this is a matter of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), and it does not seem unlikely to me that some mujtahids (jurists) may be inclined to think so, and there is no decisive evidence indicating the invalidity of their ijtihad. If it is said: 'It indicates its invalidity because it is an arbitrary reasoning without evidence that supports attributing the ruling to its cause,' we say: 'Establishing the ruling in accordance with it indicates that the Sharia (Islamic law) has taken it into consideration and is likely to be true.' If it is said: 'Your statement that establishing the ruling in accordance with it is misleading, for it means that the ruling was sought based on an appropriateness and the legislator prompted the ruling, so he responded to its prompt and acted in accordance with it,' this is arbitrary reasoning because it is possible that the ruling of the Sharia regarding the prohibition of wine is either an act of worship or arbitrary reasoning, similar to the prohibition of pork, carrion, blood, domestic donkeys, and all predatory animals with fangs, and all birds of prey, while the hyena and fox are permissible according to some schools of thought, which are arbitrary reasonings. However, the meaning of intoxication in wine is agreed upon, so it is assumed to be for the sake of intoxication, while a similar agreement does not exist regarding carrion and pork, so it is said that this is arbitrary reasoning, and this is on the assumption that there is no indication in the Qur'an mentioning enmity and hatred. It is possible that there is another meaning appropriate that has not been revealed to us, and it is possible that it is for the sake of intoxication. So these are three possibilities; thus, ruling based on one of these three is arbitrary reasoning without evidence, otherwise, what would favor this possibility? This does not change in the effective cause, as it is known to be a cause by attributing the ruling to it textually or by consensus, such as childhood and the precedence of the brother over the father and mother. The response is: 'We favor this possibility over the possibility of arbitrary reasoning with what we have countered the view of those who deny qiyas (analogy).'"(1) He then said: "As for their statement that perhaps there is another appropriate meaning that is the cause and has not been revealed to us, our souls have inclined towards the meaning that has appeared due to the non-appearance of the other, not due to any evidence that indicates it, for it is pure conjecture. We say: The predominance of conjectures in every case relies on such conjecture and depends on the absence of the appearance of another meaning; if it were to appear, the predominance of conjecture would be invalidated. If this door were opened, qiyas would not be established."(2) Al-Shatibi's position in brief: __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, 2/300-301. (2) The same source. [Page 157] This elaboration and the interruption from al-Razi regarding the lack of reasoning for actions and rulings was objected to by al-Shatibi, but he did not engage in a verbal dispute with him. Rather, he affirmed the reasoning for rulings and actions through a different approach than that adopted by al-Amidi and rejected by al-Razi. He relied on a new methodology, which is the inductive reasoning (istiqra) that he deemed conclusive. Consequently, he reached a definitive conclusion that the actions of Allah - Exalted is He - and His rulings are reasoned by the interests of the servants. He said: "Al-Razi claimed that the rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, are not reasoned by any reason whatsoever, just as His actions are not" (1). He then said: "What is relied upon is that we have inductively derived from the Sharia that it was established for the interests of the servants, an induction that al-Razi and others do not dispute" (2). Then al-Shatibi mentioned many texts from the Qur'an and referred to others from the Sunnah, all of which indicate purposes for actions or rulings. With the abundance of these texts, he establishes that, in his view, the actions of Allah and His rulings are reasoned by their purposes. Thus, the idea of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) emerged with al-Shatibi, through his new methodology in proving the reasons and foundations, which is the inductive reasoning that is beneficial for certainty. As for the disagreement regarding the presumption of interest and whether it is a reason for the ruling, whether it is a legal presumption or merely an illusion, al-Shatibi did not adopt either position, nor did he refute either of them. Instead, he sought to reconcile between them, not being satisfied with such a presumption on the grounds that it is not supported by evidence, but rather it is something that the mind may entertain that this ruling was for the sake of this interest. Likewise, he did not reject this presumption on the grounds that the rulings were established for the interests of the servants, and that this interest may have been intended by the legislator with this ruling. However, he stipulated that there should be a multitude of rulings that give rise to the presumption that they were established for that interest, and thus the beneficial inductive reasoning for certainty is achieved, leading to certainty regarding the reasoning of this interest in legislation. This also illustrates how this idea arose with al-Shatibi regarding the consideration of interests and harms. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/2. (2) The same source. [Page 158] It should be noted that taking an appropriate description or public interest (maslaha) as a reason for a ruling is a form of reasoning based on indicators that have not been proven to be a cause. Therefore, reasoning based on them is negated if a more appropriate description is found, or if it does not apply consistently. Al-Shatibi said: "The purpose of establishing laws is for the interests of the servants in both the immediate and the ultimate, and this is a claim that must be substantiated as true or false, and this is not the place for that, and there has been disagreement about it in the science of theology" (1). He then said: "When it became necessary in the science of usul al-fiqh to establish reasons for rulings specifically, they were established as indicators, and there is no need to delve into this matter" (2). Therefore, these interests or reasons are understood as indicators of knowledge, not as causes, and thus they are not suitable for analogy and reasoning based on them. Consequently, those who reasoned with them aimed to establish the principle of reasoning, as it then becomes akin to a cause and is useful in analogy. However, al-Shatibi did not suffice with the establishment of the principle of reasoning, which he affirmed through induction; he also stipulated that induction must apply to the reason itself or the indicator itself, thus making this reason substantiated in its own right, which is a condition of the Hanafis, making it a cause for legislation and a basis for it. This will become clear during the explanation and elaboration of the concept of objectives (maqasid) according to him. The meaning of objectives (maqasid) according to al-Shatibi: Objectives linguistically are the plural of maqsad, which is the thing that is intended. He said in Lisan al-Arab: "Ibn Jinni said: The root of (q-s-d) and its usages in the speech of the Arabs are determination and direction, and moving towards something in a straight manner, whether that is just or unjust. This is its essence in reality, even if it may be specified in some contexts to mean the intention of uprightness without deviation. Do you not see that you sometimes intend injustice just as you intend justice at other times? Thus, determination and direction encompass both" (3). And he said in al-Qamus al-Muhit: "Al-qasd: the straightness of the path, reliance, and intention; he intends it, and to it, he aims" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat 2/2. (2) The same source. (3) Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab. (4) Al-Firuzabadi, al-Qamus al-Muhit, p. 396. [Page 159] As for the technical term, there is no agreed-upon or established definition. The accepted definition in terminology is the linguistic amount present in the term. It is not possible to establish a technical definition for the objectives (maqasid) except after understanding what is meant by them, as the judgment on a thing is contingent upon its conception. Al-Shatibi did not provide a technical definition for the objectives, but what is found in his book (al-Muwafaqat), especially in its second part, serves to define what he meant by the objectives. There is no harm in this; in fact, there is little benefit in presenting a text that does not help the reader understand the defined reality. Such definitions can only be grasped by someone who has previously understood their reality. Therefore, defining by means of a limit does not benefit him at all; rather, it judges the definition according to his understanding of the defined. Some later scholars have attempted to provide a definition for the objectives, limiting them to the objectives of the Sharia, and perhaps some have referred to objectives for the Sharia and objectives for people. However, they did not highlight the distinction between the objectives of the Sharia and the objectives of the legislator. Sheikh Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour (may Allah have mercy on him) spoke of general objectives and specific objectives, defining each of them. He said: "The general objectives of legislation are the meanings and rulings considered by the legislator in all circumstances of legislation, which include the characteristics of the Sharia and its general purpose, and the meanings that legislation cannot be devoid of considering; this also includes meanings of rulings that are not considered in all types of rulings but are noted in many of them" (1). He said regarding the specific objectives: "The intended modalities for the legislator to achieve the beneficial objectives of people or to preserve their public interests in their private actions so that their efforts in their private interests do not nullify what has been established for them in obtaining their public interests" (2). __________ (1) Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour, Objectives of Islamic Law, p. 50: Tunisian Distribution Company, Tunisia, 3rd ed., December 1988. (2) Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour, Objectives of Islamic Law, p. 146. [Page 160] As for Professor Allal al-Fassi, he said: "The intended meaning of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) is the purpose behind it and the secrets that the legislator has placed with each of its rulings" (1). Dr. Ahmed al-Raisuni referred to these definitions and others, stating: "Based on the various usages and statements found among the scholars who have discussed the topic of objectives, it can be said that the objectives of the Sharia are the goals that the Sharia has set to achieve for the benefit of the servants" (2). The Saudi writer Khalid bin Saleh al-Saif referred to these definitions in an article he began with the question: What are the objectives? (3). Dr. Hamadi al-Abidi points to the definition of Sheikh Muhammad al-Tahir bin Ashour, saying: "This is not, in fact, a definition of the objectives because definitions do not take this form; rather, it is a clarification and elaboration of the areas where the objectives of the Sharia are sought. It is more appropriate to limit the definition to saying: 'The objectives are the intended rulings of the legislator in all circumstances of legislation'" (4). In reality, all these definitions fall short of conveying the intended meaning. This is because the meaning of objectives according to al-Shatibi differs from its meaning according to others who preceded him or from contemporary scholars discussing the objectives. All these definitions, if they are correct, are only valid in the sense that exists in the minds of the definers. They are all far from accurately reflecting al-Shatibi's intent. __________ (1) Allal al-Fassi, The Objectives of Islamic Law and Its Virtues, p. 3, Arab Unity Library, Casablanca. (2) Ahmed al-Raisuni, The Theory of Objectives According to Imam al-Shatibi, p. 119, 4th ed., 1416 AH - 1995 CE, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Global Islamic Bookstore. (3) Al-Hayat Newspaper, Issue: 12615, September 13, 1997, p. 21. (4) Hamadi al-Abidi, Al-Shatibi and the Objectives of the Sharia, p. 119. [Page 161] It must be noted here that the research is not about the word "qasd" or its derivatives, where and when it has been mentioned, as it is an Arabic word commonly used in the speech of Arabs both in the past and present. Rather, the research is about the objectives (maqasid) in a specific sense, which is the meaning or meanings intended by the scholars of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence). The first to speak about the objectives was Imam al-Juwayni - and Allah knows best - and he, along with the scholars who came after him - except for al-Shatibi - refers to a single meaning of the objectives, which is the necessary, need-based, and enhancement objectives of the Sharia. These can be defined by them as the goals or interests for which the Sharia was established. As for al-Shatibi, the matter encompasses this definition and goes beyond it, as the objectives for him are the objectives of the legislator and the objectives of the obligated person (mukallaf). The objectives of the obligated person can be defined as the goals or interests that the obligated person seeks to achieve, whether they are worldly or otherworldly. The objectives of the legislator, however, are broader than the objectives of the Sharia, and the objectives of the Sharia are merely objectives that the legislator intended through legislation, but they are not all the objectives of the legislator. Allah, Exalted is He, created things and has an objective in doing so, according to al-Shatibi, and this objective is His purpose in creation, not in legislation, as creation is not legislation. He, Exalted is He, says: { He created death and life to test you as to which of you is best in deed } (1), and He says: { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me } (2), so the test and worship here are objectives of the legislator and not objectives of the Sharia. __________ (1) Surah Al-Mulk, 2. (2) Surah Adh-Dhariyat, 56. [Page 162] If these objectives are limited, according to others besides al-Shatibi, to the objectives of the Sharia, then the objectives of the legislator, according to al-Shatibi, are of four types, one of which is the objectives of the Sharia. He says: "The objectives that are considered fall into two categories: one pertains to the intention of the legislator, and the other pertains to the intention of the obligated person. The first is considered from the perspective of the legislator's intention in establishing the Sharia from the outset, from the perspective of his intention in establishing it for understanding, from the perspective of his intention in establishing it for obligation according to it, and from the perspective of his intention in bringing the obligated person under its ruling. These are four types" (1). The definitions mentioned revolve around the necessary, need-based, and enhancement objectives of the Sharia, which are only the first type, that is, the intention of the legislator in establishing the Sharia from the outset. This is one aspect of the shortcomings in attempts to define the objectives, and there is another matter in these definitions that contradicts al-Shatibi's intent regarding this type of objectives. That is, all these definitions suggest that the objectives are the interests and rulings, meaning they are the appropriate meanings that the mind accepts. This understanding, once again, if it is correct according to what is held by others besides al-Shatibi, does not hold true according to what is held by al-Shatibi. For example, Sheikh Ibn Ashur defined them as objectives for achieving beneficial objectives for people or for preserving their public interests. Dr. al-Raisuni's definition is that they are the goals for which the Sharia was established to achieve the benefit of the servants. Dr. al-Abidi defined them as the rulings. As for Professor Allal al-Fasi, he limited them to the goals of the rulings. Whereas the objectives according to al-Shatibi are what is established as intended by the legislator regardless of whether it is an interest in the habitual sense, or whether it is something that minds accept, or whether it is appropriate or inappropriate. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/2. [Page 163] The objectives (maqasid), according to him, are not limited to the goals of the rulings, but rather the rulings themselves are among the objectives, as the rulings are intended by the legislator through the texts. All definitions revolve around the objectives of the rulings, which is the first type according to al-Shatibi, while one of the main focuses of al-Shatibi is the objectives of the legislator in understanding the commands and prohibitions in addition to the intention of worship and compliance. What these definitions mention are the goals of legislation, which are results or causes for it, and the Sharia or rulings are means to achieve the goals or reasons for them. Therefore, these definitions, in addition to their shortcomings, do not accurately define what al-Shatibi intended, nor the first type of the objectives of the legislator according to him. For example, Dr. al-Raisouni's definition: "They are the goals that the Sharia was established to achieve for the benefit of the servants" is not valid due to the restriction to the benefit of the servants. If this restriction is removed, the definition becomes: "They are the goals that the Sharia was established to achieve," which is correct for al-Shatibi's intended meaning of the objectives of the Sharia, not the objectives of the legislator. Additionally, what some have referred to as the division of objectives into specific, general, and partial does not exist in al-Shatibi's work, nor is there any evidence in his texts to support it. In fact, his texts refute this claim. This will become clear upon further elaboration, which is central to the idea of objectives according to al-Shatibi. The objectives according to al-Shatibi are universal principles, and they are general in all circumstances, at all times, and for all accountable individuals, while the particulars are not objectives because the objectives are universal principles; rather, the particulars may serve as branches that support the objectives or relate back to them. Moreover, the objectives, according to al-Shatibi, are definitive principles and not presumed rulings. This is one of the most important pillars of the idea of objectives according to al-Shatibi, which none of the mentioned definitions or published research on the objectives according to al-Shatibi have noted. [Page 164] These matters will become clear through analysis, investigation, and documentation in the upcoming chapters of this message. However, I will point out here what is necessary in this regard, in order to complete this topic. Al-Shatibi says: "The obligations of the Sharia (sharia) relate to preserving its objectives in creation, and these objectives fall into three categories: the first is that they are necessary, the second is that they are needed, and the third is that they are embellishing"(1). And any objective in any of these categories is not established except if it is general and definitive, that is, universal, and not partial or speculative. He says: "The principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) in religion are definitive, not speculative, and the evidence for that is that they relate to the universals of the Sharia, and whatever is thus is definitive"(2). And he says in the same context: "By universals here, I mean the necessary, the needed, and the embellishing." His explanation of his intent regarding the universals, and his stipulation of the necessity of certainty for them, confirms the requirement of certainty regarding the objectives (maqasid) in his view. He dismisses the notion that the foundational principles for which certainty is required are the general evidences: the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). Rather, he asserts that these certain foundational principles are ultimately related to the universal objectives, which are necessities, needs, or enhancements. Therefore, these definitions of the objectives (maqasid) are limited and incorrect. The more accurate statement - and Allah knows best - is to say: "The objectives are the goals, and the objectives of the Legislator (al-Shari) according to al-Shatibi are the goals indicated by actions, texts, and rulings as being desired to occur." Thus, actions and divine commands have specific goals, and the legal texts or the discourse surrounding them have goals of understanding and obligation. The rulings have goals that are adherence to them and not adhering to others, and some - but not all - of what results from this adherence. __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/3, 4. (2) The same source, 1/10. [Page 165] These actions, texts, and rulings serve as means in relation to the objectives (maqasid) or as causes in relation to the outcomes or effects. It must be noted here that not every effect resulting from a cause is intended by the legislator (shari). The mere fact that something is a result does not indicate that it is an end or an objective. For example, the marriage of a woman who has been divorced three times leads to her being lawful for the first husband if the second husband divorces her, but this legality is not an end or objective of the legislator, according to al-Shatibi, since marriage with this intention is prohibited. The end is a result and an effect, but not every result or effect is an end or an objective. This is central to al-Shatibi's ideas, and it will become clear in its place, if Allah wills. Chapter Three The Criteria of the Objectives of the Sharia (Maqasid al-Sharia) According to al-Shatibi It contains a brief definition of the subject of this chapter and three sections: The first section: ... in the introductions. The second section: ... in the documents. The third section: ... on the results and the concept of public interest (maslaha) And the harm (mafsada) according to al-Shatibi. Chapter Three The Criteria of the Objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) According to al-Shatibi The topic of this chapter: Al-Shatibi dedicated the second part of his book, al-Muwafaqat, to the topic of objectives (maqasid), and he divided the objectives into two categories: the objectives of the Legislator (al-Shari) and the objectives of the obligated (al-Mukallaf). As for the first part of al-Muwafaqat, he titled it the Book of Rulings (Kitab al-Ahkam), in which he discussed the legal rulings, the rulings of obligation and the rulings of status. The topics that he highlighted in the Book of Rulings (al-Ahkam) were discussed by the imams of usul (usul al-fiqh) before him, and among them are some new aspects. The novelty lies in the perspective on these rulings, whether obligatory, recommended, permissible, disliked, or prohibited, as well as the cause, condition, impediment, firm ruling, concession, validity, corruption, and nullity. This perspective serves the idea of the objectives of the Legislator (maqasid al-sharia) and addresses any objections or refutations against them. Thus, he establishes principles for understanding these rulings and their meanings or objectives. In addition to this, before he begins the Book of Rulings, he presents thirteen introductions, which he considers necessary for understanding his book. [Page 166] In fact, there is no principle that he discusses in his book al-Muwafaqat except that it has a share of those introductions. For the sake of these introductions and principles, this chapter was made, and I have divided it into three sections. The first is about the necessary introductions for the idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), the second is about the references or principles that he highlighted in his discussion of rulings, and the third concerns the results and meanings that arise from these principles and introductions, which includes a discussion on the meaning of public interest (maslaha) and harm (mafsada) according to al-Shatibi. This is essential for understanding al-Shatibi's methodology. The first section On the introductions The subject of this section: Al-Shatibi divided his book (al-Muwafaqat) into five sections. He began by mentioning the introductions that he considers necessary for understanding his book. He said: "Thus, the book is confined to five sections, the first of which is about the scientific introductions needed to lay the groundwork for the intended goal" (1). He then laid out thirteen introductions. In order to highlight what is necessary from these introductions to clarify his methodology or idea, this section was created. The principles of jurisprudence are definitive: Al-Shatibi stated in his first introduction: "The principles of jurisprudence in religion are definitive, not speculative, and the evidence for this is that they pertain to the universals of the Sharia, and whatever is thus is definitive" (2). He then established his proof for this introduction, and among the things he said was: "If it were permissible for speculation to be attached to the universals of the Sharia, it would also be permissible for it to be attached to the foundation of the Sharia (3) since it is the first universal. This is not usually permissible, and by universals here, I mean the necessities, needs, and enhancements. Also, if speculation were permissible regarding the foundation of the Sharia, then doubt could be attached to it, which is not the case, and it would be permissible to change and alter it, which contradicts what Allah, Exalted is He, has guaranteed regarding its preservation" (4). He also said: "If it were permissible to make the speculative a foundation in the principles of jurisprudence, it would be permissible to make it a foundation in the principles of religion, and this is not the case by consensus" (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/7. From the preface of the book. (2) The same source, 1/10 from the first introduction. (3) What he means by the foundation of the Sharia: the Noble Qur'an. And Allah knows best. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/10. (5) The same location. [Page 167] He said: "The principle, in any case, must be certain, because if it is merely probable, the possibility of disagreement arises, and such a thing cannot serve as a principle in religion based on induction" (1). He concluded this introduction by saying: "Probabilities do not constitute principles, and this is sufficient to dismiss the uncertain from the principles outright; whatever is based on it that is not certain is derived from the certain" (2). His statement in the text above: "And by the universals here, I mean the necessities, the needs, and the embellishments" indicates that he does not limit the condition of certainty in the principles of jurisprudence to the sources of legislation such as the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). He states in the second introduction: "The premises used in this science (3), and the evidence relied upon in it must be certain, because if they were merely probable, they would not yield certainty in the specific matters pertaining to it, and this is clear" (4). This is because the premises are the foundations or criteria through which, by linking them together or building upon them, one reaches the principles. Since the principles must be certain, their premises must also be certain. Induction alone is the path to certainty: __________ (1) The same source, 1/12. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/12. (3) That is: the science of usul al-fiqh. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/12. [Page 168] One of the most important introductions to al-Shatibi's methodology is his third introduction, where he says: "The relied-upon intention (qasd al-awwal)(1) is the legal evidence, and the existence of certainty in it regarding the commonly accepted usage is nonexistent or extremely rare, I mean in the singular pieces of evidence. If they are from the reports of the singular (akhbar al-ahad), then their lack of providing certainty is evident. And if they are mutawatir (consecutively transmitted), then their provision of certainty is contingent upon all or most of its premises being speculative. What is contingent upon the speculative must necessarily be speculative. For it depends on the transmission of languages, the opinions of grammar, the absence of ambiguity, the absence of metaphorical usage, the legal or customary transmission, the implicitness and specification of the general, the restriction of the absolute, the absence of abrogation, the precedence and postponement, and the rational opposition. The provision of certainty while considering these matters is impossible."(2) Thus, al-Shatibi denies the existence of definitive evidence in singular texts, even if they are from the texts of the Noble Qur'an or the mutawatir hadiths. And if we understand his requirement for certainty in the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), a question arises: how will this certainty be achieved according to him? He says: "The provision of certainty while considering these matters is impossible, and those who claim its existence have held that it is speculative in itself, but if it is accompanied by observable or transmitted indications, it may provide certainty, and all of this is rare or impossible. The considered evidence here is that which is extrapolated from a group of speculative evidences that converge on one meaning until it provides certainty in it, for the gathering has a strength that separation does not have, and for this reason, the mutawatir provides certainty, and this is a type of it. If a collection of evidence on the issue is obtained that provides knowledge(3), then it is the required evidence, and it is similar to the moral mutawatir, rather it is like the knowledge of the bravery of Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) and the existence of Hatim, derived from the abundance of transmitted incidents about them."(4) __________ (1) The first intention: that is, when a command or prohibition comes from the legislator. Thus, the performance of the action is the first intention of the command, and refraining from it is the first intention of the prohibition. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/14. (3) Knowledge is beneficial: that is, it is beneficial knowledge that is certain. Knowledge is opposed to conjecture. (4) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat 1/14. [Page 169] Thus, al-Shatibi does not rely on anything other than induction (istiqra) to establish certainty in legal matters, and this is one of his innovations; he adopted it in his book and considered it the only way to achieve certainty, stating that it is a characteristic of his work. He said, referring to this third introduction of his: "It has also been explained how to seize certainty from the conjectural, and this is a characteristic of this book, and praise be to Allah" (1). Induction is when there are numerous pieces of evidence indicating a specific meaning, or rulings that are presumed to have a particular wisdom or result. The indication of the evidence is conjectural, and the notion that the legislator intends a specific meaning or a particular wisdom is also conjectural. It is not valid to take conjectural matters as a basis in jurisprudence or legislation, nor to build upon them. When the evidence or rulings on a specific meaning become numerous and corroborative, this leads to beneficial induction that results in certainty, and these meanings become foundational principles. He said: "When the evidence becomes abundant for the observer, supporting one another, it becomes collectively beneficial for certainty; likewise, the matter is in the sources of evidence in this book, which are the sources of the principles" (2). He added: "However, the earlier scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) may have neglected to mention this meaning and to point it out, leading to its oversight by some later scholars" (3). He warned that through this oversight, we do not attain certainty regarding a legal ruling at all, and that the indication of consensus (ijma) on legal rulings is not established (4). __________ (1) The same source, 4/194. (2) The same source, 1/15. (3) The same place. (4) The same place. [Page 170] Al-Shatibi has provided many examples in his book that illustrate his inductive method in deriving conclusions; here is one of them: He says, "The ummah, indeed all religious communities, have agreed that the Sharia was established to preserve the five necessities: religion, life, lineage, wealth, and intellect. This knowledge is as certain to the ummah as the necessities themselves, and we do not have a specific proof for this, nor is there a particular origin that we can refer to. Rather, we have recognized its compatibility with the Sharia through a collection of evidence that cannot be confined to a single category. If it were to rely on something specific, it would normally require specification, and the people of consensus would have to refer to it, which is not the case. This is because each of these individually is speculative, and it is not necessary in the case of moral or other forms of tawatur (transmission) that a single report be the one that provides knowledge over all other reports; likewise, it is not necessary here, as all the evidence equally contributes to the inference of speculation if considered in isolation."(1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/15. [Page 171] The establishment of the preservation of religion, for example, as a necessary principle, requires—according to him—the definitive proof of the five pillars such as prayer and almsgiving, among others, through induction. He says: "From this path, the obligation of the five pillars such as prayer and almsgiving has been definitively established. Otherwise, if someone were to argue for the obligation of prayer based on His saying, { Establish the prayer } (1) or something similar, there would be several points of contention in the argument itself. However, it is supported by external evidence and the rulings that follow, which have made the obligation of prayer a necessity in religion, and only a skeptic regarding the fundamentals of religion would doubt it" (2). He said: "So when we look at prayer, it comes with { Establish the prayer }. In various aspects, there is praise for those who establish it and condemnation for those who abandon it, and there is compulsion for the obligated to perform it, whether standing, sitting, or lying on their sides, and fighting against those who abandon it or resist abandoning it, among other things of this nature. Likewise, the soul is prohibited from being killed, and killing it makes one liable for retribution, and it is threatened as one of the major sins associated with polytheism, just as prayer is associated with faith. The necessity to provide for the needy is established, as is the obligation of almsgiving and supporting those who cannot rectify themselves, and judges and rulers have been appointed for this purpose, and armies have been organized to fight against those who attempt to kill the soul. The one who fears death is obligated to sustain himself by any lawful means, even if it involves consuming carrion, blood, or pork, among other things that relate to this meaning. Thus, we have certainty regarding the obligation of prayer and the prohibition of killing, and similarly for all other evidence in the rules of Sharia. This is how the principles differ from the branches, as the branches are based on individual pieces of evidence and specific sources, remaining reliant on conjecture, unlike the principles, which are derived from the comprehensive induction of the implications of the evidence, not from individual pieces in particular" (3). __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 43. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 1/14. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 1/15 - 16. [Page 172] These texts above clarify his intention regarding induction, and that induction is the only way to reach certainty in religious matters, and that induction is not for the evidences which are the texts, but rather for their meanings, and their meanings are their linguistic implications, rulings, and consequences. All of these are speculative if one relies on isolated texts; thus, they should not be relied upon in legislation unless they are transmitted through continuous narration (tawatur). The tawatur intended here is the tawatur of meanings. Therefore, we see him say: "It is similar to the meaningful tawatur" (1), and look at his statement in the previous text: "Unlike the principles, which are derived from the induction of the implications of the evidences in general." He did not say: "from the induction of the evidences." Rather, he said: "from the induction of their implications," and their implications are their implications or meanings. Then his statement: "in general," does not limit the meanings to linguistic implications but also includes their rulings, objectives, or causes. __________ (1) See: p. 139 of this research. [Page 173] And based on this introduction, one of the most important principles according to al-Shatibi is established, a principle that serves as the spirit of his entire methodology. He says: "And based on this introduction, there is another meaning, which is: every legal principle that does not have a specific text supporting it and is suitable for the actions of the Sharia (1), and whose meaning is derived from its evidence is valid and can be relied upon, and it is referred to if that principle has become established through its collective evidence, because the evidence does not necessarily have to indicate certainty in the ruling by itself without the addition of others to it, as previously mentioned, because that is somewhat impossible. This falls under the category of the general reasoning (istidlal al-mursal) that was adopted by Malik and al-Shafi'i (2). __________ (1) The meaning of suitability for the actions of the Sharia is clarified in the first chapter, which is that more than one ruling must support the appropriate description. As noted in al-Shatibi's texts, he does not merely use the term "more," but rather stipulates that the abundance must result in a beneficial induction leading to certainty, and it is not necessarily the case—according to him—that the suitable is appropriate. This will become clear in its place, if Allah wills. (2) In the first chapter, the conflicting reports about Imam Malik (may Allah have mercy on him) regarding the mursal principle or reasoning were mentioned, as well as the conflicting opinions of the Shafi'i scholars regarding the mursal or reasoning, and their differences concerning what is attributed to Imam al-Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him). We then clarified the differing meanings of mursal among the scholars and the differing positions based on that. The text above attributes to the two Imams (may Allah have mercy on them) the saying of general reasoning, but it restricts that to what is established with certainty and what is consistent with his methodology. This suggests that this inductive methodology in establishing certainty and relying on its results is practiced among the scholars, and perhaps this is part of what he meant by saying: "However, the earlier scholars of usul may have neglected to mention this meaning and to point it out, leading to its oversight by some later scholars." 1/15. Likewise, what was stated in the preface of his book in response to the denial of those who may deny what is presented in his methodology: "Indeed, by the grace of Allah, this is a matter confirmed by the verses and reports, strongly established by the righteous predecessors, delineated by the scholars, and its foundations built by the discerning. When the path is clear, denial is not permissible, and acceptance of what it contains is obligatory." Preface of the book. p. 9. [Page 174] For although it does not witness a specific origin for the branch, it has witnessed a general origin, and the general origin, if it is definitive, may equal the specific origin or exceed it depending on the strength or weakness of the specific origin... Likewise, the principle of istihsan (preference)(1) according to the opinion of Malik is based on this principle"(2). We observe in this text that the general principle (ma'nawi) is stronger than the text in its indication, because the general principle is definitive in its meaning, whereas the definitiveness of the text in its meaning is difficult or rare if it exists. The primary and secondary objectives: Al-Shatibi says in his seventh introduction: "Every religious knowledge is sought by the legislator only as a means to worship Allah, Exalted is He, and not for any other reason. If another consideration appears in it, it is secondary and by way of following, not by way of the primary intention"(3). This is because when a command or prohibition comes from the legislator, the legislator's intention is to establish what is commanded and to avoid what is prohibited, and this is the primary intention. In other words, the primary intention is obedience without regard to the outcomes or benefits, and thus religious knowledge is what aids in knowing Allah's commands and prohibitions, in order to understand how to obey and how to worship, and this is the meaning of his statement: "a means to worship." __________ (1) It is attributed to Imam Malik, may Allah have mercy on him, that he said: "Istihsan is nine-tenths of knowledge." Al-Shatibi means by istihsan the preference of a definitive meaning or principle over analogy, or the specification of analogy by a general meaning. We will dedicate a study to it, if Allah wills. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/16. (3) The same source, 1/30. [Page 175] If it becomes evident that there is a worldly benefit for the obligated person (mukallaf) in either performing or refraining from that action, and if this benefit has been established as a definitive, universal meaning that the legislator intended by enacting that ruling, then it becomes a definitive principle. It is akin to a text, and achieving it with the intention of obedience is akin to the primary intention. If that anticipated benefit—whether definitively or presumably—has not been definitively established as an objective of the legislator in enacting that ruling, it is considered the secondary objective or the dependent objective. That is, it is dependent on the primary objective. According to what al-Shatibi states in his introductions, this second meaning is speculative, thus it is not considered a principle, nor does it hold significance in legislation. However, it cannot be entirely dismissed, as it may be subject to an inductive reasoning that renders it definitive. Therefore, it is examined: if it strengthens adherence to the primary intention, it is considered; if it weakens or opposes the primary intention, it is rejected. The primary intention is worship, and the secondary intention is considered if it serves as a means to the primary intention. Hence, it is termed dependent or additional. For example, the primary intention of seeking knowledge and learning is action. He said: "Any knowledge that does not lead to action has no basis in the Sharia that indicates its commendation" (1). He said: "The Sharia has come for the purpose of worship, which is the objective of the mission of the Prophets (peace be upon them)" (2). He said: "Indeed, the proofs of monotheism have come in this manner in the course of the Qur'an: { except as a reminder } (3), except for this, which is clear in that worshiping Allah is the objective of knowledge, and the verses on this meaning are countless" (4). He said: "The essence of knowledge is action; otherwise, knowledge is a loan and of no benefit" (5). He then said: "No one denies the virtue of knowledge in general except an ignorant person, but it has a primary intention and a secondary intention. The primary intention is what has been mentioned earlier, while the secondary intention is what the majority mention regarding its possessor being noble, even if he is not originally so. And the ignorant person is base, even if he is originally noble... __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/30. (2) The same source, 1/31. (3) From verse 3 of Surah Taha. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/31. (5) The same location. [Page 176] "And knowledge is beauty, wealth, and a rank that is unmatched by any other rank" (1). Then he said: "Knowledge may be sought for the sake of enjoyment and the pleasure of conversing about it, especially the sciences that allow for intellectual engagement and where there is ample room for contemplation of its aspects, and where the path to deducing the known from the unknown is broad. However, each of these pursuits is either a servant of the original intention or not. If it serves that intention, then the pursuit of it from the outset is correct... If it does not serve that intention, then the pursuit of it from the outset is incorrect, such as seeking knowledge for ostentation, to argue with the foolish, to boast among the scholars, to win the hearts of people, or to gain from their worldly affairs" (2). He also said: "The legal objectives (maqasid) are of two types: original objectives and subsidiary objectives. As for the original objectives, they have no share for the obligated person" (3). He said: "As for the subsidiary objectives, they take into account the share of the obligated person, and from them, he obtains what is in accordance with his natural inclination towards fulfilling desires, enjoying permissible things, and fulfilling needs" (4). Al-Shatibi refers to the subsidiary objectives as those that the rulings lead to, which the servant is inclined towards by nature and instinct. The consideration of these objectives, whether accepted or rejected, depends on whether they are a means to the primary objective or not. If they are a means to the primary objective or serve it, then they are a subsidiary legal objective; if they are not, then they are not an objective for the legislator, although they may be an objective for the obligated person. If they oppose the primary objective, then they are forbidden. Characteristics of the universals: __________ (1) The same source, 1/35. (2) The same source, 1/36. (3) The same source, 2/120. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/124. [Page 177] Al-Shatibi says in his ninth introduction that the religious sciences (ulum al-sharia) correspond to the rational sciences (ulum al-aqliya) in terms of the possibility of certainty regarding them or deriving certainty from them. Just as the legal truths are situational, meaning they are established by the legislator, the truths of existence and things are also situational, established by the Creator. He states: "Situational truths may correspond to rational truths in providing certain knowledge. The knowledge of the Sharia is among them, as knowledge of it is derived from the general induction that organizes its disparate individuals until they become in the mind a collection of general, consistent, established universals that are neither transient nor changeable nor subject to judgment. These are the characteristics of rational universals. Furthermore, rational universals are derived from existence, which is a situational matter, not a rational one, thus they are equal to the legal universals in this regard, and the distinction between them is removed" (1). Accordingly, the legal universals have three characteristics: the first is generality and consistency,... the second is permanence without decay,... and the third is that knowledge is a judge, not something judged upon (2). The meaning of the first characteristic is that legal rulings apply to the actions of the obligated individuals absolutely; there is no action that is not judged by some legal universal, and if an action is assumed not to be judged by any universal, it is judged by some other universal (3). __________ (1) The same source, p. 44. (2) The same source, pp. 44 - 45. (3) See: the ninth introduction. 1/43 - 44. [Page 178] The meaning of the second characteristic is that the general principles (kulliyat) are neither abrogated nor specified nor restricted, nor do they change according to time or place. Rather, what we derive from al-Shatibi's comparison of the legal general principles with the rational general principles is that the legal general principles are not merely definitive truths, but rather absolute definitive truths. They are not restricted to a specific time over another time, nor to a specific place over another place, nor to a specific accountable person (mukallaf) over another accountable person. He says: "You will not find in them, after their perfection, any abrogation, nor specification of their generality, nor restriction of their absoluteness, nor the lifting of a ruling from their rulings, neither according to the generality of the accountable nor according to the specificity of some of them, nor according to a time over another time, nor a state over another state. Rather, whatever establishes a cause is a cause forever and does not cease, and whatever is a condition is forever a condition, and whatever is obligatory is always obligatory or recommended is recommended, and thus all rulings have no cessation or alteration. Even if the obligation were to continue indefinitely, its rulings would remain the same" (1). The meaning of the third characteristic is that there is nothing in the religious sciences that is contradicted by truths, whether they are religious or rational, or that opposes them to the extent that one is compelled to interpret it in a way that the text cannot bear, because it then becomes a ruled matter rather than a ruling (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/45. (2) Accordingly, the general principles, whether rational or religious, are absolute truths, and the religious truths are also rational truths, because they are based on the definitive rational proof of the prophethood of our master Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him), and on the certainty of the truth of his message and report. The certainty that the Qur'an is from Allah is fundamentally a rational path. Accordingly, the religious reports and everything that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) brought, which does not allow for rational inquiry, is based on reason in that the truth of the report is rationally certain. [Page 179] Al-Shatibi explains that these universals (kulliyat) are the foundation of the sciences of Sharia and are the sources of rulings. The basis of legislation is what is universal or related to the universal; thus, whatever is like this is central to knowledge, and what is not like this has no consideration according to his methodology. He says: "Some knowledge is central to knowledge, and some is peripheral to knowledge but not central, and some is neither central nor peripheral; these are three categories. The first category is the foundation and the basis upon which the pursuit revolves, and to which the objectives of the firmly rooted (rasikhun) ultimately lead, and that is what is definitive or related to a definitive origin" (1). He said: "The second category, which is counted among the peripheral knowledge and not among the central: is what is not definitive nor related to a definitive origin, but rather to something speculative, or it is related to a definitive origin, yet it lacks some of those characteristics, or more than one characteristic, thus it is speculative (mukhayyal) (2), and it is something that provokes the intellect at first glance and initial consideration without compromising its origin or the meaning of another" (3). This category is dismissed by al-Shatibi (4). __________ (1) Al-Muwafaqat. 1/43. We will clarify shortly what al-Shatibi means by referring to a definitive origin. (2) That is: it instills in the heart an illusion of correctness, so it is something that minds receive with acceptance or that souls find pleasing. In this category fall - according to al-Shatibi - the meanings or descriptions that come in the paths of analogy (masalih) and resemblance (shabah), or through the method of inference as long as they are not definitive. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 1/45. (4) Al-Shatibi's stance on the meanings that fall into this category resembles the stance of the Hanafi scholars regarding the path of analogy, as it is speculative and does not return to a definitive origin, and the speculation here is not of the type that is applicable in legal matters but rather is purely rational speculation. Therefore, this category is not considered, and meanings may have evidence that completes their three characteristics, making them considered, and they may have what qualifies them from the third category due to their harm to the Sharia. See: 1/46 - 50. [Page 180] And the third category is that which is neither from the fundamentals (usul) nor from the ancillary matters (milah), which does not return to a definitive (qat'i) or speculative (dhanni) origin. Rather, its nature is to revert to its origin or to another by way of nullification of what is established as being from the recognized sciences and the principles referred to in actions and beliefs, or what is inclined towards nullifying the truth and establishing falsehood. This is not knowledge because it reverts to its origin through nullification; it is neither stable nor authoritative nor consistent, nor is it from the ancillary matters, because the ancillary matters are those that are appreciated by minds and are pleasing to souls(1). And he said about this category: "If it sways a people and they find it pleasing and seek it, it is due to a passing resemblance and confusion between it and what preceded it, so the foolish may consider it to be based on an origin, and they may lean towards it for that reason. The reality of its origin is delusion and imagination, with no reality to it, along with the ulterior motives and desires that accompany it"(2). These texts about al-Shatibi indicate or establish his position on the approach of analogy (qiyas) and suitability (munasaba), or how to consider public interest (maslaha), and the following research clarifies his stance on how to consider interests or wisdoms in legislation. The meaning of returning to a definitive origin: Al-Shatibi said that the foundation and what is relied upon, which the demand revolves around, is what is definitive or refers back to a definitive origin(3). In his first introduction, he stated: "By the universals here, I mean the necessities, the needs, and the enhancements"(4). In his ninth introduction, he said: "The necessities, the needs, and the enhancements, along with what complements them and completes their aspects, are the foundations of the Sharia, and definitive proof has been established for their consideration, with all branches relying upon them"(5). __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/51. (2) The same place. (3) See the previous page. (4) See p. 137 of this research. (5) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/44. [Page 181] The requirement for certainty in the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) is well-known and established among jurists. Al-Shatibi referred to this in his first introduction. What the jurists mean by the principles that must be certain are the definitive evidences or the general sources of legislation, which are the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). As for other topics in the principles, such as the paths of reasoning and their conditions, and discussions of generality and specificity, absolute and restricted, and the conditions of narration and narrators, these do not require certainty, and it suffices to rely on preponderance of evidence. Al-Juwayni said: "If it is said: What is jurisprudence (fiqh)? We say: It is, in the terminology of the scholars of Sharia, the knowledge of the rulings of obligations. If it is said: Most of what is contained in the issues of Sharia is based on conjecture. We say: Conjectures are not jurisprudence; rather, jurisprudence is the knowledge (1) of the obligation to act when conjectures arise. Therefore, the scholars have stated: The reports of the singular (akhbar al-ahad) and the analogies of jurisprudence do not necessitate action by themselves; rather, action must be based on what necessitates knowledge of the obligation to act, which are the definitive evidences regarding the obligation to act when reporting singular reports and applying analogies. If it is said: What are the principles of jurisprudence? We say: They are its evidences, and the evidences of jurisprudence are the textual evidences from the Qur'an, the textual evidences from the mutawatir Sunnah, and consensus, all of which are based on the saying of Allah, Exalted is He. From this perspective, the principles of jurisprudence derive from discourse. If it is said: The details of singular reports and analogies can only be found in the principles and are not definitive. We say: The role of the jurist is to clarify the definitive in acting upon them, but it is necessary to mention them so that the meaning is clarified and the evidence is connected to it." (2) __________ (1) That is, the certain knowledge of the obligation to act based on the conjectural reports regarding their authenticity or implications, or both. (2) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh. 1/78 - 79. Paragraphs: 4 - 5 - 6. [Page 182] Imam Jamal al-Din Abdul Rahim al-Asnawi said: "As for the reports of the single narrators (ahad), they are invalid because the narration of a single narrator, if it provides any benefit, only provides conjecture. The legislator has only permitted conjecture in practical matters, which are the branches, and not in scientific matters such as the principles of the faith and likewise the principles of jurisprudence, as conveyed by al-Anbari, the commentator on al-Burhan, from all the scholars" (1). Al-Baydawi said: "The principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) are the knowledge of the evidence of jurisprudence in general, how to benefit from them, and the state of the beneficiary" (2). Al-Asnawi, in his commentary on the above text, said: "What is meant by knowing the evidence is to know that the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas) are evidence that can be relied upon... Know that the expression 'evidence' excludes many principles of jurisprudence such as generalities, reports of single narrators, analogy, presumption of continuity (istishab), and others. For the jurists, even if they accept working with them, they are not considered evidence for jurisprudence but rather indications of it, for the term 'evidence' among them is only applied to what is certain" (3). __________ (1) Jamal al-Din Abdul Rahim al-Asnawi, Nihayat al-Sul fi Sharh Minhaj al-Usul, 2/270. Thus, conjecture is acted upon if it is based on a firmly established principle that it is one of the sources of legislation. The hadith attributed to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) is obligatory to act upon even if it is not of certain authenticity, because it is firmly established that the Sunnah is one of the sources of legislation, meaning it is revelation. (2) Al-Qadi Nasir al-Din ibn Umar al-Baydawi, Minhaj al-Wusul ila Ilm al-Usul, 1/5. Along with Nihayat al-Sul of al-Asnawi, Dar al-Ilm - Beirut. (3) Al-Asnawi, Nihayat al-Sul fi Sharh Minhaj al-Usul, 1/9 - 11. [Page 183] The intention of the usuliyyin (principlists), before al-Shatibi, regarding the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) that must be definitive is the Qur'an and the Sunnah, along with what they indicate from general sources, which are consensus (ijma) and analogy (qiyas). As for al-Shatibi, he does not limit the requirement of definitiveness to these sources; rather, the universals (kulliyat) for him are necessities (darurat), needs (hajiyat), and enhancements (tahsinat), as well as what complements them. If we understand that the necessities for him are the preservation of religion, intellect, life, lineage, and wealth, this indicates that these objectives must be definitive to be considered; one cannot suffice with mere conjecture or with them being based on definitive sources like the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Likewise, if we understand that the permissibility of marriage, the removal of harm, and the non-obligation of burdensome duties are among the needs for him, this means they must be established definitively to be considered. The same applies to the category of enhancements and complements. Once these meanings are established, they become principles, that is, sources for legislation in his view, and are used as evidence just as the legal texts are used. If these meanings are not established definitively through induction, they must either return to a definitive origin or not. If they return to a definitive origin, there is no issue in employing them in legislation. If they do not return, there is a detailed discussion that will be mentioned in its place, if Allah wills. He said: "Every legal evidence is either definitive or conjectural. If it is definitive, there is no issue in considering it... If it is conjectural, it either returns to a definitive origin or does not; if it returns to a definitive origin, it is also considered, and if it does not return, one must be cautious regarding it, and it is not correct to simply accept it." (1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 3/7. [Page 184] As for the meaning of returning to a definitive origin, an example of this is the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): "There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm" (1). This is a report of singular transmission (khabar ahad) that is not definitive, and therefore, according to the methodology of al-Shatibi, it is a particularity and not a definitive universal origin. It is not correct to apply it until it is established that it returns to a definitive origin, nor can it be said here that it is from the Sunnah, which is a definitive source or universal origin, as this is not the meaning of returning to a definitive origin according to al-Shatibi. Rather, the meaning is that the meaning of the hadith is in accordance with a definitive legal meaning, that is, a universal meaning that has been established as universal through the induction of many evidences (particularities) that converge on this meaning. Al-Shatibi states: "His saying, peace be upon him: 'There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm' falls under a definitive origin in this meaning, for harm and reciprocating harm are widely prohibited in the Sharia in particular incidents and universal principles, such as His saying, Exalted is He: { And do not hold them to hurt them, so that you may commit an injustice } (2), { And do not harm them, so that you may make it difficult for them } (3), { A mother should not be harmed regarding her child } (4), and the like. This includes the prohibition of transgressing against lives, properties, and honor, as well as against usurpation and injustice, and everything that is in the meaning of causing harm or reciprocating harm. It includes harm to the self, intellect, lineage, or property, and it is a meaning that is extremely general in the Sharia, with no dispute or doubt about it" (5). The abundance of texts and evidences used for inference is merely to complete the induction and thus reach certainty. In this way, the meaning of lifting harm becomes a universal origin, and the meaning contained in the hadith aligns with the universal origin, which is a particularity, and thus it can be said that it returns to a universal origin, making it valid. __________ (1) Its transmission has been previously mentioned. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 231. (3) Surah At-Talaq, 6. (4) Surah Al-Baqarah, 233. (5) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 3/8. [Page 185] Thus, the intended meaning of al-Shatibi with the term "foundations" is confirmed, along with his method of establishing them, which is induction, and the meaning of returning to a definitive origin, which is part of his new contributions that provide us with some controls or principles of his methodology. He - may Allah have mercy on him - pointed out this difference between him and the earlier usuliyyin (foundational scholars). He said: "Know that the purpose of returning to the definitive origin is not to establish proof of the validity of acting upon it, like the proof that acting upon the report of a single narrator or by analogy is obligatory, for example. Rather, what is intended is something more specific than that, as previously mentioned in the hadith 'There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm' and the issues mentioned alongside it, which is a meaning contrary to that intended by the usuliyyin, and Allah knows best" (1). The particular and the branch and the difference between them: It has been clarified previously that the foundations of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) are general principles derived from particulars. These particulars are the indications and meanings of the legal texts. And these particulars are speculative and are not considered unless they return to the general principles. The meanings of the legal texts are their linguistic indications, and the descriptions that are conceivable or appropriate for the rulings, and the outcomes and results and causes of the rulings. Although these are speculative, they are indicated by the texts, or they do not indicate them but are merely presumed to be intended by the legislator; these are particulars. So, if one of these meanings - which is particular - returns to a general origin, it is then called a branch. Accordingly, every branch is particular, but not every particular is a branch. The lack of the particular returning to the general is a distinction that differentiates the particular from the branch. This difference is evident from the analytical tracing of al-Shatibi's texts where he uses these two terms, and the following is documentation of what we have mentioned: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/12. [Page 186] Al-Shatibi said in his first introduction: "The preservation guaranteed in His saying, Exalted is He: { Indeed, We sent down the Reminder, and indeed, We will preserve it } (1) refers to the preservation of its general principles that are explicitly stated, which is also what is meant by His saying, Exalted is He: { This day I have perfected for you your religion } (2). It does not refer to specific issues, for if that were the case, no specific aspect of the Sharia would be neglected in preservation, and this is not the case, as we can assert the permissibility, supported by occurrence, due to the variation of conjectures and the possibility of errors in specific texts, and the occurrence of mistakes in them is certain. Mistakes have been found in the reports of the singular narrators and in the meanings of the verses, which indicates that what is meant by the preserved Reminder is that which is general" (3). He said in his ninth introduction: "What is definitive or related to a definitive origin, and the blessed Sharia of Muhammad was revealed in this manner, and therefore it is preserved in its roots and branches, as He, Exalted is He, said: { Indeed, We sent down the Reminder, and indeed, We will preserve it }, because it pertains to the preservation of the objectives (maqasid) that ensure the well-being of both abodes, which are the necessities, needs, and enhancements, along with what completes and supplements them, and these are the roots of the Sharia. Definitive evidence has been established regarding their consideration, and all branches are based upon them, so there is no doubt that they constitute knowledge, a foundation, firmly established, and stable in its pillars" (4). __________ (1) Surah Al-Hijr, 9. (2) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 3. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 1/13. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 1/43 - 44. [Page 187] The first text above states that particulars do not fall within the meaning of preservation intended by the noble verse, while the second text states that the branches are preserved based on the verse itself. By understanding that particulars are the basis for universals, and the meaning of returning to the certain (qat'i), the aforementioned distinction is confirmed(1). Thus, it becomes clear that al-Shatibi does not adopt the approach of analogy (qiyas) and suitability (munasaba) in the manner that the scholars of the Shafi'i school assert; he also does not dismiss it as the scholars of the Hanafi school have done. Rather, he stipulates that the meaning or description proposed for reasoning must be related to the certain (qat'i), and without that, he does not accept it. He also does not reject it, as there may be particulars that combine with it to form a certain meaning. This is something that must be noted to understand al-Shatibi's methodology. Section Two On the Sources Introduction: __________ (1) Based on this, it can be said that what the scholars of the book al-Muwafaqat, such as Sheikh Muhammad al-Khidr Hussein from Tunisia, Dr. Abdullah Daraz, and Abu Ubaida Mashhoor bin Hassan al-Salman, have posited in their comments on the introductions of the book, especially the first, second, third, and ninth, is far from the true intent of al-Shatibi regarding these introductions. This also applies to other commentators mentioned by the latter. See: al-Muwafaqat, 1/17 - 18, and thereafter. Volume One, edited by Abu Ubaida Mashhoor bin Hassan al-Salman, 1st edition, 1421 AH. Dar Ibn Afan, Arab Republic of Egypt. It is in 6 volumes. [Page 188] They attributed contradiction to al-Shatibi when he said that particulars are not included in preservation while branches are preserved. This is another error on their part that indicates their failure to distinguish between the particular (juz'i) and the branch (far') in al-Shatibi's methodology. See: al-Muwafaqat, 1/12 and 1/44 from the edition of Sheikh al-Tunisi. And 1/32 from the edition of Dr. Daraz. And 1/22 and 1/107 from the edition of Abu Ubaida. Al-Shatibi dedicated the second section of his book al-Muwafaqat to discussing legal rulings (ahkam shar'iyya), which either pertain to the address of obligation (khitab al-taklif) or the address of status (khitab al-wad'). The address of obligation has five types: obligatory (wajib or fard), recommended (mandub), permissible (mubah), disliked (makruh), and forbidden (haram). The address of status has five types: cause (sabab), condition (shart), impediment (mani'), validity and invalidity (sihha wa fasad), and concession and obligation (rukhsah wa azimah). Al-Shatibi discussed these types in his book on rulings (1), elaborating particularly on the address of obligation in relation to the permissible (mubah), and regarding the address of status in relation to the cause and the concession and obligation. This is due to the impact these rulings have on his concept of objectives (maqasid). If we understand that his idea is based on the premise that all legal rulings return to general principles of public interest (maslaha), then the permissible, which is a legal ruling of obligation, meaning what the legislator has allowed between action and inaction, contradicts this principle and undermines his idea, which he views as a definitive general principle. For permission to act means that there is a public interest intended by the legislator, and permission to refrain means that the legislator does not intend the existence of that public interest, and this is a contradiction that undermines the idea that all rulings have objectives or maqasid. Therefore, al-Shatibi directs attention to the permissible in a different way. He states that the choice in the permissible is in terms of its being particular, and this does not undermine the idea because the public interests apply to the general principles and not to particulars, and in general principles, there is no choice. Thus, the permissible is permissible in the particular but is required to be acted upon or required to be refrained from in the general. The same applies to concession and obligation, as the ruling on taking the concession or refraining from it is permissibility; if both taking the concession and adhering to the obligation are permissible, then where is the public interest? Is it in taking the concession or in adhering to the obligation? This is why al-Shatibi's discussion on the permissible and the concession is extensive, in order to maintain the integrity of his idea. __________ (1) al-Muwafaqat, 1/68 and onwards. [Page 189] As for the study of the cause, it is an important foundation for his idea, as it is based on the notion that the legal rulings have objectives, and that the Sharia was established to achieve these objectives. These objectives are causes or results, and their causes are the legal rulings. Thus, the legal ruling is a cause for an effect, and the required action has an end result that arises from it. Just as the legislator intended to bring about the required action, he also intended for the end result to occur. The prohibited action has an end or result that the legislator intended to prevent from occurring, and just as the legislator intended to prevent the action, he also intended to prevent its result. Therefore, the study of causes and effects is the foundation upon which the idea of objectives (maqasid) rests according to al-Shatibi. The permissible (mubah): A reader may be surprised by al-Shatibi's lengthy and detailed discussion of the permissible, and the differences in his reports compared to other usul scholars, to the extent that his discussion of the legal obligations seems to focus solely on the permissible, while his discussion of other rulings—namely, the obligatory, recommended, disliked, and forbidden—is limited to a few sentences or paragraphs. However, studying these discussions, after understanding his idea of objectives, sheds light on this approach, as al-Shatibi considers the foundational principles he has established and the relationship between these principles as the basis for his opinions and reports regarding the permissible. This necessitates presenting some of the foundational principles or rules of his idea of objectives. Al-Shatibi concludes—through induction—that the Sharia was revealed for the interests of the servants, and these interests are the objectives of legislation, which can be categorized into three sections: necessary, needful, and embellishing, with each of these sections having its complements. [Page 190] Every objective must be absolute and definitive, and it should serve and affirm the necessary objectives, which are: the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and wealth. The embellishments serve the necessities, and both serve the essentials. The legal rulings (ahkam shar'iyya) must refer to one of the enhancing (tahsiniyya), need-based (hajiyya), or necessary (daruriyya) principles, meaning that the objective of each ruling must support or serve a benefit (maslaha) that has been established through comprehensive and definitive induction in one of the three categories. If the ruling's return to any principle does not become apparent, then it is either to be rejected or suspended. The meaning of the statement that the Sharia (law) came for the interests of the servants is that there is no ruling that does not bring benefit to the servants, even if it does not result in harm. The notion of the existence of such a ruling implies that it is futile, and there is no futility in the Sharia. The action required by Islamic law, whether obligatory or recommended, serves a universal principle or more than one of the principles that are the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia). The action that is prohibited by Islamic law, whether it is forbidden (haram) or disliked (makruh), undermines or serves to undermine a fundamental original principle or more than one of the principles that are the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) or interests (masalih). With these principles or rules regarding the concept of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), al-Shatibi's discussion of what is permissible (mubah) is directed. If it is said that what is permissible (mubah) is what the legislator has left to choice between action and inaction, or it is what neither the doer is blamed nor praised for, nor is the one who refrains from it blamed or praised, or it is what is equal in both action and inaction according to the legislator, or what the textual evidence indicates regarding the legislator's address to choose between action and inaction, or something similar to these statements, then this is problematic according to those principles. This is because action has a purpose, and refraining from it misses that purpose. If the intended purpose is achieved by refraining from the action, then performing it would miss that purpose. And if the rulings were legislated only for the benefit of the servants, then it is necessary to prefer one side over the other, or to claim the existence of a fourth level beyond the enhancements that is characterized by not serving any of the three levels nor undermining any of them. However, this claim contradicts al-Shatibi's idea that no legal ruling is devoid of an objective, whether it is to bring about a benefit or to avert harm. So how does al-Shatibi resolve this problem? [Page 191] The depiction of the particular and the universal in rulings: Al-Shatibi addresses this issue by stating that rulings have two perspectives, one as they are particular and the other as they are universal. He responds to those who say that the permissible (mubah) is to be avoided because one who engages in what is permissible may become distracted from what is required to be done, and he counters those who say that it is required to be done because one who engages in what is permissible has abandoned what is prohibited (haram), saying: "The permissible in the view of the Lawgiver is that which one is free to choose between doing and not doing, without praise or blame for either action or inaction" (1). He states: "The permissible, in its nature as permissible, is neither required to be done nor required to be avoided" (2). Here, that is, in its nature as permissible, it is viewed as a particular; however, if it is viewed as something required to be done or required to be avoided, that is from a perspective in which it serves or undermines the universal. The permissible is viewed in terms of its particularity and its universality; however, in terms of its universality, there is nothing that one is free to choose because it would be mere play. As for its particularity, that is, a specific legal ruling for a specific action, if one is free to choose it, this means it is stripped of wisdom or objective, and this does not negate the idea of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) in al-Shatibi's view because he applies them to universals rather than particulars. He says: "The recognized interests are the universals, not the particulars" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/68. (2) The same source. (3) The same source, 1/91. [Page 192] As for looking at the permissible (mubah) from the perspective of the whole, it makes the permissible permissible in part and required in total; it may be recommended in total or obligatory in total, or permissible in part and prohibited in total; it may be disliked in total or forbidden in total. He says: "The permissibility according to the partial and the total is subject to the remaining rulings. The permissible is permissible in part and required in total in the sense of recommendation or obligation, and permissible in part and prohibited in total in the sense of dislike or prohibition. These are four categories: The first: like enjoying the good things of food, drink, transportation, and clothing... If some times are left out while being able to do so, it would be permissible just as if it were done. If it were completely abandoned, it would be contrary to what the Sharia has recommended... And likewise, if all people abandoned that, it would be disliked. The second: like eating and drinking, having relations with wives, buying and selling, and the obligation of permissible earnings... All these things are permissible in part, meaning if one chooses any of these things over others, that is permissible. And if a man leaves them at certain times or circumstances, or if some people leave them, that does not detract from it; if we assume that all people left that, it would be abandoning what is necessary and commanded. Thus, entering into it would be obligatory in total. The third: like strolling in gardens, listening to the cooing of doves, permissible singing, and permissible play with doves or others; such things are permissible in part, so if done one day or in a certain situation, there is no harm in it. If done constantly, it would be disliked, and its doer would be attributed to a lack of intellect and to going against the virtues of customs and to extravagance in doing that permissible act. The fourth: like the permissible things that undermine justice when done continuously, even if they are permissible." (1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/85. I must point out here that I am presenting the ideas and inquiries of al-Shatibi to fill any gaps or to mend any flaws in his thought, and I am not in the position of discussing them... Otherwise, the question remains: Is not the permissible in part a legal ruling, in which one has a choice? Does this not undermine the complete validity of his idea, leaving the issue unresolved? [Page 193] Thus, the characteristic of universality has been attributed to the permissible (mubah) in order to preserve the foundation of the idea of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), so that interests are intended in the permissible even if both sides are equal. After illustrating the universality and particularity in the permissible, al-Shatibi also establishes that what is recommended in the particular is obligatory in the universal, and what is disliked in the particular is prohibited in the universal, and what is obligatory in the particular is obligatory in the universal. The same applies to prohibitions. He then states: "If the illustration of universality and particularity in the five rulings is established, then evidence may be sought for its validity, and the matter is clear upon reflection on what has preceded in the course of the report; rather, it is, in the consideration of the Sharia, at the level of certainty for whoever examines the Sharia in its contexts" (1). He then said: "It is established in these matters that the considered interests are the universals and not the particulars" (2). However, the observer of this illustration of universality and particularity in rulings may object to what has been mentioned regarding the permissible in the third and fourth sections (3). The permissible in the particular that is required to be abandoned in the universal, as the action that is required to be abandoned in the universal serves to undermine the universals; how can it then be considered optional, or equal on both sides? This is another issue that al-Shatibi investigates; how does he address it? The permissible is divided into two categories: __________ (1) The same source, 1/90. (2) The same source, 1/91. (3) See the previous page. [Page 194] Al-Shatibi divides the permissible (mubah) into two categories: the first meaning is choice (takhyir), and the second meaning is the lifting of hardship (raf' al-haraj). What is meant by choice is that it is permissible in part, while the action is required in total. What is meant by the lifting of hardship is that it is permissible in part, while the abandonment is required in total. Therefore, it is noted in the text mentioned on the previous page that the term "permissible" (jائز) is used in relation to what is recommended (mandub) in total, as well as in relation to what is obligatory (wajib) in total. As for the third category, which is what is permissible in part but disliked (makruh) in total, the term "permissible" is not mentioned; rather, it states: "there is no hardship in it" (1). He says: "The permissible is used in two senses: one is in terms of being given the choice between action and abandonment, and the other is in terms of saying: there is no hardship in it" (2). __________ (1) See p. 155. And see: al-Muwafaqat. 1/85. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/92. [Page 195] He says: "If it is said that there is no harm in what is permissible (mubah), then it is not included under the choice between action and inaction" (1). Then he said: "The category that requires action in its entirety is the one in which choice is given between action and inaction, as in His saying: { Your women are a tilth for you, so go to your tilth as you will } (2), and His saying: { And eat from both of them abundantly wherever you wish } (3)... This is indeed a true choice... As for the category that requires inaction in its entirety, we do not know of anything in the Sharia that indicates a true choice in it textually; rather, it is either silent about it or refers to some of it with a phrase that removes it from the ruling of explicit choice, such as naming this world as play and amusement in the context of reproach for those who lean towards it, for it implies that amusement is not something one has a choice in" (4). He said: "In general, it (i.e., the permissible) is of four categories: the first is that it serves a matter that requires action, the second is that it serves a matter that requires inaction, the third is that it serves a matter that allows for choice. The fourth is that it does not contain any of that" (5). __________ (1) The same source, 1/94. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 223. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 35. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 1/93 - 94. We may wonder, regarding this classification of the permissible and this distinction between the two categories, whether there is some confusion in Al-Shatibi's thought. We have cited his text in defining the permissible as it appears in the first part, p. 68: "What is permissible according to the legislator is that which one has a choice in between action and inaction," and here he mentions that some of the permissible is not something one has a choice in!! (5) The same source, 1/92 - 93. [Page 196] The first category has already been discussed, which is the permissible option (mubah al-mukhayyar). The second has also been addressed, which is the permissible in the sense of lifting hardship (mubah bi-ma'na raf' al-haraj). As for the fourth, since it does not serve any purpose, it means that it neither serves nor undermines any essential, necessary, or enhancing principle, as it does not benefit the servants nor avert any harm from them. Thus, it is fundamentally contradictory to the requirement of being for the benefit of the servants. Therefore, al-Shatibi referred it back to what is required to be abandoned, stating: "As for the fourth, since it does not serve any significant purpose, it is considered frivolous or akin to frivolity in the eyes of rational individuals, and thus it is also required to be abandoned, for it serves only to waste time without any benefit for religion or worldly matters; hence it is a servant of what is required to be abandoned, making it, in totality, required to be abandoned" (1). As for the third category, which is the permissible part that serves a choice. It is essential to note here that this choice is served, and consequently, it is a universal principle. According to al-Shatibi's idea, a universal principle cannot be a matter of choice; otherwise, it undermines it. In essence, the depiction of universality and particularity in the permissible was intended to prevent the existence of the permissible or the choice in universals. Therefore, after al-Shatibi discussed the fourth category, he returned to this third category to say: "The third category is similar as well, for it serves it, and thus it is also required to be abandoned" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/93 - 94. (2) Al-Muwafaqat, 1/93. It is noted here that he discussed the four categories as follows: first, then second, then fourth, and then third. He made his opinion on the fourth a prelude to his opinion on the third. [Page 197] Thus, there are two types of what is permissible (mubah): one that signifies the choice between action and inaction, which is the action that is required in totality, and one that signifies the lifting of hardship, which is the inaction that is required in totality. However, its being permissible continues to oscillate around the fundamental idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) or the purposefulness of rulings with skepticism. Al-Shatibi explores what might cast doubt on his idea, stating that the permissible in the sense of choice is, from one perspective, partial, and its existence is theoretical; whereas practically, it is the action that is required. As for the permissible in the sense of lifting hardship, the interest (maslaha) lies in leaving it, since it is required to be left entirely. So how can it be permitted when acting upon it negates the interest? Here, al-Shatibi asserts the possibility of a sixth rank of rulings, which is the rank of pardon, and this rank seems to resolve the issue of particulars that do not serve the idea of objectives. Regarding the permissible that signifies choice, al-Shatibi believes that an action, in its essence, has a rationality in the mind, and it has a reality that differs from its rationality. When it occurs, it does not occur in isolation from circumstances or attributes. For example: walking is permissible, looking is permissible, eating is permissible, and lying down is permissible; however, this ruling pertains to the action as an action, that is, as walking, looking, eating, or lying down. In reality, walking may be towards an act of worship or towards a sin, and the same applies to looking; eating may be for what is permissible or for what is forbidden, and it may occur out of necessity or not. The act of lying down varies in its reality based on circumstances. Actions in reality do not occur without attributes, so should one consider the action from the perspective of its rationality or from the perspective of attributes? He chooses the latter and states: "The purpose of establishing the evidence is to apply the actions of the obligated individuals according to their nature, and there is no dispute in this. However, the actions of the obligated individuals have two considerations: one from the perspective of their rationality and the other from the perspective of their occurrence in the external world" (1). He then says: "If that is the case, then the consideration should be based on what has occurred in the external world, which consists only of actions described by necessary attributes and matters contrary to that. Every obligated individual is addressed in relation to their specific self; thus, they are addressed by what is valid for them to achieve in the external world, which cannot happen except through external necessities; thus, they are addressed by them and not by anything else" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 3/17. (2) The same source, 3/19. [Page 198] The permissible (mubah) that is chosen seems to be akin to the obligatory (wajib) that is chosen, like the attributes of expiation (kafara). He says: "It is summarized that every permissible act is not permissible in an absolute sense, but rather it is permissible in part specifically, and as for the whole, it is either required to be acted upon or required to be refrained from. If it is said, 'Is this explanation not a contradiction to what was previously stated, that the permissible is that which has equal sides?' The answer is no, because what was previously mentioned is in terms of looking at it in itself, without considering any external matter, and this perspective is in terms of considering it with respect to external matters. So, when you look at it in itself, it is what is called here the permissible in part. And when you look at it according to external matters, it is what is called the required in whole. You see that this nice garment, for example, is permissible to wear; it has equal consideration in the view of the Sharia for both acting and refraining, so there is no intention in either matter. This is a rational reality when considered in this limited regard to the essence of the permissible as it is. And from the perspective of being a protection from heat and cold, a cover for the private parts, and beauty in appearance, it is required to be acted upon. This perspective is not limited to this specific garment nor to this specific time; it is a perspective in the whole, not in part."(1) __________ (1) The same source, 1/93. [Page 199] As for what is permissible (mubah) in the sense of lifting hardship, it is required to be abandoned entirely, and granting permission for it undermines or contradicts the universals. Therefore, al-Shatibi says: "As for the category in which there is no hardship, it is almost akin to following the blameworthy whims; do you not see that it is almost contrary to the intent of the Legislator in seeking the general prohibition in principle? However, due to its scarcity, lack of permanence, and its participation with the servant required to act by chance, as mentioned in its place, it has not been given much attention" (1). Then al-Shatibi mentions that although particulars may oppose the universals, they do not affect them because the universals are established with certainty, and the particulars that oppose the objectives of public interest (maslaha) do not reach the level of universals; thus, they do not undermine the fundamental idea of the objectives. He states: "The particular (2) does not undermine a required principle (3), and although it may open the door in general, it is not influential in itself as a particular, until it combines with others of its kind, and the combination is strengthening (4), and from there the universal that is prohibited, which is contrary to the desired action, is formed" (5). Therefore, if these particulars come together in a universal that encompasses them and returns to it, they will no longer be permissible in the sense of mubah, but will instead be required to be abandoned both partially and universally. However, in reality - according to al-Shatibi's view - they are particulars and do not return to a universal, while at the same time serving to undermine the idea of the objectives. __________ (1) The same source, 1/96. (2) That is: from the permissible included under the category of lifting hardship. (3) It will come in our discussion of the objectives that the particular does not undermine the universal even if it opposes it, because if the particular does not return to a universal, it can be interpreted or rejected. (4) That is, it does not have an effect until it combines with others and provides a significant consensus; then it becomes universal and must be considered in specifying the universals, but prior to that, it is not considered even if it opens the door for consideration. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/96. [Page 200] Based on this understanding of al-Shatibi's intent in his discussion of the permissible (mubah) and its details, it can be judged that most of the explanations and commentaries by the commentators on the book al-Muwafaqat regarding this topic are far from the truth, and indeed have no connection to al-Shatibi's intended meaning, let alone that some of them are not free from confusion and meaningless discourse(1). The rank of exemption: This is what leads al-Shatibi to assume a sixth type of rulings, which applies to these particular rulings and others that resemble them in being particulars that do not serve the universals. He says: "It is valid for there to be a rank of exemption between the lawful (halal) and the unlawful (haram), so it cannot be judged as one of the five"(2). Included in this rank are matters that are not burdensome, concessions (rukhas), and actions devoid of intention, among others. He states: "It makes no difference whether we assume those actions are commanded or prohibited or whether there is choice in them, because if they are neither prohibited nor commanded nor subject to choice, they revert to the category of what has no ruling in the Sharia, which is the meaning of exemption. Even if there is a command or prohibition attached to them, the condition for holding someone accountable for it is the mention of the command and prohibition and the ability to comply, and this is impossible in the case of the mistaken, the heedless, and the forgetful, as well as the sleeper and the insane... Among them is the error in ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning)... Thus, the essence of this is that there is no burden on him for what he has left and for what he has done, and among them are the concessions of various kinds, as the texts indicate by stating the lifting of burdens and the removal of hardship and the attainment of forgiveness"(3). __________ (1) See for example: al-Muwafaqat. 1/226. Footnote number 1. Edited by Abu Ubaida Mashhur bin Hasan Al-Salman. First edition. 1421 AH. Dar Ibn Afan, Arab Republic of Egypt. 6 volumes. The footnote includes comments from many of the commentators on the book al-Muwafaqat. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/107. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/109 - 110. [Page 201] However, al-Shatibi does not determine whether the status of pardon is a ruling or not. He says: "However, the consideration remains regarding whether pardon is a ruling or not, and if it is said to be a ruling, does it pertain to the address of obligation (taklif) or to the address of status (wada)? All of this is possible, but since it does not lead to a practical ruling, clarification in this matter is not emphasized, and it is preferable to leave it. And Allah is the Guide to the Truth" (1). Licenses and Determination: What applies to licenses, according to al-Shatibi's methodology, also applies to what is permissible (mubah). He says: "The ruling of a license is permissibility absolutely, in terms of it being a license" (2). He also states: "Is the permissibility attributed to the license of the kind that removes hardship or of the kind that allows choice between action and abstention? What appears from the texts of licenses is that it is in the sense of removing hardship, not in the other sense" (3). __________ (1) The same source, 1/119. Here, one might wonder, if this does not lead to a ruling, does it not undermine the concept of objectives (maqasid)? And if we say it does not undermine, does that not force us to say that this category of permissible acts and licenses is to be avoided and does not fit the definition of what is permissible? (2) The same source, 1/214. (3) The same source, 1/221. [Page 202] Therefore, the issue present in the permissible (mubah) regarding the idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) is the same as that in the concession (rukhsah). Thus, for him, concessions do not return to general principles nor serve the generalities; they are merely specific, in contrast to the original ruling (azimah). He says: "The original ruling is what has been legislated from the general rulings from the outset, and the meaning of it being general is that it does not pertain to some of the obligated individuals as they are obligated, nor to some situations over others, like prayer for example, which is legislated absolutely and universally for every person and in every situation, as are fasting, almsgiving (zakat), pilgrimage (hajj), jihad, and other rituals of Islam" (1). He says: "As for the concession, it is what has been legislated for a difficult excuse, as an exception to a general principle that necessitates prohibition, while being limited to the places of need therein. The fact that it is legislated for an excuse is the particularity mentioned by the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence). And the fact that it is difficult means that the excuse may simply be need without any existing hardship, and that would not be called a concession, like the permissibility of partnership (qarad), for example" (2). He said: "The original ruling returns to a general foundational principle, while the concession returns to a specific exception from that general principle" (3). These definitions and statements indicate the mentioned issue, which appears here once again, as he said that the original ruling is general and does not pertain to some obligated individuals or situations, then he said that the concession is an exception from that generality, which means that the original ruling has become specific. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/209. (2) The same source, 1/210. (3) The same source, 1/11. [Page 203] It should not be said here that this exception is a case of specifying the general, known in the science of usul (principles of jurisprudence), for this specification contradicts the idea of universals and their properties mentioned by al-Shatibi, including his statement: "You will not find in it, after its perfection, any abrogation or specification of its generality, nor any restriction of its absoluteness, nor the lifting of a ruling from its rulings, neither in terms of the generality of the obligated nor in terms of the specificity of some of them, nor in terms of time over time, nor in terms of condition over condition" (1). It will become clear in the discussion of generality and specificity that specification, in the sense of exception or lifting some of what the text encompasses, is rejected by al-Shatibi; rather, specification for him is the clarification of the meaning of the text, that is, what the general term encompasses. Accordingly, the concessions do not belong to universal principles. He said: "The fact that this legislation is for an excuse that is an exception from a universal principle indicates to you that concessions are not legislated from the outset; therefore, they are not universals, even if they are presented with that, it is incidental" (2). And there may be those who say: Concessions return to the individual with benefit, as they are justified by hardship, and they implement a universal principle, which is the principle of lifting hardship, like the hardship for the traveler, or for the principle of preserving life, like eating carrion for the one in dire need, or for a complementary principle, like the sitting prayer of the followers when the imam prays sitting, or other such universal principles (3). __________ (1) The same source, 1/46. And see p. 144 of this book. (2) The same source, 1/211. (3) Lifting hardship and not obligating with burdensome difficulties are among the universal principles and belong to the rank of needs. Preserving life is a universal principle that belongs to the rank of necessities. The sitting prayer of the followers due to the imam praying sitting refers to a universal principle of the complements of necessities. Al-Muwafaqat, 1/209 - 211. [Page 204] The answer is that al-Shatibi avoids this response and rejects it, because if it initially appears that he is patching a gap in the methodology, in reality, he is destroying more than he is building. For if we find a public interest (maslaha) in the concession and claim that it serves a general principle, the law has stipulated that the original ruling is better: { and to fast is better for you } (1). Al-Shatibi believes that adhering to the original rulings (azaim) is preferable to taking concessions (rukhas). He stated in his argument that concessions are akin to permissibility in the sense of lifting hardship, not in the sense of offering choice: "And the evidence that choice is not intended in these matters is that the majority or all say: whoever does not utter a word of disbelief under coercion is rewarded and in the highest ranks" (2). __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 184. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 1/222. [Page 205] Add to this, for example: Prayer and fasting are rooted in the preservation of religion, which is one of the necessities. How can breaking the fast, combining prayers, and shortening them be permitted in a journey where hardship is hardly mentioned, or for a wealthy king? However, if the journey involves hardship and significant difficulty, then according to the methodology of al-Shatibi, this elevates the concession from being merely a concession to being something that is required, recommended, or obligatory, and it serves overarching principles, such as the principle of alleviating hardship or not being burdened with what causes significant difficulty, or the principle of preserving life. For example, eating carrion in a state of necessity serves the principle of necessities, which is the preservation of life, and this is a requirement, not merely a concession. Similarly, the sitting of the followers behind a sitting imam is not a concession but rather an obligation and a necessity that complements the necessities, unlike the sitting of the imam, which is a concession if he is able to stand with difficulty. On one hand, and on the other hand, if we concede to returning concessions to overarching principles, this undermines the idea that the overarching principles support and reinforce one another, and that all rulings and principles serve and return to the preservation of necessities, which are the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and wealth. In His saying, Exalted is He: { Whoever disbelieves in Allah after his belief, except for one who is forced while his heart is secure in faith } (1). And in His saying, Exalted is He: { And when you travel throughout the land, there is no blame upon you for shortening the prayer } (2), the concessions do not support the principles; rather, they undermine them. Indeed, the preservation of religion takes precedence over the preservation of life, and yet uttering the word of disbelief in this case is permissible, as is shortening the prayer in a journey where there is no hardship or difficulty, which does not serve the principle of preserving religion, meaning it does not serve its universality. This leads to the conclusion that the principles do not support one another. __________ (1) Surah an-Nahl, 106. (2) Surah an-Nisa, 101. [Page 206] If al-Shatibi referred the optional permissible (mubah) to a general principle by directing attention to it being sought in its entirety, then the concession (rukhsah) and the permissible in the sense of lifting hardship did not return to general principles according to him. Therefore, he proposed for them, as we explained in the previous discussion, the rank of exemption, and he stated that partial rulings do not violate general principles. He also said this regarding concessions after confirming that they do not belong to general principles. He stated: "The necessities are not called concessions by the scholars" (1). He said: "The legitimacy of concessions is partial, limited to the place of need. If the traveler’s journey is interrupted, he must return to the original ruling of completing the prayer and observing the fast. The sick person, if he is able to stand in prayer, does not pray sitting, and if he is able to use water, he does not perform tayammum. Likewise, other concessions, unlike loans, partnership, and agricultural contracts, which resemble concessions, are not truly concessions in the sense of this terminology" (2). The conclusion is that concessions are particulars that do not revert to universals, and even though they are such and do not align with his methodology or his idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), the world will not be disrupted. He says: "The firm ruling returns to a general principle in obligation because it is absolute and general in its essence for all obligated individuals, while the concession returns to a particular based on some obligated individuals who have an excuse, and based on certain conditions and times for those with excuses, not in every situation, nor at every time, nor for everyone. It is like an incidental occurrence to the general principle. The established rule in its place is that if a general matter and a particular matter conflict, the general matter takes precedence because the particular entails a partial benefit while the general entails a general benefit, and the order of the world is not disrupted by the disruption of the partial benefit" (3). He then said: "The legitimacy of the concession is that it should be partial" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/21. (2) The same source, 1/28. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/224. (4) The same place. [Page 207] It is redundant to say, after clarifying his views on concession (rukhsah) and obligation (azimah), that he believes standing with obligation is better in terms of Sharia than taking concession. Likewise, concessions do not have a universal law; thus, their instances are limited to those mentioned in the texts, and they cannot be analogized. As for what falls under general rules, such as not being tasked with what is beyond one's capacity, the hardships that cause distress, and the removal of hardship, these are considered obligations and not concessions (1). Causes and effects: The cause is one of the situational rulings. In the terminology of the jurists (usuliyyin), it is a clear, defined description that the textual evidence indicates as a marker for the existence of the ruling (2). For example, the crescent moon of Ramadan is a cause for the ruling of fasting, and a sale is a cause for ownership and the permissibility of benefiting from the property. The relationship between the cause and the ruling in legal rulings is different from that between the cause and effect in rational matters. For instance, drinking alcohol is a cause of intoxication; thus, drinking alcohol results in intoxication. However, in Sharia, the crescent moon of Ramadan does not contain the ruling of fasting; rather, it exists at its occurrence, not due to a material relationship between cause and effect, but rather by a report from the Legislator who made the description a sign or indicator for the existence of the ruling. This is the understanding commonly held by the jurists regarding the relationship between cause and ruling in legal terminology. __________ (1) The question remains regarding concessions as it does for what is permissible: does their permissibility undermine the concept of objectives (maqasid)? And does the assertion that they are partial and not universal negate the inquiry? (2) See p. 53 of chapter one. [Page 208] But al-Shatibi establishes a new understanding, and he sees that the legal universals (kulliyat al-sharia) are, although they are either legislative or established by the Lawgiver, equivalent to the rational universals (kulliyat al-aqliyya), because these are also established by the Lawgiver. He says: "The legislative matters may parallel the rational matters in providing certain knowledge, and the knowledge of the Sharia is among them" (1). He also states: "Moreover, the rational universals are derived from existence, which is a legislative matter and not a rational one, thus they are equal to the legal universals in this regard, and the distinction between them is lifted" (2). And since causes have their effects, and whoever intends to bring about a matter aims to establish its causes, the doer of the cause is considered like the doer of the effect. Thus, the legal rulings are considered causes for effects intended by them. Al-Shatibi said: "Establishing the cause is akin to establishing the effect, whether that effect is intended or not. Because when it is made a cause in the course of customs, it is regarded as if he directly caused it. This is supported by the principle of customary practices, as the relationship of effects to their causes is like that of satiety to food, quenching to water, burning to fire, and purging to scammony(3) and all other effects to their causes. Likewise, the actions that result from our earning are attributed to us even if they are not from our earning, and if this is well-known and established, the custom of the Sharia follows this measure in legal causes with their effects" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat 1/44. See p. 144 of this book. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/44. (3) [Illegible]: A plant from which a sticky moisture is extracted, dried, and is also named after its plant; it is more effective against the stomach and intestines than all laxatives. Al-Firozabadi, al-Qamus al-Muhit. p. 1447. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/148. [Page 209] Therefore, the matter that must be considered in al-Shatibi's discussion of causes is that the legal rulings are causes for intended results. These results are the effects of the rulings or the intended benefits, and the rulings are the means leading to them. Just as the Legislator intended through commands and prohibitions to bring about what is commanded and to prevent what is prohibited, He also intended to achieve certain results from the commanded action and to prevent certain results from the prohibited action. This is the foundational principle of the objectives (maqasid) in al-Shatibi's thought. For this reason, al-Shatibi discussed causes and effects in detail and at length before beginning his book on the objectives. However, the obligation regarding causes, which are the rulings, even though the effects are intended by the Legislator, does not mean that there is an obligation regarding the effects themselves, as they are not within the capacity of the obligated person nor are they dependent on him; rather, what is within his capacity is the cause that the Legislator has commanded him to pursue. The occurrence of the effect happens within that framework. He said: "The evidence for this is what has been established in the discourse that what is required of the obligated person is to engage in the causes, while the effects are the actions of Allah, Exalted is He, and there is no earning involved for the obligated person" (1), and he said: "Thus, the obligation and address only pertain to what is acquired, so the effects are excluded from the address of obligation because they are not within their capacity; if they were to be addressed, it would be an obligation of what is not bearable, which is not the case" (2). Furthermore, the fact that the effect is intended by the Legislator through the establishment of the cause does not imply the permissibility of intending to bring about the effect through a means other than the legislated cause, as just as the effect is intended, the primary intention is the cause because the address indicates it and the obligation is placed upon it, and the effect is only understood through it. He said: "The fact that the Legislator did not legislate this cause for this specific effect is evidence that there is a corruption in that causation and no benefit" (3). We will clarify this matter in more detail and with more documentation in the third section of the fifth chapter. Section Three On the Results and the Concept of Benefit and Harm in al-Shatibi Definition of the Research Topic: __________ (1) The same source, 1/131. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/148. (3) The same source, p. 173. [Page 210] In the sections on introductions and documents, some rules or principles of al-Shatibi's methodology in establishing the objectives (maqasid) are clarified. The objectives or principles reached are a result of applying this methodology. This section aims to build upon those introductions and documents with ideas, definitions, or concepts that must be considered and relied upon when applying the methodology in order to reach the general rules and principles. Based on this, this section is to introduce some terms or legal terminology used by al-Shatibi, and understanding their meanings is essential for grasping his methodology, particularly the terms public interest (maslaha) and harm (mafsada), in addition to the terms cause (sabab), effect (musaab), wisdom (hikmah), and reason ('illah) and the meanings of rulings. Cause: As for the cause, its meaning has been clarified in the previous section. It is what the legislator has made a cause for an effect, whether in religious matters or in rational matters. The relevant application in the legal objectives is what is a legal cause. He stated when discussing one of the principles: "What has been discussed in this principle pertains to the effects of causes in terms of whether the causes are lawful or unlawful, that is, from the perspective of what falls under the scrutiny of the law, not from the perspective of what are ordinary causes for ordinary effects" (1). As has been clarified, the causes are the legal rulings that the legislator has specified, whether as commands or prohibitions, and they are the indications of the texts. Since the legislator has objectives in legislation, he has established rulings so that these objectives become the causes for adherence to them, making the legal rulings causes. The intended outcomes are rulings or effects or interests or reasons, but according to a specific methodology that will be clarified below. Wisdom: It is presumed that the ruling was legislated for its sake or for the sake of attaining it, thus it is a cause. However, before it is definitively established that it is intended by the legislator, it can be a plausible description or an appropriate description, making it the presumed intention of the legislator rather than a definitive one, and this has no legal consideration. The wisdoms may be known to the observer, may be presumed, or may be potentially imagined. __________ (1) Al-Muwafaqat. 1/171. [Page 211] In addition to that, some of the wisdoms may not be perceived or anticipated by a person, even though they may be the most important objective for the legislator. Among the outcomes, a person may feel that there is a worldly benefit for him and may naturally incline towards it, and this is what al-Shatibi refers to as the aim or the share. Therefore, the mere assumption of wisdom, in which the mind wanders, is not to be considered until it is established through the Sharia. He says: "If transmission (naql) and reason ('aql) collaborate on legal issues, it is on the condition that transmission precedes and is followed, while reason is subordinate; thus, the mind should only explore within the limits set by transmission" (1). He also says: "If we understand through necessity or choice an independent wisdom in the legislation of the ruling, it does not follow that there is not another wisdom and a second and third benefit, and more. Our ultimate understanding is that we have grasped a worldly benefit that is suitable to independently justify the legislation of the ruling, so we consider it under the ruling of legal permission, and we do not know that the benefit and wisdom are limited to what has appeared. If we do not attain knowledge or suspicion from that, we cannot decisively claim that there is no benefit except what has appeared to us. For that is a decisive claim about the unseen without evidence" (2). It is apparent from this text that it is a response to those who assert the establishment of the cause, wisdom, or benefit, based on its being probable, even though there may be others that have not appeared to us which are stronger in assumption. It seems to be a direct rebuttal to al-Amidi, who said: "If it is established that the rulings were legislated for the benefits of the servants, then if we see a ruling that entails a beneficial matter, it must either be that this is the aim of the legislation of the ruling or something that has not been revealed to us. It cannot be what has not been revealed to us; otherwise, the legislation of the ruling would be merely an act of devotion, which contradicts the principle previously established. Thus, it must be legislated for what has appeared, and if that is presumed, it must be acted upon" (3). __________ (1) Al-Muwafaqat. 1/53. (2) The same source, 2/216. (3) Al-Amidi, Al-Ahkam fi Usul Al-Ahkam. 3/250. [Page 212] Al-Shatibi's response to this statement means that he does not suffice with the presumed wisdom. Therefore, he said: "This is not permissible, for there remains the possibility of another wisdom for which the ruling was legislated, so we are, from that perspective, standing with the act of worship" (1), and he said: "If a reason appears to us that is suitable for the independence of the ruling's legitimacy and we are not required to deny anything other than it, then the usuliyyin (jurisprudents) allow for the possibility that the reason may differ from what has appeared to them" (2). What confirms this in his methodology is his consideration that wisdom is a consequence. He said: "As for the cause, it refers to what has been legislated for a ruling due to a wisdom necessitated by that ruling" (3). He also said: "The wisdoms of the causes are the consequences" (4). The consequence: It is the wisdom intended by the Legislator through the legislation of the cause. It is the result of the commanded action that the Legislator intends to achieve through the occurrence of the action, and it is the result of the prohibited action that the Legislator intends not to achieve through the non-occurrence of the action that causes it. However, not everything that can result from an action or from the omission of an action is a consequence of the cause; therefore, the consequence is what is established as being intended by the Legislator through inductive reasoning that leads to certainty. It is not sufficient for it to be something that can result from the action. The reason: The reason is the consequence or the result that the Legislator intended by legislating the ruling. Thus, it is the objective and the wisdom. One might ask how the reason can be the consequence, while it is closer in meaning to be a cause rather than a consequence? The answer is that in the terminology commonly used among the usuliyyin, the reason is neither a cause nor a consequence; rather, the reason is the motivator for legislation. This has been clarified in the previous chapter. However, for al-Shatibi, the matter is different, and the reason is the consequence according to his methodology. The explanation of this is that the Legislator only legislated the rulings to achieve objectives, and the objectives are the consequences of the rulings. If we want to know the objective of the Legislator, we look into these rulings and their consequences and intended outcomes, and what is established as such is considered a principle of legislation. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/217. (2) The same source. (3) The same source, 1/185. (4) The same source, 1/175. [Page 213] And if these objectives (maqasid) are the reason for the legislation of rulings, then the rulings are indeed legislated based on them, thus serving as the causes for legislation. The jurist (mujtahid) has no way to know the causes of the rulings except through following and deducing their consequences. For this reason, it is said that the objectives of the Sharia are to bring about benefits and to avert harms, and it is also said that the Sharia is characterized by bringing about benefits and averting harms. Based on this, what applies to the cause applies to the consequence and to the wisdom mentioned earlier. Al-Shatibi said: "As for the cause, it refers to the wisdoms and benefits that are related to the commands or permissions, or the harms that are related to the prohibitions" (1). It follows that the cause must be definitive: it must be the benefit itself or the harm itself, not its mere possibility. He said: "In general, the cause is the benefit itself, or the harm, not its mere possibility, whether it is apparent or not, whether it is defined or not" (2). He said: "The cause may be known or unknown; if it is known, it is followed, and wherever it exists, the requirement of the command or prohibition exists, whether it is intended or not, such as marriage for the benefit of procreation, and sale for the benefit of benefiting from the contracted item, and punishments for the benefit of deterrence. The cause is recognized here through its known pathways in the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). When it is determined, it is known that the intent of the Legislator is what those causes necessitate in terms of action or inaction, and in terms of causing or not causing. If it is unknown, one must refrain from asserting that the Legislator intended this or that" (3). Then he said: "And it is judged by knowledge or conjecture that it is not intended by Him (the Legislator). For if it were intended, there would have been a definitive proof for it" (4) (5). Meanings of rulings: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/185. (2) The same source. (3) The same source: 2/276-277. (4) That is: a definitive proof, not a conjectural indication, because the proofs of definitive matters must be certain. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat: 2/276-277. [Page 214] The meanings of rulings are the same as the causes or intended wisdoms of the legislator, such as the preservation of religion and the preservation of life; they are meanings derived from the legal rulings that lead to these outcomes. He said: "It is necessary to pay attention to the meanings for which the rulings were legislated, and the meanings are the causes of the rulings" (1). He also said: "Legal actions are not intended for themselves, but rather for other matters that are their meanings, which are the interests for which they were legislated" (2). Interest and harm: It becomes clear from the above that the pursuit of interests and the prevention of harms are the goals and outcomes of the rulings. They are their causes, objectives, and meanings. However, it should be noted that there is a fundamental difference between the meaning of both interest and harm according to al-Shatibi and their meanings according to those who preceded him among the jurists who assert the superiority of pursuing interests and preventing harms. For the earlier scholars, interests and harms are what is deemed so by rational individuals and wise people, meaning they are what returns to the obligated individuals in accordance with their innate nature and inclinations, and aligns with their desires and objectives; therefore, they are suitable meanings or descriptions. Thus, the recognized interests for them are the suitable descriptions if a ruling or rulings come in accordance with them (3). As for al-Shatibi, the interest is what is established as being intended by the legislator, regardless of whether it is suitable or unsuitable. This is done by deducing a meaning or description in the rulings, regardless of whether it is an interest or a harm according to the obligated individuals and their customs. If the meaning is deduced in a way that conveys what resembles a moral consensus, it is a general meaning intended by the legislator, and it is considered an interest if it causes what the Sharia requests, and it is considered a harm if it causes what the Sharia prohibits. This concept of interest and harm according to him is considered a reversal of the conventional meaning among the jurists, and failing to recognize this meaning leads to a misunderstanding of his concept of objectives, or to attributing to al-Shatibi opinions and ideas that contradict the reality of his views and thoughts. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/138. (2) The same source, 2/268. (3) This has been clarified in the first chapter. [Page 215] Since the benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid), in terms of bringing about and averting, are the causes (illal), the objectives (maqasid), the effects (musabbabat), and the meanings of the rulings (ahkam), and since they are frequently mentioned and utilized by al-Shatibi, the failure to ascertain the true meaning of what al-Shatibi intended by benefit and harm leads the researcher in the Muwafaqat to contradictions and diverts him from understanding al-Shatibi's methodology. Therefore, it is necessary to explore and establish al-Shatibi's concept of benefits and harms in detail and separately. The concept of al-Shatibi regarding both public interest (maslaha) and harm (mafsada): The concept of al-Shatibi regarding public interests (masalih) and harms (mafasid) appears in many of his texts, and it is also evident from the manner in which he established that the Sharia (Islamic law) is based on public interests and harms. Indeed, al-Shatibi attempted to prove this matter in the introduction to his book on the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), responding to al-Razi, who denied the reasoning of the Sharia based on benefits and harms and cut off that discussion. He presented texts that show that the commands of Allah, Exalted is He, and His actions are reasoned, as evidenced by the legal texts indicating that Allah has ruled this for such and such a reason, and has acted thus for such and such a reason, such as His saying: { so that you may attain piety }, { to test you }, { to worship Me }... Since al-Shatibi's method of establishing principles and foundations is through beneficial induction (istiqra), he brought forth numerous texts that explicitly state that the ruling or action was for the sake of a purpose. He pointed to the existence of countless texts indicating that rulings and actions have objectives. Based on the occurrence of induction, he establishes a universal principle that does not fail, which is that the actions and rulings of Allah have purposes and objectives. Thus, al-Shatibi sees that he has definitively proven that the Sharia is reasoned by benefits and harms. Upon examining these texts that al-Shatibi cited, we find that the majority of them do not indicate the intention of the legislator towards what is beneficial or the removal of harm in the sense of what aligns with the interests or desires of people or what rational individuals or wise men deem beneficial for people. Rather, most of them lack a rational or suitable meaning that can be said to bring about a benefit or avert a harm. [Page 216] Indeed, the utmost that these texts indicate, which al-Shatibi intended by citing them, is that rulings and actions have objectives or purposes. Since these actions and rulings are from the Legislator, their objectives are thus legal (shar'i). And since they are legal objectives, they are termed benefits (masalih) or harms (mafasid) depending on the legality of the actions or their illegality. To prove that this is al-Shatibi's concept of benefits and harms, we will discuss the evidence he presented to demonstrate that the Sharia is based on benefits, one by one. Analytical discussion of al-Shatibi's arguments: Al-Shatibi said: "The purpose of establishing the laws is solely for the benefits of the servants in both this world and the Hereafter."(1) He also said: "Al-Razi claimed that God's rulings are not based on any reason whatsoever, just as His actions are not, and that the Mu'tazila agreed that His rulings are based on the consideration of the benefits of the servants, and that this is the choice of most later jurists. And when he was compelled in the science of Usul al-fiqh to establish reasons for the legal rulings, he did so on the basis that the reasons are merely signs that indicate the rulings."(2) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/2. (2) The same source, 2/2 - 3. [Page 217] This statement indicates that since the view of justifying the Sharia (Islamic law) based on public interest (maslaha) is the opinion of most later jurists, it is necessary to establish proof for that. The proof that is valid for this issue pertains to the justifications if they are understood as signs of knowledge, that is, abstracted from any wisdom that the jurist may find. This is a reference to his intent regarding public interest, and this is entirely contrary to the methodology of justification adopted by the jurists before him, who justified the Sharia based on public interest. He then said: "The relied-upon position is that we have inferred from the Sharia that it was established for the interests of the servants, an inference that neither al-Razi nor anyone else disputes" (1). He then mentioned twelve texts as evidence, by way of example and not limitation. He said: "Indeed, Allah, Exalted is He, says regarding the sending of the messengers, which is the foundation: { Messengers bringing good news and warning, so that people will have no argument against Allah after the messengers } (2), { And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the worlds } (3). And He said regarding the origin of creation: { And He is the One who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His Throne was upon the water, that He might test you as to which of you is best in deed } (4), { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me } (5), { Who created death and life to test you as to which of you is best in deed } (6). As for the justifications for the details of the rulings in the Book and the Sunnah, they are more than can be counted, such as His saying after the verse on ablution: { Allah does not intend to make difficulty for you, but He intends to purify you and complete His favor upon you } (7), __________ (1) The same place. (2) Surah An-Nisa, 165. (3) Surah Al-Anbiya, 107. (4) Surah Hud, 7. (5) Surah Adh-Dhariyat, 56. (6) Surah Al-Mulk, 2. (7) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 6. [Page 218] He said regarding fasting: { Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, that you may attain piety } (1), and regarding prayer: { Indeed, prayer prohibits immorality and wrongdoing } (2), and he said regarding the qibla: { So turn your faces toward it, so that there will not be for the people a reason to argue against you } (3), and regarding jihad: { Permission is given to those who are being fought because they were wronged } (4), and regarding retribution: { And there is for you in retribution a saving of life, O you who have understanding } (5), and regarding the affirmation of monotheism: { Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes, we have testified, lest you say on the Day of Resurrection, "Indeed, we were of this unaware" } (6). The aim is to draw attention, and if induction indicates this and is beneficial for knowledge in such a matter, we assert that the matter continues in all details of the Sharia (Islamic law) (7). In this way, al-Shatibi sees that he has established conclusive evidence that the legal rulings are based on public interest (maslaha), and we will look - in the following - at this text analytically to understand his intention regarding the reasoning based on public interest. Let us take - then - the texts he used as evidence, each of which is beneficial for reasoning based on public interest, and their abundance forms an induction that suggests something akin to moral consensus. His first evidence: His saying: "Indeed, Allah, Exalted is He, says regarding the sending of the messengers: { Messengers as bringers of good tidings and warners, so that there will not be for the people a reason to argue against Allah after the messengers }" (8). __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 183. (2) Surah Al-Ankabut, 45. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 150. (4) Surah Al-Hajj, 39. (5) Surah Al-Baqarah, 179. (6) Surah Al-A'raf, 172. (7) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 2/3. (8) Surah An-Nisa, 165. [Page 219] This text is prepared by al-Shatibi as a ruling or action of Allah, Exalted is He, justified by public interest (maslaha). Upon careful consideration, we find it indicative of a goal—one of the objectives—of sending the messengers, or of a result intended to be achieved. The action is the sending of the messengers as bearers of good news and warners, and the result is establishing the proof against the people that they have been given glad tidings and warned, so they cannot say on the Day of Resurrection: "No warner came to us," nor can they say: "How can we be held accountable for doing something we were not forbidden from, and for abandoning something we were not commanded to do?" What al-Shatibi intends here is to establish that the actions and rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, have goals or outcomes for which He acted or legislated. Thus, cutting off the proof for the servants on the Day of Resurrection is a goal or result of sending the messengers that the legislator intends to achieve. It is not a cause in the sense of a cause that is a pillar in analogy (qiyas), for the cutting off of the proof for the servants on the Day of Resurrection is not a cause for a legal ruling, and there is no ruling in this text that is subject to analogy. The fact that al-Shatibi refers to the goal or result or outcome or effect as a cause prompts us to clarify the meanings of these terms in his context so that we do not misplace them. As for the fact that this cause is a public interest, this is a matter of figurative language and not a matter of recognizing that this matter is a public interest and then observing that the Sharia has commanded or established what a person recognizes as a public interest. Yes, it is not from this perspective, and the intended figurative language is that everything Allah commands is called a public interest or truth or justice, and everything He forbids is called corruption or injustice or falsehood. This is what al-Shatibi means, and to understand the matter, let us look at the text above: is there in this goal, which is that people will not possess a proof on the Day of Resurrection by which they can escape accountability and punishment, a public interest or an aspect of public interest? If no bearer of glad tidings or warner had come to them, they would have been among those in a state of ignorance and would have escaped punishment { And We would not punish until We sent a messenger } (1), so where is the public interest here or the appropriate meaning that, if presented to minds, would be accepted? The cutting off of the proof for the servants on the Day of Resurrection does not fall within the public interest of the servants. Based on this, al-Shatibi's use of this text to argue for justification by public interest indicates that what he means by public interest is what has been established as intended by Allah, Exalted is He, regardless of whether it is rationally meaningful or not. His second evidence: { And We have not sent you except as a mercy to the worlds } (2). __________ (1) Surah Al-Isra, 15. (2) Surah Al-Anbiya, 107. [Page 220] This text has two aspects of meaning regarding the justification of the Sharia (Islamic law) based on public interest (maslaha). The first aspect is the one adopted by the scholars who argued for the justification of the Sharia, stating that since it is a mercy, it must return to the servants with benefits and avert harm and evils from them. Thus, the pursuit of benefits and the prevention of evils become the justification for the rulings. This is not the aspect of reasoning that al-Shatibi relied upon, as we know that al-Shatibi does not suffice with a single text or isolated texts to establish meaning. Al-Shatibi's intention in citing this text is the second aspect, which is that the actions and rulings of Allah are justified. This text is one of the particulars that support this meaning. In other words, Allah, Exalted is He, performed the act of sending, and the text indicates that His action has a purpose, which is mercy. Thus, this meaning, which is the justification of actions and rulings, is realized in this particular instance. This is the intended meaning in all of his twelve arguments; if his intention with this text were the first aspect, it would not strengthen all the other texts. Therefore, this text establishes that the sending of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) was for a purpose. Since al-Shatibi used this text as evidence for reasoning based on public interest (maslaha), this indicates that he uses the term "reason" to refer to the objective. As for the fact that this reason is a public interest, it can be said that mercy is a public interest for the servants, and thus the legislator aimed for it. However, this is not what al-Shatibi intended; rather, his point is that the mercy for the worlds is an objective of the legislator, and therefore it is a public interest. This text does not imply that what a person considers to be a public interest is what the Sharia has come to indicate, because the meaning of the text is that the message is a mercy for the servants, regardless of the commands and prohibitions it contains; it is a public interest for the worlds in whatever commands and prohibitions it includes, however they may be. His third proof: { And He is the One who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His Throne was upon the water, that He might test you as to which of you is best in deed }(1). __________ (1) Surah Hud, 7. [Page 221] This text was brought by al-Shatibi here because it states a purpose or result of creation, which is {to test you which of you is best in deed}. This is added to his other proofs for the purpose of establishing induction. The common or shared meaning that these texts converge upon is the indication of a purpose or result of action. The inference from this text regarding causation serves as evidence for al-Shatibi's designation of the intended purpose or result as a cause. If we consider what al-Shatibi calls a cause here, we would recognize the difference between it and the cause of analogy (qiyas). The test (ibtila) is not a cause of analogy. There is no ruling in this text that can be applied to a specific incident by analogy based on the commonality of the test. All that these texts, which al-Shatibi uses as evidence, affirm is the existence of purposes for actions. As for the fact that this purpose is a public interest (maslaha), there is no dispute that it is inappropriate to say regarding the actions, commands, and prohibitions of Allah, Exalted is He, anything other than that they are public interest, truth, and justice, and not merely what a servant perceives as a public interest or a suitable description or wisdom in the eyes of the wise and discerning. In fact, the matter seems to be quite the opposite, as this text indicates the control of the Creator over His creations. Where is the public interest that a person feels or that the mind perceives in creating a human to be tested, either towards Paradise or towards Hell? Before a person is created, how can they comprehend or understand the assertion that their creation and testing is a public interest for them? This does not reveal any aspect of public interest, and this confirms that al-Shatibi uses the term public interest for what has been established as intended by the legislator, even if it is not rationally comprehensible. [Page 222] His fourth proof: { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me } (1). This also applies to what was previously mentioned, as it has been presented to prove the purpose or intended result of the legislator from creation { to worship Me }, and it also confirms the aforementioned concept of al-Shatibi regarding the term public interest (maslaha). If what he meant by this term was the description or appropriate meaning that is understood by rational individuals and wise people, then this text would contradict his aim. This text is cited by those who oppose reasoning based on public interests. And where is the interest of the nonexistent in creating him for obligation? There is no reasonable interest, and this affirms the earlier mention of al-Shatibi's intention with the term public interest. His fifth proof: { He who created death and life to test you which of you is best in deed } (2), and this is essentially the same as his third proof. It has been presented to increase the evidence. What has been said about what preceded it can be said here. His sixth proof: { Allah does not intend to make difficulty for you, but He intends to purify you and complete His favor upon you } (3). It is also noted that he cited this because it includes mentioning the result that can arise from this obligation { to make }, { to purify you }, { and to complete His favor }. Even if a person recognizes the benefit in cleanliness or purification, he cannot adopt a form of cleanliness in place of the prescribed form. Considering these objectives as public interests indicates that they are regarded as such because they are intended by the legislator, not that Allah, Exalted is He, legislated what the servants perceive as beneficial. __________ (1) Surah Adh-Dhariyat, 56. (2) Surah Al-Mulk, 2. (3) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 6. [Page 223] His seventh proof: { Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, that you may attain piety }(1). The evidence in this proof is in { that you may attain piety }. Al-Shatibi establishes through this that the obligation is for specific purposes, and their being intended by the Legislator makes them a public interest (maslaha). There is no appropriate meaning in this text to be pointed out. And if it is said that piety is a public interest, this contradicts the essence of the idea and does not support the claim of reasoning based on public interests, because piety is obedience. This text is similar to the text: { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me } in its indication of this matter. His eighth proof: { Indeed, prayer prohibits immorality and wrongdoing }(2). Here, al-Shatibi also uses the text to establish a result or outcome of the ruling, and that this outcome is intended by the Lawgiver, thus it is a public interest (maslaha). This proof is similar to the previous one. His ninth proof: { So turn your faces toward it, so that there will be no argument against you from the people } (3). The obligation is for the sake of achieving the result { so that there will be }, thus the result becomes an objective of the obligation. There is no reason to call this objective a public interest (maslaha) except that it is intended by the legislator. His tenth evidence: { Permission is granted to those who are fought because they have been wronged }(4). Al-Shatibi uses this text as evidence to establish that the ruling ordained by Allah, which is the permission to fight, is aimed at lifting the oppression that has befallen them. Thus, this objective is intended by the legislator (al-shari) with the ruling, and for this reason, the permission to fight has a purpose. An example of this is his following evidence. His eleventh proof: { And there is for you in legal retribution (qisas) a life, O you who possess intellect }(5). __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 183. (2) Surah Al-Ankabut, 45. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 150. (4) Surah Al-Hajj, 39. (5) Surah Al-Baqarah, 179. [Page 224] He establishes through this reasoning that the legislation of retribution (qisas) is for a purpose or outcome, which is to eliminate intentional murder or transgressions or to reduce them. Thus, this outcome is intended by the Legislator, and it is established that the actions or rulings of the Legislator are justified by their purposes. Since the purposes are intended by the Legislator, they are considered public interests (masalih). This text and the one preceding it can be said to have as their aim a benefit according to common sense and nature or according to rational individuals, and this is correct. However, this is not the basis of al-Shatibi's reasoning, as it does not align with his other proofs. Rather, his intended purpose, which is supported by all his other arguments, is to establish the existence of a purpose for the ruling or action, regardless of whether it is rational or not. His next and final proof clarifies and emphasizes this matter. His twelfth proof: { Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes, we bear witness, lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection: Indeed, we were of this unaware } (1). The complete text is: { And when your Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants and made them testify of themselves: Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes } (2) [the verse]. This is what al-Shatibi presented to prove that actions have purposes. The purpose here is to establish evidence against the Children of Adam and to cut off their excuses on the Day of Resurrection. The existence of a purpose for an action or ruling, and the affirmation of this in many actions and rulings, establishes for al-Shatibi that the actions and rulings of Allah have purposes. If this is established and there is a ruling for which there is no text regarding its purpose or the intention of the Legislator behind it, then one must search for a purpose or aim that the Legislator intends from it. __________ (1) Surah Al-A'raf, 172. (2) Surah Al-A'raf, 172. [Page 225] This is the essence of al-Shatibi's intention behind these arguments. In this last text, we do not perceive a reasonable benefit, for al-Shatibi used this last text as evidence for the reasoning based on public interest (maslaha). The benefit is so that they do not say on the Day of Resurrection, "Indeed, we were heedless of this." The action that is reasoned is God's witnessing to people against themselves after taking them from the backs of the children of Adam. A person can do nothing but affirm and believe in this text and what it contains. While he may be able to comprehend the necessity of this affirmation, he cannot understand, with the mental capacity he has been given, how the establishment of this proof is contingent upon this witnessing. And where is the benefit for the servants in the cessation of their proof? Based on their testimony against themselves, a testimony in which they have no power or strength? Accordingly, this verse does not indicate any benefit for the servants, neither closely nor remotely. It contains no evidence in this context except that the actions of God, Exalted is He, have a purpose or intended outcome. The purpose of this action by God is to nullify the servants' proof on the Day of Resurrection. Since al-Shatibi referred to it as a reason and called it a benefit, this means that he names the objectives of the Lawgiver (maqasid al-sharia) as reasons and benefits. Based on what has been mentioned, those who cite some texts from al-Shatibi and rely on his statements intending something other than what he intended, and establish rulings based on worldly interests, goals, and desires, citing his book or his methodology - according to their claim - have not taken the trouble to reflect and think lightly about his arguments. If al-Shatibi's intention in reasoning based on benefits were what is considered a benefit according to sense, nature, or intellect and observation, his methodology would have been invalid from the outset, because these arguments he presented do not support this indication; rather, most of them contradict it. [Page 226] One of those interested in the topic of the objectives of Islamic law (maqasid al-sharia), and who asserts that the objectives are the public interests (masalih) — in a sense contrary to that of al-Shatibi — is Sheikh Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour, who says: "The examination of many evidences from the Qur'an and the authentic Sunnah necessitates certainty that the rulings of Islamic law are contingent upon purposes and reasons that pertain to the general welfare of society and individuals" (1). This Sheikh — may Allah have mercy on him — did not grasp al-Shatibi's intended meaning of public interest, but he did recognize the meanings of these evidences. Therefore, he concluded that they are not suitable for this argument. He said: "Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi mentioned in the introduction of the book of objectives from his book the title of the definition (2) the sound evidence following the verse on ablution: { Allah does not intend to make difficulty for you, but He intends to purify you } and His saying: { And there is for you in retaliation the saving of life }" (3). Thus, he considered only two of al-Shatibi's evidences and rejected ten that he deemed unsuitable for argumentation. If what the Sheikh said were correct, it would invalidate al-Shatibi's claim of having achieved a comprehensive examination in this matter and would undermine his methodology from the outset. The correct approach is not to reject al-Shatibi's arguments from this perspective (4), but rather to understand his intended meaning of public interest in the sense we have mentioned. And Allah knows best. Below are some explicit texts clarifying his intended meaning of public interest and harm. Some texts regarding al-Shatibi's intended meaning of public interest and harm: __________ (1) Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour, Objectives of Islamic Law. p. 14, Tunisian Distribution Company, Tunisia, 3rd ed., December 1988. (2) This is the book al-Muwafaqat, and al-Shatibi referred to its introduction as "The Title of the Definition of the Secrets of Obligation." (3) Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour, Objectives of Islamic Law. p. 16. (4) It may be valid to reject his arguments from another angle, which is the claim of having achieved a comprehensive examination that leads to certainty, and the claim that the matter is continuous in all details of the Sharia. [Page 227] He says: "If it is accepted that the purpose of the Sharia (law) is for the interests of the servants, then it returns to them according to the command of the Lawgiver and within the limits He has set, not according to their whims and desires. Therefore, the legal obligations are burdensome on the souls, and the senses, customs, and experience bear witness to this. The commands and prohibitions remove him from the inclinations of his nature and the pursuit of his desires until he takes them from beneath the prescribed limit... As for the fact that the interests of the obligations return to the obligated person in both the immediate and the delayed sense, this is correct, and it does not necessitate that attaining them be outside the limits of the Sharia or that he obtains them by himself without the Sharia providing them to him, and this is evident"(1). He says: "The pursuit of interests and desires does not contradict the purpose of the Sharia from this perspective because the Sharia is also established for the interests of the servants. If the interest is made subordinate, there is no harm on the doer, except that there is a significant condition here, which is that the means by which he achieves his interest must be shown to be legislated by the Lawgiver for the attainment of such, otherwise the prior matter is the command of the Lawgiver"(2). He says: "The actions and abstentions, in terms of being actions or abstentions, are rationally equivalent regarding their intended purpose, as there is no rational basis for commendation or condemnation. When the legislator specifies one of the equivalents for the sake of public interest (maslaha) and designates the other for harm (mafsada), he clarifies the reason through which the public interest is achieved, thus commanding it or permitting it. He also clarifies the reason through which harm is achieved, thus prohibiting it out of mercy for the servants. If the obligated person intends exactly what the legislator intended by permission, he has aimed for the public interest in its most complete form, and he is deserving of it being realized for him. However, if he intends something other than what the legislator intended, this often occurs due to a misconception that the public interest lies in what he intended, as a rational person does not intentionally aim for harm. He has thus rendered what the legislator intended as disregarded, while considering what the legislator neglected as a valid aim, which is a clear contradiction to the Sharia."(3) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/117. (2) The same source, 2/119. (3) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/231. [Page 228] He says: "The fact that the public interest (maslaha) is an interest intended by the ruling and that the harm (mafsada) is likewise a harm that pertains to the legislator is a matter that does not allow for rational consideration based on the principle of negating the good and the bad. If the legislator has enacted a ruling for a specific interest, then he is the one who establishes it as an interest; otherwise, it could rationally be that it is not so, since all things are equal in relation to their original state, and reason has no jurisdiction over their goodness or badness. Therefore, the existence of the public interest is from the legislator, such that reason affirms it and the soul finds reassurance in it. The interests, in their essence as interests, have been concluded to be matters of worship, and what is built upon acts of worship can only be worshipful" (1). It may be said that many rulings observe the consideration of the interests of the servants in the sense of what they are inclined to according to their senses, nature, and habit, or that many rulings have objectives that align with the aims and purposes of the servants. Al-Shatibi's response here is that the public interest is what the legislator has sought or what was intended for it; if this coincides with the worldly interests of the servants, it is incidental, not fundamental. This is a grace from Allah, Exalted is He, to encourage obedience and worship. He says: "The rulings of the Sharia do not escape the five categories; as for obligation and prohibition, their opposition to the inclination that falls under choice is evident, as it is said: 'Do such and such, whether you have an interest in it or not.' And 'Do not do such and such, whether you have an interest in it or not.' If the obligated person has an interest that aligns with the desire that motivates the command or prohibition, it is incidental, not fundamental. As for the other categories, although their apparent nature falls under the choice of the obligated person, they have entered under the legislator's choice, and thus they revert to being removed from his choice" (2). __________ (1) The same source, p. 219. (2) The same source, 2/216. [Page 229] He said: "If Allah had willed, He would have imposed it upon us while we turn away from worldly gains, or He would have imposed it upon us while stripping us of the innate inclinations. However, He has bestowed upon His servants what He made a means to what He intended for the cultivation of this world for the Hereafter, and He made the pursuit of these gains permissible, not prohibited, but according to legal regulations that are more effective in terms of benefit (maslaha) and more enduring than what the servant considers to be beneficial { and Allah knows, while you do not know } (1). If He had willed, He could have prevented us from seeking the gains of the Hereafter, for He is the Owner and has the ultimate argument, but He encouraged us to fulfill the rights that are obligatory upon us with the promise of a share for us, and He hastened for us many shares from that which we enjoy on the path of what we have been commanded" (2). Based on this, al-Shatibi's concept of benefits and harms is that the legal rulings were established for specific purposes. The action required by the Sharia has a desired purpose or purposes, and the action that is prohibited has results that are desired to be absent. These purposes of the rulings are the objectives of the legislator, and since they are objectives of the legislator, what is sought from them is called benefit (maslaha), and what is intended to be avoided is called harm (mafsada), whether it is appropriate or not. Moreover, among the terms that one should be attentive to their meanings according to al-Shatibi are the terms particular (جزئي) and branch (فرع), and the meaning of returning to the definitive (قطعي), due to the differences in their meanings according to him compared to what may come to the reader's mind. The meanings of these terms have been clarified by him in the first section of this chapter. Chapter Four The Intention of the Legislator In Establishing the Sharia from the Beginning And in Establishing it for Understanding ... It contains an introduction and three sections: Section One: ... The Intention of the Legislator in Establishing the Sharia from the Beginning. Section Two: ... The Infalibility of the Sharia. Section Three: ... The Intention of the Legislator in Establishing the Sharia for Understanding. Chapter Four The Intention of the Legislator in Establishing the Sharia from the Beginning And in Establishing it for Understanding Introduction: __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 216. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 2/123. [Page 230] Based on what was mentioned in the previous chapter regarding the criteria set by al-Shatibi for the causes (illal) or objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), he establishes a new matter and considers it a reconciliation between those who differ on the issue of justifying rulings through appropriate attributes or legal meanings, or other matters that some have considered pathways for justification. For example: the disagreement regarding the reasoning behind the prohibition of alcohol due to intoxication, where the reasoners stated that intoxication is a reason even if it is not explicitly mentioned or understood from the discourse, based on the principle of reasoning and the appropriateness of the description. On the other hand, those who oppose this reasoning argue that it is not indicated by the Sharia nor understood from the discourse, but rather it is something that the reasoner inclines towards and imagines its correctness in his heart; thus, it is a product of the whims of the mind and not from the indications of the Sharia. Al-Shatibi came with his methodology or criteria for reasoning to say that this reasoning or this description, in itself, is not indicated by the legal discourse. Therefore, reasoning based on it is a matter of beautification and vilification. However, since it has been established that legislation was for the sake of goals, reasons, objectives (maqasid) or rulings, it has been established that it is permissible for the jurist (mujtahid) to search for the wisdom behind the prohibition of alcohol. With Al-Shatibi's condition for certainty regarding the reason or objective or that it returns to something certain, the reason determined by the jurist cannot merely be an appropriate description, nor is that a requirement at all; rather, it must be something established through induction or returning to a principle or meaning that is certainly established through that method. Accordingly, the claim of the reason of intoxication, if this meaning is not certain, has no value in the Sharia. However, since the preservation of the intellect is a meaning that the legislator intended to achieve with certainty and has become a firmly established principle in the religion, and since reasoning based on intoxication returns in its meaning to this certain principle - which is the preservation of the intellect - therefore, reasoning based on intoxication is valid. [Page 231] Thus, it becomes clear that he agrees with the Hanafis, for example, in that the mere existence of meaning in a ruling or in some rulings does not benefit in the process of reasoning, and he agrees with the Shafi'is in the validity of reasoning or searching for the meanings intended by the Legislator, while he disagrees with the Hanafis in their rejection of this reasoning, and he disagrees with the Shafi'is in being satisfied with the meaning being a presumption of being intended by the Legislator and being satisfied with a few evidences based on the meaning, as in the appropriate cases, or with a single evidence as in the rare cases, or merely its existence in the ruling as in the mursal (unattributed hadith). We have explained this matter in detail in the first chapter. With these criteria, al-Shatibi enters into the discussion of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), and he explained these criteria in the first part of his book, dividing them into two sections: the first is the introductions that he deemed necessary for understanding his book, and the second is the Book of Rulings. As for the objectives, he made them the third section of his book, which occupied the second part of it. The third and fourth parts, which complete his book al-Muwafaqat, contain the fourth and fifth sections, which are applications of his idea regarding the objectives, or his methodology in establishing the principles based on the sciences of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The idea of the objectives of the Sharia and their division into three categories: necessary, need-based, and embellishing, along with the addition of supplements for each category, is not new to al-Shatibi; it first appeared through Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni, and Allah knows best. Many scholars followed this matter after him. However, what is new in al-Shatibi's approach is his stipulation of certainty for the objective to be considered legal, and his requirement of induction as a means to that end, as well as his understanding of benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid). Furthermore, his discussion on the objectives is characterized by detail, arrangement, and classification that is absent in his predecessors. According to him, the objectives are divided into two categories: the objectives of the Legislator and the objectives of the obligated person (mukallaf). The objectives of the Legislator are of four types: the first is His intention in establishing the Sharia from the outset, which is the type that the legal theorists (usuliyyun) referred to before him, and in it, the division of objectives into necessary, need-based, and embellishing occurs. [Page 232] The second: his intention in establishing the Sharia for understanding. The third: his intention in establishing the Sharia for obligations according to it, and the fourth: his intention in the compliance of the obligated person and their submission to its ruling. Al-Shatibi says: "The objectives that are considered are of two types: one refers to the intention of the legislator, and the other refers to the intention of the obligated person. The first is considered in terms of the legislator's intention in establishing the Sharia from the outset. And in terms of his intention in establishing it for understanding. And in terms of his intention in establishing it for obligations according to it. And in terms of his intention in having the obligated person submit to its ruling; these are four types" (1). The subject of this chapter is the first two types. As for the third and fourth types, they are the subject of the following chapter - if Allah wills. The first discussion The intention of the legislator in establishing the Sharia from the outset The meaning of this type: Establishing the Sharia from the outset refers to the obligation of it, meaning the commands and prohibitions. This type represents the objectives of the legislator regarding obligations, such that the obligations are the causes for their effects, which are the objectives of the legislator through them; it is correct to refer to this type as the objectives of the Sharia. The objectives are of three categories: These objectives are understood from the legal discourse and from the legal obligations. Al-Shatibi says: "The obligations of the Sharia relate to preserving its objectives in creation, and these objectives do not exceed three categories: the first is that they are necessary, the second is that they are needed, and the third is that they are embellishing" (2). He then defines the limits of each of these three categories and clarifies that the legislator's intention to preserve them is evident in all obligations of the Sharia, as the obligations of the Sharia are the rulings of acts of worship, customs, transactions, and crimes. In these four, the legislator's intention to preserve the necessities, needs, and embellishments is evident. An introduction to these three categories: __________ (1) Al-Muwafaqat: 2/2. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat: 2/3 - 4. [Page 233] He said: "As for the necessities, their meaning is that they are essential for the establishment of the interests of both religion and the world, such that if they are lost, the interests of the world will not proceed in a proper manner, but rather in corruption, chaos, and the loss of life. In the Hereafter, it results in the loss of salvation and bliss, and returning with manifest loss" (1). With this description, the necessities are defined by their specific entities. He states: "The total number of necessities is five: the preservation of religion, life, lineage, wealth, and intellect, and it has been said that they are to be observed in every community" (2). He also said: "As for the needs, their meaning is that they are required in terms of expansion and alleviating the constraints that generally lead to hardship and difficulty resulting from the loss of what is sought. If they are not observed, hardship and difficulty will generally befall the obligated, but it will not reach the level of the ordinary corruption expected in public interests." The public interests, that is, the necessities, and based on this definition, the principle of not imposing what is beyond one's capacity and the alleviation of hardship are foundational or essential rules. __________ (1) The same source. (2) The same source, 2/4. [Page 234] He said: "As for the enhancements, their meaning is to adopt what is appropriate from the virtues of customs and to avoid the disgraceful conditions that rational minds abhor, and this encompasses the category of noble character (makarim al-akhlaq)"(1). He also said: "The absence of these does not negate a necessary or a needful matter, but rather it falls under the category of enhancement and adornment"(2). To further clarify the limits of each of these ranks, he states: "The needful matters revolve around the necessary ones, as do the enhancements"(3). He says: "For whoever seeks more, the needful matters revolve around expansion, facilitation, alleviation of hardship, and kindness. In relation to religion, this appears in legal instances of concessions in purification, such as tayammum (dry ablution), the lifting of the ruling of impurity when its removal is difficult, shortening the prayer, lifting the obligation of prayer due to fainting, praying while seated or on one's side, and breaking the fast while traveling or ill"(4). He states: "The category of enhancements also operates similarly to the needful matters, as it pertains to acting upon noble character and what is appropriate in the course of customs, such as purifications in relation to prayers according to the opinion of those who consider it to be in this category(5), taking adornment from clothing, the virtues of appearances, perfumes, and similar matters, selecting the best and highest in zakat (almsgiving) and expenditures, and the etiquette of kindness in fasting, as well as in relation to souls, such as kindness and benevolence, and the etiquette of eating and drinking, and so forth, and in relation to offspring, such as maintaining good conduct and parting with kindness"(6). In his book, there are more examples for those who wish to seek further clarification(7). The operation of these objectives in all obligations of the Sharia: __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/5. (2) the same source. (3) the same source, 4/16. (4) the same source, 4/17. (5) Purification oscillates between being an enhancement or a complement to the preservation of religion from necessities, which is preferable according to his methodology. Unless it is understood in the sense of cleanliness and the removal of impurities, which are repugnant to nature, the demand for it by the Sharia would categorize it as an enhancement according to his methodology. (6) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/17. (7) the same source, 4/18, 2/5. [Page 235] As for necessities, he says: "The foundations of acts of worship are related to the preservation of religion in terms of existence, such as faith, the utterance of the two testimonies, prayer, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage, and similar matters. Customs are related to the preservation of the self and intellect in terms of existence as well, such as consuming food and drink, clothing, and housing, and similar matters. Transactions are related to the preservation of lineage and wealth in terms of existence... and crimes, which are encompassed by the command to enjoin good and forbid evil, relate to the preservation of all in terms of non-existence" (1). Regarding needs, he says: "They pertain to acts of worship, customs, transactions, and crimes. In acts of worship, they are like the concessions that ease the burden of illness and travel (2). In customs, they include the permissibility of hunting and enjoying permissible delights in food, drink, clothing, housing, transportation, and similar matters. In transactions, they include partnerships, agricultural contracts, and forward sales... In crimes, they include rulings on blood money, compensation, oaths, and the liability of craftsmen, and similar matters" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/4. (2) It was clarified in the previous chapter that concessions are partial and do not relate to general principles, and here he brings them as an example of needs, which are general objectives. The explanation is that some legal concessions do not consider the existence of hardship or difficulty, such as the travel of one who does not experience hardship. Some concessions, however, do show hardship; those that display undue hardship are classified as needs not because of the existence of legal concessions, but because the absence of obligation to endure undue hardships, whether there is a concession or not, is among the foundational needs according to al-Shatibi. Therefore, he did not say "like the easing concessions," but rather qualified it by saying: "in relation to the occurrence of hardship due to illness or travel." (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/5. [Page 236] And regarding improvements, he says: "They are applicable in the same contexts as the two prior categories" (1), meaning the necessities and needs. "In acts of worship, such as the removal of impurities, and in general all forms of purification, covering the private parts, adorning oneself, and drawing closer through voluntary good deeds like charity and acts of devotion, and similar matters; in customary practices, such as the etiquette of eating and drinking, avoiding impure foods and drinks, and avoiding extravagance and stinginess in consumption; in transactions, such as the prohibition of selling impurities, the preference for water and pasture, depriving a slave of the position of testimony and leadership, and depriving a woman of the position of leadership and marrying herself... and in criminal matters, such as the prohibition of killing a free person with a slave or killing women, children, and monks in warfare" (2). Complements or additions to the objectives: Each section of these three categories is accompanied by what is like a complement or addition. This means that if it were absent, it would not undermine the objective or the foundation. For example, retribution (qisas) is essential for the preservation of life, while its equivalence is complementary. The prohibition of alcohol is essential for the preservation of the intellect, while the prohibition of a small amount that does not intoxicate is complementary. Selling, for instance, is essential for the preservation of wealth, while witnessing and pledging in it are complementary. Purification, for example, is among the improvements, and the recommended acts of purification are complementary. Shortening prayers during travel, which involves hardship, is among the needs, while combining prayers in it is complementary (3). __________ (1) The same source. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/5. It becomes clear from the examples that al-Shatibi provided for the three categories that some of them may be inclined towards by natural dispositions and sound instincts, or in his words when defining improvements "the sound intellects," which may mislead the reader into thinking that these objectives or interests are also so according to rational individuals and wise people, but this is not the case as clarified by his understanding of interests and harms. However, the occurrence of objectives sometimes according to what human characteristics require and what sound instincts aspire to, or in his words "the sound intellects," occurs incidentally as a favor from Allah to encourage obedience. (3) See: the same source, 2/5 - 6. [Page 237] The complement, in as much as it is a complement to an essential, necessary, or enhancing aspect, must be considered a condition, which is that it does not invalidate the original. The invalidation of the original results in the invalidation of the complement. Al-Shatibi gives examples of this, including jihad, which is essential for the preservation of the religion. He says: "Jihad is necessary, and the ruler in it is necessary, and justice in it is a complement to necessity. If the complement returns to invalidate the original, it is not considered. Therefore, the command for jihad with unjust rulers came from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), as well as the command to pray behind wicked rulers, for in abandoning that, one abandons the Sunnah of the congregation, and the congregation is one of the required symbols of the religion, and justice complements that requirement, and the original is not invalidated by the complement." (1) With the invalidation of the original, the complement is invalidated, whereas with the invalidation of the complement, the original is not invalidated, even though it may be affected in some way. Al-Shatibi considers enhancements to be like the complement to necessities, and both are like the complement to essentials. Thus, the Sharia is based on the preservation of necessities. He says: "The interests of religion and the world are based on the preservation of five matters... If religion is absent, the expected reward will not be realized; if the obligated person is absent, there will be no one to practice religion; if reason is absent, the practice of religion will cease; if progeny is absent, there will be no continuity in the usual manner; and if wealth is absent, there will be no sustenance." (2) This means that the absence of necessities leads to the absence of needs and enhancements. Necessities, along with others, are like the described with the attribute; they cannot exist without each other, while the latter can exist without the former. The varying ranks of objectives: __________ (1) The same source, 2/7. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/7 - 8. [Page 238] How can one determine whether the objective (maqsad) is of the rank of necessities, needs, or enhancements? We have previously clarified the limits of each rank and provided examples for them. Nevertheless, the reader may wonder what makes pilgrimage (hajj), prayer (salah), or jihad (struggle) classified as necessities. Are they not things that, if neglected, would disrupt life, lead to chaos, and cause life to be lost? There are large societies in the world that do not observe these matters, and yet the feared consequences have not occurred. There are countries and communities that permit fornication, usury, and drinking alcohol, even though prohibiting these is necessary for the preservation of lineage, wealth, and intellect. What then makes, for example, the prohibition of pork and carrion classified as enhancements, or certain animals impure, or alcohol impure, while avoiding impurities is considered an enhancement? Yet, there are people who consume pork and carrion, live in the same place as dogs, drink alcohol, and use alcohol-based perfumes, without finding this to be something that rational minds would reject or that souls would abhor. Similarly, how can fasting (sawm) be considered a necessity, while the lifting of obligations due to hardships or what is beyond one's capacity is classified as a need? Why is it not the other way around? Al-Shatibi's answer to this matter is that it is a legal (shari) determination, not a rational one. Just as an objective cannot be classified as such unless the law indicates it through beneficial induction leading to certainty, the rank of the objective is also determined by the law, and this will be clarified with texts from him. However, there is a flawed perspective in viewing these objectives, which is based on identifying objectives or interests according to the prevailing concepts in society, or based on the concepts held by those with insight, knowledge, and experience, or decisions in society. These concepts may be influenced by legal rulings or may not be, and in this regard, these objectives are considered interests and deemed legal, upon which legislation is built. Those who contribute to or serve these objectives are considered legal, while those who undermine them are deemed corrupt and prohibited or unlawful. Al-Shatibi has repeatedly refuted this understanding in his Muwafaqat, yet there are still those who advocate it and attribute it to the law and to al-Shatibi. [Page 239] And this division of the objectives (maqasid) can be understood from two perspectives: The first: The observable reality in humans is that they have needs, and these needs vary in life and differ in the degree of necessity. Some needs are indispensable for human survival, and their absence leads to death; others are essential for the community, and their absence leads to chaos and conflict; some lead to disturbance and hardship; and some are less critical than that, and so on. It is natural for a human, when legislating or trying to understand the philosophy of any legislation, to take into account what they perceive of these needs and the degree of necessity for them. They would formulate their legislation according to what they see as achieving the best outcomes based on their concepts, and it is natural for them to include in their considerations the trade-offs between interests and harms according to their understandings. Thus, a person may consider some needs as essential and others as luxury, and others as falling in between. All of this is based on what they perceive and find within themselves. People differ in this regard based on their concepts; some may see freedom of belief and freedom of opinion and the right to change one's religion as fundamental human rights and a necessary need, thus considering the right to apostasy as a necessity. Others may view this as one of the greatest evils, believing that the necessity is to kill the apostate after giving them a chance to repent if they do not return, as it is essential for preserving the faith. Some may see adultery as a corruption that undermines the fundamental objective of preserving lineage, while others view it as a personal freedom and an interest. Some see usury as a necessity for society and transactions, ranking it among the essentials, while others regard it as a need, and yet others consider it one of the greatest evils. [Page 240] The determination of a person regarding benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid) and the preference between them returns to two matters: the first is his characteristics and nature as a human being, which lead him to seek food, drink, shelter, wealth, pride, praise, security, and prosperity, and to aim at preserving his life and satisfying his desires, as well as protecting his children and family, and so on. He feels that these things are benefits or good, and their loss is a harm or evil. The second matter is what concepts are formed within a person, whether as a result of thought and conviction, such as someone who believes that gambling or cheating is forbidden, thus viewing it as a harm even though ownership is a benefit in itself, or that adultery is forbidden, leading him to judge it as a harm, or someone who does not believe in Islam or in resurrection and accountability, seeing gambling, usury, or adultery as a benefit. Or it may not be due to thought and conviction, but rather as a result of upbringing and environment, such as someone who grows up among Muslims and develops a sense of preserving honor and a revulsion towards adultery, and a disgust for pigs or carrion... or someone who grows up among non-Muslims and develops a veneration for idols and feels that destroying them is a harm, or does not feel disgust at kissing dogs or does not find adultery repugnant... Based on this, people's perspectives on benefits and harms vary, and they contradict and differ in their preferences. The second aspect from which the classification of objectives (maqasid) and the determination of their ranks arises is what is understood by one who has embraced Islam and realized that he is a servant of Allah, that Islam is Allah's law for all people, that there is no ruling except for Allah, and that it is not for a believing man or woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decreed a matter, to have any choice in their affair. And that every legislation from anyone other than Allah is tyranny (taghut). Thus, he begins to understand Allah's objectives in legislation, and he starts to affirm what the Sharia has deemed good, and to condemn what it has deemed bad, to magnify what the Sharia has indicated is great, and to belittle what it has indicated is small, and so on. The judgment of what is a benefit and what is a harm thus becomes dependent on the Sharia, determining what is a benefit and what is a harm, and clarifying what is known (ma'ruf) and what is condemned (munkar), what is good and what is evil. [Page 241] Similarly, the matter regarding the ranks of the objectives (maqasid) is as follows: the necessities are what the legislator has requested and repeated his request or emphasized it to a certain degree, while the needs are what the legislator has requested and confirmed to a certain degree without reaching the first level. Likewise, what the legislator has requested in a manner that places it at a lower rank is called enhancements. From this perspective, the second aspect, al-Shatibi divided the objectives into three categories: necessary, needful, and enhancing. Here are a few clear and decisive texts from him that illustrate his methodology in this matter to clarify the rank of the objective within these categories or its rank within a single category. He says: "Indeed, before the rise of this light (1), we were groping about like the blind, and our minds were running in pursuit of our interests in a disordered manner, due to their weakness in bearing these burdens, and the participation of hasty desires... So we place poisons in the place of remedies (2)... and we derive barren analogies, and we seek the signs of health from a sick body, and we walk on our faces while we think we are walking on the straight path, until the pure compulsion appeared in the face of destiny and the reality of the hands of necessity was raised to the One, the All-Compelling" (3). __________ (1) This light refers to Islam. (2) That is, we consider an interest to be a harm and a harm to be an interest. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/2. That is, Islam came and clarified the interests and harms, and the reality of human incapacity and their need for someone to clarify that for them, and that is only Allah. [Page 242] He says: "Indeed, these three ranks serve one another and specify one another. If that is the case, then it is necessary to consider the whole in its contexts and according to its conditions. Moreover, the legislator (al-shari) considers from this what cannot be comprehended by minds except through explicit text, which is most of what the Sharia indicates in particulars. This is because rational individuals during periods of ignorance used to preserve those things according to their rational perspectives, but in a manner that did not lead them to justice among creation and equity among them. Rather, during that time, chaos occurred, and one interest (maslaha) would undermine another, or destroy one principle or another. Thus, the legislator came to consider absolute interest and equity at all times, clarifying the interests that are consistent and those that are opposed by another aspect of interest."(1) The meaning of this text is that in the time of ignorance, when the rulings of the Sharia are obscured and only the general principles or some of them remain, rational individuals strive to preserve what remains by establishing rulings or particulars of their own that they see—through their rational perspectives—as achieving the preservation of those general principles. However, when they preserved one interest, they would destroy another, meaning that they would see evils as interests until the law came and clarified what is considered an interest and what is not. __________ (1) The same source, 3/15. [Page 243] He said: "The concept derived from the position of the Legislator is that obedience or disobedience is magnified according to the magnitude of the benefit (maslaha) or harm (mafsada) resulting from it. It is known from the Sharia that the five essential needs are recognized in every community, and the greatest harms are those that occur from neglecting them. The evidence for this is found in the threats associated with neglecting them, such as disbelief, murder, and what pertains to it, adultery, theft, and drinking alcohol, along with other matters for which a punishment or threat has been established. In contrast, matters related to needs (hajiyat) or enhancements (tahsinayat) do not have a specific threat or a known punishment associated with them. If that is the case, it pertains to a necessary matter, and induction (istiqra) clarifies this" (1). Thus, the necessities are those that the Sharia has specified with a threat or a known punishment to protect them from non-existence. He said: "Each of these ranks, being different in the degree of consideration, has the necessities as the most emphasized, followed by the needs and then the enhancements" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/9. (2) The same source, 2/12-13. [Page 244] He said: "The commands in the Sharia do not all carry the same level of emphasis, nor do they fall under a single intention. The commands related to necessary matters are not like those related to needs, nor are they like those related to enhancements, nor are the matters that complete necessities like the necessities themselves; rather, there is a known distinction between them. Indeed, the necessary matters are not all demanded in the same manner; for example, the demand related to the foundation of religion is not emphasized like that of the soul, nor is the soul emphasized like that of the intellect, compared to other types of necessities (1) and needs as well... Similarly, enhancements are treated in the same manner, word for word... The criterion in this is to examine each matter to see whether it is sought in the first intention or the second intention. If it is sought in the first intention, it is in the highest ranks of that type (2). If it is among those sought in the second intention (3), one must consider whether the necessary can exist without it to the extent that the action can still be called that necessity or not. If it cannot, then that sought matter takes the place of the pillar and the part that is essential to the necessity. If it can be referred to by that name without it, then that sought matter is not a pillar but rather a complement and an addition, either from the needs or from the enhancements, and one should look at its ranks in the order mentioned or similar to it based on what inductive reasoning leads to in the Sharia regarding each part of it" (4). __________ (1) This means that the order of necessities is as follows, from highest to lowest: religion, then the soul, then the intellect, then lineage, then wealth. (2) That is, from the five types of necessities. (3) The meaning of primary objectives and secondary objectives was previously explained in the last chapter. The second objective is a secondary objective that has been established as serving the primary objective, which is the first. (4) Al-Muwafaqat: 3/120 - 121. [Page 245] What this text means is that the five necessities are the primary objectives (maqasid). Other objectives are considered thereafter. If they are such that the necessity cannot be established without them, then they are among the necessities in that category which cannot be established without them. For instance, jihad preserves the religion, and thus it is a necessity for the preservation of the religion, as are the five pillars, the killing of the apostate, the supreme leadership (imama al-uzma), and the prohibition of killing and retribution, which are essential for the preservation of life; therefore, they are necessities in this category, namely the preservation of life. This applies to other categories as well. However, if that category of necessities is not negated or lost by the absence of a particular objective, then this objective is not considered a necessity but rather one of its complements, which may be classified as needs (hajiyat) or enhancements (tahsinat). For example, cleanliness in acts of worship does not undermine the essence of preserving the religion, nor does shortening prayers or breaking the fast while traveling. Similarly, drinking a drop of alcohol does not invalidate the essence of preserving the intellect, so it is not classified as a necessity. The same principle applies to the complements of necessities to determine their classification as needs, enhancements, or complements of either. All of this is based on the examination of the legal texts (nusus) and their meanings. What can be established through examination is considered an objective, while what cannot be established may either serve an objective, thus being a branch related to it, or negate an objective, in which case it is rejected, or it may neither negate nor serve, in which case it is suspended and not considered a branch but rather a detail. A careful consideration of this previous text summarizes this matter from its methodology. [Page 246] He also states, affirming this meaning and that the ranks of the objectives (maqasid) are derived from the Sharia: "An action is considered in the Sharia based on the benefits and harms it entails. The Sharia has clarified this and distinguished between actions whose benefits are significant, making them a pillar, or whose harms are significant, making them a major sin. It has also distinguished what is not so, calling the benefits good and the harms minor sins. In this way, what is part of the fundamentals of religion and its principles is distinguished from what is part of its branches and details, and what is known as major sins is distinguished from minor sins. What the Sharia has elevated in the commandments is part of the fundamentals of religion, while what it has placed below that is part of its branches and complements. What it has deemed significant in the prohibitions is part of the major sins, while what is below that is part of the minor sins, and this is according to the extent of benefit and harm" (1). From the previous two texts, we conclude that al-Shatibi refers to the necessities, which are five, or what cannot be established without these five, calling them the pillars or principles of religion, while what is below them he calls the complements or branches of religion. Violating the necessities is considered a major sin in terms of harms or sins. This difference in the ranks of the objectives does not mean neglecting any objective under the pretext of preserving what is more certain, nor does it justify contradicting or changing rulings under the guise of objectives, because these objectives are established based on the extrapolation of rulings and their meanings. The rulings serve as the foundations for the objectives, and the objectives are built upon them. By nullifying the foundation, what is built upon it is also nullified. Thus, the objectives are the objectives of the Sharia, and the Sharia is fixed and does not change or alter. It is not correct to invoke the objectives for that reason. This is what is implied in al-Shatibi's statement that the Sharia is infallible, which is the subject of the next discussion. Second Discussion The Infallibility of the Sharia The meaning of this expression: __________ (1) al-Muwafaqat: 1/149 - 150. [Page 247] This means that the rulings of the Sharia (Islamic law) are preserved from change, alteration, abrogation, or distortion, and Allah has taken upon Himself the task of preserving them, so nothing of that sort will occur within them, unlike the previous laws. The evidence for this is from two aspects: the first is the legal texts, such as His saying, Exalted is He: { Indeed, We sent down the Reminder, and indeed, We will preserve it } (1), and this preservation includes the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet), even if the texts do not explicitly mention it (2). The second aspect of the evidence is the reality from the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) until now, where Allah, Exalted is He, has appointed individuals to preserve this Sharia through their efforts, defending it and striving for it in every science that understanding the Sharia depends upon. Al-Shatibi said: "This blessed Sharia is infallible just as its Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) is infallible, and just as its community is infallible in what they have agreed upon" (3). Among those whom Allah has appointed to preserve His religion are the scholars who understood the objectives of the Sharia from the Book and the Sunnah. He says: "And Allah sent from among them leaders who understood from Allah and from His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), deriving rulings and comprehending their meanings from the purposes of the Sharia in the Book and the Sunnah, sometimes from the very words, sometimes from their meanings, and sometimes from the rationale behind the ruling, until they applied the incidents that were not mentioned to those that were, and made the path easy for those who came after them, and thus the matter has proceeded in every science that understanding the Sharia depends upon, which is the very preservation that the transmitted evidences entail, and with Allah is success" (4). __________ (1) Surah Al-Hijr, 9. (2) It is clarified in the third chapter that Al-Shatibi's view is that the preservation guaranteed by the verse is for the general principles and not for the particulars. The particulars follow the general principles, which are the particulars that return to the general principles, and thus he said regarding the Sunnah: "And the Sunnah, even if it is not mentioned (i.e., in the guaranteed preservation), is an explanation of it (i.e., the Book) and revolves around it; it is from it, and to it returns in its meanings, so each of the Book and the Sunnah supports the other" Al-Muwafaqat, 2/38. (3) Al-Muwafaqat, 2/38. (4) The same source, 2/40. [Page 248] One consequence of this is that the particulars derived from texts of uncertain authenticity or uncertain meanings will remain the sources of the universals, and they are the subject of induction. It is not correct to claim the preservation of the universals by any means, for the universals have no path except through these particulars. Just as it is impermissible to neglect the universals, neglecting the particulars is similar. On the other hand, neglecting the particulars is a neglect of the universals. He says: "If a universal principle is established in these three (1) or in any of them, it must be preserved in relation to what the universal entails, which are the particulars. The particulars are intended and considered in establishing the universal; if the universal is neglected, its intended benefit in legislation will also be neglected" (2). He then presented evidence for this and said: "And since this is the case, it indicates that the particulars are included in the demand and preservation of the universals" (3). He said: "If the particulars were not considered and intended in establishing the universal, the command regarding the universal would not be valid in the first place, because the universal, as such, cannot be the object of obligation" (4). __________ (1) The three: namely, necessities, needs, and enhancements. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/41. (3) The same source. (4) This is because these universals are objectives in the sense of results or causes, and obligation only pertains to the causes, not to the results, as they belong to Allah and not to the servant, and obligation regarding them is beyond the servant's capacity. [Page 249] And based on this, it is not permissible to disregard or neglect the particulars (juz'iyyat) under the pretext of the universals (kulliyyat), nor is it correct to object here by stating that the absence of individual particulars does not affect the establishment of the universals. He says: "There is no doubt in the necessity of intention towards the particular" (1) and he says: "The absence of the particular there is only due to the preservation of the particular in its universality from another perspective, just as we say that the preservation of lives is legislated, and this is a universal that is definitively intended by the Legislator, then retribution (qisas) was legislated for the preservation of lives, so killing a soul in retribution is a preservation of it by intention, and it necessitates the absence of a particular from the particulars of the universal being preserved, which is the destruction of this soul due to an incidental occurrence, which is the assault on the soul. Thus, neglecting this particular in its universality from the perspective of preserving a particular in its universality as well, which is the assaulted soul... Therefore, the absence of individual particulars from the requirement of the universal, if it is for no incidental reason, is not valid legally, and if it is for an incidental reason, then it pertains to the preservation of the universal from another perspective or to the preservation of another universal; the first case would render its absence detrimental to the universal, while the second case would not render its absence detrimental" (2). It is not permissible to oppose the rulings under the pretext of the objectives (maqasid): __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/42. (2) The same source. [Page 250] The assertion of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), and the varying ranks of these objectives, does not justify the violation or alteration of certain rulings under the pretext of preserving their objectives, nor does it justify neglecting some objectives in order to attain what is higher in rank. This is because the universals cannot be preserved by every means, but only by what Allah has legislated for them. Thus, violating the rulings undermines the objectives even if this is not apparent. The particulars and complements in the Sharia were legislated to preserve the necessities, and they serve them. Therefore, the preservation of the necessities can only be achieved through them. Accordingly, what some may occasionally present as opinions or fatwas that disregard the textual evidence under the pretext of preserving the objectives and claim the permissibility of developing or changing the legal rulings based on that are statements that contradict the idea of objectives according to al-Shatibi. He previously stated that those who sought to preserve the universals based on their rational perspectives failed to do so and ended up neglecting the interests and undermining their foundations. He also says: "Every necessary and complementary matter is merely a servant of the essential necessity and a comfort and enhancement of its specific form... In every case, it revolves around serving it, so it is more likely that the necessity will be fulfilled in its best state" (1). He states: "Since each of these ranks is different in the degree of consideration, the necessities are the most emphasized, followed by the needs and then the enhancements. And since they are interconnected, the invalidation of the lighter one is a boldness towards what is more emphasized and a means of disrupting it. Thus, the lighter one is as if it is a protection for the more emphasized, and the one grazing around the protection is close to falling into it" (2). He further states: "If the necessity can be disrupted by the disruption of its complements, then preserving them for its sake is required" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/42. (2) The same source, 2/12 - 13. (3) The same source, 2/15. [Page 251] He says regarding the change of rulings under the pretext of public interest (maslaha) or objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia): "If they (i.e., the interests) were established in such a way that their system could be disrupted or their rulings could be invalidated, then legislation would not be based on them(1). For their being interests at that point is no more valid than their being harms, but the Legislator intends for them to be interests in all cases, so their establishment must be in that manner eternally, universally, and generally in all types of obligations and for all obligated individuals and in all circumstances, and thus we have found the matter in it, and all praise is due to Allah"(2). Interpretation of Some Texts of al-Shatibi: Many contemporary scholars have approached the texts of the Muwafaqat without paying attention to the true meanings of their content, attributing to al-Shatibi opinions that he does not hold, but rather refutes and clarifies their invalidity. In reality, many of al-Shatibi's texts, if not viewed based on the premises he established and the principles he articulated, and in such a way that the subsequent texts build upon the preceding ones, will lead to ambiguities and suggest contradictions between some of the texts. Some of the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) have produced reports that hold no value in Sharia, mistakenly believing that they are relying on the idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), like one who claims that wherever there is public interest (maslaha), there is the law of Allah, or that the path to what is permissible (mubah) is permissible, or like one who says that Allah has prohibited what our minds perceive as harmful and permitted what our minds perceive as beneficial, or something similar to that. And if some do this claiming to rely on al-Shatibi, there are those who have realized that al-Shatibi's ideas do not apply to these meanings. Sheikh Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour - for example - points out, in the context of his assertion that the Sharia is based on the interests of the servants, that most of al-Shatibi's arguments on this matter are invalid. This is due to the fact that what is being argued for according to al-Shatibi is different from what is held by the Sheikh(3). Therefore, Dr. Abdullah Daraz saw a contradiction between some texts of al-Shatibi. __________ (1) That is, for the purpose of achieving them, because they are objectives, and the legal rulings are the means to them, or the rulings are causes and the interests are the effects. (2) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/25. (3) See p. 181 of this book. [Page 252] Al-Shatibi says in the fifth issue of the first type of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia): "The interests (masalih) spread in this world are considered from two perspectives: from the perspective of their existence and from the perspective of the attachment of the legal ruling to them. As for the first perspective: the worldly interests, in terms of their existence here, cannot be purely considered as interests. By interests, I mean those that pertain to the sustenance of human life, the completeness of his existence, and the fulfillment of his sensual and rational attributes in general, so that he is in a state of abundance in every respect. This, in mere habitual terms, cannot be the case because those interests are mixed with obligations and hardships, whether few or many, and are accompanied by, preceded by, or followed by matters such as eating, drinking, clothing, housing, riding, marriage, and others. These matters can only be attained through effort and toil. Likewise, worldly harms (mafasid) are not purely harms in terms of their existence, as there is no harm that is typically imposed without being accompanied by or preceded by much kindness, gentleness, and enjoyment of pleasures. If that is the case, then the interests and harms related to this world are understood according to what predominates. If the predominant aspect is an interest, then it is the understood interest by common consent; if the other aspect predominates, then it is the understood harm by common consent. Therefore, an action with dual aspects is attributed to the predominant side... according to what is customary in similar cases... As for the second perspective regarding the attachment of the legal ruling to them, if the interest is predominant when compared to the harm in terms of habitual judgment, it is the one intended by the Sharia. For its attainment, the demand upon the servants has arisen... If it is followed by a harm or hardship, it is not intended in the legality of that action and its demand. Similarly, if the harm is predominant in relation to the interest in habitual judgment, then its removal is the intended goal in the Sharia, and for this reason, prohibition has been established... If it is followed by an interest or pleasure, it is not the intended goal of the prohibition of that action, but rather the intended goal is what predominates in the situation."(1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/15 - 16 - 17. [Page 253] In the eighth issue of the first type of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), he says: "The benefits that are legislated and the harms that are repelled by law are only considered in terms of how they establish worldly life for the sake of the Hereafter, not in terms of the whims of souls in seeking their ordinary benefits or averting their ordinary harms" (1). These two texts from al-Shatibi in the fifth and eighth issues were seen by Dr. Darraz as contradictory; therefore, he commented on the first text by saying: "The limitation of this view will come in the eighth issue" (2). He commented on the second text by saying: "It is necessary to limit the fifth issue by this so that it does not contradict the apparent meaning there... He based the benefit and harm on what predominates among them in terms of establishing life and attaining the desires that are necessitated by the sensual qualities of man, making it something that is based on being a sought benefit or a repelled harm. Here he says that mere consideration of it as a benefit in the eyes of a person is not considered; what is considered is that it should be such that worldly life is established for the Hereafter, which can only be the case in accordance with the framework of the law that knows the benefit from this perspective, reconciling it with what he has established in the reality of existence" (3). He also said, commenting on another text from al-Shatibi on the same topic: "This alone does not benefit after having previously considered that what predominates in terms of benefit is the benefit, and what is predominant in terms of harm is the harm... Therefore, we said that it is necessary for the correctness of the statement to limit what has preceded by this" (4). __________ (1) The same source, p. 25. (2) The same source, 2/26, Dar al-Ma'rifah edition - Beirut, with commentary by Dr. Abdullah Darraz. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, p. 38. (4) The same location. [Page 254] Thus, the issue in this matter has been presented, and before explaining its solution and removal, I would like to point out that Dr. Daraz did not grasp the true meaning intended by al-Shatibi with the terms "maslaha" (public interest) and "mafsada" (harm), understanding them in the sense of benefit and harm. Therefore, he attributed to al-Shatibi the statement that what predominates in terms of benefit is the maslaha, and what is predominant in terms of harm is the mafsada. This is incorrect, and this was not al-Shatibi's statement; rather, he said that what predominates in terms of maslaha is the maslaha understood by custom, and similarly for mafsada. The two matters are different. The maslaha according to al-Shatibi is what has been definitively established as intended by the Lawgiver, and the mafsada is what has been definitively established as prohibited by the Law. As for benefits and harms, they pertain to the interests of the servant and what he loves and dislikes; thus, some benefits are prohibited and some harms are permissible. Therefore, al-Shatibi objected to al-Razi, stating after establishing that the masalih (benefits) and mafasid (harms) are considered in relation to the sustenance of this life for the afterlife: "It is not valid to maintain that the principle regarding benefits is permissibility and regarding harms is prohibition as established by al-Fakhr al-Razi, for there is hardly any true benefit or true harm; rather, most of them are relative" (1), and he adds: "And the masalih and mafasid, if they are related to the address of the Lawgiver... how can it be permissible to generalize this statement that the principle regarding benefits is permissibility and regarding harms is prohibition" (2). Additionally, there is another error, which is the failure to distinguish between al-Shatibi's intention in the fifth issue and his intention in the eighth issue. Dr. Daraz based his objection on al-Shatibi's statement in the fifth issue: "By masalih, I mean what pertains to the establishment of human life and the completion of his existence and attaining what is necessitated by his carnal and rational attributes in general, so that it is a blessing in general." __________ (1) The same source, 2/27. (2) The same location. [Page 255] To clarify the difference between the two issues, I say: al-Shatibi did not present the fifth issue to define benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid), but rather to indicate that they are not limited to mere existence, and that they are limited to the Sharia. As for the text upon which Dr. Daraz based his objection, which raises a problem, its meaning is that what the Sharia has brought forth in terms of commands and prohibitions, and what is established based on it as beneficial and harmful, is what returns to the human being in a way that preserves his life and the completeness of his existence through food, shelter, and other things that his sensual and rational attributes necessitate, such as security, dignity, ownership, and other pleasures of life. These can only be attained through what leads to them, which are the rulings of the Sharia. Therefore, al-Shatibi's text does not say: "By benefits I mean the sustenance of human life and obtaining what his sensual attributes necessitate," but rather says: "By benefits I mean what pertains to the sustenance of human life..." This meaning is clear in al-Shatibi's book for those who reflect upon it, and it will be elaborated upon when discussing the fourth type of the objectives of the Sharia, which is its establishment for compliance. His texts on this matter are numerous; I will mention here a text that suffices for the purpose. He says: "If it is established that the purpose of the Sharia is for the benefits of the servants, then it returns to them according to the command of the legislator and within the limits he has set, not according to their whims and desires... As for the fact that the benefits of obligation return to the obligated person in this world and the hereafter, this is correct, and it does not necessitate that obtaining them is outside the limits of the Sharia, nor that it is attained by oneself without the Sharia providing it to him, which is evident. Thus, it becomes clear that there is no contradiction between this and what has preceded, because what has preceded is a consideration in terms of establishing the benefit and purpose as affirmed by the legislator, not in terms of what is necessitated by whim and desire." (1) The meaning of the text upon which Dr. Daraz based his objection is that the benefits indicated by the Sharia through induction are those that lead to a person obtaining his shares and purposes, and not that benefits are understood according to what returns to people based on their inclinations and perspectives. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/172 - 118. [Page 256] As for the other texts that Dr. Daraz saw as contradictory, what was mentioned in the fifth issue is not intended to define benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid), but rather the purpose of the issue is that benefits and harms are viewed from two perspectives. The first perspective is regarding their existence in reality, which here is not absolute; benefits are mixed with harms, and vice versa. That is, the action commanded for a purpose intended by the Legislator results in a legal benefit arising from the action, but the action may also produce other outcomes that are not intended by that command, which may be harms, and vice versa, because harms and benefits are not absolute in reality. For example, jihad is a benefit, and it results in benefits intended by the Legislator, such as the expansion of the authority of Islam, its honor, and the entry of people into it. It also results in the loss of lives, expenditure of wealth, and hardships; are these latter outcomes the intention of the Legislator in jihad? No. Rather, these are harms in the Sharia. Based on this, the saying of al-Shatibi is understood: "If that is the case, then the benefits and harms related to this world are understood according to what predominates." That is, one looks at the benefits, their extent, and the degree of their expectation. Is victory expected or not, and to what degree is that presumed? One also considers the costs in terms of lives and wealth, and the expected outcomes according to those with insight and experience. Therefore, he said: "If the predominant aspect is that of benefit, then it is the understood benefit in customary terms." [Page 257] An example of this is also: "Eating, drinking, housing, riding, and marriage, for these matters can only be attained through effort and toil." And as he said: "Those interests are mixed with obligations and hardships." If these are intended interests, then the hardships are evils that are required to be alleviated, according to al-Shatibi. He said: "If the intention of the obligated person is to cause hardship, then he has contradicted the intention of the Lawgiver, in that the Lawgiver does not intend hardship itself with the obligation, and any intention that contradicts the intention of the Lawgiver is void; thus, the intention towards hardship is void, and it is therefore among the things that are prohibited."(1) He also said: "It has been made clear by the Lawgiver that hardship is to be avoided; thus, if He commands something that necessitates it, He does not intend it."(2) So if interests can only be attained through effort and toil, and these are evils, this means that worldly interests and evils, in terms of their existence in reality, are not absolute, and the ruling on an action is based on what predominates in the situation. He said: "The truth that the Sharia has brought is the combination of these two matters under the consideration of justice, taking from the interests what does not violate an obligation and leaving the interests that do not lead to a prohibition, while maintaining balance in the recommended and the disliked."(3) This indicates his intent with the statement: "And if the other side predominates, it is the understood evil," and with the statement: "According to what has become customary in its like." An explanation of such texts will become clearer and more evident in the discussion of the third type of the objectives of the Sharia, but I will present here a text that clarifies his intent with phrases like "the understood evil or interest" and "according to what has become customary in its like," and his intent in favoring one side over the other based on custom and habit. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/86. (2) The same source, 2/58. (3) The same source, 2/99. [Page 258] He says that the purchase of grapes, weapons, or a slave, for example, may be for a legitimate purpose (maqasid al-sharia) or for something forbidden (haram). In the first case, it is a benefit (maslaha), and in the second, it is a harm (mafsada). How can one judge which side should be favored over the other when the intention of the actor is hidden from others? In this sense, al-Shatibi speaks of the authority of custom and habit unless the intention of a specific actor is known to be otherwise. He states: "That some benefits are lawful (halal) and some are forbidden (haram) is where the main consideration of the issue lies... that one side is the primary intended purpose by custom, while the other side is a secondary, unintended purpose by habit, unless it is specifically intended and contrary to the norm. There is no doubt that the ruling is for what is primarily intended by custom, while the other has no ruling because if we were to consider the secondary side, it would not be permissible for us to own any of the items or to contract over them, as they contain forbidden benefits... An example of the primacy of lawful benefits is the purchase of a slave with the intention of converting her to Islam for prostitution, purchasing a boy for immoral acts, and buying grapes to turn into wine or weapons to rob... An example of the primacy of forbidden benefits is the purchase of a dog for hunting... and buying wine for vinegar-making and buying the fat of carrion to coat ships or to light for people... If the secondary purpose becomes predominant in intention and precedes in the custom of certain times until what was originally intended becomes as if it were nonexistent, then the ruling reverses. I do not think this can happen in such a general way, but if its occurrence is assumed, the ruling would reverse" (1). More details on this matter will come when discussing the principle of the original and the predominant within the discussion of the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) in chapter nine. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/107 - 108 - 109. [Page 259] This is the first aspect of looking at benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid), which is that they do not exist in a pure form. As for the second aspect, which is the relation of the legal ruling to them, here there are either pure benefits or pure harms at all times. If the legal demand is for an action, it is for a benefit intended by the legislator. If this action is preceded by, accompanied by, or followed by harms, meaning what is considered harmful by the law, this relates to the fact that benefits and harms do not exist in a pure form in reality. However, these harms are not intended by the legislator with that demand, and their relation to that demand does not imply that they are acceptable or excusable in the legal sense. The existence of certain outcomes for specific rulings is not sufficient to indicate that they are benefits or harms; it is necessary to consider the benefit or harm through the examination of a large number of rulings. Therefore, the benefit established by law remains a benefit, and the same applies to the harm. The fact that harms are related to a desired action and benefits are related to a prohibited action does not change anything regarding the nature of the benefit as a benefit and the harm as a harm, nor does it indicate that benefits have been prohibited or that harms may become desired. This means that benefits and harms are pure in the law, even if they are not pure in terms of existence in reality. Therefore, al-Shatibi says: "The conclusion from this is that the benefits considered by law or the harms considered by law are pure and not mixed with any harms, neither little nor much. Even if it is imagined that they are mixed, they are not in reality so according to the law" (1). Examples of this include work and seeking sustenance for one's dependents, which is a benefit, despite the toil and effort involved; the legislator intended the benefits therein and did not intend the toil and effort. Going out for prayers or seeking knowledge or similar activities, even though there are abominations that are heard and seen along the way, does not change anything regarding what is a benefit and what is a harm. It does not change anything in the legal rulings, and one must avoid abominations as much as possible. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/17. [Page 260] He says: "Essential matters or other needs or complementary issues, if they are surrounded by external matters that do not conform to the Sharia, then the endeavor to bring about benefits is valid on the condition of exercising caution to the best of one's ability without hardship, such as marriage, which requires the sustenance of dependents amidst the narrow paths of what is lawful and the vast avenues of what is unlawful and questionable... If such considerations were taken into account in marriage in our time, it would lead to the invalidation of its essence, which is not correct. Likewise, seeking knowledge if it is accompanied by abominations that one hears and sees, and attending funerals and performing religious duties if one can only perform them by witnessing what is not acceptable, does not remove this incidental factor from these matters because they are the foundations of religion and the principles of benefits" (1). As for al-Shatibi's use of the term "worldly" when he mentions worldly benefits and harms, this is in contrast to the term benefits and harms of the Hereafter, which are the delights of Paradise and the torments of Hellfire. The worldly benefits and harms, although they may not be purely existent in reality, the benefits of the Hereafter are pure benefits, meaning they are untainted by any harms, such as punishment. The harms, that is, the punishment, is pure and not mixed with any benefit for those who are eternally in Hell, while it is mixed with mercy for the monotheists who will return to Paradise. From this mixture, the Fire does not reach their places of prostration and the seat of faith (2). __________ (1) The same source, 4/119. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/20 - 21 - 22. [Page 261] Thus, it becomes clear that the subject of the fifth issue is consistent and aligned with what is mentioned in the eighth issue, and it is indeed a prelude to it. This is confirmed by al-Shatibi's explanation of how to prioritize and weigh between the two sides where interests and harms conflict in terms of existence, as he states: "In summary, whenever the evidence contradicts, it must be that the two sides are either equal or one is preferred over the other. If they are equal, then there is no ruling from the perspective of the obligated person regarding one side over the other if the equality is evident according to the evidence. Perhaps this does not occur in the Sharia, and if it is assumed to occur, there is no preference except by desire without evidence, and this in matters of the Sharia is invalid by consensus." (1) As for the eighth issue, it is in harmony with the fifth issue; however, Dr. Daraz's understanding of interests and harms as benefits and detriments, and that they are such according to custom and tradition and based on the views of rational individuals, led him to see an irreconcilable contradiction. Consequently, he made the following comments: "This alone does not benefit after considering previously that what predominates in the direction of benefit is the interest, and what is preferred in the direction of harm is the detriment." He also said: "If the basis of the argument is that rational individuals agree that what is considered is the greater matter, which is the direction of interest that is the foundation of religion and worldly affairs, regardless of the desires of souls, then this can be valid as evidence, but there is no need to mediate the previous premises before it." This indicates that he did not grasp al-Shatibi's intent regarding the fifth issue. __________ (1) The same source, 2/20. [Page 262] As for the clarification of the integration between the two issues, this text confirms it - for example - taken from the eighth issue, which states: "The benefits that are legislated and the harms that are repelled are only considered in terms of establishing worldly life for the afterlife, not in terms of the desires of souls in seeking their ordinary benefits or averting their ordinary harms. The evidence for this consists of several matters: the first is: { And if the truth had followed their desires, the heavens and the earth and whoever is in them would have been corrupted } (1). The second is what has been previously mentioned, that the benefits obtained by the obligated person are usually mixed with harms, just as harms are surrounded by benefits. For instance, we say that souls are respected, preserved, and sought to be revived, such that if the matter is between reviving them and destroying wealth, reviving them is preferable. If reviving them opposes the destruction of religion, then reviving religion is preferable even if it leads to their destruction, as in the case of fighting the disbelievers and killing the apostate, and so on. Similarly, if the revival of one soul opposes the destruction of many souls in a conflict, for example, then reviving the many souls is preferable. Likewise, if we say that eating and drinking revives souls and has apparent benefits, even though it involves many hardships and pains in obtaining it initially, in using it at the moment, and in its requirements and consequences ultimately. Nevertheless, what is considered is the greater matter, which is the aspect of benefit that is the foundation of both religion and worldly life, not in terms of the desires of souls" (2). Al-Shatibi's discussion of some opinions on benefits and harms: __________ (1) Surah Al-Mu'minun, 71. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 2/25 - 26. [Page 263] Al-Shatibi clearly explained his concept of public interest (maslaha) and harm (mafsada), stating that it is subordinate to the Sharia and not something that is followed. This is not in line with what the earlier scholars considered regarding interests and harms, although al-Ghazali did point to this meaning when he said: "As for public interest, it originally refers to bringing about benefit and averting harm, and we do not mean by that that bringing about benefit and repelling harm are the objectives of creation and the welfare of creation in achieving their objectives. Rather, we mean by public interest the preservation of the objectives of the Sharia, which are five: to protect their religion, their lives, their intellect, their lineage, and their wealth. Anything that entails the preservation of these five foundations is a public interest, and anything that undermines these foundations is a harm, and repelling it is a public interest" (1). By adopting the path of analogy and the strange and remote analogy, he contradicts what al-Shatibi establishes, and it is considered that he justifies public interest in the sense that he stated in this text that he does not mean. This is after incorporating this meaning into the objectives of the legislator. What we mentioned about al-Ghazali applies to other jurists who consider public interests, such as al-Juwayni, al-Amidi, al-Razi, al-Qarafi, Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam, and others. This meaning makes public interest—at least theoretically—something that is followed by the Sharia rather than subordinate to it, which leads to complications in the idea of justifying actions based on public interests. From this perspective, al-Shatibi, in his work on al-Muwafaqat, aimed to refine the science of usul al-fiqh. Therefore, after establishing that public interests and harms are considered in relation to the sustenance of worldly life for the afterlife, and that they relate to enhancement and deprecation, he proceeded to critique or reject some opinions in this field. He rejected al-Razi's statement that the original ruling regarding benefits is permissibility and regarding harms is prohibition, as clarified in the previous pages. __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa. 1/286. [Page 264] It is also directed at al-Qarafi, as he presented a problem that is considered a refutation of the idea of reasoning based on public interest (maslaha), and it is necessary for all who consider public interests and harms. Al-Shatibi says: "Indeed, al-Qarafi raised a problem regarding public interests and harms and did not respond to it, and it is, for him, necessary for all scholars who consider public interests and harms"(1). Al-Qarafi established that this problem applies to everyone, including the Mu'tazila and others, saying (and the statement is attributed to al-Qarafi): "Because deviating from the principle of public interest and harm is rejected by the principles of the Mu'tazila, for it is foolishness, and they cannot say that the criterion for this is that every public interest for which Allah has threatened punishment for neglecting it, and every harm for which Allah has threatened punishment for committing it, is the intended goal, and what Allah has neglected is not included in our objective"(2). Al-Qarafi's intention here is that the existence of rulings that do not follow the principle of public interests and harms refutes the idea, and he adds (al-Qarafi): "For we say that the threat in your view and the obligation is contingent upon public interest and harm, and it must be, according to you, rationally that Allah threatens punishment for neglecting public interests and committing harms. If you derived the considered public interests and harms from the threat, it would necessitate circular reasoning, and if the derivation in(3) public interests and harms were valid, it would require you to allow that the obligation could come from neglecting public interests and committing harms, and the realities would then be inverted, for what is considered is the obligation, so whatever Allah has commanded is a public interest, and this invalidates your principle"(4). As for those who are not Mu'tazila, who affirm the causality of bringing about public interests and averting harms, al-Qarafi presents them with the following problem: "As for our companions' share of this problem, it is that it becomes impossible for them to say: 'Indeed, Allah, Exalted is He, has taken into account absolute public interest and absolute harm... Rather, their way is only to extrapolate from specific instances, and although this detracts from a certain pattern of insight into some of the secrets of jurisprudence, they say: Allah does what He wills and rules as He desires, and Allah considers what He wills and leaves what He wills, nothing more"(5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/28. (2) The same source. (3) Thus is the text. It may be more accurate to say: from. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, p. 29. (5) The same source. [Page 265] The reality is that these issues arise for those who consider benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid) when they are understood as meaning advantages and disadvantages, or the wisdoms (hikmah) and what human attributes necessitate. Therefore, al-Qarafi raised these issues but did not respond to them. Al-Shatibi addressed these issues, and his response is valid according to his own methodology in considering benefits and harms; thus, his affirmation of the idea of reasoning based on benefit is a correction of the concept of this idea, for both benefit and harm. He says: "As for the Ash'arites, the induction (istiqra) of the Sharia indicates what is considered and what is not considered" (1). Thus, he directs consideration towards the induction that leads to certainty regarding the specific benefit, and he says: "As for the Mu'tazilites, it is the same, because they only consider benefits and harms based on what reason leads them to believe is the way to achieve the general and detailed welfare of the world in benefits or its disruption in harms. They have made the Sharia a revelation of what reason claims without addition or subtraction, so there is no difference between them and the Ash'arites in the outcome of the issue" (2). This means that they do not rely on reason in determining benefits and harms, but rather they rely on the Sharia. Accordingly, there is no issue according to al-Shatibi's methodology because the determination of benefit or harm is referred back to the Sharia. Al-Shatibi critiques the statement of Imam Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam, where he said: "Most of the benefits and harms of this world are known by reason, and that is the essence of most Sharia" (3), and where he said: "As for the benefits and harms of the Hereafter, they are only known through transmission" (4), __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, p. 29. (2) Same source. (3) Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam, Qawa'id al-Ahkam fi Masalih al-Anam, 1/7. (4) Same source, 1/9. [Page 266] He said: "As for the interests of the two abodes (darain) and their causes and harms, they can only be known through the Sharia, and if something is hidden from that, it should be sought from the evidences of the Sharia, which are the Book, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), sound analogy (qiyas), and correct reasoning. As for the interests of this world and their causes and harms, they are known through necessities, experiences, customs, and credible conjectures. If something is hidden from that, it should be sought from its evidences. Whoever wishes to know the correspondences, interests, and harms, and which are preferred and which are not, should present that to his intellect, assuming that the Sharia did not address it, and then build upon that the rulings, for hardly any ruling will fall outside of that except what Allah has made obligatory upon His servants without informing them of its benefit or harm."(1) __________ (1) The same source, 1/10. [Page 267] Al-Shatibi says, objecting to the statements of Ibn Abd al-Salam: "Some people have said that the interests of the Hereafter can only be known through the Sharia, while those of this world can be known through necessities, experiences, customs, and conjectures" (1). He then states: "As for the claim that what pertains to the Hereafter can only be known through the Sharia, that is as he said. However, what he said regarding worldly matters is not entirely accurate, and if it were as he claimed, there would be no need to refer to the Sharia except for the dissemination of the interests of the Hereafter specifically, which is not the case... Custom prevents the independent intellects in this world from discerning their interests and harms in detail, unless this speaker intends that knowledge of them is obtained through experiences and others after the Sharia has established its principles, and there is no dispute about that" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/30 - 31. (2) The same source. These statements that al-Shatibi attributed to Ibn Abd al-Salam suggest that the latter is a Mu'tazili, especially since al-Shatibi did not mention the name of the speaker. Dr. Daraz commented on these statements by saying: "It resembles the doctrine of the Mu'tazila." See Dr. Daraz's commentary 2/48 from al-Muwafaqat, Dar al-Ma'rifah edition. However, from the words of Ibn Abd al-Salam: "Indeed, Allah, Exalted is He, is not obligated to bring about the interests of the good nor to avert the harms of the evil, just as He is not obligated to create, provide sustenance, impose duties, reward, or punish. Rather, He brings about the interests of the good and averts the harms of the evil out of grace towards His servants. If the matter were reversed, it would not be wrong, for there is no constraint upon Him" (Qawaid al-Ahkam, 1/10). Among other things, Ibn Abd al-Salam said: "And Allah, Exalted is He, has commanded the establishment of harmonious interests and excluded some from that command. He has prohibited similar harms and excluded some from that prohibition" (Qawaid al-Ahkam, 1/6). This confirms the existence of the issue mentioned by his student al-Qarafi. [Page 268] One of the issues discussed by al-Shatibi is the disagreement among jurists regarding rulings. If one of them says that an action is permissible, and another says it is forbidden, then considering the benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid), if the action is harmful, how could it be permissible according to the first, and if it is beneficial, how could the second prohibit it? This is a problem for those who consider benefits and harms. Al-Shatibi states that there is no problem here; if it is permissible according to the first, this means that its benefit is predominant in his view, and if it is forbidden according to the second, this means that it is harmful in his view. Thus, the consideration of benefits and harms differs among jurists, and there is no issue. He said: "Some later scholars - namely al-Qarafi - claimed that the argument for benefits only holds if the correct opinion in matters of ijtihad (juristic reasoning) is singular, because the rational principle is that the predominant cannot be both the thing and its opposite. Rather, whenever one is predominant, the other must be less so, and this necessitates that the correct opinion is one, which is the opinion of the one who rules by the predominant, while the others must be mistaken as they rule by the less predominant. This contradicts the principle of those who claim correctness with those who say that the laws are based on benefits. This is what he said, and he quoted his teacher Ibn Abd al-Salam in response, stating that these individuals must say that this principle only applies to consensus rulings" (1). He then refuted this claim, saying: "The benefits or harms in matters of disagreement are established according to what is in the reality of the matter for the jurist and in his view, and there is no difference here between the mistaken and the correct. If the Maliki is convinced that the excess interest in fresh fruits and vegetables is permissible, then the aspect of benefit for him is the predominant one, and it is also so in reality as he perceives it" (2). This means that the action is permissible according to Sharia and thus is a benefit for him. "And if the Shafi'i is convinced that interest in this case is not permissible, then it falls under the ruling of forbidden interest for him, and the aspect of benefit for him is the less predominant one, not the predominant one, and it is also so in reality as he perceives it" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/36. (2) The same source. (3) The same source, 2/37. [Page 269] That is, the action is forbidden (haram) and thus the benefit (maslaha) derived from it is outweighed, as it is considered a harm (mafsada) in his view. He then said: "Contradiction only occurs if the preferred (rajih) is considered less preferred (marjuh) from the perspective of one observer; rather, it is from two observers, each of whom believes that the reason upon which the ruling is based exists in the subject according to what is in the reality as he perceives it and in his assumption." (1) These texts and opinions in al-Shatibi's view emphasize the difference in his understanding of benefit (maslaha) and harm (mafsada) compared to the prevailing understanding among others. He also affirms that the intended meaning for him is that the benefit is what has been established as intended by the Legislator (Shari) regardless of whether it is suitable or unsuitable. Section Three The Intention of the Legislator in Establishing the Sharia for Understanding The meaning of this type: Al-Shatibi discusses under this type of the objectives of the Legislator five issues related to the Arabic language, in which he establishes the principles that must be followed in order to understand the Sharia from its sources, that is, from the legal texts. He clarifies how meanings are derived from words and structures, what meanings are considered, and what meanings are not considered. He also discusses whether the meanings of rulings are among the indications of the texts or not. The meanings of rulings are the derived meanings that are taken from the legal objectives. The Sharia is in the Arabic tongue and style: __________ (1) The same location. [Page 270] The Sharia (Islamic law) was established to achieve the objectives of the Lawgiver (al-Shari) in creation. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the Sharia and the objectives of the Lawgiver. For this reason, the Lawgiver addressed people in a manner they could comprehend, speaking to them in Arabic, using Arabic words, structures, and styles. He obligated them to understand the reports and rulings according to the implications of the texts as understood by the Arabs. Al-Shatibi says: "This blessed Sharia is Arabic, and there is no place for foreign tongues in it" (1). Al-Shatibi does not mean by this that the Qur'an does not contain foreign words; this has been addressed by the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence). Rather, his point is that "it was revealed in the language of the Arabs, with its specific words and styles of meaning, and that it speaks in accordance with what it is naturally inclined to in its language, addressing the general with the intended meaning of its apparent sense, and the general intended in one aspect and the specific in another, and the general intended as specific, and the apparent intended as non-apparent. All of this is understood from the beginning, middle, or end of the speech, and it speaks in a way that its beginning indicates its end or its end indicates its beginning" (2). He then said: "It is not possible to understand the language of the Arabs from the perspective of understanding the language of the non-Arabs due to the differences in structures and styles" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/42. (2) See: the same source, 2/43 - 44. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/44. Al-Shafi'i mentioned this matter in several places in his book (al-Risala), perhaps most notably on pages 51 - 52 - 53. Among what he said: "Indeed, Allah addressed the Arabs in His Book in their language according to what they know of its meanings, and among what they know of its meanings is the expansiveness of their language, and that its nature is to address something in a general apparent sense intended as the general apparent, and the beginning of this suffices for its end, and a general apparent intended as general that includes the specific, and this is indicated by some of what they were addressed with therein. And a general apparent intended as specific, and the apparent is known in its context to be intended as non-apparent. All of this is known from the beginning, middle, or end of the speech. And it begins a matter in its speech that clarifies its first word in it from its last, and it begins a matter that clarifies its last word in it from its first... and it speaks of something that it knows by meaning without clarification by word, just as it defines by indication, and this is considered among its highest speech due to the exclusivity of its scholars over those who are ignorant of it" (See: al-Risala, paragraphs 175, 174, 173). Among what al-Shafi'i said: "The language of the Arabs is the most expansive of languages in its methodology and has the most words, and we do not know of anyone other than a prophet who can encompass all its words, but nothing escapes it from its generality, so that there is no one among them who does not know it" (al-Risala, p. 42, paragraph 139). In (al-Risala), there are sections with the following titles: Clarification of what was revealed from the Book as general intended as general that includes the specific, clarification of what was revealed from the Book as general apparent that encompasses both general and specific, clarification of what was revealed from the Book as general apparent intended as entirely specific. See, pp. 53 - 62. [Page 271] He pointed out that the one who alerted to this matter was Imam al-Shafi'i in his Risala, but many who came after him did not take it in this manner (1). Accordingly, it is impossible to translate the Qur'an and convey it into a non-Arabic tongue, because while the words and meanings of phrases can be transferred to another language, the style has an impact on the meanings, which cannot be translated. However, it is permissible to interpret the Qur'an for the general public and for those who are unable to understand its meanings, and it is permissible to translate the words and phrases, but this is merely a transfer of their meanings without preserving the effect of the style, which provides additional meanings that serve the meanings of the words and phrases (2). The illiteracy of the Sharia: Al-Shatibi says: "The illiterate (ummi) is one who is attributed to the mother, remaining on the original state of birth from the mother, having not learned a book or anything else, thus he is in the original state in which he was born" (3). He says: "This Sharia is illiterate because its people are likewise; as for the fact that its people are so, it is decisive due to His saying, Exalted is He: { He it is Who has sent among the unlettered a Messenger from among themselves } (4) and His saying: { So believe in Allah and His Messenger, the unlettered Prophet who believes in Allah and His words } (5), and in the hadith: 'I was sent to an illiterate nation' (6), and also 'We are an illiterate nation; we do not calculate nor write' (7)" (8) and other such evidence. __________ (1) Same source, 2/42. (2) Same source, 2/44 - 46. (3) The same place. (4) Surah Al-Jumu'ah, 2. (5) Surah Al-A'raf, 158. (6) Narrated by Ahmad (22308) with the wording: "I was sent to an illiterate nation." (7) Narrated by al-Nasa'i (2112) with the same wording. And by al-Bukhari (1780) and Muslim (1806) and al-Nasa'i (2111) and Abu Dawood (1975) and Ahmad (4775) with the wording 'we do not write' preceding 'we do not calculate.' (8) ... See: al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/44 - 46. [Page 272] Al-Shatibi's intention in this is that the legal texts must be understood based on their implications, as they were revealed to people for them to comprehend. They addressed them according to their existing knowledge and sciences, and if they had been addressed with something they were unfamiliar with or similar to it, they would not have understood it, and it would not have been a miracle for them. He states: "If it were not in accordance with what they were familiar with, it would not have been a miracle for them, and they would have dismissed it as not being in line with what we are accustomed to, since we have no experience with such speech" (1), just as if the Qur'an had been revealed in a foreign language. And if the Arabs, to whom the Qur'an was revealed, had some knowledge, it is considered for the purpose of understanding the legal discourse, as they were addressed according to their characteristics, sciences, or knowledge. Therefore, if new sciences or meanings arise that they are unfamiliar with, they are not specifically intended in the address of the legislator, even if they are within the capacity of the words. The same applies if new meanings arise for words they used to employ. Thus, words are interpreted by the meanings that were in use at the time of their revelation. He says: "It is essential in understanding the Sharia to follow the customary understanding of the unlettered ones, namely the Arabs to whom the Qur'an was revealed in their language. If the Arabs have a consistent custom in their language, it is not correct to deviate from it in understanding the Sharia. If there is no custom, it is not correct to interpret it based on what is unfamiliar to them, and this applies to meanings, words, and styles" (2). __________ (1) The same source, 2/47. (2) The same source, p. 53. [Page 273] And from this, it follows that the meanings understood from the texts are those that are grasped by the general public, not just the elite. It also follows that the accepted meanings of the texts regarding doctrinal and practical obligations are what the general public, for whom the Qur'an was revealed, understands. It is not correct to require philosophical and logical premises or sciences that are only available to the elite in order to understand them. He says: "What is valid in the realm of understandings and comprehension is what is general for all Arabs, so it should not be forced beyond what they can grasp according to the words and meanings, for people in understanding and the obligation therein are not on the same level or close to one another, except that they are similar in public matters."(1) He says: "The doctrinal and practical obligations must be such that an unlettered person can comprehend them, so that they can enter under their rule"(2). And he says: "If they were only understood by the elite, the Sharia would not be general, nor would it be suitable for the unlettered, and it has been established that it is so. Therefore, the meanings that must be known and believed in must be easy to grasp. Moreover, if they were not so, it would necessitate imposing upon the general public what they cannot bear, which is not the case, as mentioned in the fundamentals"(3). Al-Shatibi indicates that he does not mean to allow the common people to derive rulings and establish legal truths, but rather that the plausible meanings of the texts, the valid ones, are those that follow that course. The one who engages in deriving and establishing meanings and legal truths is the qualified mujtahid (jurist) for that purpose. This matter will be elaborated upon in the discussion of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/56. (2) The same source, 2/58. (3) The same place. [Page 274] Therefore, al-Shatibi turns away from delving into the discussions of the attributes of Allah, which are beyond the comprehension of the servant, and directs attention to the texts that are the subject of disagreement and dispute in this matter to what is actionable. He considers deep investigation into them a departure from the requirements of the Sharia. He says: "Thus, you find that the Sharia has only defined divine matters in a way that can be understood, and has deferred other matters, defining them according to the implications of names and attributes, and has encouraged reflection on the created beings as a semblance of that, and has referred what leads to confusion to a general principle, which is His saying, Exalted is He: { There is nothing like Him } (1)" (2). He says: "The Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) did not convey to us any engagement in these matters that would serve as a foundation for researchers and those who overreach, nor did it come from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), nor from the followers who are to be emulated" (3). He said: "Thus, deep investigation into them and seeking what the majority does not share in understanding is a departure from the requirements of the original Sharia, for the soul may rush to seek what is not required of it, leading it into a darkness from which it cannot escape" (4). Based on this - also - he refutes the claim that the Qur'an contains all sciences, including natural sciences and logic, citing His saying, Exalted is He: { And We have sent down to you the Book as a clarification for all things } (5), and His saying: { We have not neglected in the Book anything } (6). Such meanings are not known, and no one among those who preceded has claimed them, so they cannot be established. It is not permissible to attribute to the Qur'an what it does not imply, just as it is not correct to deny from it what it does imply, and one must limit oneself in seeking to understand it to all that is attributed to the Arabs, including the meanings of words and structures, and their styles (7). The meanings are the primary objective of the texts: __________ (1) Surah Ash-Shura, 11. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 2/58. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 2/59. (4) The same source. (5) Surah An-Nahl, 89. (6) Surah Al-An'am, 38. (7) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 2/22. [Page 275] And this is undoubtedly without dispute. The speech and the texts were intended for a specific purpose, which is their meanings. Therefore, attention was given to the meanings of words and their implications, to the implications of structures, and to the meanings of letters. This is why the scholars of jurisprudence (fiqh) and the scholars of principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) paid attention to the sciences of language and their implications. Al-Shatibi says: "The concern for the meanings dispersed in the discourse is the greatest objective based on the fact that the Arabs were concerned with meanings, and they only refined the words for their sake. This principle is well-known among the people of Arabic. The word is merely a means to attain the intended meaning, and the meaning is the objective, and not every meaning; for the individual meaning may not be taken into account if the composite meaning is understood without it" (1). The individual meaning refers to words like hand, eye, their hands, our eyes, and with you, among others, in the verses that raised discussions about attributes, and to the word abba in His saying: { And fruit and abba } (2). He says: "In the collection of al-Isma'ili, which is narrated on the authority of Sahih al-Bukhari from Anas ibn Malik, that Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) recited { And fruit and abba } and said, 'What is abba?' Then he said, 'We were not tasked with this,' or he said, 'We were not commanded with this.' It is also reported from Anas that a man asked Umar ibn al-Khattab about His saying { And fruit and abba }, 'What is abba?' Umar said, 'We were forbidden from delving deeply and being overly concerned.' It is well-known that he admonished Dubay' when he frequently asked about the verses of the sent ones and the violent winds and similar matters. The apparent meaning of all this is that he only forbade it because the composite meaning is generally known, and no legal ruling can be based on performing these actions... If understanding the individual word were a prerequisite for understanding the composite meaning, it would not be considered a burden but rather a necessity, as was narrated from Umar himself regarding His saying: { Or He takes them with fear } (3), for he was asked about it on the pulpit, and a man from Hudhayl said to him: 'Fear among us means belittlement,' then he recited (the long meter): __________ (1) The same source 2/57. (2) Surah Abasa, 31. (3) Surah an-Nahl, 47. [Page 276] The traveler feared it, like a monkey... as the ship feared the return of the spring (1). Omar said: "O people, hold on to the record of your poetry from the time of ignorance, for in it is the interpretation of your Book... If this is the case, then it is necessary to pay attention to understanding the meaning of the address" (2). This is if the meanings are the meanings of the words and texts; however, if what is meant by meanings are the meanings of rulings, that is, the rulings or presumed interests for them, which, if established through induction, become certain legal interests and objectives (maqasid); and if they are not established as such, they are treated according to their service or destruction of established objectives, and are considered or rejected based on that. In this sense of the term meanings, al-Shatibi discusses whether this is from the indications of language or something for which speech was intended or not, and he concludes that it is not from the indications of language, and this will become clear in what follows. Original meanings and derived meanings: __________ (1) Al-Firuzabadi said: "To fear something: to diminish it." Al-Qamus Al-Muhit, p. 1046. [Page 277] The complete: the hump is what it was, and the great she-camel is the hump." p. 1207. "The monkey: what has fallen off from the hair and wool, or its waste... and the hair is crinkled like it is joyful: it is curled." p. 396. "To peel it, he peels it: he stripped it... and the rough skin is a coarse leather and a stone with which it is carved and softened, or anything with which something is carved." p. 1556. "The wood: the timber," p. 386. "The spring: a tree for bows and arrows." p. 988. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/57 - 58. Al-Qurtubi said in the interpretation of the verse: "Ibn al-A'rabi said: that is, to diminish from wealth, lives, and fruits until He destroyed them all." He said: "The complete (tamk) of the hump is to be long and raised, so it is complete. The rough skin (safn) and the tool (masfan) are what is used to carve wood." Al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an 10/110, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, Beirut. Al-Shatibi says: "The Arabic language, in terms of its words that indicate meanings, has two perspectives: one from the standpoint of being words and expressions that are absolute indicators of absolute meanings, which is the original indication, and the second from the standpoint of being words and expressions that are restricted indicators of serving meanings, which is the secondary indication" (1). He says: "As for the aspect of the original meaning, there is no doubt about its validity in indicating rulings absolutely, and there can be no disagreement in this regard, such as the forms of commands and prohibitions and generalities and particularities... As for the aspect of the secondary meaning, is it valid to consider it in indicating rulings in terms of understanding additional meanings beyond the original meaning or not?" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/44. (2) The same source, 2/63. [Page 278] To clarify al-Shatibi's (may Allah have mercy on him) intention regarding the secondary meaning, he provided the example he mentioned. He said: "If an action occurs in existence for Zayd, such as standing up, then if every speaker wants to inform about Zayd's standing, he will achieve what he intends without any difficulty" (1). The meaning understood from the report here is the original meaning. He then said: "As for the second aspect, it is that which is specific to the Arabic tongue in that narration and that report, for every report in this aspect necessitates matters that serve that report" (2). He then said: "That is, you say at the beginning of the report, 'Zayd has stood up,' if there is no concern for the one being reported about, but rather for the report itself. If the concern is for the one being reported about, you would say, 'Zayd has stood up.' In response to the question, 'What is the status of that standing?' you would say, 'If Zayd has stood up.' In response to the denial of his standing, you would say, 'By Allah, Zayd has stood up'" (3). He then said: "All of this revolves around reporting Zayd's standing, so such actions, which change the meaning of the same speech according to them, are not the original intention. Rather, they are complements and supplements" (4). Based on this, if this difference in reporting were considered among the original meanings, it would not be possible to translate any speech from Arabic into the speech of the non-Arabs, let alone translate the Qur'an (5). __________ (1) The same source, 2/44. (2) The same source, 2/44. (3) The same location. (4) The same source, 2/44 - 54. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/54. [Page 279] Based on al-Shatibi's clarifications, the derived meaning (ma'na tab'i) can be defined as a meaning that serves the original meaning but is not one of the indications of speech. The meaning becomes clearer when al-Shatibi responds to those who assert that the derived meaning is one of the indications of speech. He cites their statement, saying: "They argued that the maximum duration of menstruation is fifteen days based on his saying (peace and blessings be upon him), 'One of you remains in her menstruation for half of her lifetime' (1), and the intended meaning is to inform about the deficiency in religion, not to inform about the maximum duration, but exaggeration necessitated mentioning that, and if the increase had been mentioned, it would have been addressed. Al-Shafi'i argued for the impurity of a small amount of water that is not altered based on his saying (peace and blessings be upon him), 'If one of you awakens from his sleep, he should not dip his hand into the vessel until he washes it' (2)"(3). He then said: "As for their argument regarding the minimum duration of pregnancy being six months, taken from His saying, Exalted is He, { And his gestation and weaning is thirty months } (4), along with His saying, { And weaning is in two years } (5)"(6). He then said: "And they said regarding His saying, Exalted is He, { So now go in unto them } (7), up to His saying, { until the white thread of dawn becomes distinct to you from the black thread } (8), the verse. __________ (1) Al-Bayhaqi (9271), 5/400. Its text is: "One of you remains as long as Allah wills..." And Sunan al-Tirmidhi (2538), 5/10, its text is "One of you remains for three or four..." He said: It is authentic, strange, and good from this aspect. And in Musnad Ahmad (8849), 2/373, similar to the text of al-Bayhaqi. (2) Narrated by Muslim (416), and he added three, for he does not know where his hand has been. And al-Tirmidhi (24) said: It is good and authentic. And al-Nasa'i (1), Abu Dawood (95), Ahmad (9491), and Ibn Majah (388). (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/46. (4) Surah Al-Ahqaf, 15. (5) Surah Luqman, 14. (6) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/64. (7) Surah Al-Baqarah, 187. (8) Surah Al-Baqarah, 187. [Page 280] It indicates the permissibility of waking up in a state of ritual impurity (janabah) and the validity of fasting, because the allowance for intimacy until dawn necessitates this, even if it is not the intended point of clarification, as it is a necessary consequence of the intention to clarify the permissibility of intimacy, eating, and drinking"(1). Al-Shatibi says in his response to this statement when presenting the evidence of those who prohibit the secondary meaning from the indication of the word: "As for the duration of menstruation, it is not accepted that the hadith indicates it, and there is a dispute regarding it. Therefore, the Hanafis say that its maximum is ten days, and even if it is accepted, it is not from the perspective of the indication of the word by convention, and there is discussion about it. The issue of al-Shafi'i regarding the impurity of water is from the perspective of analogy (qiyas) or otherwise. The minimum duration of pregnancy is derived from the first perspective, not the second. Likewise, the issue of waking up in a state of ritual impurity"(2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/65. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/76. [Page 281] Based on this, what has come in legal texts such as His saying, Exalted is He: { Prohibited to you are dead animals, blood, and the flesh of swine } (1), and His saying, Exalted is He: { Indeed, intoxicants, gambling, stone alters [to other than Allah], and divining arrows are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it } (2), and His saying, Exalted is He: { As for the thief, the male and the female, amputate their hands in recompense for what they earned as a deterrent [punishment] from Allah } (3), and His saying, Exalted is He: { The female and the male adulterer, lash each one of them with a hundred lashes } (4), the prohibition of the aforementioned items such as carrion, blood, swine, and intoxicants... and the prohibition of theft and adultery are among the original meanings and the original implications of the speech. As for what may be argued as the rationale for these rulings or taken as wisdom for them without the existence of a term indicating that or texts from which it can be inferred, such as saying that the rationale or wisdom is the harm caused by carrion, blood, or swine, or the intoxication caused by alcohol, or that the preservation of life, preservation of intellect, preservation of wealth, and preservation of lineage is the meaning of these rulings or the intent of the Legislator behind them, this is not among the implications of the texts. If it were among them, it would be one of the original meanings; rather, the fact that it is intended by the Legislator is a conjecture that is not supported by legal evidence, and it is additional to the original meanings. So, can rulings be derived from it or built upon it? There is no ruling for the dependent indication: Al-Shatibi presents a discussion on this issue, providing the evidence of those who affirm it, and he presents the evidence of those who oppose it, concluding with the statement: "The result is that inferring from the second aspect regarding rulings is not established, thus it cannot be applied at all"(5). __________ (1) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 3. (2) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 90. (3) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 38. (4) Surah An-Nur, 2. (5) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 2/68. [Page 282] Then he says: "It has become clear that there is a conflict of evidence in the issue, and it has appeared that the stronger position from both sides is that of the prohibitors, thus the situation necessitates that the second position, which indicates the derivative meaning, has no indication of an additional legal ruling whatsoever" (1). The summary of the evidence of the prohibitors is that these derivative meanings are either indicated by the text or they are not. If they are indicated by the text, then they are among the original meanings and are considered valid, and can be used as evidence for rulings because they are among the indications of language. If they are not indicated by the text, then the one who claims them is required to provide legal evidence. If there is no legal text that indicates them in any type of linguistic indication, then they are mere conjectures and assumptions that cannot be attributed to the Sharia. In reality, this disagreement that al-Shatibi raises and clarifies his position on is the disagreement mentioned in the second chapter between those who advocate for reasoning based on presumed wisdom, and building rulings upon it on the grounds that they are conjectures, which are acceptable in legal matters, and those who reject considering these meanings and rulings based on the fact that there is no evidence for them, thus they hold no validity, as they describe them as mere figments of the heart or whims of the mind. From here, al-Shatibi's approach to this issue is that these meanings hold no validity in legislation as they are presumed rulings, and there is nothing to prevent the intended wisdom from being something else. There is also nothing to prevent it from being the opposite of the intended wisdom of the legislator, but a person may perceive the ugly as beautiful or the beautiful as ugly. Thus, al-Shatibi's condition for a beneficial induction that leads to certainty in considering these meanings as legal objectives is that it establishes for him the compatibility of this meaning with the actions of the Sharia (2). However, the reader of al-Shatibi may wonder whether what al-Shatibi asserts, that such an induction is beneficial in considering these meanings with certainty, is correct? __________ (1) The same location. (2) Now, the reader can refer to the reading of the third introduction from al-Shatibi's introductions, to gain more confidence in what we have presented to him regarding his methodology, and to increase his understanding of the importance of that introduction and what it contains for his methodology. [Page 283] If the secondary meanings in individual texts are not considered, from where will the consideration arise if the texts are numerous? In other words, if the consideration of meaning depends on the convergence of evidence on that meaning, from where will the consideration arise if none of this evidence has any indication of that meaning? This is according to his statement, "The situation necessitates that the second aspect, which indicates the secondary meaning, has no indication of a legal ruling whatsoever." Among al-Shatibi's statements regarding the exaggeration in rejecting the consideration of meanings that may be claimed to be intended by the Legislator without any evidence indicating them, either through original indication or through established induction, is his saying: "What assures us from Allah's questioning us on the Day of Resurrection: From where did you understand that I intended such and such a genus by what I revealed in my saying: { And they think that they are doing well } (1) or my saying: { He said, 'Indeed, I am of those who dislike your work' } (2)? For claiming such a thing about the Qur'an, that it is intended by the speaker, is dangerous; rather, it returns to the meaning of His saying: { When you receive it with your tongues and say with your mouths that of which you have no knowledge, and you think it is insignificant, while it is, in the sight of Allah, عظیم } (3) and that it is a statement in the Book of Allah based on opinion" (4). Chapter Five The Intention of the Legislator in Establishing the Sharia for Obligations According to Its Implications and in the Inclusion of the Obligor Under Its Rulings It contains an introduction and three sections: Section One: ... The Intention of Obligation According to the Sharia. Section Two: ... The Intention of the Legislator in Including the Obligor Under the Rulings of the Sharia. __________ (1) Surah al-Kahf, 104. (2) Surah al-Shu'ara, 168. (3) Surah al-Nur, 15. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 3/248. This means that whoever finds the pun in the Holy Qur'an, as in the two verses above, from where can he claim that it is intended by Allah, Exalted is He, in them? Such a claim is deemed blameworthy as it is based on doubt or conjecture, not on knowledge; that is, certainty. It is akin to slander. [Page 284] The Third Topic: ... Between the Sharia and its Objectives or Between Worship and Following Meanings. Chapter Five The Intention of the Legislator in Establishing the Sharia for Obligations According to It And in the Inclusion of the Obligor Under Its Rules Introduction: This chapter is to discuss the third and fourth types of the objectives of the legislator. What is noteworthy here is al-Shatibi's expression in the third type: "for obligations according to it," especially when we consider the title of the fourth type: "the inclusion of the obligor under the rules of the Sharia." What is the difference between the two types? The difference between them can be understood if we refer to the fourth type as the intention of the legislator in establishing the Sharia for obligations through it, which means the intention of worship and compliance. As for the third type, it is the obligation according to it, meaning the implication of worship and compliance, which is burden and hardship. It has been understood from the legislator that the intention is for the benefit of the servants and for ease, which is contrary to hardship and pain. The legislator intends through the Sharia to alleviate hardship. Is there a contradiction here? Does obligation cease with hardship? Is there a limit to the hardship that would lift the obligation, and how can we reconcile the original intention of worship and compliance with the original intention of benefit and alleviation of hardship? This is the subject of the chapter, which I have divided into three sections: the first to clarify al-Shatibi's intent and methodology in explaining the intention of the legislator in establishing the Sharia for obligations according to it, and the second and third to clarify his methodology in explaining the intention of the legislator in including the obligor under the rules of the Sharia. The First Topic The Intention of Obligation According to the Sharia The Meaning of This Type: The subject of this type is that the legislator does not impose obligations that are beyond the capacity of the obligor, nor those that entail excessive hardship, because one of the objectives of the legislator is, from the outset, to alleviate hardship and remove constraints. However, absolute hardship cannot be entirely avoided, as it is inherent in every obligation. What, then, is the criterion for the hardship that Allah does not impose obligations upon, and the hardship for which Allah, Exalted is He, obligates actions that are accompanied by similar hardship? [Page 285] It has been mentioned regarding his third introduction that he said: "Unlike the principles, they are derived from a comprehensive examination of the implications of the evidence, not from individual cases specifically" (1). This is because the implications of the evidence are the meanings of the texts and the meanings of the rulings. That is, they are the linguistic indications and the causes of the rulings. The legal meanings are the meanings that are derived, whether from the texts or from the rulings, and they are the universals or definitive principles of the Sharia. These universals must be applied when considering the texts, meaning that the meanings of the texts should be directed in such a way that the meaning derived from them does not contradict the principles, and any meaning that contradicts a principle is rejected, which is the meaning of applying the universals with the particulars. When the Exalted says: { And do not die except while you are Muslims } (2), the text can imply more than one meaning, and it has been established in the principles that there is no obligation for what is beyond one's capacity, so any meaning that contradicts this principle is rejected; therefore, the meaning shifts from the obligation of not dying to its implications. The obligation that entails hardship is to be considered, as it has been established that the legislator intends to alleviate hardship and that he intends to impose what is commanded. These are two principles from which a contradiction arises, and they are from the implications of the Sharia, that is, from its universal principles. So what does the Sharia necessitate in this case? This is the reason al-Shatibi chose this title. As for the term: "obligation" in the title, it carries the meaning of burden and hardship. What is meant by this is that there is no action without some burden, and the commitment of the obligated person to the commands of the Sharia necessarily entails hardship, regardless of its extent. Does the legislator intend to remove all hardship? Al-Shatibi answers in the negative. This opens the door to a complex topic, or one that requires understanding in the law and in the policy of the law, which is the estimation of the hardship that lifts the obligation. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/16. (2) Surah Al-Imran, 102. [Page 286] In Islamic law, there are well-known principles such as: "Necessities permit the prohibited," "Hardship brings about facility," "When the matter becomes narrow, it expands," "Need takes the place of necessity," or others that may or may not be valid. Some contemporary scholars use such principles in their excuses, justifications, or fatwas. Should such principles be taken at face value? Is the prohibited allowed by any necessity or merely by need, and is hardship taken as evidence for leniency? No, and no one has said this. So what are the controls? This is the essence of this type of objectives of the legislator. The principles and foundations that al-Shatibi diligently sought to verify and establish are primarily aimed at resolving issues of this kind, that is, establishing the foundations and rules that govern particulars and meanings when they are a source of doubt and confusion or of disagreement and divergent views. It is worth noting that the principles established by al-Shatibi in this type of objectives, such as not being obliged to do what is beyond one's capacity, and not being obliged to endure extraordinary or excessive hardship, and the lifting of hardship, are principles of need (hajiyat), because they revolve around ease, alleviation, and kindness towards the obligated person, which is the definition of needs. Obligation and ease: It has been established in the principles that Allah, Exalted is He, does not impose on the servant what is beyond his capacity. Therefore, al-Shatibi addresses this quickly, but he discusses what follows from it. He says: "It has been established in the principles that the condition for obligation or its cause is the ability of the one obligated. What the obligated person cannot do is not validly imposed upon him legally, even if it is rationally permissible (1)... And we say: If it appears from the legislator at first glance the intention to impose what is beyond the capacity of the servant, that is actually related to its precedents or its consequences or its indicators. The saying of Allah, Exalted is He: { And do not die except while you are Muslims } (2), and His saying in the hadith: "Be the servant of Allah who is killed and do not be the servant of Allah who kills" (3), and His saying: "Do not die while you are an oppressor" (4), and what is similar to that is not required from it except what falls under the capacity, which is Islam, refraining from oppression, abstaining from killing, and submitting to the command of Allah, as well as everything else of this nature" (5). __________ (1) Unlike the Mu'tazila, and unlike what is necessitated by rational good and evil, or by establishing benefits and harms by reason, assuming that reason is capable of that. (2) Surah Al-Imran, 102. (3) Narrated by Ahmad in the Musnad (21461). (4) I could not find it. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/72. [Page 287] On this basis, a person is not tasked with what does not fall under their ability, including the traits they are naturally endowed with, such as hunger and thirst and similar matters; they are not required to eliminate these, but they are asked to control themselves from inclining towards what is unlawful. As for traits that are ambiguous in nature, such as love, hatred, anger, and others, they are to be examined; the request may either be directed towards their antecedents or their consequences. He states: "What is inherent in human nature in terms of traits inevitably leads to acquired actions, so the request is directed at those actions, not at what they originated from" (1). This is similar to love, where the request pertains to the causes, as in the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): "Exchange gifts, and you will love one another" (2). And regarding the desire for unlawful sexual relations, it is a consequence for which a person is required to eliminate its cause, which is the provocative gaze (3). As for anger, for example, a person is required to manage its consequences, such as refraining from revenge. He says: "Even if the provocation is not within their ability, the request pertains to the consequences, like anger provoking the desire for revenge, just as the gaze provokes the desire for unlawful relations" (4). He concludes by saying: "If it is arranged in this manner, it is not correct to impose a duty regarding them themselves, even if it appears outwardly that such an imposition is evident; it is directed towards something other than that which precedes it, follows it, or coincides with it, and Allah knows best" (5). Directing the implications of the request towards the consequences, antecedents, or accompanying factors, in accordance with this principle, necessitates the application of other principles to determine what the request pertains to, and the meaning to which it is directed cannot be considered valid except after establishing its meaning through induction. Obligation and hardship: The legal rulings or principles related to hardships differ according to the variations of these hardships, and this difference necessitates clarifying the meanings of hardship. Based on its reality, al-Shatibi identifies four meanings for it: __________ (1) The same source, 2/74. (2) Al-Muwatta (1413), which is a part of a hadith: "Shake hands, and rancor will depart; exchange gifts, and you will love one another; and enmity will depart." (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/74. (4) The same location. (5) The same source, 2/75. [Page 288] The first: that what is meant by it is general in what is not possible to achieve and in what is possible to achieve if it is unbearable, like a disabled person who attempts to stand, or a person who attempts to fly in terms of it being a hardship that is futile; thus, its ruling is like that of what is not possible to achieve, and this has been clarified. The second: that what is meant by it is the burdensome hardship, that is, the one that is beyond the usual, which leads to a disturbance in the mind or soul, or forces one to abandon obligations or commit prohibitions. Therefore, this type of hardship does not entail a demand for what necessitates it, and it is the place of concession(1). The third: that what is meant by hardship is the ordinary hardship, that is, the one that is not burdensome, which accompanies ordinary tasks, and what these tasks require in terms of effort and cost. Such hardships have no effect on obligation. The fourth: that what is meant by hardship is the opposition to desires, in that the obligation takes the obligated person away from indulging in their desires, and such hardship has no effect on obligation(2). The legislator does not intend to remove it. The basis of the non-obligation regarding burdensome hardships: __________ (1) The meaning of the concession intended here will be explained later. (2) See: al-Muwafaqat. 2/80. [Page 289] Al-Shatibi says: "For the legislator did not intend to impose burdens that cause hardship in it" (1) and he presented evidence through useful inductive reasoning, including His saying, Exalted is He: { And He relieves them of their burden and the shackles that were upon them } (2), and His saying: { Our Lord, and lay not upon us a burden like that which You laid upon those before us } (3), and His saying: { No soul is charged except with that within its capacity } (4), and His saying: { Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship } (5), and His saying: { And He has not made upon you in religion any difficulty } (6), and His saying: { Allah intends to lighten for you, and mankind was created weak } (7), { Allah does not intend to make difficulty for you, but He intends to purify you } (8), and in the hadith: "I was sent with the easy, lenient religion" (9), and "Whenever two options are presented to him, he should choose the easier one as long as it is not sinful" (10), and other evidences (11). He said: "If He had intended hardship, He would not have intended ease or relief, but would have intended difficulty and hardship, which is false" (12), __________ (1) The same source, 2/81. (2) Surah Al-A'raf, 157. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 286. (4) Surah Al-Baqarah, 233. (5) Surah Al-Baqarah, 185. (6) Surah Al-Hajj, 78. (7) Surah An-Nisa, 28. (8) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 6. (9) Narrated by Ahmad (23710) with the wording: "I was sent," instead of "I was sent with," and it was narrated: "I was not sent with Judaism or Christianity, but I was sent with the easy, lenient religion," with number (21260). (10) Bukhari (3296), Muslim (4294), Abu Dawood (4153), Ahmad (23702) and the hadith continues: "If it is a sin, he is the furthest from it." (11) See: Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 2/80. (12) The same source, 2/91. [Page 290] He said: "If the purpose of the Sharia (law) were to impose hardship and difficulty, and it has been established that it is intended for ease and facilitation, then combining the two would be a contradiction and a discrepancy, and it is free from that." (1) Difficulties are evils: Accordingly, the legislator intends for ease and facilitation for the obligated person, and aims to eliminate difficulties. According to his methodology, difficulties are evils that must be removed, and it is forbidden for the obligated person to intend them for their own sake. He says: "The obligated person should not intend difficulty in the obligation due to the great reward for it; rather, he may intend the action that has a great reward because of its great difficulty." (2) And he said: "Nothing from the objectives of the obligated person is valid except what aligns with the intention of the legislator. If the intention of the obligated person is to impose difficulty, then he has contradicted the intention of the legislator, since the legislator does not intend the difficulty itself in the obligation. Any intention that contradicts the intention of the legislator is void; thus, the intention towards difficulty is void, and it is therefore among the things that are prohibited. What is prohibited has no reward in it; rather, it incurs sin if the prohibition rises to the level of being forbidden. Seeking reward by intending to enter into difficulty is a contradictory intention." (3) And he said: "His prohibition of hardship is well-known in the Sharia to the extent that it has become a definitive principle in it. If the intention of the legislator is not to impose hardship on the self, then the intention of the obligated person towards it is opposed to what the legislator intended by the known and established alleviation. If his intention contradicts the intention of the legislator, it is void and invalid. This is clear, and may Allah grant success." (4) And he said: "It has been made known by the legislator that difficulty is prohibited." (5) However, this raises a question: difficulties are inherent to human actions, and there is no obligation without difficulty. How can it be consistent that the legislator intends to eliminate difficulties while also requiring adherence to obligations? The answer from al-Shatibi, according to his methodology, is that the legislator's intention to eliminate difficulties is a general principle that does not fail. __________ (1) The same source. (2) The same source, 2/86. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/89. (4) The same source. (5) The same source, 2/85. [Page 291] When the obligation is established with what entails hardship, the solution is that not everything termed hardship is considered hardship in Islamic law; that is, these hardships are not the meaning that the principle of alleviating hardships refers to, from one perspective. From another perspective, if the obligation falls on something that entails hardship which the legislator intended to alleviate, then two principles come into conflict: the principle of compliance and the principle of alleviating hardship. Here, one must weigh the interests and harms, and the ruling will be based on what predominates in the situation, meaning that one must weigh the demand for action due to the benefit of compliance against the demand for abstention due to the harm of hardship. Usual hardship is not termed hardship: ... It has been established through induction that every obligation involving hardship, no matter how slight, indicates a definitive general principle that the legislator imposes obligations that entail hardship. Here, two principles come into conflict: the principle of alleviating hardships and the principle of acting upon what entails hardship. Al-Shatibi saw the solution in that not every hardship is considered hardship in Islamic law. What is the criterion for what is considered and what is not? Al-Shatibi states: "There is no dispute that the legislator intends to impose obligations that entail some cost and hardship, but it is not usually termed hardship, just as the pursuit of livelihood through various trades and crafts is not usually termed hardship because it is a possible and customary practice that does not prevent the costs associated with it from being carried out in the usual manner. Rather, rational people and those accustomed to such practices consider those who refrain from it to be lazy and condemn them for it. Likewise, the usual obligations" (1). He adds in clarifying the required criterion: "To this meaning returns the distinction between hardship that is not usually considered hardship and that which is considered hardship, which is that if the action leads to its discontinuation or to some of it, or to a disruption in the individual, their wealth, or their condition, then the hardship here is outside the usual. If it does not involve any of that in the usual case, it is not usually considered hardship, even if it is termed a cost" (2). He then said: "Based on this, one should understand the obligation and what it entails of hardship" (3). He then went further, rejecting the notion that usual hardships are termed hardship, thus eliminating the conflict between the two principles. He said: "What results from ordinary actions is not usually termed hardship. The conclusion is that obligations involving customary matters and those of their kind do not entail hardship, as previously stated; what results from the obligation is not termed hardship" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/82 - 83. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) The same source, 2/85. [Page 292] He said: "If it is not outside the norm but occurs in a manner similar to the hardship that arises in ordinary tasks, then the legislator, even if he did not intend for it to occur, does not intend to remove it either. The evidence for this is that if he had intended to remove it, the obligation would not remain, since every ordinary or extraordinary task entails effort and obligation to a degree, whether little or much" (1). ... Along with these hardships is the hardship of opposing one's desires, which is not taken into account in obligations because one of the objectives of the legislator is to divert the obligated person from following their desires to compliance. He said: "Opposing what the souls desire is difficult for them, and it is hard to depart from it" (2). He said: "But the legislator intended by establishing the Sharia to divert the obligated person from following their desires so that they become a servant of Allah. Therefore, opposing one's desires is not one of the hardships considered in obligations, even if it is difficult in the course of habits, for if it were considered to the extent that alleviation would be legislated for it, that would contradict the purpose for which the Sharia was established, and that is invalid" (3). __________ (1) The same source, 2/105. (2) The same source, 2/103. (3) The same location. [Page 293] ... Under the following of desires (hawa) fall many positions, fatwas, or actions for which their proponents invoke the attainment of benefits and the prevention of harms, under the title of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), and the identification of benefits and harms based on desires, or the advantages or disadvantages that may befall a person. For this reason, it becomes permissible to commit prohibitions or neglect obligations, under the pretext of preserving a position, job, or wealth, or seeking knowledge, and they refer to the sacrifices, hardships, or harm they may face as harms. Although this way of thinking has no basis in religion, as it renders what the legislator has commanded as harmful and what He has prohibited as beneficial. The falsehood is magnified when the proponents of such claims cling to al-Shatibi and his methodology, as he criticized this approach and referred to these considerations as desires, and he cited in the context of discussing the hardship of opposing desires the saying of Allah, Exalted is He: { Have you seen the one who has taken as his god his own desire, and Allah has led him astray despite his knowledge? } (1) and His saying: { They follow not except assumption and what their souls desire. } (2), and His saying: { Is one who is upon clear evidence from his Lord like one to whom his evil deed has been made attractive, and they follow their desires? } (3). He then said: "Just as hardship can be worldly, it can also be otherworldly. For if actions lead to neglecting an obligation or committing a prohibition, it is considered a greater hardship in terms of the Sharia than the worldly hardship that does not compromise religion. The consideration of religion takes precedence over the consideration of the self and others in the view of the Sharia." (4) The recognized hardships or those intended to be alleviated: __________ (1) Surah Al-Jathiya, 23. (2) Surah An-Najm, 23. (3) Surah Muhammad, 14. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 2/104. [Page 294] ... It clarifies the meaning of the hardships that the legislator intended to alleviate, and thus it is forbidden for the servant to seek them. These are the hardships that are beyond the norm, which lead to a cessation of the required actions or some of them, or that cause a disruption in the individual. Such is the case with hardship. It is intended to be alleviated by law. Among the hardships is that the obligated person imposes upon themselves actions that, due to their nature or their abundance, lead to a shortcoming in their duties. He says: "Know that hardship is lifted from the obligated person for two reasons: the first is the fear of being cut off from the path and the aversion to worship and the dislike of obligation, which encompasses the fear of causing corruption to their body, mind, wealth, or state. The second is the fear of shortcoming when competing obligations related to the servant of different types arise, such as their duty to their family and children alongside other obligations that may come in the way. Perhaps delving into some actions will distract them from others and prevent the obligated person from fulfilling them, and perhaps they intend to burden both sides with excessive scrutiny, thus cutting them off from both" (1). Here, there is a conflict between the principle of compliance and the principle of alleviating hardship, which is a genuine hardship that is legally termed as hardship, meaning that which the legislator intended to alleviate. ... For such hardships, it is legislated to ease the obligation or grant concessions, making these hardships reasons for licenses. However, it should be noted that some ordinary hardships may be burdensome for certain obligated individuals, while some burdensome hardships for the general public may be ordinary for some. Likewise, there are places in the Sharia where licenses exist without any significant or burdensome hardship. So what is the meaning of a license, and how can the obligation be eased or lifted if its cause is found? Meaning of the license: __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/91. [Page 295] ... The term "license" (rukhsah) is used in more than one meaning, but the intended and predominant meaning is that which corresponds to the exemption (azimah) in the rulings of legal status (ahkam al-wad‘), which is what the jurists (usuliyyun) derive from. This is the meaning that al-Shatibi employed in his discussion of licenses and exemptions as types of legal rulings, and in this sense, it is: "what has been legislated for a difficult excuse as an exception to a general principle that necessitates prohibition, while being limited to the places of need therein" (1). It can also be used in other meanings mentioned by al-Shatibi (2), among which we will mention what concerns us here. He says: "The term 'license' may refer to what has been alleviated from this nation in terms of severe obligations and burdensome actions, as indicated by His saying, Exalted is He: { Our Lord, and lay not upon us a burden like that which You laid upon those before us }" (3) (4). He mentioned some evidence that indicates the principle of lifting hardships. In this sense, the concession (tarakhus) refers back to a definitive general principle from the essential needs (al-usul al-hajiyyah), and not in the sense that the jurists commonly use. ... The first technical definition refers to the licenses explicitly stated by the Sharia, which are permissible to use as soon as their cause exists, even if the hardship is absent, such as the license for shortening (qasr) or combining (jam‘) prayers during travel. These licenses are specific, and thus it was said about them, "as an exception to a general principle," and therefore they cannot be analogized and are limited to their specified instances. ... As for the second definition, it is what al-Shatibi intended by concession (tarakhus) or alleviation in the presence of hardship or burdensome difficulties. __________ (1) The same source, 1/290. (2) The same location. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 286. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/212. [Page 296] ... In both cases, the burdensome hardship (al-mashaqa al-mu'ntah) is the reason established by Islamic law for the concession (rukhsah), but since hardships are relative, meaning they differ among individuals and cannot be standardized, the legislator has set specific reasons (causes) to identify them. Therefore, if the reason exists, it is permissible to act upon the concession even if the burdensome hardship does not exist, because the concession is explicitly stated. If the reason exists along with the burdensome hardship, such as when there is a significant hardship during travel, it becomes obligatory to relieve the hardship, similar to how a person in dire need must eat something unlawful, for example. It is called a concession because it falls under the definition of a concession. ... He says: "The true hardship is the reason established for the concession; if it does not exist, the ruling is not obligatory, unless the presumption arises, which is the reason, taking the place of the wisdom, in which case the reason becomes sufficient for permissibility rather than obligation" (1). He also says: "There is no specific criterion or fixed limit for the considered hardship in alleviations that applies to all people; therefore, the law has established the reason in many cases to take the place of the cause because it is the closest presumption of the existence of hardship, leaving each individual to what they find... and leaving much of it to ijtihad (independent reasoning)" (2). Let us pay attention to his statement: "in many cases," meaning the explicitly stated concessions. This indicates that some of them do not have a reason established by the law that takes the place of the cause, and thus we apply the cause itself for alleviation, which is the true hardship. Here, the concession in the second sense comes into play, which is in the presence of the true hardship, meaning the burdensome one. His statement: "and leaving each individual to what they find..." indicates that some actions may be difficult for some and easy for others; therefore, these concessions are relative just as the hardships are relative. He says: "The concession is relative, not original, meaning that everyone is an expert in taking it for themselves unless a legal limit is set that they must adhere to" (3). He said: "There may be a man who is accustomed to cutting through difficulties until it becomes a habit for him, and he does not feel burdened or distressed by it... and another man is the opposite" (4). He said: "Many people can endure in their illness what others cannot, so the concession is legislated for one of the two men but not the other, and there is no doubt about this" (5). Reasons for concessions: __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/233. (2) The same source, 2/218 - 219. (3) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/218 - 219. (4) The same location. (5) The same location. [Page 297] ... It has been established that true hardship is the reason for concession. However, since hardship is relative and people differ in their ability to bear it, the Sharia has specified a number of concessions that exist when their causes are present, such as the concessions of shortening prayers, combining prayers, and breaking the fast while traveling. These concessions are deemed permissible in general according to al-Shatibi. However, if there is a significant hardship, taking the concession becomes obligatory, even though it is still referred to as a concession. He said: "There is no doubt that the concession here is akin to decisive commands, and for this reason, the scholars have stated that it is obligatory to eat carrion out of fear of death; if one does not do so and dies, he will enter the Fire" (1). Hardship is divided into two categories: habitual and non-habitual. The former is not intended to be alleviated by the Sharia, while the latter requires a concession to be taken. He said: "When the hardship faced by the obligated person in fulfilling the obligation is beyond the usual hardships encountered in ordinary actions, to the extent that it leads to religious or worldly corruption, the aim of the Legislator in this case is to generally alleviate it" (2). The action that causes this hardship is prohibited, and it must either be completely removed or alleviated. __________ (1) The same source, 2/223. (2) The same source, 2/105. [Page 298] ... The difference in hardships among people makes the allowances vary according to what they can bear, as the allowance is justified by the hardship that is burdensome or unusual: the ruling revolves around the reason for it, whether it exists or not. He says: "The prohibition is for a reason that is rational in meaning and intended by the legislator (1). If this is the case, then the prohibition is contingent upon the existence of the reason. When what the Messenger - (peace and blessings be upon him) - justified is present, the prohibition is directed and applicable; and if it is not present (2), then the prohibition is absent, as people in this regard are of two types" (3). He then mentioned two categories of people: one category experiences work that causes them additional hardship beyond what is usual, affecting them or others, and these are the majority of those obligated. He said regarding them: "Such individuals should not engage in actions that involve this, but rather they should take allowances" (4). He indicated that the allowance should be according to what is legislated, saying: "They take allowances according to what has been legislated for allowances if it is something that cannot be abandoned, or they abandon it if it is something that can be left, which is the implication of the justification" (5). ... The second category consists of ascetics, pious worshippers, or Sufis, or the people of states, as he refers to them in various places in his book. These individuals can endure what others cannot because their love for Allah has led them to renounce their desires, benefits, and pleasures, even if they are permissible. Thus, they are able to fill their time with more religious duties. These individuals are not required to take allowances because the justification is absent in their case (6). ... There is another category of people that al-Shatibi mentions in other parts of his book, which are the people of desires in contrast to the people of states. These individuals may find that abandoning the disliked (makruh) and performing the recommended (mandub) could lead them to a more severe disliked action or to a forbidden (haram) act, or result in abandoning a greater recommended act or an obligation. In this case, it is preferable for them to abandon the recommended act or to perform the disliked act. __________ (1) This refers to the removal of hardship or distress or compulsion. (2) That is, the reason. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/105. (4) The same source. (5) The same source. (6) The same source, 2/93 - 94 - 95. [Page 299] ... However, the ruling of what is permissible (halal) and forbidden (haram) does not change for them, and these - the possessors of fortunes - must take advantage of the areas of concession. It is said: "These must fulfill their allotted shares that are permitted to them by the Sharia, but in a manner that does not compromise any obligation upon them nor harm their shares. We have found that not taking advantage of the areas of concession in relation to them leads to a situation of harm or harms that are significantly detrimental according to the Sharia" (1). Conditions of concession: ... The fact that one is not obligated to do what is beyond their capacity, and that one is not tasked with burdensome difficulties, is a legal matter that does not involve reason. Likewise, the areas of concession and the type of concession are legal matters; therefore, there are conditions for the concession. Some of these conditions have been mentioned previously, namely that the difficulty must be burdensome. Below, these conditions are mentioned to complete the discussion. ... It is said: "If the difficulty leads to the disruption of a fundamental principle, then the principle of determination (azima) should not be considered, as completing the act of worship here and performing it as it should leads to its being nullified from its origin. Thus, performing what one is capable of from it, which is the essence of the concession, is what is required" (2). This difficulty is also associated with hardship, as it is said: "Hardship applies to one who is afflicted by hardship to the extent that it prevents them from their necessities and needs" (3). Likewise, there is necessity, as it is said: "The state of necessity has been clarified as that which one fears will lead to the loss of life, and this can only occur after being unable to perform acts of worship and daily activities, and it is, in itself, also an excuse" (4). These definitions clarify a condition of the difficulties, which is the disruption of a fundamental principle. He refers to it as burdensome or real, as has been clarified. __________ (1) The same source, 2/98 - 99. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/233. (3) The same source, 1/219. (4) The same source, 1/218. [Page 300] ... Among the conditions is that the hardship must be actual or certain to occur; it is not sufficient for it to be based on conjectures and unproven estimates, for this is an illusion that has no validity. He says: "Indeed, conjectures and unproven estimates fall under the category of illusions, which are varied. Likewise, the desires of the souls estimate things that have no reality; thus, it is correct to adhere to the principle of determination (azimah) except in cases of severe and debilitating hardship, for patience is preferable unless it leads to a detriment to the intellect or religion of a person. The reality of this is that one cannot bear patience, for one is only commanded to be patient if one is capable of it. You will find through observation that severe hardship does not have its illusion attached to it; rather, its ruling is weaker based on the fact that illusion is often not truthful in many situations. Therefore, hardship is not real... and it is preferable to remain with the principle" (1). That is, with determination; however, if the occurrence of this hardship is uncertain between being realized and being conjectured, and it is likely to occur according to the course of customs, then this is a domain for the jurists. ... Among the conditions is that the determination of hardship should not align with desires. He says: "The principles of the Sharia are opposed to desires... and often hardships arise and increase due to opposing desires, and following desires is contrary to following the Sharia, and one who follows desires finds everything difficult, whether it is inherently difficult or not" (2). __________ (1) The same source, 1/233. (2) The same source, 1/230. [Page 301] One of its conditions is that the ruling regarding it being burdensome or outside the norm must be based on the Sharia, and it may be said that this relates to the two previous conditions. However, it differs from them in that the hardship may undermine a fundamental principle, and yet there is no concession (1), such as the hardships of jihad. He says: "The fact that it is difficult for some people or in some situations does not remove it from being intended for Him" (2), meaning for Allah, Exalted is He. He says: "The hardship may reach in customary actions to what is thought to be unusual, but in reality, it is customary, and its hardship in such a case is what is customary, as the hardship in a single action has two extremes and a mean, an upper extreme... and a lower extreme... and the mean is what is predominant and most common" (3). Accordingly, hardship may increase, leading one to believe it has become unusual, while for those familiar with the flow of customs, meaning what has been established by the Sharia in obligations, it remains in the middle. It has been understood from the objectives of the legislator in obligations that hardships occur for the servants as a test and trial. If that is the case, then to judge whether the hardship is customary or not must be based on the Sharia; otherwise, the test and trial would be invalidated. He said: "The incidental difficulties that befall the servants are a test and trial for the faith of the believers and the hesitation of the uncertain until it becomes clear who has believed in his Lord with certainty from those who are in doubt. If all obligations were to be invalidated by every hardship that arose, then the fundamental principles would be invalidated as previously mentioned, and nothing would be distinguished from that, nor would the pure be distinguished from the impure" (4). __________ (1) This is because the degree of hardship considered in Sharia varies according to the actions, and this will become clear shortly when discussing the moderation of the Sharia. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/227. (3) The same source, 2/106. (4) The same source, 1/228. [Page 302] ... One of the conditions for seeking a concession (rukhsah) is that the concession must be in accordance with the Sharia, so one should not escape from the hardship that the Sharia has allowed him to escape from except through the Sharia itself. He should take what the Sharia has granted him in terms of alleviation and not follow his whims. This matter pertains to the concepts of good and evil, and there is no room for reason in it. He said: "Every difficult matter for which the legislator has provided an exit, the legislator intends for the obligated person to seek that exit if he wishes, as is the case with the legal concessions that provide an exit from hardships. If the obligated person seeks to exit in the manner prescribed, he will be complying with the command of the legislator and taking precautions in his matter. If he does not do so, he will fall into two prohibitions: the first is his opposition to the intention of the legislator, whether that opposition is in a mandatory, recommended, or permissible act; and the second is that he will close the doors of ease upon himself and lose the exit from that difficult matter from which he sought to escape in a manner not prescribed for him" (1). ... And he said: "The obligated person in seeking alleviation is commanded to seek it from the prescribed means, because what is sought in terms of alleviation is certainly attainable in both the present and the future in general. If he seeks it from another path, what he seeks in terms of alleviation will not be certain nor even probable, neither in the present nor in the future, neither in general nor in detail" (2). And he said: "Returning to the means established by the legislator is a return to the means of attaining benefit and alleviation in its entirety, unlike returning to what contradicts it" (3). The moderation of the Sharia: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/240. (2) The same source, 1/243. (3) The same location. [Page 303] ... "The Sharia (law) operates in its obligations according to the middle, most just path, taking from both sides with a share that has no bias in it, falling under the earnings of the servant without hardship upon him or dissolution" (1). With this meaning, al-Shatibi concludes this type of objectives of the legislator, and this meaning has been clarified previously, and there is no need to reiterate it and the intention of al-Shatibi behind it, except for what sometimes circulates from meanings that have no reality concerning the middle and moderation or the moderation of the Sharia. The concept of the middle is the actual matter between two extremes, such that one of them signifies strictness and the other signifies dissolution, or one signifies excess and the other signifies deficiency, or what may be imagined from two sides on either side of the middle. Accordingly, the term middle is used to mean or with the intention of improvement or beautification or acceptance of what occurs between two extremes. The same can be said about justice. Dr. Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Bouti states in his presentation of evidence regarding the consideration of the Sharia for public interests: "His Exalted is He's saying: { Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice. Excellent is that which Allah instructs you. Indeed, Allah is ever Hearing and Seeing }" (2). The essence of justice between two things or two persons is the equation and balance between them in a matter, so what is meant by it is then to observe moderation between the extremes of excess and deficiency in everything, and the true organization of people's interests and their harmony with one another is nothing but a straight line that separates the extremes of excess and deficiency in their affairs, and these are two extremes that inevitably lead to corruption" (3). __________ (1) The same source, 2/110. (2) Surah an-Nahl, 90. (3) Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Bouti, The Controls of Public Interest in Islamic Law, p. 71. 5th ed., Al-Risalah Foundation, Al-Dar Al-Muttahida, 141 AH - 1990 CE. [Page 304] In reality, the terms justice and moderation have a pleasant impact on the soul, but they, like the terms oppression, excess, and negligence, cannot be understood in isolation unless they are connected to a foundational understanding. The man-made and distorted laws have their own definitions of justice and oppression or what they call good and evil, and if we were to examine the justice within them and compare it to our Sharia, we would find it to be sheer oppression, and we would find the truth within it to be falsehood and goodness to be a vice... These terms can only be understood through what they signify, that is, through what the Sharia has come to teach us is justice, oppression, goodness, or otherwise. In other words, to say that the Sharia is justice or the Sharia is moderation, if what is meant is that we know what justice and moderation are, and the Sharia commands us to adhere to what we know, is incorrect. The correct meaning is that the Sharia has come with commands and prohibitions, and what it has commanded is justice and moderation, and by knowing this, one understands what justice and moderation are, and what is contrary to them. Accordingly, the statement that justice is the straight line between the extremes of excess and negligence is a statement that lacks meaning. For this statement to have a tangible reality, one must know what excess is and what negligence is. Could it not be that what a person sees as excess is actually moderation and justice, or it is negligence? And what they see as negligence is actually justice and moderation, or it is excess? And what they perceive as justice or moderation could be excess or negligence. Is this not also consistent with the assertion that the notions of good and evil are based on Sharia rather than reason? Therefore, it is necessary to point out the frequent misreadings of al-Shatibi regarding this matter. Promoting terms like moderation or centrism or the centrism of the Sharia without specifying a foundation to embody these terms in meanings is superficial in thought and understanding. Al-Shatibi does not define moderation based on the feeling of what is excess or negligence, but rather he defines excess and negligence by deviating from moderation. [Page 305] He says: "Moderation is known by the Sharia, and it may also be known by customs and what most rational people witness, as in extravagance and stinginess in expenditures" (1). Thus, when he places the truth with moderation, he defines moderation as that which is indicated by the Sharia, or you could say that which is indicated by the Sharia is moderation or the middle ground. As for his statement: "and what most rational people witness," he has placed this in matters where the Sharia has designated the resolution to custom or to those with knowledge and expertise, such as the dowry of the equivalent (mahr al-mithl), the wage of the equivalent (ajr al-mithl), and the expenses of the equivalent (nafaqa al-mithl). And in defining the rich and the poor, extravagance and stinginess, all these matters are relative. In this sense, al-Shatibi's statement that the Sharia operates in obligations according to its requirements on the middle and just path comes. He then says that if there comes in the obligations of the Sharia a tendency towards one of the extremes, that is part of the policy of the Sharia in either strictness or leniency, depending on the inclination of the obligated person towards the other side. He says: "If you look at a general Sharia ruling, you will find it advocating moderation; if you see a tendency towards one of the extremes, that is in response to a reality or expectation on the other side... Accordingly, if you see in the transmission from those considered in the religion a deviation from moderation, know that this is in consideration of a reality or expectation on the other side" (2). The difference in the degree of customary hardship due to the difference in actions: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/114. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/113 - 114. [Page 306] This further clarifies what was mentioned above, which is that the hardship that is considered outside the norm in one action may not be regarded as such in another action, even if it is heavier or more severe. Thus, moderation varies according to the different actions. He says: "The fatigue and hardship in customary actions differ according to those actions... but every action in itself has a customary hardship that is comparable to the hardship of similar ordinary actions" (1). He states: "The hardship in a single action has two extremes and a mean" (2). His phrase "in a single action" indicates this meaning, and thus the customary hardship and the non-customary hardship are recognized by the Sharia, and in each action individually. The Sharia may consider the hardship to be non-customary in one action, while it is lighter for the obligated person than what it considers customary in another action. He says: "Much of what appears at first glance as hardships that are outside the norm may not be so for one who is knowledgeable about the flow of customs, and if it does not fall outside the norm, there would be no intention by the legislator to alleviate it like other customary hardships" (3). He said: "When Allah, Exalted is He, said: { march forth, light and heavy } (4), then said: { if you do not march forth, He will punish you with a painful punishment } (5), this is a point of severity because it implies that there is no concession at all for staying behind, except that it is, according to the evidence on alleviating hardship, applicable to the utmost burden in customary actions such that marching forth is feasible and one can proceed" (6). This means that although the hardship here is heavy, the Sharia considers it customary in such an action, and it does not fall under the principle of obligation that is unbearable or what a person cannot perform. He said: "The essence of hardship is constriction, so whatever is among the customary hardships in actions similar to it is not considered hardship either linguistically or in the Sharia, especially since this type of hardship is established for a legal wisdom, which is purification and testing" (7). __________ (1) The same source, 2/105. (2) The same source, 2/106. (3) The same location. (4) Surah At-Tawbah, 41. (5) Surah At-Tawbah, 39. (6) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 2/106 - 107. (7) The same source, 2/107. [Page 307] The Second Topic The Intention of the Legislator in the Obligated Person Submitting to the Rules of the Sharia Introduction to this Type: ... This is the fourth type of the objectives of the legislator (maqasid al-sharia), and it is the most important according to al-Shatibi, while the previous three types serve it. The first type, which is that the obligations relate to the preservation of necessities, needs, and enhancements, clarifies the goals and reasons for the Sharia so that they serve as foundations upon which the particulars and branches are directed and built. The second type, which is the establishment of the Sharia for understanding, clarifies the principles for comprehending the meanings of words, structures, and texts, in order to know the meanings and rulings. The third type, which is the establishment of the Sharia for obligation according to it, clarifies how to implement the texts while preserving the foundations or universals, and it essentially refers to the application of both the universals and particulars without neglecting either, in order to derive the subsidiary rulings. Thus, the three types serve the process of arriving at the legal ruling. The subject of the fourth type, the obligated person submitting to the rules of the Sharia, is obedience; when a command or prohibition comes from the legislator, obedience is required, and it is not permissible to issue a fatwa contrary to that or to deviate from it for any reason. If there is an exception or concession in a particular case, then the legal demand does not originally encompass that case. ... While the second and third types do not raise any significant jurisprudential or foundational disputes that affect methodology in reasoning and derivation, the first and fourth types provoke considerable debate. [Page 308] ... The scholars who preceded al-Shatibi and spoke of the first type of objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) argued for the reasoning behind rulings based on wisdoms, on the premise that these wisdoms are the beneficial meanings or appropriate descriptions that, if presented to minds, would be accepted. However, al-Shatibi's understanding of the concept of benefit (maslaha) differed from that of his predecessors. The difference between the two is like the difference between their saying: what is presumed to be rationally beneficial or is felt in the heart as a benefit or intended wisdom behind the ruling is a reason, and his saying: what is definitively established through the induction of rulings as a goal or intended by the Legislator is a reason and a benefit. In other words, they say: the benefit is a reason. He says: the reason is a benefit. ... The difference between the two methodologies is one that turns matters upside down. This difference is not limited to what has been clarified regarding their understanding of benefits and harms, but extends to other matters(1). __________ (1) The idea of reasoning based on benefit or legislation based on it has become widespread in our time, and as a result, clear invalid opinions and fatwas have been issued. Some have resorted to ideas they attribute to the Sharia, such as bringing about benefits, preventing harms, necessity, facilitation, the flexibility of the Sharia, and the permissibility of changing rulings with the change of time. These individuals did not adhere to the conditions set by the imams who advocate for benefits. Among these conditions is that this reasoning should not lead to the invalidation of the ruling being reasoned for, and that the beneficial description used for reasoning should not be contradicted by a text or opposed by a beneficial meaning that is used to reason for another ruling. Some contemporary scholars have argued for the necessity of expanding the scope of what is permissible (halal) through what they call broad juristic preference (istihsan) and broad analogy (qiyas), meaning not being bound by the conditions for the validity of analogy or preference because those conditions entered the science of usul al-fiqh through Greek logic. This was advocated by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi in his book Renewal of the Foundations of Jurisprudence. [Page 309] He called in his book for an approach that does not adhere to individual texts, but rather relies on a collection of texts from which the general meaning or the type of public interest (maslaha) is derived, and then legislation is based on that general meaning. In this case, there is no concern for the new legislations contradicting individual texts. Sheikh Rashid al-Ghannouchi followed him in this approach in his book (Public Freedoms in the Islamic State). In a press interview with the Lebanese magazine al-Shiraa, Sheikh al-Ghannouchi responded to the notion that his ideas are strange by Islamic standards, saying: "We are still governed by the complex of the text," and he said: "Al-Turabi is the teacher of a generation, and I am one of them." Legal rulings in our time have been given according to the whims of those in power, to the extent that it has been attributed to some the saying: "You have the opinion, and I have the evidence." And to another, the saying: "Present to me what benefits the people, and I will present to you the evidence." See: an article titled (Response to Fabrications Against al-Shatibi) by Mahmoud Abdul Karim Hassan, 1994 CE. And see: al-Muwafaqat, edited by Abu Ubaida, in his introduction to the book, vol. 1, footnote, p. 42. [Page 310] ... Therefore, you find him in many instances in al-Muwafaqat addressing fatwas that are issued citing public interest (maslaha) or necessity, and addressing leniency without a license, and addressing the jurists who present such opinions based on the assertion that the Sharia of Islam is lenient and accommodating. He says, for example: "The leniency of the Hanif (haneef) is only present within the bounds of what is consistent with its principles, and it is not the pursuit of concessions or the selection of opinions based on whims that is established from its foundations" (1), and he says: "The pursuit of concessions is a leaning towards the desires of the souls, and the law has come with a prohibition against following desires... Some may permit this in situations where they claim necessity and compelling need based on the principle that necessities permit the prohibited, thus taking what aligns with their objective... This too is of the previously mentioned category, as its essence is taking what aligns with the present desire, and the locations of necessity are well-known in the Sharia" (2). He then says: "Piety and religiousness are scarce among many who position themselves to disseminate knowledge and issue fatwas" (3), and we will discuss this matter in detail - if Allah wills - in the chapter on ijtihad and taqlid. ... For this reason, we find al-Shatibi in this type of objectives (maqasid) to be thorough and meticulous, discussing the issue of legislation for the interests of the servants, and relating it to the principle of obedience and servitude to Allah. He discusses the issue of changes in people's customs with the variation of times and places, clarifying that this has no effect on the legal rulings, and he discusses the issue of adhering to the text or following meanings, indicating that following meanings must not deviate from the text under any circumstances. ... The volume of al-Shatibi's discussions in this type of objectives amounts to the total of his discussions in the three previous types, and it occupies - approximately - half of the second part of the book al-Muwafaqat. The principle of obedience or servitude: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 4/81. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 4/81. (3) The same source, 4/82. [Page 311] ... Al-Shatibi emphasizes that adherence to commands and prohibitions is fundamental in the Sharia, and that servitude to Allah must be present in every action of the accountable person. Any action that does not involve worship of Allah is following one's desires. He stresses that determining benefit (maslaha) and harm (mafsada) is contingent upon the provisions of the legislator, and that following what one perceives as beneficial without considering the ruling of the Sharia regarding that benefit is purely following one's desires, and whatever is thus is entirely invalid. ... He states: "The legal objective of establishing the Sharia is to free the accountable person from the call of their desires so that they may be a servant of Allah by choice, just as they are a servant of Allah by necessity" (1). He then provides evidence that conclusively supports his methodology. He says: "The evidence for this consists of several matters: the first is the explicit text indicating that the servants were created to worship Allah and to submit to His commands and prohibitions, such as His saying: { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me. (56) I do not want from them any provision, nor do I want them to feed Me. } (2). And His saying: { And command your family to pray and be steadfast therein. We do not ask you for provision; We provide for you. } (3). And His saying: { O mankind, worship your Lord, who created you and those before you, that you may become righteous. } (4)... and other verses commanding worship in general and its details specifically. All of this refers back to returning to Allah in all circumstances and submitting to His rulings at all times, which is the essence of worshiping Allah... The second is what indicates the blameworthiness of opposing this objective, starting with the prohibition against disobeying Allah's command and the condemnation of those who turn away from Allah... The root of this is following one's desires and yielding to the obedience of immediate interests and fleeting passions... The third is what is known through experiences and customs, that religious and worldly benefits cannot be attained by indulging in following desires and aligning with interests" (5). Based on this, there is no action of the servant that does not involve worshiping Allah; thus, it must be accompanied by the intention of compliance, and this can only be with permission from the legislator. This is because what is good and bad, or beneficial and harmful, is known through the Sharia, and if the Sharia has no role in defining this, then what is followed is desire, as the matter is confined between the Sharia and desire, with no third option. __________ (1) The same source, 2/141. (2) Surah Adh-Dhariyat, 56 - 57. (3) Surah Ta-Ha, 132. (4) Surah Al-Baqarah, 21. (5) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 2/114 - 115. [Page 312] He says: "Indeed, Allah has made following desires opposed to the truth and has made it its counterpart... He has confined the matter to two things: revelation, which is the Sharia, and desire; there is no third option. If that is the case, then they are opposites, and when the truth is determined in revelation, it is directed against desire... All of this is clear in that the intent of the Legislator is to move away from following desires and to enter into servitude to the Lord" (1). ... By making revelation and desire counterparts, he negates the existence of a ruling of reason, and what is imagined to be a ruling of reason in opposition to the ruling of the Sharia is merely desire. Accordingly, what is said to be wisdom or public interest (maslaha) according to rational people and wise individuals, if it is not established by revelation, is desire. Based on this, he established principles and said: "If this is established, it follows that principles arise from it, including that any action in which desire is followed absolutely, without regard to command or prohibition or choice, is absolutely invalid, because an action must have a bearer that compels it and a motivator that calls to it. If there is no entrance for the Legislator in that, then it is only the result of desire and lust, and whatever is thus is absolutely invalid because it contradicts the truth absolutely" (2). Among these principles is: "Following desire is a path to what is blameworthy, even if it comes within the praiseworthy" (3), because if it becomes clear that it is opposed by its very nature to the nature of the Sharia, then wherever it competes with its requirements in action, it is to be feared... For it is a cause of neglecting commands and committing prohibitions" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 2/115. (2) The same source, 2/118. (3) Even if it comes within the praiseworthy, meaning that the goal is legitimate or the intention is sound, such as one who intends to grow the wealth of an orphan by lending it with interest, or one who issues a fatwa permitting interest under the pretext of public interest. Or one who issues a fatwa and participates in ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, claiming to serve the interests of Muslims, and in all of this there is neglect of commands and committing prohibitions, as Allah says: { And prohibited is interest } Al-Baqarah, 275 and His saying: { And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed - then it is those who are the wrongdoers } Al-Ma'idah, 45, and others. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat 2/119. [Page 313] ... Among them is: "Following one's desires in legal rulings is a pretext for manipulating them to achieve one's aims, making them like a tool prepared to seize one's objectives, like the show-off who uses righteous deeds as a means to what is in the hands of people" (1). ... Al-Shatibi emphasizes the principle of compliance and its existence in every action of the servants, and this principle is not contradicted by the fact that the purpose of the Sharia is to preserve the interests of the servants, nor by the fact that the rulings take into account human nature, desires, and sensual characteristics. This objective is an end and a result, that is, a consequence of the causes, and the causes are compliance. The Sharia is established based on the requirement of worship and compliance, { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me } (51:56), and not based on the desires and aims of the servants. This is what the types of legal rulings necessitate. He says: "No one has the right to claim that the Sharia was established based on the desires and aims of the servants, as the rulings of the Sharia do not escape the five categories. As for obligation and prohibition, their contradiction to the requirement of indulgence that falls under choice is evident, as it is said to him: Do such and such whether you have an aim in it or not, and do not do such and such whether you have an aim in it or not. If the obligated person happens to have a compatible aim and a desire that motivates him according to the command or prohibition, it is by accident, not by origin. As for the other categories, although their apparent nature falls under the choice of the obligated person, they have entered by the legislator's inclusion of them under his choice, thus they revert to being removed from his choice" (2). Then he says: "Thus, the permissibility of the permissible, for example, does not necessitate its absolute inclusion under the choice of the obligated person as it is a decree from the legislator. At that point, his choice would be dependent on the legislator's stipulation, and his aim would be derived from the legal permission, not from natural indulgence. This is precisely what removes the obligated person from the impulse of his desires so that he becomes a servant of Allah" (3) (4). __________ (1) The same source, 2/120. (2) The same source, 2/116. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/116. (4) In these statements, there is a denial of the Western idea of public freedoms in Islam. This idea stems from the notion of separating religion from life... and that man is free and not bound by any law or system, except what he chooses for himself. Hence, they spoke of the rule of the people, which led to the idea of democracy in Western systems. The concept of public freedoms is different from the meaning of freedom that opposes slavery, and it is a concept of disbelief because it implies that there is no rule of Allah, nor legislation except for the people. Similarly, the concept of permissibility (ibaha) in Islam is not a matter of freedom but is based on the idea of servitude to Allah, who alone has the right to command, prohibit, permit, and prevent. Thus, permissibility is a choice from the legislator, and the servant is bound to accept this choice, and he is not free; he cannot prohibit what is permissible nor obligate it. Therefore, the claim of the idea of public freedoms in Islam is a mistaken claim that contradicts the legal principles, and the greater errors are what come in the details of this idea. For example, Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi in his book (Public Freedoms in the Islamic State) argued that the purpose of preserving the intellect is one of the necessities in the Sharia, meaning freedom of belief and freedom of opinion, even though these freedoms contradict general and specific principles in Islam that are not limited to the preservation of religion or the obligation to rule by what Allah has revealed and the obligation to kill the apostate, among other things. See: al-Muwafaqat, edited by Abu Ubaida, in his introduction to the book, vol. 1, footnote, pp. 42-53. Also see: articles titled (Integrating Islamic Communities into Western Societies) by Mahmoud Abdul Karim Hassan, 1997 CE. [Page 314] The interests and harms are known only through the Sharia: ... This objective of the legislator in establishing the Sharia is the servitude of man to Allah, which is definitive and there is no disagreement about it. If any disagreement arises regarding it, it pertains to differences in the meanings of words and expressions, not to the essence of its meaning. If we consider the interest in the reasoning based on the perspectives of rational individuals and those who reflect, this falls under the category of rational enhancement and deprecation, which contradicts this objective of compliance. This raises issues for those who advocate for interests, some of which have been mentioned by al-Qarafi and Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam. Al-Shatibi has also responded to them, asserting that they do not exist according to his methodology because he has a different understanding of interests and harms. Al-Shatibi emphasizes, after establishing the principle of compliance, that the determination of interests and harms is a Sharia matter that relates to enhancement and deprecation, and therefore it must return to the principle of compliance. If a wisdom appears in reasoning that is suitable for justifying the ruling, it should not be considered before obtaining conclusive induction, as there may be other wisdoms, and it may not be established through induction, making its consideration an arbitrary judgment without evidence and a misinterpretation of the legislator's intent. He states: "The fact that an interest is an interest intended by the ruling and a harm is a harm likewise is something that is specific to the legislator; there is no room for reason in this based on the principle of negating rational enhancement and deprecation. If the legislator has enacted the ruling for a particular interest, he is the one who establishes it as an interest; otherwise, it could logically be that it is not so, as all things are equal in relation to their original state, with no judgment from reason regarding their goodness or badness. Therefore, the existence of an interest as an interest is from the legislator, such that reason affirms it and the soul finds reassurance in it. Interests, as they are interests, have been concluded to be acts of worship, and what is built upon acts of worship can only be worshipful" (1). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/219. And see the nineteenth issue of the fourth type of matters regarding the intent of the legislator. [Page 315] If we consider al-Shatibi's opinion regarding the second type of objectives of the Lawgiver (maqasid al-shari'a), which is to establish understanding, where he stated that the texts do not indicate the secondary meanings, in addition to the fact that the public interest (maslaha) is what has been definitively established through induction, it seems that al-Shatibi is rejecting the method of reasoning by appropriate description and is refuting the justification of the Sharia by bringing about benefits and repelling harms in the conventional sense held by its proponents. ... This is what led Sheikh Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour to see that most of al-Shatibi's arguments for justifying the Sharia are invalid(1). This is also what prompted Dr. Ahmed Rissouni to label this opinion of al-Shatibi as one of the negative effects of theological discourse, asserting that the reason for al-Shatibi's stance is his influence by the Ash'ari perspective. Dr. Rissouni states under the title: "Understanding benefits by reason": "The well-known issue in theological discourse and in the science of Usul al-Fiqh regarding the issue of good and evil... because al-Shatibi himself did not escape some of its negative effects, specifically his influence by the Ash'ari perspective on the subject. In fact, this Ash'ari perspective is still prevalent - if not dominant - today"(2). __________ (1) See: p. 181 of this book. (2) Ahmed Rissouni, The Theory of Objectives in Imam al-Shatibi, p. 263. [Page 316] ... To establish the Ash'ari (Ash'ariyya) position of al-Shatibi, al-Raisuni mentions what he calls the essence of the Ash'ari theory, along with some texts from al-Shatibi. He says: "They do not consider anything good except through the enhancement of the Sharia; without the enhancement or condemnation of the Sharia, there is neither good nor evil, and all matters are equal. This is precisely what al-Shatibi reiterates" (1). He states: "The Ash'ari influence is evident in his words, as it entails the denial of the goodness and badness of actions, meaning that they, in themselves, are either beneficial or harmful, for actions and omissions, in reason, are 'equally similar'; thus, there is no enhancement or condemnation by reason, and this is the essence of the Ash'ari theory" (2). He then defends the idea that goodness and badness in actions are intrinsic and that reason can, and has the right to, enhance and condemn. He observes that some scholars have refrained from this statement to avoid being associated with the Mu'tazila, not because they see it as incorrect, mentioning among them Abu al-Ma'ali al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali, for example. He says: "It seems to me that Abu al-Ma'ali... has deviated from the bounds of the Ash'ari theory" (3). He adds: "And although the Imam of the Two Sanctuaries was compelled to this extent of acknowledgment of enhancement and condemnation." He remarks: "It is strange what disputes and conflicts can do, that you find Imam al-Ghazali—who is a giant of Islamic thought—fearing and warning against being attributed to him what has been attributed to these individuals regarding the influence of the Mu'tazila, as he was inclined to assert the understanding of reason regarding benefits" (4). Dr. al-Raisuni then attempts to prove the validity of the claim regarding the enhancement and condemnation by reason (5). The intent behind these statements by Dr. al-Raisuni is to highlight the contradiction between al-Shatibi's methodology and others regarding the issue of reasoning based on benefits and harms. In fact, the assertion of the causality of bringing about benefits and repelling harms for legal rulings necessitates the claim of enhancement and condemnation by reason. __________ (1) Ahmad al-Raisuni, The Theory of Maqasid in Imam al-Shatibi, p. 264. (2) Ibid, p. 265. (3) Ibid, p. 267. (4) Ibid, p. 274. (5) Ibid, pp. 276 - 293. [Page 317] It should be noted here that the issue of whether good and evil are determined by the Sharia (shar'i) rather than by reason (aql) is a definitive matter. As for the disagreement regarding the ability of reason to determine good and evil, for those who affirm its capability, it does not imply that it grants legitimacy to what is deemed good by reason. On one hand, neither al-Juwayni nor al-Ghazali leans towards the correctness of the rational determination of good and evil. Al-Juwayni says: "The ruling attributed to its subject is not an inherent quality within it. Thus, when we say: drinking alcohol is forbidden, the prohibition is not an intrinsic quality of drinking. If we deem drinking permissible in necessity, it is like forbidden drinking in choice. What is meant by it being forbidden is that it is related to the prohibition, and what is meant by it being obligatory is that it is related to the command"(1). He also says: "Among the rulings of the Sharia are the determination of good and evil, which are related to commands and prohibitions. Nothing is deemed evil in the ruling of Allah, Exalted is He, for its own sake, just as nothing is deemed good for its own sake"(2). Al-Ghazali says: "If this discourse from the Legislator does not exist, then there is no ruling. For this reason, we say that reason does not determine what is good or bad, nor does it necessitate gratitude to the Benefactor, and there is no ruling for actions before the arrival of the Sharia."(3) Following the words of the two imams, al-Juwayni and al-Ghazali, leaves no room for what Dr. al-Raisuni has imagined. Those who justify by means of public interest (maslaha) do not see this as legislation by reason; rather, they view it as being in accordance with the legal command, unlike their opponents. If the matter of this justification becomes problematic and necessitates a rational improvement or condemnation, it is rejected without hesitation. If Dr. al-Raisuni believes that the resolution of the issue lies in asserting the legitimacy of rational improvement and condemnation, then he has strayed far. The conflict between reasoning based on public interest (maslaha) and the authority of the Sharia (hakamiyyat al-sharia): __________ (1) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan, 1/79, paragraph: 8. (2) The same place, paragraph: 9. (3) Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa, 1/55. [Page 318] ... There is no contradiction between these two principles according to al-Shatibi, as the benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid) are determined by the Sharia, meaning that whether something is a benefit or a harm falls under the category of commendation and condemnation. However, a contradiction arises if the benefit is considered according to the perspective of rational individuals and those who deliberate, and their determination of what is suitable or what constitutes a benefit and what constitutes a harm. Those who hold this view have their evidence for reasoning based on benefits, so do their proofs contradict the principle of worship and compliance? ... The answer according to al-Shatibi is: Yes, they do contradict. Therefore, he attempts to negate this contradiction in a way that turns matters upside down. After he concluded the proof and establishment of the principle of compliance as a definitive objective of the Lawgiver, he turned to what he fundamentally relied upon to justify the Sharia by bringing about benefits and repelling harms, and he reconfigured it in another way. He said: "If it is said: The establishment of the laws is either in vain or for a wisdom, the first is invalid by consensus, and Allah, Exalted is He, said: { Did you think that We created you in vain? } (1), and He said: { And We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in vain } (2), { And We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them as play. We did not create them except in truth } (3). If it is for a wisdom and benefit, then the benefit is either directed to Allah, Exalted is He, or to the servants. Its return to Allah is impossible because He is Self-Sufficient, and it is impossible for benefits to return to Him as clarified in the science of theology. Thus, it remains that it returns to the servants, which is necessitated by their interests, for every doer seeks the benefit of himself and what aligns with his worldly and otherworldly affairs, and the Sharia has guaranteed this demand within the framework of obligation. So how can it be denied that the Sharia is established according to the interests of the servants and the motives of their desires? Furthermore, it has been previously stated that the Sharia came in accordance with the interests of the servants and confirmed their shares as a favor from Allah according to what the scholars assert, or as an obligation according to what the Mu'tazila claim. If this is established as a true objective of the Lawgiver, then what contradicts it is false" (4). This text presents an objection to al-Shatibi regarding how he establishes benefits, and al-Shatibi responds to this text not by denying or refuting it, but by affirming it while directing its meaning or interpretation in a way that differs from the conventional or immediate understanding. __________ (1) Surah Al-Mu'minun, 115. (2) Surah Sad, 27. (3) Surah Al-Dukhan, 38 - 39. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 2/117. [Page 319] He says: "The answer is that the establishment of the Sharia (law) is, if it is accepted that it is for the interests of the servants, returning to them according to the command of the Lawgiver and to the extent that He has defined, not according to their whims and desires. Hence, the legal obligations are burdensome on the souls... The commands and prohibitions remove a person from the inclinations of his nature and the pursuit of his desires until he takes them from beneath the legal limit, and this is precisely the intended meaning, which is the very essence of opposing whims and desires. As for the fact that the interests of the obligation return to the obligated person in this world and the Hereafter, this is correct, and it does not necessitate that attaining them is outside the bounds of the Sharia, nor that he can attain them by himself without the Sharia providing them to him, which is evident. This clarifies that there is no contradiction between this statement and what has preceded, because what has preceded looked at the establishment of interest and desire as affirmed by the Lawgiver, not as dictated by whim and desire." (1) What is noticeable in this text, and in the entire book of al-Muwafaqat, is that al-Shatibi's intended meaning by the term "considered interest" (mashlaha) in the Sharia is different from the commonly understood meaning among others. The commonly understood meaning uses other terms such as interest, desire, benefit, and whim. __________ (1) The same source, 2/117 - 118. [Page 320] ... Al-Shatibi's intention in raising the contradiction is that the interests of the servants, their purposes, and their desires are not realized or attained by following them, but rather they are realized by adhering to the rulings of the Sharia. A servant may perceive the fulfillment of his benefit, purpose, or satisfaction of his need through a certain means, and if he follows it, then that is following one's desires (hawa), even if he believes that this is a benefit and that the Sharia was revealed for the sake of benefits. This belief is not legitimate, and this is not a benefit according to al-Shatibi. If the realization of benefits and purposes and the satisfaction of needs is permissible, not every means to that is permissible; the purpose may be legitimate, such as ownership, but the means to it may be forbidden, such as gambling, deceit, usury, and theft. If ownership is permissible, it can only be attained through permissible means. This is the meaning of his statement: "The commands and prohibitions remove him from the inclinations of his nature and the pursuit of his desires until he takes them from beneath the permissible limit," and his statement: "Nor should he attain them by himself without the Sharia providing them for him." ... Thus, al-Shatibi states that the Sharia was established for the interests of the accountable individuals in both abodes, but interests can only be known through the Sharia. It is not correct for the accountable individual to seek his share except through the means prescribed by the Sharia, and his meaning ultimately leads to the conclusion that there is no difference between saying that the Sharia was established for the servants and saying that the servants were created for the Sharia, which is the implication of His saying, Exalted is He: { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me } (1). __________ (1) Surah Adh-Dhariyat, 56. [Page 321] ... So if the purposes of the servants and their benefits and desires are found in fulfilling the needs of hunger, thirst, cold, heat, sovereignty, security, women, leadership, and other matters, did the Sharia come with the most upright system to ensure that people satisfy their true needs, and thus the Sharia is for their sake? Or is the Sharia merely commands and prohibitions from Allah that people must comply with, as Allah created in people what He created of needs, desires, and instincts that drive them to obedience? The Sharia commands the worship of Allah and submission and humility before Him, and Allah created in people the innate disposition towards faith and worship as a kindness to them and assistance in obedience, and commanded them to preserve life, to marry, to care for the family, and to provide for them, and created in them desires and emotions that assist them in that? Which of the two is the correct interpretation? Answering this requires evidence, whether rational or textual. If the arguments of those who assert the primacy of interests in the sense of benefits and advantages are based on the first interpretation, al-Shatibi adopts the second interpretation. He says: "The wisdom of the All-Wise and All-Aware has decreed that the establishment of religion and the world is only valid and sustained by motives from humans that drive them to acquire what they need for themselves and others. He created in them the desire for food and drink when they experience hunger and thirst to motivate them to seek to fulfill this need as much as they can. Likewise, He created in them the desire for women to motivate them to acquire the means to reach them. He also created in them the discomfort from heat and cold and unexpected occurrences, which serves as a motivation to acquire clothing and shelter. Then He created Paradise and Hell and sent the messengers, clarifying that stability is not here, but rather this world is a cultivation for another abode, and that eternal happiness and eternal misery are there; however, the means to attain them are acquired here by adhering to what the legislator has defined or by deviating from it... [Page 322] And if Allah had willed, He could have imposed it while disregarding the interests, or He could have imposed it while stripping away the innate motivations, but He has made it easier for His servants by making it a means to what He desires of cultivating this world for the Hereafter and has made the acquisition of these interests permissible, not prohibited, but according to legal regulations that are more beneficial and more enduring than what the servant considers to be beneficial { and Allah knows, while you do not know } (1). And if He had willed, He could have prevented us from seeking the interests of the Hereafter, for He is the Owner and has the ultimate argument, but He has encouraged us to fulfill the obligatory rights owed to Him by promising us a share of it and has hastened for us many shares that we enjoy along the way of what we have been commanded to do (2). ... So did al-Shatibi affirm the idea of reasoning by bringing about benefits and repelling harms, or did he diminish it?! This depends on the meaning of benefit and the meaning of harm, that is, on the concept of each. It is clear that he has refuted it if it is understood in the sense recognized by the jurists before him, or in the common sense today. The objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) are of two types: primary and secondary: ... It follows that the Sharia takes into account the interests of the servants and their purposes and characteristics, but this consideration does not mean following them in legislation; rather, it means following the legal rulings because the interests are achieved through them. The preservation of religion, life, wealth, and other objectives of the Sharia are also interests and objectives for the servants. The interests of the servants and their benefits are variable and changeable, while the rulings of the Sharia are fixed. Therefore, al-Shatibi refutes al-Razi's statement that the original ruling regarding benefits is permission and regarding harms is prohibition. He also says, "How many a person of desires wishes that a certain permissible thing were prohibited, to the extent that if he were entrusted with legislation, he would prohibit it" (3), and he says, "Even if it were assumed that it were made permissible for him, he would make it obligatory, and then the matter regarding that very permissible thing might turn around, so he may love what he hated today and vice versa, thus a ruling cannot be established in absolute terms" (4). __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 216. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/122. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/116. (4) The same source. [Page 323] However, the interests of the servants may align with the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), meaning they may serve it, such as the drive to work for earning a livelihood, marriage, fulfilling desires, and responding to human nature. So, are these objectives considered Sharia objectives? That is, is the pursuit of interests among the objectives of the Sharia? He says: "The Sharia objectives are of two types: original objectives and subsidiary objectives. As for the original ones, they are those in which there is an interest for the obligated person, and they are the necessities recognized in every community" (1). Then he said: "As for the subsidiary objectives, they are those in which the interest of the obligated person is taken into account, through which he attains what he is naturally inclined to, such as fulfilling desires, enjoying permissible things, and fulfilling needs" (2). __________ (1) The same source, 2/120. (2) The same source, 2/122. [Page 324] As for his statement that there is no benefit for the obligated person (mukallaf) in the necessities, while he affirms in many places that all obligations of the Sharia return to the individual with immediate or delayed benefits, for example, he says: "The necessities are of two types: one is that which has an immediate benefit for the obligated person aimed at enabling the individual to fulfill the interests of himself and his dependents in terms of sustenance, housing, clothing, and other transactions such as sales, rentals, marriages, and other means of earning that sustain human structures. The second is that which does not have an immediate intended benefit, such as the obligatory acts of worship, both physical and financial, like purification, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimage, and similar acts, or from the obligations of communal responsibility, such as public offices like caliphate, ministry, representation, judiciary, prayers, jihad, education, and other matters that have been legislated generally for public interests" (1). His statement that "there is no benefit for the obligated person in these matters" is from the perspective that they are commands and prohibitions that must be adhered to based on the principle of compliance, regardless of the outcomes they lead to. Yes, they do lead to the benefit of the servant. However, in terms of being necessities, meaning established interests in the Sharia, they must be adhered to because they are legitimate, not because they lead to benefits, as benefits are not fixed, and the servant's view of his benefits is fluctuating, while these necessities are fixed. He says: "We only say that there is no benefit for the servant in them as necessities because they fulfill absolute general interests that are not limited to one state or form, nor to one time over another" (2). He also says: "This is evidenced by the fact that if the servant were to choose contrary to these matters (3), he would be restricted and prevented from his choice. Hence, he becomes devoid of benefit and is ruled upon in himself. If he were to have a benefit in them, it would be from another perspective that is subordinate to this original objective" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 2/123. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/120. (3) These matters are the preservation of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and wealth. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/121. [Page 325] Al-Shatibi focuses on establishing that the necessary objectives (maqasid) are those that take into account the obligations of the accountable person (mukallaf), thus countering any objections to his previous opinion regarding the intention of compliance and his understanding of public interest (maslaha) and its justification. Therefore, he introduces an important idea within the context of his research, which justifies his statement that he considers the obligations of the accountable person in matters of necessity. This is that the objectives of the Sharia, even though they pertain to the accountable person by affirming their interests, also, in the process, pertain to affirming the interests of others, whether the accountable person has a share in the interests of others, such as a wife or a son, or others whom he desires to fulfill their purposes, or whether he does not have a share in their interests, as in leases and sales and other transactions. He fulfills his share through housing, while others fulfill their share through ownership of the rent, even if he has no desire or inclination whatsoever for the other to fulfill their share. [Page 326] He says that the original objectives (maqasid) are divided into essential (ainiya) and sufficient (kafiya). As for the essential, it is upon every accountable person to preserve their religion, self, intellect, lineage, and wealth. As for the sufficient: "It is contingent upon others to fulfill it generally among all accountable individuals so that public affairs, which cannot be established without it, may be rectified" (1). He speaks regarding actions that involve the attainment of benefits through lawful means: "This category is divided into two: one category involves fulfilling interests directly without intermediaries, such as fulfilling one's own interests directly (2), and the other category involves fulfilling interests through the benefits of others, such as fulfilling the duties of spouses and children, and earning through what benefits others, like rents, leasing, trade, and other forms of crafts and earnings. All of these seek the individual's share, and in doing so, they serve the interests of others, creating a cycle among people, just as some parts of the human body serve one another so that the benefit is achieved for all" (3). This means that the benefits that are attained and the advantages that result from the rulings of the Sharia have outcomes that circulate among people; they are related to a general system in society and a network of relationships and public interests. Not all of this is grasped by the observer; if one perceives certain benefits or rulings, there are others that remain unrecognized. He states: "If we understand through necessity or choice an independent wisdom in the ruling of the law, it does not necessitate that there are not other wisdoms and benefits, second, third, and more. Our ultimate understanding is that we have comprehended a worldly benefit that is suitable to independently justify the ruling, and we have considered it under the ruling of legal permission, while we do not know that the benefit and ruling are limited to what has appeared. If we do not attain knowledge or conjecture from this, we cannot decisively claim that there is no benefit in the ruling except what has appeared to us, for that is a decisive claim on the unseen without evidence, which is not permissible. There may be another wisdom for which the ruling was established, and we have become from those wisdoms standing with devotion" (4) __________ (1) The same source. (2) Such as acts of worship to preserve religion, and to preserve oneself and one's intellect. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/124. (4) The same source, 2/219. [Page 327] Therefore, viewing necessities as having no share for the accountable person (mukallaf) is to prevent the share that may result from it from becoming the legal objective, as this would waste many other shares. Taking these shares or benefits as objectives under the pretext that the Sharia intended to fulfill them has repercussions on the network of relationships and public interests in society, in addition to what it may lead to in terms of neglecting commands and prohibitions. ... An example of this is the ruling on the killing of an apostate (murtad). The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Whoever changes his religion, kill him" (1), and the companions unanimously agreed on this ruling and acted upon it. It is one of the necessities in the preservation of the religion. Researchers may mention a ruling regarding it, such as their saying that apostasy weakens the strength of Islam, confuses the weak among the Muslims, and affects others as it prevents or delays their entry into it, among other things, and killing the apostate prevents all of that. Therefore, this ruling has benefits for society and individuals. In our time, there are those who say that the apostate should not be killed, claiming that the dangers have been removed, and that Islam and Muslims today are not affected by such an act; the difference is vast between the reality of Muslims in the city and their reality today. By applying the meaning of the original objectives (maqasid) according to al-Shatibi, the ruling on the apostate must be viewed as a necessary principle stripped of share, and it should not be lifted even if circumstances change. The mentioned rulings, which may be cited, are not all the rulings, and moreover, not applying the text nullifies the act of worship, even if some of these rulings are established with certainty and thus become benefits, they do not annul the text, because adherence to it is also a principle as it returns to a definitive meaning, which is the preservation of the religion. On the other hand, any imagined wisdom that leads to abandoning the meaning of the text is rejected, because the meanings of rulings are only established through induction, and the induction here serves to contradict the principles, thus it is certainly rejected, following the methodology of al-Shatibi himself. __________ (1) Al-Bukhari, Chapter on "No one should be punished with the punishment of Allah" (2794), (6411), Al-Tirmidhi, Chapter on "What has been reported regarding the apostate" (1378) and he said: "Hasan Sahih and this is the practice." Al-Nasa'i (3991) - (3997). Abu Dawood (3787) and Ibn Majah (2526) and Ahmad (1775). [Page 328] ... As for the consideration of interests, which he called the subsidiary objectives (maqasid tab'iyya), this means that the legal rulings pertain to the obligated person in terms of preservation, security, care, and obtaining what is necessitated by their sensual attributes. Induction has indicated this, so the attainment of these interests has become a legal objective, and it is permissible for the obligated person to intend through their actions the fulfillment of these needs and the attainment of these desires, and for their actions to be aimed at acquiring these interests. However, he still referred to them as subsidiary objectives in contrast to the original objectives, meaning that it is permissible for him to intend them, but only within the limits of what is legally permissible; that is, it is not permissible for him to pursue them except through actions that are legally authorized. In this case, the intention of interests strengthens the idea of worship, and this was previously mentioned in his seventh introduction where he said: "Every legal knowledge is sought by the legislator only as a means to worship Allah, Exalted is He, and not for any other reason. If another consideration appears in it, it is only secondary and by way of the second intention, not the first" (1), and he mentioned in this introduction his proofs, including: "The law was only revealed for the purpose of worship, which is the objective of the sending of the prophets, peace be upon them" (2). He said: "Every subsidiary objective is either a servant of the original intention or not. If it serves it, then the intention towards it from the outset is correct... But if it does not serve it, then the intention towards it from the outset is incorrect" (3). ... Thus, the subsidiary objectives are legal objectives that the obligated person also intends because they align with their nature and attributes, but it is not permissible to intend them if that is through violating the legal rulings or texts. He said regarding those who take their interests without adhering to the commands and prohibitions: "As a precaution against those who take it without considering the command and prohibition, and this is the blameworthy interest, for they do not refrain from what has been prescribed for them but rather act boldly like an animal that knows nothing but walking in its desires" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/30. (2) The same source, 1/31. (3) The same source, 1/35 - 36. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/133. [Page 329] ... And if it is the nature of man to seek his interests, then among these interests are those that are lawful, meaning those that are subordinate objectives, and others that are not. The obligated person (mukallaf) may take a lawful or unlawful path to achieve his objective. Likewise, the mukallaf may act with the intention of seeking his interests, or he may do so with the intention of compliance, or with both intentions together. All these cases will be discussed in detail - if Allah wills - in the next chapter, the chapter on the objectives of the mukallaf. The third section Between the Sharia and its objectives Or between worship and following meanings The subject of this section: It has been clarified in the first type of the objectives of the legislator that the Sharia was established to preserve the interests of the servants. The rulings of the Sharia have goals that result from adhering to its rulings, and the legislator intended them by enacting the rulings. It has also been clarified in the fourth type that one of the objectives of the legislator is adherence to the commands and prohibitions. Between these two types, questions arise. If the rulings were enacted for the interests of the servants, are the rulings a means to those interests, so can the rulings be changed to preserve their goals? And if certain goals for the rulings have been established that the legislator intended, is the mukallaf obligated to the goals, that is, to the effects of the rulings, just as he is obligated to the rulings? And is it valid for the mukallaf to intend goals other than those intended by the legislator? And if the intention of the legislator is compliance and worship, is it valid for the mukallaf to comply without regard to the intended goals of the legislator? And is everything that results from the rulings or arises from them considered interests or objectives of the legislator? How can one distinguish what is intended by Him - Exalted is He - from what is not? And do interests and harms change with the change of customs according to the change of times and places? And does this have an effect on the rulings? For such questions and similar ones, this section was created, and the answers will come within it - if Allah wills - according to the methodology of al-Shatibi. The universality of the Sharia and its stability: ... Al-Shatibi emphasizes within the objective of worship and compliance the universality and stability of the Sharia. It is general for all obligated persons, and no mukallaf is exempt from it at all, and it is general for all actions; there is no action except that you find the Sharia governing it. No mukallaf is exempt from a general ruling in any action except by a specific legal text that does not extend its ruling to the mukallaf, and this does not undermine the principle, which is the universality of the Sharia. [Page 330] ... Among what the generality of the Sharia (Islamic law) necessitates is the stability of its rulings in every time and place; otherwise, it would not be general for those obligated by it. The revelation has ceased after the death of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), so there is no abrogation, and what is good does not become bad, nor does what is bad become good. ... If some rulings change, it is due to the change in their underlying reasons (manat), such as when the legislator has linked the ruling to a reason, and the ruling changes according to the presence or absence of that reason. Or it may be that the legislator has arranged the rulings based on certain attributes, so the ruling changes according to the attribute, such as puberty in legal responsibility (taklif), which may differ from place to place or from person to person. Legal responsibility may apply to one person at the age of eleven, for example, and to another at the age of fifteen. This change, in this sense, is not a change in the essence of the address, but rather a stability, as the condition of puberty in legal responsibility is fixed and does not change. ... Likewise, the rulings that are affected by the intention (niyyah) or purpose (maqsad) of the obligated person, such as prostrating to Allah, Exalted is He, or to an idol, or the utterance of the two testimonies (shahadatayn) in faith or hypocrisy, depend on the intention of the doer. Here, the intention or purpose is part of the underlying reason for the ruling, meaning it is part of the act, and the ruling is a ruling on an act that changes with its change according to the address. ... Similarly, the rulings that have words as their causes, such as marriage (nikah), divorce (talaq), and emancipation (itaq), occur with the utterance of the words that indicate them. The meanings of the words may change, as people may become accustomed to certain words for meanings or to meanings for certain words, and the customs of one group may differ from another, leading to a change in the ruling based on those words accordingly. This does not affect the fact that the words are causes, as the words were established for their meanings. If the connotations of the words change, the consideration is given to the connotations or meanings and the words that indicate them. [Page 331] ... Likewise, the rulings that the legislator has linked to custom (urf), where the intended meaning of custom here refers to the terms or quantities that are commonly recognized, such as saying: this commodity is for a thousand. Is it a thousand lira, dollar, or dinar? Or if it is a dinar, is it an Iraqi, Jordanian, or gold dinar? And similarly, the meanings of the terms used in contracts and transactions. And like the estimation of expenses or the estimation of wages or the dowry or the price. These matters may change according to places, times, people, or conditions, and the rulings are based on these terms and estimations. Thus, although it may be said that there is a change in the rulings, it is not a change based on time or place, but rather a change in reality and conditions. For example, if the law prescribes for a divorced woman a maintenance equivalent, then what changes is the amount of maintenance, which depends on the condition of the divorced woman, and this is not a change in the ruling, as the ruling is that she has maintenance equivalent to her, and this is established. ... For example, the prohibition of carrion in normal circumstances and its permissibility in cases of necessity is not a change in the rulings, as its prohibition is established in that case, and its permissibility is established in the other case. Similarly, it is said about wine: it is forbidden, but if it turns into vinegar, it becomes permissible; this is not a change or reversal in the rulings, but rather the prohibition of wine is established and the permissibility of vinegar is established. Accordingly, the legal rulings are fixed and permanent. ... Therefore, it is not correct to say: the change of rulings is not denied by the change of time and place (1). If the change is restricted to the meanings mentioned above, it then becomes related to the bases of the rulings, that is, to changes in the realities or conditions that are part of the action to which the ruling pertains. __________ (1) See for example: The Theory of Objectives (Maqasid) by Imam al-Shatibi by Dr. Ahmad Rayesuni, p. 288, where he says: "However, it is also undeniable that there are many interests - and harms - that are affected by the differences in conditions and circumstances, leading to changes in their situations and priorities, and altering their benefits and harms... which necessitates a new consideration and appropriate estimation, and all of this affects the rulings in some way." He also states: "In any case, I do not wish to delve into the topic of the change of interests and the change of rulings with the change of times and conditions, but I only wanted to point out a wide area of fields that require a kind of refinement of the intellect and its corruption through its estimation of the changing and renewed interests and harms and what they require of appropriate rulings," p. 288. [Page 332] ... Al-Shatibi's focus on the universality of the Sharia and its permanence, and his mention of this matter within the objective of worship and compliance, affirms his concept of benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid) and refutes the claim of the Sharia's evolution and flexibility and the permissibility of changing its rulings. He states: "Among the characteristics of the Sharia is 'universality and consistency; therefore, the legal rulings regarding the actions of the accountable individuals are absolute, even if their specific instances are countless. There is no action imposed, nor movement or stillness claimed, except that the Sharia governs it, both individually and collectively, which is the meaning of its being general" (1). Among its characteristics also is "permanence without abrogation; therefore, you will not find in it, after its completion, any abrogation or specification of its universality, nor restriction of its absoluteness, nor lifting of any of its rulings, neither in terms of the generality of the accountable individuals nor in terms of the specificity of some of them, nor in terms of one condition over another. Rather, whatever establishes a cause is a cause forever and does not cease, and whatever is a condition is always a condition, and whatever is obligatory is always obligatory, or recommended is recommended, and so on for all rulings; they do not cease or change. Even if the obligation were to continue indefinitely, its rulings would remain the same" (2). ... He says: "If it is established that the legislator intended through legislation to establish benefits for the Hereafter and this world in a manner that does not disrupt their order, neither in terms of the whole nor in terms of the part, and whether it is of the nature of necessities, needs, or embellishments, then if it were established in such a way that its order could be disrupted or its rulings could be violated, the legislation would not be intended for it, for its being benefits in that case is no more valid than its being harms. Rather, the legislator intends for it to be benefits absolutely; thus, its establishment must be in that manner eternally, universally, and generally for all types of obligations and the obligated individuals in all circumstances, and thus we have found the matter therein, and all praise is due to Allah" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/44. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/45. (3) The same source, 2/25. [Page 333] ... Accordingly, the interests (masalih) and harms (mafasid) according to the methodology of al-Shatibi are fixed and do not change, and they are what the legislator has established as reasons for the Sharia. The concept of interests and harms is not the same as benefits and detriments, as the latter are relative and not fixed. The rulings are not justified by them. He says: "Generally, benefits and detriments are relative and not real, and the meaning of being relative is that they are benefits or detriments in one situation but not in another, and in relation to one person but not another, or at one time but not at another" (1). ... He also says: "It is not correct to continue to assert that the original principle regarding benefits is permission and regarding detriments is prohibition, as stated by al-Fakhr al-Razi, for there is hardly any real benefit or real harm (2), rather, they are mostly relative, and if the interests and harms are related to the address of the legislator, and we know from His address that it is directed according to circumstances, individuals, and times, so that a specific benefit is permitted at one time or situation or for one person, and not permitted if it is otherwise, then how can one justify the statement that the original principle regarding benefits is permission and regarding detriments is prohibition" (3). ... The meaning of his statement that the Sharia is directed according to circumstances, individuals, and times is that the rulings of the Sharia, in general and in totality, encompass all actions for all accountable individuals at all times. For example, the Sharia has clarified the rulings regarding carrion, blood, and pork in ordinary circumstances, and it has also clarified them in cases of necessity. It has clarified, for instance, the ruling of jihad for the accountable individuals in times of ability, and it has also clarified it in times of inability, illness, or disability. The customary practice (urf) and its consideration according to al-Shatibi: __________ (1) The same source, 1/26. (2) That is, what may be a benefit for one person may be a detriment for him in a different situation or at another time or for another person. This is unlike the interest that is established by the Sharia, which is real, thus being an interest for every person in every situation and at every time. Therefore, it is not correct to replace the term real benefit or real harm with mere benefit or mere harm. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/27. [Page 334] ... Custom ('urf) is not a source or a basis for legislation, but rather the Sharia (Islamic law) governs customs. Since the Sharia is general and comprehensive, it has assigned a ruling to every action. Certain actions may emerge from among the permissible actions that people become accustomed to, or actions that people abandon, or actions that are specific to certain occasions or times. Thus, abandoning a customary action, performing an abandoned action, or engaging in actions specific to certain occasions may become noticeable and call for interpretations. Alternatively, this action may become a term or a euphemism for a specific meaning or intention. ... An example of this is the complete white dress or the complete black dress for women; the former has become, in current custom, indicative of weddings, while the latter indicates mourning. There are also certain garments that have become, in general or specific custom, indicative of the profession of the wearer. Another example is certain styles of clothing, head coverings, or shoes, which are originally permissible for both men and women. However, in custom, certain styles have become specific to men and others to women. Thus, in people's understanding, women wearing what is specific to men is seen as imitating them or as a lack of modesty and religion. Similarly, men wearing what is specific to women is viewed as imitating them and as a lack of modesty and religion. Another example is that the 'awra (private parts) of a man is what is between the navel and the knee, and the original ruling is that revealing or covering anything other than that is permissible. If people become accustomed to covering more than the 'awra, then a man going out in public while covering only what is 'awra would be contrary to custom and indicative of a lack of modesty or a deficiency in manliness or something else. Similarly, it is permissible for a man to uncover his head as well as to cover it, and some people may develop a custom regarding this. [Page 335] ... These are examples of what is meant by custom (urf). The term custom may be used to refer to what people commonly agree upon in applying certain words to specific meanings, such that the indication of the word towards the meaning becomes a matter of customary truth, and this is akin to terminology. It may also refer to what people commonly agree upon regarding estimations of wages, prices, dowries, and the values of goods... ... The intended meaning of custom here is that which was mentioned in the examples above. This is not a source of rulings; rather, it requires a ruling from the Sharia. The Sharia came to judge the actions of people and their customs and traditions. Therefore, if it becomes customary for a woman to expose her neck, hair, or legs without it being considered reprehensible, this has no legal value, and these things remain private parts (awra) whose exposure is considered ugly. ... Thus, the custom that must be taken into account is what the Sharia has indicated is permissible, and then it becomes a sign or indication of something else as in the examples above. This does not change the rulings. For example, if a particular action becomes indicative of something that is legally reprehensible, this action becomes reprehensible according to the Sharia. For instance, if a man covers only his private parts while exposing everything else, and this becomes considered ugly in the eyes of people, then its prohibition in the Sharia does not mean that the private parts have changed; rather, the prohibition is due to contradicting modesty. The Sharia has commanded modesty. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Modesty is a branch of faith" (1), and there is no doubt that such an action contradicts modesty. ... However, if the action is not permissible, it cannot become an accepted custom, and opposing such a custom is a requirement of the Sharia. This is the concept of custom and its consideration according to al-Shatibi. Below are some of his texts to document what we have mentioned. __________ (1) Narrated by al-Bukhari in Faith, (8), and Muslim in Faith (50) and (51), and Ibn Majah (56) and (57), and al-Nasa'i (4918), and Abu Dawood (4056), Ahmad (9333). [Page 336] ... He says: "Continuous customs are of two types: the first type is the legal customs that are affirmed or denied by legal evidence. This means that the Sharia has either commanded them as obligatory or recommended, or prohibited them as disliked or forbidden, or permitted them in action or abstention. The second type consists of the customs that are prevalent among people for which there is no legal evidence for their denial or affirmation. As for the first type, it is always established like other legal matters... either good in the view of the Lawgiver or bad; they are among the matters that fall under the rulings of the Sharia, and they cannot be changed even if the opinions of the obligated individuals differ regarding them. It is not valid for what is considered good in this context to become bad, nor for what is considered bad to become good, until it is said, for example... that uncovering the private parts is neither a fault nor bad, so it is permissible, or something similar. For if such a thing were valid, it would be abrogation of the established and continuous rulings, and abrogation after the death of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) is invalid, so the lifting of legal customs is invalid" (1). Al-Shatibi continues: "As for the second type, customs may be established or they may change, and nonetheless, they are causes for rulings that are derived from them. The established ones are like the existence of the desire for food, drink, and sexual intercourse... If they are causes for consequences that the Lawgiver has ruled upon, there is no doubt in considering them and building upon them and ruling according to them at all times. As for the changing ones: some may change in custom from good to bad and vice versa, such as uncovering the head, which varies according to the regions in reality. It is considered bad for those of honor in the Eastern lands but not bad in the Western lands. Thus, the legal ruling differs according to that, so it is a defect in justice among the people of the East and not a defect among the people of the West. Additionally, there are expressions that differ in conveying meanings, so the expression may shift from one meaning to another... like the differences in expressions according to the terminology of craftsmen... or in relation to the predominance of usage in certain meanings, until that term is understood to convey a specific meaning that it previously did not, or it was ambiguous and became specific..." __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/197 - 198 - 199. [Page 337] This often occurs in oaths, contracts, and divorce, both implicitly and explicitly... Among them are those that differ based on matters external to the obligated person, such as puberty, which is considered based on the customs of people regarding wet dreams or menstruation, or reaching the age of one who experiences wet dreams or menstruates" (1). ... Then al-Shatibi emphasizes the stability of rulings, saying: "Know that what has been mentioned here regarding the difference in rulings due to differing customs is not, in reality, a difference in the essence of the command, because the Sharia is established as being eternal and everlasting, even if the world were to continue without end, and the obligation likewise does not require further elaboration in the Sharia. Rather, the meaning of the difference is that when customs differ, each custom returns to a legal origin that is judged accordingly, as in the case of puberty, for example, where the obligation is lifted from the child before reaching puberty. Once he reaches puberty, the obligation falls upon him... And similarly for other examples, the rulings are stable and follow their causes wherever they may be, and Allah knows best" (2). The obligation of rulings is not an obligation of their objectives: Al-Shatibi states that the legal ruling is related to the action of the servant, and the action is a cause for an effect. Since the effects are not from the actions of the servant and are not within his capacity, the obligation does not fall upon them. Therefore, when a command to act is given, it is not a command regarding its outcome. __________ (1) The same place. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/199 - 200. [Page 338] Since the establishment of the cause is akin to the establishment of the effect in both legal and rational matters, the legality of the cause indicates the legality of the effect. The prohibition of the cause indicates the illegality of its effect. Thus, the demand for action indicates that its outcome is beneficial, while the prohibition of action indicates that its outcome is harmful, except that the obligation pertains to the cause and not to the effect. What is required legally is to perform the action or to refrain from it, not to aim for the attainment of benefit or the avoidance of harm, because the attainment or avoidance is an effect, and it is not within the capacity of the obligated person to establish or remove it as an effect; to impose an obligation regarding it is to impose an obligation regarding what is beyond one's ability. In brief: the command regarding the cause indicates the legality of its effect but does not imply a command regarding the effect itself. If it is said that there may be multiple effects of the cause, resulting from the required or permitted action what is intended to be attained legally, and also resulting what is unintended or what is desired to be removed, the Shatibi responds that the legality of the action indicates the legality of its effect, but it does not necessitate the legality of everything that results from or is caused by it. The required action may produce what is desired to be removed, and refraining from what is prohibited may eliminate what is desired or legally permissible to exist. He states: "The legality of causes does not necessitate the legality of effects, even though the correlation between them is usually valid. This means that if a legal ruling of permissibility or prohibition or other rulings of obligation is attached to the causes, it does not necessarily follow that the rulings are attached to their effects. Therefore, if a command is given regarding the cause, it does not necessitate a command regarding the effect, and if it is prohibited, it does not necessitate a prohibition regarding the effect, and if one is given a choice regarding it, it does not necessitate that one is given a choice regarding its effect."(1) He then said: "The evidence for this is what has been established in discourse, that what is for the obligated person is to engage in the causes, while the effects are the actions of Allah, Exalted is He, and there is no earning in them for the obligated person."(2) __________ (1) Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/130. (2) The same source, 1/131. [Page 339] Then he said: "The inference of this meaning in the Sharia is conclusive, and if that is the case, the causes that one is obligated to act upon fall under the generality indicated by reason and revelation. Thus, the causes are what the servants' gains are attached to, rather than the effects. Therefore, the obligation and its address only relate to what is acquired, while the effects are excluded from the address of obligation because they are not within their capacity. If they were to be addressed, it would be an obligation to do what is beyond one's ability, which is not the case" (1). Accordingly, the primary aim of the command and prohibition is to carry out what is commanded and to refrain from what is prohibited, regardless of the effects and outcomes, as they are not in the hands of the obligated but rather in the hands of the Legislator. Thus, when the obligated person performs an action, they should consider its ruling and adhere to that ruling, rather than looking at its cause to determine whether it is beneficial or harmful (2). He says: "It is not necessary for the obligated person, in engaging in the causes, to pay attention to the effects or to intend them; rather, the aim is to operate under the established rulings, whether they are causes or not, whether they are justified or not. The evidence for this is what has been previously mentioned, that the effects return to the one who causes them, and they are not within the capacity of the obligated. If that is the case, then what is necessary is to consider what pertains to their own acquisition, while what is beyond that is not necessary and is what is sought" (3). Furthermore, among the legal obligations, there are those that have a share for the self and to which there is an inclination, which prevents one from entering under the requirement of the demand (4)" (5). __________ (1) The same location. (2) Considering the outcomes of actions and their effects is obligatory for the jurist looking to determine the ruling of the action, and not for the one who engages in the ruling. This matter will be detailed when discussing the principle of the outcomes of actions. (3) That is: and it is what is required to be proven. (4) That is: the legal demand. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/133. [Page 340] Thus, the causes are intended by their effects, and they are intended by the one who established the causes as causes; they are intended by the legislator (al-shari) and not by the obligated person (al-mukallaf), and their attainment is through these causes. Therefore, the obligated person must adhere to the causes, that is, to the legal rulings, and it is not upon him to consider or take into account the effects, which are the interests (masalih) and harms (mafasid). He said: "The establishment of causes necessitates the intention of the establisher towards the effects, I mean the legislator" (1). Then he said: "It follows from the intention to establish them as causes that there is an intention towards what arises from them, namely the effects" (2). Then he said: "The legal rulings were legislated to bring about interests or to avert harms, and these are certainly their effects" (3). Then he said: "If the effects were not intended by the causes, their establishment as causes would not be valid; however, they were imposed as such. Therefore, they must be established as causes, and they cannot be causes except for effects. Thus, the establisher of the causes intends the occurrence of the effects through them" (4), and if this is established, and the causes are intended by the legislator, it follows that the effects must be so as well" (5). Thus, the legislator's intention with the Sharia is to bring about interests and avert harms, and this is achieved through what he has legislated. It is not upon the obligated person to consider the intended interests and harms; rather, it is upon him to adhere to what has been legislated for him. However, is it permissible for him to consider the results and strive to attain them? Al-Shatibi says: "There is no explicit evidence in the Sharia that mandates seeking the intention of the effect" (6). He said: "If it is said to you: The legislator commanded and prohibited for the sake of interests. You say: Yes, and that is for Allah, not for me; for what is upon me is to cause the means, and the attainment of the effects is not upon me. So I direct my intention towards what has been made obligatory upon me and entrust what is not upon me to the One who is responsible for it" (7). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/133. (2) The same source, 1/134. (3) The same source, 1/135. (4) Through it, meaning: it is not valid for the obligated person to intend it except through the action that the legislator has made a cause for it. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/135. (6) The same source, 1/136. (7) The same source. [Page 341] Then he said: "If it is established that there is no obligation to intend the cause, then the accountable person (mukallaf) may abandon the intention to it absolutely, and he may intend it" (1). As for abandoning the intention to the cause, this has been discussed previously. As for the permissibility of intending it, this does not mean that the act is permitted or prohibited based on the anticipated outcome, whether it is beneficial or harmful, as this would lead to the permissibility of some prohibited acts or the prohibition of some permissible, recommended, or obligatory acts based on the results they produce. Rather, the opposite is intended, which is that it is valid for the mukallaf to consider the effects if this strengthens adherence to the cause and encourages further commitment to it. However, if it weakens adherence to the cause, meaning the legal ruling, then this itself is a harm, and it is not valid. Al-Shatibi provides several examples of this. For instance, someone who earns a living to support himself and his family, as considering the outcomes may motivate him to work harder for greater earnings and better care for his family. Similarly, someone who obeys Allah to please Him and enter His Paradise, as contemplating these goals may drive him to greater sacrifice, generosity, patience, righteousness, striving, and commitment, thus reinforcing the cause. Here, it is valid for the mukallaf to consider the outcomes. He says: "This intention, when accompanied by the causation, is correct because it is an attention to the prevailing customs. And Allah, Exalted is He, said: { Allah is the One who made the sea subservient to you, so that ships may sail upon it by His command and that you may seek of His bounty } (2)" (3). Then he said: "Thus, the essence of this is to seek what Allah prepares for him through this cause, which returns to reliance on Allah and turning to Him" (4). Then he said: "If that is the case, then paying attention to the outcomes and intending them is considered in customary matters, especially for the jurist (mujtahid)" (5) __________ (1) The same source, 1/135. (2) Surah Al-Jathiya, 12. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 1/137. (4) The same source, 1/137 - 138. (5) The same source, 1/138. [Page 342] He said: "The criterion is that if turning to the effect (muscab) strengthens the cause and completes it, and encourages one to strive to fulfill it, then it brings about benefit (maslaha). But if it tends to undermine the cause by nullifying it, weakening it, or being negligent towards it, then it brings about harm (mafsada)" (1). He concluded that: "The one who refrains from focusing on the effects is of a higher rank and has a purer deed if he is engaged in acts of worship, and he receives greater reward in customary matters" (2). Based on the fact that benefits and harms do not exist in isolation, the cause leads to its intended effects, accompanied by what is not intended by the Legislator, but rather what is intended to be lifted. He says: "An example of this is the command to enjoin good and forbid evil, for it is legislated because it is a cause for establishing the religion, manifesting the symbols of Islam, and suppressing falsehood in any form. It is not a cause in the legal sense for the destruction of wealth or life, even if it leads to that along the way... The establishment of punishments and retribution is legislated for the benefit of deterring corruption, even if it leads to the destruction of lives and the spilling of blood, which in itself is a harm... As for the prohibited causes, such as invalid marriages, they are forbidden even if they lead to the attachment of offspring and the establishment of inheritance and other rulings, which are benefits" (3). Then he said: "There is no legislated cause except that it contains a benefit for which it was legislated. If you see it leading to a harm, know that it does not arise from the legislated cause. Likewise, there is no prohibited cause except that it contains a harm for which it was prohibited. If you see it leading to a benefit in appearance, know that it does not arise from the prohibited cause, but rather each of them produces what it was established for in the Sharia" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 1/166. (2) The same source, 1/159. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/167. (4) The same source, p. 168. [Page 343] Thus, not everything that is based on a cause or observed in its attributes, rulings, or meanings that is acceptable to rational individuals takes the ruling of the caused. This leads to a question about how to distinguish between these results to know what is intended by the Sharia (law) to be a goal and an objective, and what is not, so that it can be disregarded. The answer lies in the method of induction for these attributes or meanings. If there is a meaning or an imagined result presumed in a few rulings, this meaning or cause is not definitively considered intended by the legislator, and thus it is not taken into account, even if it is caused by these rulings; these rulings do not constitute a legal cause for it. However, if this result is found in numerous rulings that exceed enumeration, then this result or meaning has the continuity (tawatur) that al-Shatibi mentioned resembles the conceptual continuity. At that point, this result becomes a cause, and the rulings that support this meaning become a legal cause. That is, they are legislated for this cause. In this way, a distinction is made between legal and non-legal results or causes, or those that are intended by the legislator through the ruling and those whose intention by the legislator is not established. If a ruling is legislated for specific interests that have been established through induction, and this ruling results in a harm, it does not mean that the existence of that harm as a cause of the ruling indicates that it is intended by the legislator. Rather, this is because interests and harms are not purely distinct. This result is recognized as a harm from its induction in many other rulings, where the beneficial induction is available to establish that the legislator intended to eliminate it. Thus, the legislator's intention to eliminate it is a definitive principle, and the existence of doubt or presumption in results, outcomes, or causes being intended by the legislator is a possibility or presumption that has no legal value. For the objectives or interests and harms are generalities or fundamental principles that can only be established through definitive evidence derived from induction. [Page 344] The legal causes (al-masbabat al-shar'iyya), meaning those intended by the Legislator, are those that have been established definitively, and this matter has been previously explained. He said: "The legal rulings were established to bring about benefits and avert harms, and they are certainly their causes"(1). Al-Shatibi states that: "The prohibited causes are causes of harm, not of benefit, just as the permissible causes are causes of benefit, not of harm"(2). He then says: "The point is that the permissible causes cannot be causes of harm, and the prohibited causes cannot be causes of benefit, as this is not valid in any case"(3). What this statement means is that the cause which is established as intended to occur through a permissible reason is a benefit (maslaha) and not a harm (mafsada), regardless of its suitability to human nature, perception, and disposition. And what is established as intended to be removed through a prohibited reason is a harm (mafsada) and not a benefit (maslaha), even if it is something that human nature tends to favor by virtue of instinct or habit, or if it is something that rational individuals and wise people incline towards. The legal connection between the cause and its effect: It is not correct for the legal ruling to be intended for anything other than what the legislator intended, nor is it correct to achieve or intend what the legislator intended through a ruling that was not legislated for that purpose. Al-Shatibi says: "The causes, inasmuch as they are legal causes for their effects, were legislated to achieve their effects, which are the benefits sought or the harms repelled"(4). He also says: "The effects, in relation to their causes, are of two types: the first type: those for which the causes were legislated either with the primary intention, which pertains to the original objectives (maqasid al-sharia), or with the secondary intention, which pertains to the subsidiary objectives... The second type: anything other than that which is known or presumed that the causes were not legislated for, or it is not known or presumed that they were legislated for or not legislated, thus the categories come to three: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/135. (2) The same source, 1/167. (3) The same source, 1/168. (4) The same source, 1/171. [Page 345] One of them: What is known or presumed to be the reason for which the law was established, thus the causation of the one who causes it is valid because he approached the matter from its proper avenue and sought it through what the legislator permitted to seek in relation to what he also permitted to seek. This is because we have assumed that the legislator intended by marriage, for example, procreation primarily, followed by establishing a home and forming alliances with the family of the woman due to their nobility or religion or something similar, or providing service or attending to his interests, or enjoying what Allah has made lawful from women, or beautifying oneself with the wealth of the woman, or desiring her beauty, or being pleased with her religion, or refraining from what Allah has prohibited, or something similar as indicated by the Sharia. Therefore, what this causative agent intended is, in general, the intention of the legislator. (1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/171 - 172. [Page 346] "The second: what is known or presumed to be a cause that was not legislated for its sake from the outset. The evidence indicates that this causation is incorrect because the cause was not originally legislated for this presumed effect. If it was not legislated for it, then it does not result in its wisdom of bringing about a benefit or averting a harm concerning what was intended by the cause; thus, it is invalid. This is one aspect, and a second aspect is that this cause, regarding this presumed objective, is not legislated, so it becomes like a cause that was not legislated at all. If an unlegislated causation is invalid, then likewise what was legislated if it is taken for something it was not legislated for. A third aspect is that the fact that the legislator did not legislate this cause for this specific effect is evidence that this causation contains a harm and not a benefit, or that the benefit for which the cause was legislated is negated by that effect, making the cause in relation to it mere frivolity." (1) "The third: it is when the cause is intended for an effect that is neither known nor presumed to be intended by the legislator or not intended at all. This is a point of consideration and a matter of ambiguity and confusion. This is because if we were to cause it, it could be that this cause is not designated for this presumed effect, just as it could be designated for it and for others. In the first case, the causation would be unlegislated. In the second case, it would be legislated. If the action is in a state of uncertainty between being legislated or unlegislated, then proceeding with the causation is unlegislated." (2) __________ (1) The same source, 1/173. (2) The same source, 1/181. And see: 1/171 - 182. [Page 347] Then he said: "The reason is only prescribed in relation to a specific, imposed, known matter, not absolutely" (1). And he said: "Rather, we know that many of the reasons were legislated for matters that arise from them and were not legislated for matters, even if they arise from them and are contingent upon them... So when we know that it is legislated for specific matters, what is unknown to be legislated for it is unknown in ruling, thus the legitimacy of proceeding is not valid until the ruling is known" (2). Then he said: "If this is established and a causation is clarified that we do not know whether it is what the Legislator intended with the prescribed causation or not, it is necessary to pause until the ruling on it is known. For this, there is a principle by which what is intended by the Legislator from the consequences of causes and what is not prescribed can be clarified, and it is mentioned in the Book of Objectives (maqasid)" (3). Accordingly, al-Shatibi believes that achieving the legal objective is only valid through the legal method that the Legislator has established. And although the method is legal, it is not valid to adopt or utilize it to achieve a legal objective unless the Legislator has established that method for this objective. It is not valid to prevent theft except by cutting off the hand, and the punishment cannot be replaced by another. And cutting off the hand is only valid for what it has been legislated for. Likewise, applying jihad for other than what it has been legislated for is not valid. And it is not valid, for the sake of establishing the ruling by what Allah has revealed, which is a legal objective, to adopt means or methods that have not been legislated for it, such as charitable institutions, for example, even if they are permissible, they are not prescribed for this objective. Or like participating in governance through disbelief, for this was not established for this purpose, let alone that it is prohibited by law. Customs and acts of worship between following meanings and devotion: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/181 - 182. (2) The same source, 1/181. And see: 1/171 - 182. (3) The same source, 1/181 - 182. [Page 348] ... If it is established that the rulings have their intended purposes as intended by the Legislator, which are the interests (masalih) or the causes (illal), then there are some rulings for which no cause can be found that is suitable for extending the ruling by analogy, even if a cause is known that is characterized by a generality that does not allow for analogy to be applied. This is similar to the reasoning for acts of worship, which is based on devotion and compliance. Therefore, there are some rulings for which one should not seek a cause, and there are rulings for which one must provide a rationale or follow the meanings in order to ascertain their causes. The meaning of following the meanings: ... The causes or interests are not considered valid unless they are definitively established through induction. The method of induction is to examine the rulings and derive the meanings and judgments that result from them. What the mind typically considers when reflecting is the rational meanings or appropriate descriptions; however, the existence of a specific meaning in a few texts is not sufficient for it to be considered valid. There must be a large number of rulings that contain that meaning for it to be valid, which resembles the concept of moral transmission (tawatur al-ma'nawi) in the terminology of hadith science. Thus, imagining a valid meaning in a few rulings is not enough for it to be considered, and it must be established in numerous rulings that exceed enumeration. This establishment or search for meaning or its pursuit in the rulings is what is meant by following the meanings. Al-Shatibi did not intend by following the meanings to apply a meaning merely due to the existence of an imagined or presumed connection between it and the ruling. ... Following the meanings is not limited to appropriate descriptions or those that the mind perceives the wisdom in. Any meaning that is established through induction is definitively considered valid in Sharia merely due to the existence of a causal relationship between it and the rulings that were induced. However, most of what the Legislator has used to justify the rulings is the appropriate, which, when presented to the minds, is readily accepted. Therefore, the key in following the meanings is to consider the rulings first, and then examine their causes or meanings, regardless of whether they are appropriate or not. In reality, most of the justifications in Sharia have come with appropriate descriptions or rational meanings. Al-Shatibi says: "When transmission and reason support the legal issues, it is on the condition that transmission precedes and is followed by reason, so reason does not roam in the field of reflection except to the extent that transmission allows it" (1). He also said: "The Legislator has elaborated on the causes and rulings in legislating the chapter on customs... Most of what he justified in it was the appropriate, which, when presented to the minds, was readily accepted" (2). In contrast to following the meanings is devotion (ta'abud), which means not seeking any meaning or intended interest behind the ruling—any cause—other than the interest of obedience and compliance. Acts of worship are not justified: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/53. (2) The same source, 2/213. [Page 349] ... Al-Shatibi says: "The original ruling regarding acts of worship for the accountable person is to worship without considering the meanings" (1). This means that the original principle is that one should not seek a reason for them. His use of the term "original" indicates that there are rare or few cases where it is permissible to pursue a specific meaning to see if it is established or not. Al-Shatibi supports this with several points: "Among them is induction, for we have found that purification extends beyond its required place, and likewise, the prayers are specified with particular actions in specific forms; if they deviate from these, they are not acts of worship... And so it is with other acts of worship such as fasting and pilgrimage, and we understand from the general wisdom of worship the submission to the commands of Allah, Exalted is He, and the individual acts of submission and glorification of His majesty and turning to Him. This extent does not provide a specific reason from which a specific ruling can be understood" (2). There is no need to mention all his other proofs on this matter, and Al-Shatibi's intent is that acts of worship are not to be rationalized, and it is not permissible to seek a reason for them. Even if there are some rulings on acts of worship that can carry certain meanings that may be very appropriate and provoke thought, they should be disregarded and not considered, because the principle that acts of worship are not rationalized is a definitive principle established by induction and other matters. Thus, it is not correct to pursue this meaning in other rulings to prove it through induction. He states: "It is necessary to take in this category worship without considering the meanings as a principle built upon and a pillar to rely on" (3). As for the rare cases where it is permissible—though not obligatory—to follow the meaning, they are when a text or consensus indicates a specific meaning; this meaning is one of the meanings of the proofs and not one of the meanings of the rulings. He says: "Unless it is clarified by a text or consensus a desired meaning in some cases, there is no blame on one who follows it, but that is rare and not a principle; rather, the principle is what is prevalent in the matter and predominates in the context" (4). As for the fact that the intended meaning by a text or consensus differs from others, it is because it is one of the indications of the texts or their meanings, and not one of the indications of the rulings. __________ (1) The same source, 2/211. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/212. (3) The same source, 2/213. (4) The same source, 2/212. [Page 350] As for the fact that it is permissible to follow the meaning in this case but not obligatory, this is because this meaning is speculative and cannot be considered unless it is related to a definitive origin, and this can only be established through induction. Following the meaning may affirm it or negate it; if it negates it, then it is confirmed to adhere to the act of worship, and if it affirms it, then the origin of worship is also established by the same method, that is, through induction. Therefore, it has no effect on acts of worship, neither by establishment nor by negation. He says: "What is purely for Allah, like acts of worship, has its origin in the act of worship which is based on the incomprehensibility of the meaning, such that analogy cannot be applied to it. If its meaning is not comprehensible, it indicates that the intention of the Legislator is to adhere to what He has defined and not to exceed it" (1). As for the comprehensible meaning that has been established as intended by the Legislator, it must be applied in matters other than acts of worship. Moreover, although some acts of worship contain indications of reasoning or suggest a connection, the conditions for reasoning are either absent or incomplete in them. Therefore, such descriptions or meanings do not extend the rulings, such as theft being a reason for cutting off the hand and adultery being a reason for stoning; however, analogy does not occur here, nor does the ruling extend beyond its place. This is stronger in acts of worship, as in forgetfulness being a reason for prostration. We say: "He stole, so his hand was cut off; he committed adultery, so he was stoned; he forgot, so he prostrated." These reasons, while they are understood in general terms, are not understood in specific terms. The understanding is of the general crime or sin and the general punishment or excuse. However, specifying this with that is not comprehensible, as it could logically be said: "He stole, so he was imprisoned," or "He forgot, so he repeated," or something else. The same applies to reasoning based on hardship in shortening prayers, breaking the fast, and combining prayers. He says: "Moreover, the appropriateness in them (i.e., acts of worship) is counted among those that have no counterpart, such as hardship in the traveler's shortening of prayers, breaking the fast, and combining between the two prayers, and similar matters. To this, most of the understood reasons in the chapters of acts of worship are not understood in specific terms, like his saying: 'He forgot, so he prostrated'" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/221. (2) Refer to its source. [Page 351] And His saying: "Allah does not accept the prayer of any one of you if he becomes impure until he performs ablution" (1), and His prohibition of prayer at the two ends of the day, and His reasoning for that being that the sun rises and sets between the horns of the devil (2), as well as what the scholars of dissent use in analogizing ablution to the necessity of intention... and similar matters that do not indicate a clear, precise meaning suitable for establishing a ruling upon without dispute, but rather are termed as resembling (shabah), such that those who assert it do not agree upon it, and it is only used for analogy by those who do so when they find nothing else. If we do not have a clear reason supported by evident pathways, then the solid foundation that we should resort to is to adhere to what has been defined without transgressing to anything else, for we have found that the Sharia, when we examined it, revolves around acts of worship in the realm of worship, thus it is a fundamental principle therein (3). Accordingly, acts of worship are not to be reasoned or analogized. The principle in customary practices is reasoning: __________ (1) Al-Bukhari, Chapter: On Prayer (6440), and Muslim: Chapter on the Obligation of Purity for Prayer (225), and al-Tirmidhi (71), who said: "Hasan Sahih." And Abu Dawood (55) and Ahmad (7875). (2) Al-Bukhari (3032) and Muslim (966) and (987) and al-Tirmidhi (148), who said: "Hasan Sahih," and al-Nasa'i (507). (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/211. [Page 352] ... Al-Shatibi mentioned customs (adat) in the introduction of his book on the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) and categorized them as one of four sections: acts of worship (ibadat), customs, transactions (muamalat), and crimes (jina'at). He exemplified this with the consumption of food, drinks, clothing, and other consumables (1). However, in this research, he refers to them as one of two categories: acts of worship and customs. Therefore, it means here what is aside from acts of worship in terms of rulings. He states: "The essence of customs is the consideration of meanings" (2), and he supports this with several points, the first of which is induction. He says: "We found that the legislator aimed at the interests of the servants, and the ordinary rulings revolve with it wherever it goes. You see a single thing being prohibited in a situation where there is no interest, but if there is an interest, it is permissible, like the dirham for dirham for a deferred period, which is prohibited in sale but permissible in a loan... We did not find this in the realm of acts of worship as we understood it in customs. And Allah, Exalted is He, said: { And there is for you in retaliation the saving of life, O you who possess intellect } (3), and He said: { And do not consume one another's wealth unjustly } (4), and in the hadith: "A judge should not rule while angry" (5), and He said: "There should be neither harm nor reciprocating harm" (6), and He said: "The killer does not inherit" (7) (8). Then he said: "And so on, which cannot be enumerated, all of which indicates, and indeed states, the consideration of the interests of the servants, and that permission revolves with them wherever it goes, as clarified by the paths of reasoning. This indicates that customs are among those matters where the legislator relied on the consideration of meanings" (9). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/5. (2) The same source, 2/211. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 179. (4) Surah Al-Baqarah, 188. (5) Previously cited. (6) Previously cited. (7) Previously cited. (8) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/213. (9) The same location. [Page 353] ... These meanings, although they are not from the indications of the texts, serve as foundational principles or definitive reasons upon which the rulings are established. This means that these rulings are issued based on the application of those principles. Thus, these rulings are particulars in relation to them, and the meaning of the principles is embodied within them. This is the meaning of the descent of the universals to the particulars, and therefore attention must be paid to the meanings, that is, to a specific meaning or meanings present in the ruling, and then to follow this meaning to achieve its induction, which then becomes a universal principle and a reason for public interest (maslaha). For example, in the hadith "the killer does not inherit," one can imagine the meaning of treating the opposite of the intended purpose as a punishment, or that whoever hastens a matter before its time is punished by being deprived of it. So, are these meanings principles or rules in the Sharia upon which the rulings are based? These meanings are not fixed as principles of the Sharia, even though they can be imagined in the ruling, and therefore it is necessary to trace this meaning and observe its presence or absence in many other rulings, and to note its occurrence or non-occurrence where it can be applied, and thus the induction that confirms or negates the meaning is achieved. This attention to meanings must occur in customary practices based on the principle that the Sharia was revealed for the interests of the servants, and these interests are the principles upon which the Sharia was established, and these interests must be present in the rulings. However, since the rulings can be imagined to contain many meanings or rulings, and it cannot be determined that this meaning is what the Legislator intended or upon which the ruling was established, it is necessary to conduct an induction for this meaning, because with the abundance of rulings, the meaning becomes stronger, and by being beyond limitation, it becomes definitive and intended by the Legislator and serves a public interest. He says: "The Legislator has expanded in explaining the reasons and rulings in legislating the domain of customs, as previously illustrated, and most of the reasons mentioned therein are based on suitability, which, when presented to the intellects, are accepted. Thus, we understand from this that the Legislator intended to follow the meanings rather than to rely solely on the texts, unlike the domain of worship, where the known is the opposite of that" (1). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 2/213. [Page 354] ... However, al-Shatibi makes exceptions here for some rare cases, as he did regarding acts of worship. This is because acts of worship are not governed by meanings unless there is a text or consensus indicating a specific meaning. Likewise, in customary practices, meanings are followed unless there is an element of worship; in that case, one must adhere to the texts. He says: "If this is established and the predominant aspect of customary practices is to pay attention to meanings, then if there is an element of worship, one must submit and adhere to the texts, such as the request for the dowry in marriage, the slaughtering in the specified manner for permissible animals, the fixed shares in inheritance, the number of months in the waiting periods for divorce and completion, and similar matters where there is no room for intellects to understand their specific benefits, so that others can be analogized to them"(1). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/214. [Page 355] ... These acts of worship and customary practices, although it is not correct to pay attention to their meanings in the sense that analogy (qiyas) cannot be applied to them or based on them, they do have a comprehensible meaning, even if it is not one that is suitable for analogy. This is in addition to the general meaning, which is worship. He says: "If it is said, is there a reason for these acts of worship (ta'abudat)(1) that can be understood as the specific intent of the legislator or not? The answer is that, as for acts of worship, their required action is mere submission without addition or reduction. Therefore, when Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) was asked about the obligation of a menstruating woman to make up fasting but not prayer, she said to the questioner: 'Are you a Haruriyya!' in denial of her asking about such a thing, as the act of worship was not established to understand its specific reason. Then she said: 'We were commanded to make up fasting and we were not commanded to make up prayer'(2). This supports the idea of worship over reasoning based on hardship, and the saying of Ibn al-Musayyib regarding the legislator's equal treatment of the fingers: 'It is the Sunnah, my nephew'(3), which indicates that there is no reason. As for customary practices and some acts of worship, they also have a comprehensible meaning, which is the regulation of the means of public interest (maslaha)... Thus, the legislator has set specific limits that should not be exceeded, such as eighty lashes for slander, one hundred lashes and exile for fornication without marriage, and the cutting of the hand at the wrist, and in the specified amounts"(4). It is necessary to consider worship in customary practices: __________ (1) That is, acts of worship, and customary practices that are exempted from the principle of paying attention to meaning. (2) Narrated by Muslim in the chapter on the obligation of making up fasting for the menstruating woman but not prayer (506), (508), and by al-Tirmidhi (120) who said: it is good and authentic. And by al-Nasa'i (379) and Ahmad (22908). (3) Al-Muwatta, chapter on what has been narrated regarding the blood money for fingers (1355). (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/213. [Page 356] ... This does not mean - in any way - that the recognized meanings in the rulings of customary practices, that is, those established through induction, or in other words: the public interests (masalih), can lead to the annulment of rulings based on them. This is due to the necessity of applying both the general principles and the specific cases together, as these rulings are the ones that the Legislator has made a pathway to the public interests, and thus they cannot be annulled on the pretext that the intent or meaning has been understood, and therefore the rulings can be changed while preserving the objectives (maqasid) and meanings. This is because devotion (ta'abud) exists in all rulings, whether they are related to acts of worship (ibadat) or customary practices (adat). He says: "Everything in which the consideration of devotion is established, there is no branching from it, and everything in which the consideration of meanings is established, devotion must also be considered in it" (1). He presents many proofs for this matter, including that understanding a purpose or interest of the ruling does not mean understanding all the intended interests behind it, and that the optimal way to achieve the intended goal is the legislated way, as well as the purpose of compliance and others. Based on this, he concludes: "Every legal ruling is not devoid of the right of Allah, Exalted is He, which is the aspect of devotion" (2). This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, the chapter on the objectives of the accountable person. Chapter Six Objectives of the Accountable Person ... It contains an introduction and three sections: Section One: Objectives and Intentions. Section Two: Actions of the Accountable Person and Their Objectives. Section Three: Legal Stratagems. Chapter Six Objectives of the Accountable Person Introduction: Al-Shatibi said: "The objectives that are considered are of two types: one that pertains to the intent of the Legislator and the other that pertains to the intent of the accountable person" (3). The first type of objectives, which pertains to the intent of the Legislator, has been clarified in the previous sections. The second type, which is the objectives of the accountable person, will be clarified - if Allah wills - in this chapter. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/214. (2) The same source, 2/221. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/1. [Page 357] It has become clear that the objectives (maqasid) are results or causes. The causes are the actions performed by the accountable person (mukallaf) that lead to those results; they serve as means for the objectives. The actions performed by the mukallaf may be legislatively commanded, prohibited, or permitted. The objectives of the mukallaf from his actions may be compliance with the command of the legislator, meaning they may be otherworldly objectives without regard to a worldly objective. They may also be worldly, that is, the attainment of desires and interests, according to what Allah has instilled in humans of characteristics and passions(1). They may also combine both intentions: the intention of compliance and the intention of seeking benefit. What is the effect of the mukallaf's intention on the validity of the action, whether in terms of reward or punishment in the Hereafter, or in terms of its occurrence and the resulting effects in this world? Is it permissible for the mukallaf to intend his interests and benefits while also intending compliance? Is it permissible for him to aim for results that Allah did not legislate those actions for? Is it permissible for him to intend legitimate objectives through illegitimate actions? And what is the ruling on actions performed by the mukallaf devoid of any intention? __________ (1) Many texts indicate these characteristics, as does the reality of human beings. Allah, Exalted is He, said: { Beautified for people is the love of that which they desire - of women and children, heaped-up sums of gold and silver, fine branded horses, and tilled land. That is the enjoyment of worldly life, but Allah has with Him the best return. } (Al-Imran, 14). [Page 358] ... And He said: { And you consume inheritance with [greedy] consumption (19) and you love wealth with [intense] love } Al-Fajr, 19-20. ... And He said: { Indeed, mankind was created anxious (19) when evil touches him, impatient (20) and when good touches him, withholding (21) } Al-Ma'arij, 19-21. Is it permissible for the accountable person (mukallaf) to initiate actions with the intention of making his non-Sharia objectives Sharia-compliant? This is known as legal tricks (hiyal). Like someone who gives charity from some of his wealth or spends it to evade zakat, or like someone who undertakes a journey to permit himself to break his fast, for example, or like someone who marries a woman who has been divorced three times so that he can divorce her with the intention of making her lawful for her first husband. For such actions, and for such objectives and what arises or branches from them, al-Shatibi discussed the category of the objectives of the accountable person. This chapter was written to clarify al-Shatibi's position on these issues. Since intention and purpose and their effects on the actions of the accountable person are matters extensively discussed by the scholars, and al-Shatibi's statements are both consistent and inconsistent with each other, the opinions and views of the scholars on this matter will be addressed before presenting al-Shatibi's views on it. Section One Objectives and Intentions Intention and purpose and the difference between them: Al-Ghazali said: "Know that intention, will, and purpose are terms that convey the same meaning, which is a state and quality of the heart that is encompassed by two matters: knowledge and action. Knowledge precedes it because it is its origin and condition, and action follows it because it is its fruit and branch" (1). He also said that intention "is the will and the impulse of the soul by virtue of desire and inclination towards what is in accordance with the objective, either in the present or in the future. The primary mover is the desired objective, which is the motivator, and the motivating objective is the intended purpose, and the impulse is the purpose and intention, and the activation of the ability to serve the will by moving the limbs is the action" (2). Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi said: "In language, as in the dictionary, it is to intend something with intention, which can be emphasized or softened: to aim for it. In Sharia, as in al-Talwih, it is the intention of obedience and drawing closer to Allah in performing the action" (3). __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad, Ihya Ulum al-Din, 4/365, Dar al-Ma'rifah - Beirut. (2) The same source. (3) Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi, Zain al-Din ibn Ibrahim, who passed away in 970 AH, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, p. 24, 2nd edition, 1442 AH - 1999 CE, edited by Dr. Muhammad Mut'i al-Hafiz, Dar al-Fikr al-Mu'asir - Beirut, Dar al-Fikr - Damascus. [Page 359] He said: "Al-Baydawi defined it as, in Sharia, the intention directed towards an action seeking the Face of Allah, Exalted is He, and in compliance with His command. Linguistically, it is the movement of the heart towards what it sees as aligned with a purpose of bringing benefit or averting harm, whether in the present or in the future" (1). And al-Suyuti said: "Its place is the heart in every instance because its reality is intention in general, and it is said: the intention concurrent with the action, which is a description of the action of the heart. Al-Baydawi said: Intention is the movement of the heart towards what it sees as bringing benefit or averting harm, whether in the present or in the future. And the Sharia specified it as the intention directed towards an action seeking the pleasure of Allah, Exalted is He, and in compliance with His command" (2). Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali said: "Know that intention in the language is a type of purpose and will, even though a distinction has been made between these terms" (3). He then mentioned what implies a rejection of this distinction, as will become clear. It is evident from the previous texts of the scholars regarding intention and purpose that they are interchangeable in meaning in the language, considering that the term purpose is broader than the term intention, which is indicated by al-Suyuti's statement: "Its reality is intention in general," and Ibn Rajab's statement: "Intention in the language is a type of purpose and will." __________ (1) The same source. (2) Al-Suyuti, Jalal al-Din Abdul Rahman ibn Abi Bakr, who died in 911 AH, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair fi Qawa'id wa Furu' Fiqh al-Shafi'i, p. 76, 2nd ed., 1414 AH - 1993 CE, edited and commented by Dr. Muhammad al-Mu'tasim Billah al-Baghdadi, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi - Beirut. (3) Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, Jam' al-Ulum wa al-Hikam fi Sharh Khamsin Hadithan min Jawami' al-Kalim, p. 16, edited by Fuad ibn Ali Hafiz, 2nd ed., 1421 AH - 2000 CE, Al-Rayan Foundation Beirut. [Page 360] As for the distinction between intention (niyyah) and purpose (qasd), it has become clear that purpose is broader and intention is more specific. This is evident upon careful examination of the texts mentioned earlier, which indicate that intention is invoked in the presence of the action; it is not sufficient for there to be merely a purpose or desire in the heart, but this must be accompanied by the intention to bring about the action. Therefore, al-Baydawi stated in his definition: "It is the will directed towards the action," and al-Suyuti said: "It is said to be concurrent with the action." As for his statement: "And that is a matter of the heart," this emphasizes that it is a type of purpose, with its place being the heart, similar to it. Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali said: "Those who differentiate between intention and will and purpose and the like do so because they believe that intention is specific to the first meaning mentioned by the jurists. Some of them said: Intention is specific to the action of the one intending, while will is not specific to that, as a person may want from Allah to forgive him without intending that" (1). __________ (1) Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, Jamia al-Uloom wal-Hikam, pp. 16-17. [Page 361] Upon closer examination, we notice a distinction in the linguistic usage in that the term "intention" (niyyah) is more specific than the term "purpose" (qasd). For example, we have observed the scholars saying: "the purpose of the legislator" (maqsad al-shari), "the purposes of the legislator" (maqasid al-shari), and "the purposes of the Sharia" (maqasid al-sharia), but they did not say "the intention of the legislator" or "the legislator's intentions" or "the intentions of the Sharia." Likewise, they did not say "the will of the Sharia" (1). __________ (1) The term "will" (irada) as it appears in the texts of the scholars means purpose and intention, and it has come in many legal texts. Allah, Exalted is He, said: { Among you are some who want this world, and among you are some who want the Hereafter. } { Al-Imran: 152 }, and He said: { You desire the pleasures of this world, but Allah desires the Hereafter. } { Al-Anfal: 67 }, and He said: { Whoever desires the life of this world and its adornment. } { Hud: 15 }, and He said: { Whoever desires to harvest the Hereafter. } { Ash-Shura: 20 }, and He said: { And do not drive away those who call upon their Lord morning and evening, desiring His face. } { Al-An'am: 52 }, and He said: { And keep yourself patient with those who call upon their Lord morning and evening, desiring His face, and let not your eyes pass beyond them, desiring the adornment of the life of this world. } { Al-Kahf: 28 }, and He said: { And whatever you give in usury to increase within the wealth of the people will not increase with Allah, but whatever you give in zakat, desiring the face of Allah, those are the multipliers. } { Ar-Rum: 39 }. It may also be expressed in the Qur'an with the term "seeking" (ibtigha) as in His saying: { Except seeking the face of his Lord, the Most High. } { Al-Lail: 20 }, and His saying: { And the example of those who spend their wealth seeking the pleasure of Allah and assuring themselves. } { Al-Baqarah: 265 }, and His saying: { And you spend nothing except seeking the face of Allah. } { Al-Baqarah: 272 }. See Jam' al-Ulum wal-Hikam by Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, p. 17. [Page 362] As for the distinction that Ibn Rajab referred to in the previous text by saying: "due to their assumption that the intention (niyyah) is specific to the first meaning mentioned by the jurists..." it indicates that some scholars have made a distinction between a legal meaning of intention and a linguistic meaning. The linguistic meaning is simply the intention in general, and thus the intention is broader than the specific legal meaning, which is the specification of intention as the intention to comply with the command of the Legislator or the intention of drawing closer to Allah. This is what is indicated by the texts of Ibn Najim and al-Suyuti, which they quoted from al-Baydawi. This is in contrast to al-Ghazali and Ibn Rajab, for example, who only referred to the linguistic meaning. This specification of the meaning of intention in a legal sense leads to the use of the term intention for acts of worship. However, in the case of customary actions, it is only when the intention of the obligated person is to draw closer to Allah and comply with the command. The term intention can be used here because it is general, whereas when the intention of the obligated person is for their own purposes and desires, such as the intention to acquire ownership or to satisfy desires, the term used is intention. Therefore, it is said that intentions transform customary actions into acts of worship. Ibn Najim al-Hanafi said: "There is no reward except by intention" (1). Al-Ghazali said: "There is nothing from the permissible actions except that it can hold an intention or intentions that can make it one of the merits of drawing closer to Allah and attain high ranks; how great is the loss of one who is heedless of this" (2). The effect of intention on actions (3): __________ (1) Ibn Najim al-Hanafi, al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, p. 14. (2) Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din, 4/371. (3) That is, in terms of the validity or invalidity of actions and the resulting reward or punishment in the Hereafter, or in terms of their sufficiency and the consequences of those actions in this world. Ibn Najim al-Hanafi said: "It is of two types: the Hereafter, which is reward and deserving of punishment, and the worldly, which is validity and invalidity." He considered actions based on intention with regard to the Hereafter, and denied considering them with regard to validity and invalidity in this world. He said: "The Hereafter is intended by consensus, as it is agreed that there is no reward or punishment except by intention, so the other is negated as being intended." Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, p. 14. [Page 363] Bukhari narrated from Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Actions are judged by intentions, and for every person is what he intended. So whoever's migration is for Allah and His Messenger, then his migration is for Allah and His Messenger; and whoever's migration is for a worldly benefit he may attain or a woman he may marry, then his migration is for that which he migrated towards" (1). And in Muslim, it is narrated in the wording: "Indeed, actions are judged by intentions, and indeed, for every person is what he intended..." (2). Al-Suyuti transmitted the consensus (tawatur) from the scholars regarding the significance of this hadith (3). Likewise, Al-Hafiz al-Asqalani said: "It has been transmitted in consensus from the scholars regarding the significance of this hadith. Abu Abdullah said: There is nothing in the reports of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) that is more comprehensive, richer, and more beneficial than this hadith" (4). It has been reported from many scholars, including al-Shafi'i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal (may Allah be pleased with them), that it constitutes one-third of Islam. And from al-Shafi'i, that it encompasses seventy chapters of jurisprudence (5). __________ (1) Narrated by Bukhari in the Book of Revelation (1), Faith (52), Emancipation (6439), the Virtues of the Ansar (3609), Marriage (5070), Oaths and Vows (6195), and Legal Tricks (6439), and by Muslim (3530). Also narrated by Abu Dawood in the Book of Divorce (2201), and by al-Tirmidhi in the Book of the Virtues of Jihad (1571), and by al-Nasa'i in the Book of Purification (74), Divorce (3383), and Oaths and Vows (3734), and by Ibn Majah in the Book of Asceticism (4217), and also narrated by Ahmad in his Musnad (4567). (2) See: Sahih Muslim with the commentary of Imam Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi, titled Al-Minhaj Sharh Sahih Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj 13/55, edited by Sheikh Khalil Mamoun Shihah, Dar al-Ma'rifah - Beirut, 1st edition, 1414 AH 1994 CE. (3) Al-Suyuti, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair fi Qawa'id wa Furu' Fiqh al-Shafi'i, p. 40. (4) Al-Asqalani, Ahmad ibn Ali ibn Hajar 773 - 852 AH. Fath al-Bari with the commentary of Sahih Bukhari 1/11, edited and verified by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz, Dar al-Ma'rifah - Beirut. (5) See the references mentioned in the footnotes: 2, 3, and 4 above, and also see: Jamia al-Uloom wa al-Hikam p. 13-14. [Page 364] Regarding the meaning of the hadith, actions are of two types: acts of worship (ibadat) and customary practices (adat). Those who said that intention (niyyah) means purpose and did not specify intention in a legal sense, which is the intention to seek Allah's pleasure and comply with His command, have interpreted the meaning as applying to the validity of actions whether they are acts of worship or customary practices based on the validity of the intention, which is the seeking of Allah's pleasure. If actions lack this intention, then the intention is invalid, and thus the actions are invalid because actions are judged by intentions. Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said: "The intention in the hadith is understood in its linguistic meaning" (1), and he said: "The implication is: there is no action except by intention, so the intent is not to negate the existence of the action, as it can exist without intention, but rather to negate its rulings such as validity and completeness; however, the interpretation as negating validity is more appropriate" (2). Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, in his explanation of the hadith, said: "With this, al-Bukhari began his book (al-Sahih) in the position of its introduction, indicating that every action not intended for the sake of Allah is void and has no fruit in this world or the Hereafter" (3). His statement: every action, means whether it is from acts of worship or customary practices, which is what al-Ghazali also held, as will be clarified. __________ (1) Al-Asqalani, Fath al-Bari bi Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, 1/13. (2) The same source. (3) Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, Jamia al-Uloom wal-Hikam, p. 13. [Page 365] As for those who specified the intention (niyyah) with the particular legal meaning, they differentiated between acts of worship (ibadat) and customary actions (adat). The acts of customary actions are valid, even if they are not intended to comply with the Sharia, but they do not yield any reward. As for acts of worship, intention is a condition for their validity. Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali said: "There has been a disagreement regarding the interpretation of the saying: 'Actions are judged by intentions.' Many of the later scholars claim that its interpretation is: actions are valid or recognized or accepted based on intentions, and based on this, the actions refer specifically to the legal actions that require intention. However, actions that do not require intention, such as customary actions like eating, drinking, dressing, and others, or like returning trusts and guaranteed items, such as deposits and usurpations, do not require any intention, so all of this is excluded from the generality of the actions mentioned here. Others said: No, the actions here are in their generality, and nothing is excluded from them" (1). The essence of this disagreement returns to consensus regarding acts of worship, as there is no disagreement that the validity of acts of worship depends on intention. As for customary actions, they are the subject of disagreement and detail, and those who limit the meaning of the hadith "Actions are judged by intentions" to acts of worship emphasize that the intentions of the doer affect customary actions. Therefore, they established a "legal" principle broader than the hadith on intention, based on the hadith and other legal texts, which is the principle: "Matters are judged by their intentions." __________ (1) The same source, p. 15, and the first opinion is what al-Shatibi states, as will become clear. [Page 366] The principle of matters is based on their objectives (1): __________ (1) Some books on analogies and similarities mention that some jurists trace certain legal schools back to a few dozen principles. Refer to the book of analogies and similarities by al-Suyuti, pages 35 - 38, and the book of analogies and similarities by Imam Taj al-Din al-Subki, pages 10 - 12. Al-Suyuti mentioned that the entire Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) school can be reduced to four principles: the first: certainty is not overruled by doubt, the second: hardship brings about ease, the third: harm must be eliminated, and the fourth: custom is authoritative. Among what he said is: "Some later scholars have remarked that the status of these four as the foundations of jurisprudence is debatable, as most of it does not return to them except through intermediaries and effort." Some jurists added a fifth principle to these, which is: "matters are based on their objectives," based on the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): "Actions are judged by intentions." He also said: "Islam is built upon five [pillars]." [This hadith was narrated by al-Bukhari in the Book of Faith, number (7), (4153), and by Muslim in the chapter on the pillars of Islam and its great foundations, number (16), (20), (21), and by Ahmad, number (4567), and by al-Tirmidhi, number (2534), who said it is good and authentic, and by al-Nasa'i, number (4915)]. Jurisprudence is based on five, and al-'Ala'i said: this is very good, for Imam al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) said: "This hadith encompasses a third of knowledge." page 37. [Page 367] ... ... Imam al-Suyuti said: "Know that Qadi Husayn mentioned that the foundation of jurisprudence (fiqh) is based on four principles," then he mentioned the four mentioned above. He said: "And those who claim to be precise assert that a fifth has been neglected, which is that matters are judged by their intentions (maqasid). He said: Islam is built upon five, and jurisprudence is based on five." Al-Suyuti added: "In my view, if one intends to refer jurisprudence to the five in a forced and contrived manner, then the fifth is included in the first and also in the second. Indeed, Shaykh al-Islam Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam referred all of jurisprudence to the consideration of public interests (masalih) and the prevention of harm (dar' al-mafasid), and if he were pressed, he would say: I refer everything to the consideration of public interests, for the prevention of harm is among them. He would say regarding this: one of these five is sufficient, and it is more likely that it is the second. And if one intends a clear reference, it exceeds fifty, even over two hundred." p. 12. As for the scholar Ibn Najim al-Hanafi, he counted them as six, arranging them as follows: there is no reward except by intention, matters are judged by their intentions, certainty is not overruled by doubt, hardship brings about ease, harm must be eliminated, and custom is authoritative. See: al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, pp. 1-3. [Page 368] Al-Suyuti said: "The basis of this principle is his saying - peace and blessings be upon him -: 'Actions are judged by intentions.' This is a well-known authentic hadith narrated by the six imams and others from Umar ibn al-Khattab"(1). It is thus comprehensive in this text for both acts of worship and customary practices. Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi said under the title: "Matters are judged by their intentions": "Selling juice from someone who makes it into wine is not prohibited if the intention is for trade, but it is prohibited if the intention is for fermentation; the same applies to planting a vineyard. Similarly, grape juice intended for vinegar or wine, and the act of boycotting for more than three days depends on the intention; if the intention is to boycott a Muslim, it is prohibited, otherwise it is not"(2), and the examples mentioned in the above text are not acts of worship. Therefore, they said that intention was legislated to distinguish acts of worship from customary practices and to differentiate the ranks of acts of worship from one another; as for customary practices, intention is not a condition for them, but rather the condition is that the intention must be lawful. This is in addition to the condition that the act itself must be lawful. Ibn al-Sabki said: "It also includes(3) the principle: intention to distinguish acts of worship from customary practices and to differentiate the ranks of acts of worship from one another. The first is like sitting in the mosque, wavering between sitting for i'tikaf and sitting for rest, and like ablution and ghusl, wavering between cooling off and cleaning, and seeking closeness; without intention, the act of worship would not be distinguished from others, nor would it be valid"(4). He said: "As for the second, which is their saying: to distinguish the ranks of acts of worship from one another, it is like distinguishing voluntary prayer from obligatory prayer"(5). __________ (1) Al-Suyuti, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, p. 38. (2) Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, p. 22. (3) In it: i.e., in the principle of matters being judged by their intentions. (4) Ibn al-Sabki, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, p. 57. (5) The same source, p. 59. [Page 369] Al-Suyuti said similarly: "The purpose for which the intention (niyyah) was legislated is primarily to distinguish acts of worship from customary practices and to differentiate the ranks of acts of worship from one another... Abstaining from things that break the fast may be for health reasons or treatment, or due to a lack of need for it... Giving money to others may be a gift or a connection for a worldly purpose, or it may be an act of devotion such as zakat, charity, or expiation... Each of ablution (wudu), full-body washing (ghusl), prayer (salah), and fasting (sawm) may be obligatory (fard), a vow (nadr), or supererogatory (nafl), and dry ablution (tayammum) may be for ritual impurity or major impurity, while its form is the same."(1) Ibn Najim al-Hanafi said: "They said: The objective in it is to distinguish between acts of worship and customary practices, and to distinguish some acts of worship from others"(2). Sincerity and Associating Partners in Objectives: Al-Ghazali said: "Know that everything can be imagined to be mixed with something else, and when it is purified from its mixture and freed from it, it is called pure, and the action that is purified and sincere is called sincerity (ikhlas)."(3) He also said: "So, whenever the motive is singular in its intention, the action that results from it is called sincerity in relation to the intended purpose. Whoever gives charity with the sole intention of showing off is sincere, and whoever's intention is solely to draw closer to Allah Exalted is He is sincere. However, it is customary to reserve the name of sincerity for the intention of drawing closer to Allah Exalted is He, free from all impurities."(4) As for associating partners (tashrik), it is the opposite of sincerity (ikhlas). Al-Ghazali said: "Sincerity is opposed by associating partners, so whoever is not sincere is a polytheist. However, polytheism has degrees; sincerity in monotheism is opposed by associating partners in divinity"(5). He also said: "Sincerity and its opposite both enter the heart; their place is the heart, and this occurs in intentions and purposes"(6). __________ (1) Al-Suyuti, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, pp. 46 - 47. (2) Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, p. 24. (3) Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din. 4/379. (4) Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din. 4/379. (5) The same place. (6) The same place. [Page 370] And the sharing in the objectives (maqasid) is the sharing between the intention of complying with the command of the Legislator or drawing closer to Him and the intention of fulfilling one's own desires. Among the desires of the self, some are for show (riya) and some are not for show; show is when one acts to be seen by people, such as someone who acts to be seen by the prince or others to gain esteem in their eyes because these people can see. As for one who acts with the intention of profit or gain or enjoying good things, this is an intention for the desires of the self and not show. Al-Qarafi said: "To perform the commanded action and draw closer to Allah, Exalted is He, with the intention of seeking His face and for people to esteem him or for him to be esteemed in their hearts, so that their benefit reaches him or harm is repelled from him, this is the basis of one category of show, and the other category is to perform an action without intending the face of Allah at all, but only for people. This category is called: show of sincerity, while the first is the show of polytheism, because this does not involve sharing but is purely for creation, and the first is for creation and for Allah, Exalted is He"(1). He also said: "As for absolute sharing, like one who strives to attain the obedience of Allah through jihad and to obtain wealth from the spoils, this does not harm him, nor is it prohibited by consensus, because Allah, Exalted is He, has made this for him in this act of worship. He distinguishes between striving to have people say that he is brave or for the imam to esteem him so that his gifts from the public treasury increase; this and similar actions are forbidden show, and between striving to obtain captives, horses, and weapons from the enemy's wealth; this does not harm him even though he has shared, and this is not called show because show is to act so that he is seen by others among His creation, and sight is only valid from creation. Therefore, for one who does not see or perceive, it cannot be said that the action is show in relation to him, and the wealth obtained from the spoils and similar matters cannot be said to be seen or perceived, so the term show does not apply to these intentions due to the lack of sight in them"(2).(3) Based on what has been mentioned, one can detail the ruling on sharing between the intention of compliance and the intention of desire. __________ (1) Al-Qarafi, Shihab al-Din, al-Furuq: 3/22, difference: 122. (2) Thus is the text. Perhaps its origin is: to act to be seen by... (3) Al-Qarafi, Shihab al-Din, al-Furuq: difference 122, 3/22 - 23. [Page 371] As for the intention of compliance and drawing closer to Allah devoid of any other intention, this is the highest rank of deeds and the purest. As for the intention of seeking personal gain, if it stems from ostentation (riya), it is blameworthy (1), whether in acts of worship or in customary practices, and whether it is the ostentation of associating partners with Allah or mere ostentation. Al-Qarafi said: "Know that ostentation in acts of worship is associating partners with Allah, and it leads to sin, wrongdoing, and invalidation" (2). He also said: "The purposes of ostentation are three: seeking honor, gaining worldly benefits, and averting worldly harms. The latter two stem from the first, for when one seeks honor, worldly benefits are drawn to him and harms are repelled from him; this is the ultimate purpose in reality. Thus, this is the principle of ostentation that invalidates deeds, as agreed upon by consensus" (3). Al-Ghazali said: "Whoever is motivated solely by ostentation is at risk of destruction" (4). As for seeking personal gain without ostentation, if it is devoid of the intention of compliance, it is invalid in acts of worship because acts of worship— as previously clarified— require intention. Al-Ghazali said: "Acts of obedience are linked to intentions in their validity and in the multiplication of their merit" (5). __________ (1) Scholars have elaborated on this matter, as a person may initially perform an action with the intention of obedience or otherwise, and then a form of ostentation may overwhelm him, making it difficult to escape from it. We will mention this when detailing al-Shatibi's view on the association of intentions. (2) Al-Qarafi, Shihab al-Din, Al-Furuq, 4/22-23. Distinction: 122. (3) The same source. (4) Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din, 4/379. (5) The same source, 4/370. [Page 372] And if it pertains to customs, it is according to intention. If the intention is lawful, then the action is valid; if the intention is unlawful, then it is invalid (1). Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi said: "Selling juice to someone who makes it into wine is not prohibited if the intention is for trade, but if the intention is for fermentation, it is prohibited, and the same applies to planting a vineyard. Likewise, grape juice intended for fermentation or for wine. The prohibition of severing ties is threefold depending on the intention; if the intention is to sever ties with a Muslim, it is prohibited, otherwise it is not. The mourning of a woman for a deceased other than her husband is also threefold depending on the intention; if she intends to refrain from adornment and perfume for the sake of the deceased, it is prohibited for her, otherwise it is not" (2). However, even if the intention for benefit is lawful, being devoid of the intention of compliance and drawing closer to Allah renders the action devoid of reward, for there is no reward without intention. __________ (1) Our discussion is confined to validity and invalidity in terms of the consequences of sin or reward, and is not a ruling in this world. (2) Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi, al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, p. 22. [Page 373] As for when the intention of self-interest is mixed with the intention of obedience and drawing closer to Allah, this is where the disagreement and elaboration arise. Al-Qarafi - as has been clarified - distinguished between showing off (riya) and other forms of self-interest, deeming the former as forbidden and nullifying to actions. As for al-Ghazali, although he distinguished between them in terms of prohibition and permissibility, he did not differentiate between them regarding their effect on the action that is mixed with intentions. He said: "Enjoyment and pleasure are not sins, but one will be questioned about them, and whoever is held to account will be punished, while one who engages in something permissible in this world will not be punished in the Hereafter, but their enjoyment in the Hereafter will be diminished in proportion to it, and it is a great loss to hasten towards what perishes and lose out on an everlasting increase in enjoyment" (1). He said: "Now we will discuss one who is motivated by the intention of drawing closer to Allah, but this motivation is mixed with another motive, either from showing off or from other forms of self-interest. An example of this is one who fasts to benefit from the health gained through fasting while intending to draw closer to Allah, or one who frees a slave to rid himself of their burden and bad character, or one who performs Hajj to improve their health through the movement of travel, or to escape from harm that may befall them in their homeland" (2). He then said: "These self-interests, if they are the sole motivators, the severity of the matter is clear for their owner, but we are considering the case where the original intention is to draw closer to Allah and these matters are added to it" (3). He said: "The psychological motive may be equal to the religious motive, stronger than it, or weaker" (4). __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din, 4/371 - 372. (2) The same source, 4/379. (3) The same source, 4/380. (4) The same source. [Page 374] Then he said: "Know that if an action is not purely for the sake of Allah, Exalted is He, but is accompanied by a trace of showing off (riya) or personal desires, then people have differed on whether this entails reward, punishment, or nothing at all, so that it has neither merit nor demerit. As for that which is intended solely for showing off, it is certainly upon him and is a cause of condemnation and punishment. As for that which is purely for Allah, it is a cause of reward. The consideration lies in the mixed intention. The apparent reports indicate that there is no reward for it, and the reports are not free from contradiction on this matter. What seems to be the case - and knowledge is with Allah - is that one should look at the strength of the motive. If the religious motive is equal to the personal motive, they will counterbalance and cancel each other out, and the action will be neither for him nor against him. If the motive of showing off is predominant and stronger, then it is not beneficial and is, moreover, harmful and leads to punishment. Indeed, the punishment in this case is lighter than the punishment for an action that is purely for showing off and does not contain any trace of seeking closeness. However, if the intention of seeking closeness is predominant in relation to the other motive, then he will have a reward commensurate with the strength of the religious motive" (1). He also stated that seeking worldly gain is not forbidden, but seeking it through acts of religion is forbidden due to the presence of showing off and the alteration of worship from its proper place (2). __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din, 4/384. (2) The same source, 4/385. [Page 375] Al-Qarafi and al-Shatibi opposed him in this matter. As for al-Qarafi, he said: "Similarly, one who performs Hajj and associates with it the intention of trade, such that most or all of his intention is to travel for trade specifically, and Hajj is either intended alongside that or not intended at all, and it occurs as a secondary matter by agreement, this does not invalidate the Hajj nor does it incur sin or disobedience. Likewise, one who fasts to improve his health or to achieve the removal of an illness that fasting contradicts, and healing is his primary intention or part of his intention, and he undertakes fasting alongside these intentions, these intentions do not invalidate his fast. Rather, the Lawgiver commanded it in his saying - peace and blessings be upon him -: 'O young people, whoever among you is able to marry, let him do so, and whoever is not able, then let him fast, for it is a shield' (1), meaning it cuts off desires. Thus, he commanded fasting for this purpose, and if it were invalidating, he would not have commanded it in acts of worship and their like, including renewing one's ablution and intending to cool off or cleanse oneself. All these purposes do not involve glorifying the creation" (2). He then said: "Indeed, it does not prevent that these purposes mixed with worship may diminish the reward, and that if the worship is free from them, the reward increases and the reward becomes greater. As for sin and invalidation, there is no way to it" (3). __________ (1) Al-Bukhari (4637), 5/1950. And Muslim (2485), (2486), and Ibn Majah (1835). In it: for it is more lowering of the gaze and more protective of the private parts. There are narrations without: O young people. (2) Al-Qarafi, Shihab al-Din, Al-Furuq, difference 122, 3/23. (3) The same source. [Page 376] As for al-Shatibi, his opinion will be clarified in detail below; however, two matters should be noted: First, actions that are devoid of intention altogether, whether the intention is to comply or otherwise, such as the actions of the coerced, the forgetful, the sleeping, the insane, the child, and similar cases, are outside the scope of this discussion. Second, the actions that are dependent on intention for their validity and for the hope of reward in the Hereafter, or for their validity and acceptance in this world, are only the actions that are originally lawful. If the action is unlawful, then the validity of intention or the goodness of purpose does not rectify it. Al-Ghazali said: "Sins do not change their nature by intention, so the ignorant should not misunderstand this from the general statement of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), 'Actions are judged by intentions,' thinking that a sin can turn into an act of obedience by intention, like one who backbites another person to please someone else's heart, or feeds a poor person with someone else's money, or builds a school or a mosque or a ribat with unlawful money while intending good. All of this is ignorance, and intention does not affect its being oppression, aggression, and sin; rather, intending good through evil, contrary to the requirements of the Sharia, is another form of evil. If one knows this, he is opposing the Sharia. If he is ignorant of it, he is sinful due to his ignorance, as seeking knowledge is an obligation upon every Muslim. Good deeds are only recognized as good by the Sharia, so how can evil be good? Never!"(1) __________ (1) Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum al-Din, 4/368 - 369. [Page 377] Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali said: "Indeed, the entire religion revolves around performing the commanded acts, avoiding the prohibited ones, and refraining from doubtful matters" (1). He then said: "This is accomplished through two matters: the first is that the outward action conforms to the Sunnah, and this is what is encompassed in the hadith of Aisha: 'Whoever introduces something into this matter of ours that is not part of it, it is rejected' " (2). The second is that the inward intention of the action is directed towards the Face of Allah, as indicated in the hadith of Umar: "Actions are judged by intentions." Al-Fudayl said regarding the saying of Allah, { He will test you to see which of you is best in deed } (3): "It means the most sincere and the most correct." He said: "If an action is sincere but not correct, it will not be accepted; and if it is correct but not sincere, it will not be accepted until it is both sincere and correct. The sincere action is that which is for Allah, Exalted is He, and the correct action is that which is in accordance with the Sunnah" (4). Section Two The Actions of the Responsible and Their Objectives The Impact of the Objectives of the Responsible on Actions According to al-Shatibi: Actions are of two types: lawful actions and unlawful actions, and the focus of this research now is on lawful actions. As for unlawful actions, they will be the subject of the subsequent research. __________ (1) Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, Jamia al-Uloom wal-Hikam, p. 20. (2) Narrated by al-Bukhari in the chapter on reconciliation (2499), and al-Bukhari also narrated in the Book of Knowledge in the chapter on when a worker or ruler makes a mistake contrary to the Messenger without knowledge, his ruling is rejected: "Whoever performs an action that is not in accordance with our command, it is rejected," and Muslim in the chapter on judgments regarding invalid rulings and the rejection of innovations (1718), and Abu Dawood (1406), and Ibn Majah (14). And Ahmad (24840) and (24995), and in some narrations, there is a substitution for it. (3) Surah Al-Mulk, 2. And Hud, 7. (4) Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali, Jamia al-Uloom wal-Hikam, p. 20. [Page 378] And the principle: "Actions are judged by their intentions" is acknowledged by al-Shatibi in the same sense mentioned by the jurists in the previous discussion, even though he does not state it explicitly. He said: "Indeed, actions are based on intentions, and the objectives are considered in transactions of both acts of worship and customary practices, and the evidence for this meaning is not limited; it suffices for you that the objectives differentiate between what is customary and what is an act of worship, and in acts of worship, between what is obligatory and what is non-obligatory, and in customary practices, between the obligatory, the recommended, the permissible, the disliked, the prohibited, the valid, the invalid, and other rulings. A single action may be intended for one purpose and thus be an act of worship, while if intended for another purpose, it would not be so; rather, it may be intended for one thing and thus be an act of faith, and intended for another thing and thus be disbelief, such as prostrating to Allah or to an idol. Furthermore, when an action is associated with intention, it is connected to the legal rulings, and if it is devoid of intention, none of those rulings apply to it, such as the actions of a sleeping person, an inattentive person, or a madman"(1). He also said: "Indeed, all actions that fall under choice do not become acts of worship except with the intention for that. As for what is established as an act of worship, such as prayer and pilgrimage, there is no doubt about it, while customary practices do not become acts of worship except through intentions"(2). The lawful actions are either intended by the obligated person solely for compliance, which are the primary objectives, or they are intended solely for their own interests, which are the secondary objectives. Alternatively, they may intend both purposes together. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/225. (2) The same source, 2/228. [Page 379] If one intends to comply without considering what worldly benefits may come from it, then that is the purest and highest of deeds. Nevertheless, his benefits will still be attained within that. If he considers his benefits and intends them in his action, but he aims for compliance and does not seek his benefits except through the lawful means, then his action is legitimate, and there is no doubt about its validity. He says: "An action that aligns with the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) is either in accordance with the original objectives or the secondary objectives" (1). He also said: "If it aligns with the requirements of the original objectives in such a way that they are taken into account in the action, there is no doubt about its validity and soundness, whether it is free from personal gain or whether personal gain is considered, because it corresponds to the intention of the Legislator in the original legislation" (2). He said: "The primary objective, when sought by the obligated person, includes the intention of everything the Legislator intended in the action, whether it is to achieve a benefit or to avert harm. The one acting upon it intends to fulfill the command of the Legislator, either after understanding what was intended or merely out of obedience to the command. In any case, he is intending what the Legislator intended. If it is established that the intention of the Legislator is the most comprehensive and foremost of objectives, and that it is pure light untainted by ulterior motives or personal gain, then the one receiving it in this manner is taking it in a pure, complete, and untainted manner, not falling short of the Legislator's intent... As for the secondary intention, it does not entail all of that, because the one who takes the command and prohibition with the intention of personal gain has limited his intention to that gain, thus restricting its generality and failing to rise to the level of the first" (3). Therefore, he says: "When actions are based on the original objectives, obedience becomes greater, and if they are opposed, disobedience becomes greater" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/134. (2) The same source. (3) The same source, 2/225. (4) The same source, 1/141. [Page 380] This is due to his methodology regarding causes and effects. As for when the action aligns with the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), but this alignment is incidental or due to necessity, meaning it was not intended to align, then the action is valid in one sense and invalid in another. It is valid in the sense that its effects will be realized in this world; it absolves one of liability, acquires property, permits sexual relations, and nullifies any judicial claims where there is a claim. It is invalid in the sense that no reward will be assigned to it. The doer may incur blame and sin, depending on the intention and purpose, as he (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "Actions are judged by intentions." The rulings regarding acts of worship differ in this matter from those regarding customary practices. Al-Shatibi has a thorough discussion on this, which I will summarize briefly. He states: "What the servants are commanded to do falls into two categories: the first is acts of worship... and the second is customary practices. As for the first, it cannot be devoid of a worldly or otherworldly benefit; if it is otherworldly, this is a benefit established by the Sharia (1)... If it is established by the Sharia, then seeking it is valid... If the benefit sought through acts of worship is in this world, it is of two types: one type relates to the improvement of one’s reputation and the good opinion of people, and the belief in the virtue of the doer due to his action, and the other type relates to attaining one’s benefit in this world. This can be divided into two: one pertains to what concerns the individual himself, while being heedless of seeking the admiration of people through the action, and the other pertains to seeking admiration in order to gain wealth, status, or other benefits. Thus, there are three categories: the first relates to improving the opinion of people and believing in virtue; if this intention is pursued, there is no doubt that it is showing off (riya) because it is driven by the desire for praise and to be thought well of, while he still performs his obligatory or voluntary prayers, which is clear. If it is secondary, it is a matter of consideration and scholarly interpretation, and the scholars have differed on this principle" (2). Al-Shatibi tends to validate the act of worship in this case, which is when the pursuit of a good opinion of him is secondary and not primary. __________ (1) This refers to the gardens of paradise and what is therein. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/147 - 150. [Page 381] He says: "Regarding the man who prays to Allah and then finds within himself that he loves to be seen and loves to be noticed on the way to the mosque and dislikes to be noticed on the way of others... that is, the devil comes to a person when he is pleased by the sight of people seeing him doing good and says to him: 'You are showing off,' whereas this is merely something that occurs in his heart that he cannot control" (1). Then he brings his arguments for this, and continues to mention the three categories, saying: "The second is what pertains to the individual himself while being heedless of showing off to others. Among its examples is: praying in the mosque for the sake of enjoying the company of neighbors, or praying at night for the sake of monitoring or observing conditions, the second: fasting to save money or to take a break from cooking or to protect oneself from pain or an illness that is anticipated or from a previous bout of indigestion, the third: giving charity for the pleasure of generosity and favoring others... the seventh: performing ablution for the sake of cooling down, the eighth: seclusion (i'tikaf) to escape from paying rent... the eleventh: performing pilgrimage (hajj) on foot to save on transportation costs. This point is also a matter of disagreement if the mentioned intention is subordinate to the intention of worship" (2). Al-Shatibi went on to validate the worship here, although it is preferable to separate the intention of worship from the intention of worldly matters. As for the third category, he states: "The third pertains to showing off... it is the blameworthy showing off in the Sharia, and the worst of it is the actions of the hypocrites who enter Islam outwardly with the intention of securing their blood and wealth" (3). This is regarding the first category related to acts of worship, as for the second category related to customary practices, he states: "As for the second, which is that the action is a reform of the customary practices among the people, such as marriage, sale, and leasing... this is also a share that has been established by the legislator and taken into account in commands and prohibitions, and this is known from his intention through the laws set for it. If this is understood in general, then seeking it from that angle does not contradict the intention of the legislator, thus it is rightful and valid..." (4). __________ (1) The same source, 1/150. (2) The same source, 1/151 - 153. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/153. (4) The same location. [Page 382] He says: "The seeker of his share, if he does not intend compliance in any way but seeks his share in a manner that if he could achieve it in a non-permissible way, he would take it, but he is only able to do so through the permissible way—does the initial intention exist in his case...? The answer is that it exists... because if he has no way to reach his share through the non-permissible, then his return to the permissible way is an intention towards it, and the intention towards the permissible way includes compliance with the command or acting according to the permission, which is the original first intention even if he is not consciously aware of it in detail" (1). He says: "To act with the awareness of compliance out of necessity, like one who intends to gain pleasure from a certain woman, and when he cannot do so through fornication due to her refusal or the prohibition by her family, he contracts a marriage to reach his goal—this is also invalid in the second sense because he only returns to the ruling of compliance out of necessity and insofar as it leads to his objective, not because of the permissibility of the Sharia, even though it is not invalid in the first sense. An example of this is the zakat taken under duress, which is valid in the first sense if it absolves the obligation and clears the debt, but invalid in this second sense" (2). The meaning of the two texts above is that the act itself in marriage or zakat, there is no sin in the first and it absolves the debt in the second; the act itself is valid, while the invalidity, and perhaps the sin attached to it, is due to another act, which is his intention and purpose of disobedience, and this is from the actions of the heart. __________ (1) The same source, 2/155 - 156. (2) The same source, 1/207. [Page 383] To clarify al-Shatibi's position here accurately, it is necessary to point out his distinction between performing an action that aligns with the intention of the Lawgiver with the intention of compliance out of necessity, as in the marriage mentioned above, and performing the same action without regard for compliance or non-compliance, where the compliance occurred by coincidence, that is, without intention on the part of the obligated person, and performing the same action but with the intention of non-compliance, where the compliance occurred by mistake. As for the first, it has been clarified. As for the second, its ruling is invalidity in acts of worship, and in customary matters, it is valid(1). As for the third, its ruling is like the second... In all cases, sin attaches to one who intends to oppose the intention of the Lawgiver or to one who does not regard it. He says: "If one intends to oppose the command of the Lawgiver, then whether in acts of worship he complies or opposes, what he opposes is not considered because it is contrary to the intention in general. In customary matters, the original ruling is to consider what complies and not what opposes, because what does not require intention for its validity in actions does not regard compliance with the legal intention or its opposition, like one who contracts a contract intending it to be invalid but it turns out to be valid, or one who drinks a syrup thinking it is wine, except that he bears the sin for intending to oppose. As for one who does not intend compliance or non-compliance, he is acting merely out of chance or negligence, and its ruling in acts of worship is invalidity due to lack of intention to comply, and in customary matters, it is valid if it complies with the intention of the Lawgiver"(2). That is, the intention of compliance is a condition for the validity of acts of worship, whereas for customary actions it is not. The actions of customary practices are not invalidated or rendered corrupt by the absence of the intention of compliance, nor if the intention of compliance did not cross one's mind. He said: "When an action occurs in accordance with the subordinate objectives (maqasid al-tabi'a), it can either be accompanied by the primary objectives (maqasid al-asliya) or not. As for the first, it is an action of compliance without doubt, even if it is a pursuit for personal gain; and as for the second, it is an action driven solely by desire and inclination."(3) __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/156 - 157. (2) The same place. (3) The same source, 2/142. [Page 384] Then al-Shatibi explained his meaning of companionship and inclination, saying: "Companionship is either through action, an example of which is to say, for instance: this food or this clothing, or this tangible object has been permitted for me by the Sharia to enjoy, so I enjoy what is permitted and work to obtain it because it is allowed. Or it is through potential, an example of which is entering into the causation of that permitted thing from the allowed avenue, but the very permission did not cross his mind; rather, it occurred to him that this is reached through such and such a path. If he reaches it through that, then in ruling it is like the first, provided that the path leading to the permitted is permissible from his side, except that companionship through action is superior" (1). Thus, al-Shatibi contradicts, indeed opposes, al-Ghazali significantly on this issue, especially regarding the topic of sincerity and sharing in objectives. He says: "If it is said: how can the intention of the legislator for sincerity in ordinary actions and the prohibition of sharing in them be achieved? It is said: this means that they should be performed according to what is legislated. They should not be intended for a pre-Islamic act, nor a satanic innovation, nor resemble those outside the faith, such as drinking water or honey in the manner of drinking wine, or eating what is made to glorify the festivals of the Jews or Christians even if made by a Muslim, or what is slaughtered in imitation of pre-Islamic practices, and similar acts that are a form of glorifying polytheism" (2). This is the elaboration of what he stated in the Book of Rulings, where he said: "Ordinary matters are only considered valid if they do not contradict the intention of the legislator, and the appearance of agreement is not a condition" (3). Agreement and disagreement with the intention of the legislator: __________ (1) The same source. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/143. (3) The same source, 1/181. [Page 385] It has been previously clarified that the objectives of the Legislator (maqasid al-sharia) are of two types: original and subsidiary. The original objectives are those for which there is no consideration for the obligated person (mukallaf). They mean performing an action or refraining from it based on a command or prohibition without regard to interests or outcomes, and interests only arise within the framework of obligation. As for the subsidiary objectives, they are legal objectives that take into account the interests of the obligated person, such as ownership and enjoyment, and so forth. These are objectives that the obligated person may intend through their actions, and Allah - Exalted is He - has legislated rulings for their sake. Thus, the rulings are causes for them, and these interests are legal objectives, so it is permissible for the obligated person to intend them through these causes, just as it is permissible for them not to intend them, but rather to intend compliance only through those causes. According to rational division, the actions of the accountable person (mukallaf) may conform to the command and prohibition, making the form of the action legitimate. However, the intention of the doer behind their action may be lawful or unlawful, meaning it may be in accordance with the law or contrary to it. Similarly, an action can be contrary to a command or prohibition, so the form of the act may be unlawful, but the intention of the doer may be lawful or unlawful. These are four categories that al-Shatibi elaborated on. Although there was a previous mention of some of this in the earlier discussion, it was in terms of conformity or non-conformity to the intent of the legislator, and not in terms of opposition to the intent of the legislator. There is a fifth category that will be referred to after explaining these four categories, which is when the action is legal (shar'i) and the intention is legal (shar'i), but the action was not legislated for this intention, rather for another. Similarly, the benefit or intention in general was not intended by the legislator (shari') with this action, but rather with another. This is like the act of cutting off a hand; it is a legal action, and the intention of deterrence is a legal intention. However, cutting off the hand of an apostate or a fornicator is not legal. This is because cutting off the hand, which is legal, was not established for deterring the apostate or the fornicator, even though deterring them is legal. [Page 386] As for the four categories, al-Shatibi says: "The doer of the action or the one who leaves it may either have his action or his abandonment in accordance with or in opposition to the law, and in both cases, his intention may be to comply with or to oppose the law, thus all are four categories. The first is that he acts in accordance with the law and intends to comply, such as prayer, fasting, charity, pilgrimage, and others, which are intended to fulfill Allah's command and perform what is obligatory or recommended. Likewise, abandoning adultery, alcohol, and other immoralities is intended for compliance, so there is no doubt about the validity of this action. The second is that he acts in opposition and intends to oppose, such as abandoning obligatory acts and committing prohibitions intentionally; this is also evident in its ruling. The third is that the action or abandonment is in accordance with the law while the intention is to oppose, which has two types: one is that he does not know that the action or abandonment is in accordance, and the other is that he knows it. The first is like a man who has intercourse with his wife thinking she is a foreign woman, or a drinker of jallab thinking it is alcohol, and one who abandons prayer believing it is still due upon him while he has actually performed it and is free from it in reality. This type has the intention of disobedience through opposition" (1). He said: "When we look at his intention, we find him violating the sanctity of the command and prohibition, so he is disobedient merely by intention, but not disobedient merely by action. The reality is that he is sinful in relation to the right of Allah, but not sinful in relation to the right of the servant, like the usurper who thinks he is taking the property of the one from whom it is usurped, while it is actually the property of the usurper himself. Thus, there is no claim against him from the one he intended to usurp from, but there is a claim against him in relation to the sanctity of the command and prohibition. The principle is that every obligation includes the right of Allah and the right of the servant" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/234. (2) The same source, 2/235, and we will discuss in a separate study in this chapter about the right of Allah and the right of the servant. [Page 387] As for the second type, he said: "The second is that the action or abstention is in accordance, but he is aware of the conformity, and yet he intends to oppose it. An example of this is praying for show to gain worldly benefits, or to gain respect among people, or to avert death from himself, and the like. This category is more severe than the previous one, and its essence is that this worker has made the legal subjects that were intended as means for other matters, which the Legislator did not intend them for, thus it includes hypocrisy, ostentation, and tricks against the rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, and all of this is invalid because the intention opposes the intention of the Legislator in essence, so it is not valid at all" (1). As for the fourth category, which is that the action or abstention is contrary while the intention is in accordance, al-Shatibi elaborates and expands on it. He says: "The fourth category is that the action or abstention is contrary while the intention is in accordance; it is also of two types. One is that it is done with knowledge of the opposition, and the other is that it is done in ignorance of it. If it is done with knowledge of the opposition, this is innovation, such as establishing new acts of worship and additions to what has been legislated. However, it is common that one does not dare to do this except with a type of interpretation, and yet it is condemned as stated in the Qur'an and the Sunnah" (2). As for if the action is contrary to the command or prohibition while being ignorant of the opposition, but the intention is in accordance with the intention of the Legislator and the worker intends to conform, this is a matter of consideration, ijtihad, and disagreement, and there is no single rule regarding its judgment. Al-Shatibi indicated that it is a thorny issue. This is because it cannot be judged as invalid since the correctness of the intention in the action affects the ruling on it, nor can it be judged as valid since the opposition to the command and prohibition also affects it. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/236. (2) The same source. [Page 388] He said: "If the action is contrary while being ignorant of the contradiction, there are two perspectives. The first is that the intention is in accordance, so it is not contrary from this angle. Although the action is contrary, actions are judged by intentions, and the intention of this worker is one of compliance; however, ignorance has led him to the contradiction. One who does not intend to oppose the Lawgiver outright does not fall under the category of intentional contradiction in both intention and action. Thus, his action, from this perspective, is generally considered, and there is no absolute rejection of it. The second perspective is that the action is indeed contrary, for the intention of the Lawgiver in commanding and prohibiting is compliance. If he does not comply, then he has opposed that intention, and the contradiction of intention does not negate the compliance that motivates the action because the intention of the Lawgiver was not achieved in that action in any way, nor did the intention align with the action, resulting in the whole being contrary, just as if both were contradicted together, thus compliance is not achieved" (1). He then said: "Both perspectives oppose each other in themselves and also oppose each other in terms of preference, for if you prefer one, the other presents a reason for preference, leading to mutual opposition. Therefore, this matter has become obscure in the Sharia" (2). __________ (1) The same source, 2/238. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/238. [Page 389] The lack of compliance leads to a ruling of invalidity, except that the validity of intention with ignorance of the violation necessitates the correction that ignorance may occur in the Sharia in the same way as forgetfulness or error for which there is no accountability (1). Therefore, some of these actions may be rectified. However, he did not clarify a principle regarding this. He said: "If it is said: His (peace and blessings be upon him) statement: 'Actions are judged by intentions' indicates that these actions, even if they are in violation, may be considered, for the intentions are the souls of actions, thus the action has become a body with a soul in general. If that is the case, it is considered, unlike when the intention is in conflict with the action or when both are in conflict, for then it is a body without a soul, and it does not fulfill the implication of his statement: 'Actions are judged by intentions' due to the lack of intention in the action. It is said that if this is conceded, it is opposed by his (peace and blessings be upon him) statement: 'Every action not in accordance with our command is rejected' (2), and this action is not in accordance with his command (peace and blessings be upon him), thus it is not considered but rather rejected. Also, just as a body without a soul is of no benefit, so too is a soul without a body" (3). Then he said: "Thus, the issue was very problematic" (4). Thus, should the aspect of the compliant intention be considered to validate the action, or should the aspect of the conflicting action be considered to invalidate the action, or should both aspects be considered? (5). __________ (1) This is unlike what we mentioned from al-Ghazali in the previous discussion of this chapter. (2) This was previously cited in relation to the hadith: "Whoever introduces something into this matter of ours that is not part of it, it is rejected." (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/239. (4) The same location. (5) We note here that the violation is with ignorance of the violation, meaning with the assumption that it is not a violation. [Page 390] Al-Shatibi (may Allah have mercy on him) holds that it is necessary to apply both sides; what can be corrected should be corrected, such as forgetfulness (sahw) in prayer. What can be avoided should be avoided, as in the case of the missing person (mufqood) if his wife marries another man and he returns. The error can be rectified by prioritizing the first husband, or the first husband is prioritized if he returns before her marriage. What cannot be rectified is disregarded. Al-Shatibi's statement on this is: "And disregard what must be disregarded that cannot be rectified" (1). An example of this is eating forgetfully during Ramadan, and in the case of the missing person, if his wife marries and he returns after her marriage, she belongs to the second husband (2). Among Al-Shatibi's statements regarding the application of both sides is his saying: "So apply the implications of agreement in lifting the punishment and penalty, and apply the implications of disagreement in not relying on that action and not building upon it, until what must be corrected is corrected, leaning towards the intention as well, and disregard what must be disregarded that cannot be rectified" (3). He said: "Count those who err in actions and statements as ignorant of the ruling of the forgetful" (4). He stated: "This is evident in purification (taharah), prayer (salah), fasting (sawm), pilgrimage (hajj), and other acts of worship, as well as in many customary matters such as marriage (nikah), divorce (talaq), foods, and drinks, and it is supported by evidence indicating the lifting of accountability for error and forgetfulness. As for errors in financial matters, the aspect of intention is considered regarding the Hereafter, while the aspect of action is considered concerning the rights of others in this world. Therefore, it is liable for compensation, and ignorance in this regard is treated like knowledge or intent. He said: "In financial matters, it is liable for compensation in ignorance and intent because we say: the ruling on liability for property is different, as the error in it is equivalent to intent in the resulting liability for its destruction" (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/240. (2) The same source, and the issue has details we are not addressing. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/240. (4) The same source. (5) The same source, 2/241. [Page 391] It is agreed upon that an error in action, if it is not intended to contravene, or if it is intended to comply with the intention of the Lawgiver, then the accountability in the Hereafter for it is lifted. It is also agreed upon that this accountability is not lifted absolutely, whether in this world or the Hereafter. Al-Shatibi said: "And in the hadith: 'Mistakes, forgetfulness, and what one is compelled to do are lifted from my community' (1), and this is a generally agreed-upon meaning with no opposition, although they differ regarding the lifting of accountability: whether it is specific to the accountability in the Hereafter or not. They also did not disagree that the lifting of accountability in general is not valid" (2)(3). As for the fifth category, which is that the action is lawful and the intention is lawful, but the action was not legislated for this intention, or was not established in the law as a cause for this effect, it has been clarified within the fourth type of the objectives of the Lawgiver under the title of the legal connection between the cause and the effect. The following is its explanation as mentioned by al-Shatibi in the section on the objectives of the obligated person. __________ (1) Narrated by Ibn Majah in the chapter on the divorce of the compelled and the forgetful (2033) and (2034) with the wording: "Indeed, Allah has overlooked" instead of "lifted." And (2035) with the wording "placed." (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/241. (3) Al-Suyuti said: "Know that the legal maxim is: 'Forgetfulness and ignorance absolve one from sin absolutely.' As for the ruling, if they occur in neglecting a commanded act, it does not absolve, rather it must be rectified, and the reward associated with it is not attained due to the lack of compliance, or in performing a prohibited act that is not in the category of damage, then there is nothing in it, or if it involves damage, the liability is not lifted. If it incurs punishment, it is a doubt regarding its abrogation." Al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair, pp. 239 - 240. And see the discussion on the ignorant, the forgetful, and the compelled, pp. 337 - 374 of the same book. [Page 392] He said: "The intention of the legislator (shari') for the accountable person (mukallaf) is that their intention in action should align with the intention in legislation" (1), meaning that the accountable person, even if they act with the intention of compliance in accordance with the command and prohibition, that is, according to the original objectives (maqasid), must also ensure that the intended outcomes, if they exist for the accountable person (2), align with the subsidiary objectives. If the accountable person intends from the action a benefit, a gain, or an outcome, then this outcome must be one that the legislator intended to achieve through this action. Otherwise, intending it through this action or this means signifies a contradiction to the intention of the legislator. The objectives of the legislation have been established by the legislator through specific actions, so if the accountable person intends through these actions objectives other than those, this constitutes a violation in that the accountable person has made these objectives means to others, which they are not in the law, and it is also a violation in that the legal objectives intended by the accountable person have specific actions designated by the legislator, thus adopting actions other than what the legislator has established is neglecting what Allah has legislated. Al-Shatibi said: "Whoever seeks in the obligations of the Sharia something other than what it was legislated for has contradicted the Sharia, and whoever contradicts it, their action in contradiction is void. So whoever seeks in the obligations of the Sharia what was not legislated for them, their action is void" (3). He also said: "If the accountable person intends exactly what the legislator intended by permission, they have sought the path of benefit in its most complete form, and they are worthy of attaining it. But if they intend something other than what the legislator intended, this is usually due to the misconception that the benefit lies in what they intended, for the rational person does not directly intend the path of harm. They have made what the legislator intended neglected in consideration, and what the legislator neglected as an intended consideration, which is a clear opposition to the Sharia" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/230. (2) We have previously mentioned that the accountable person can intend their gains through legal actions alongside their intention of compliance, and they may also not intend them; hence we said: if they exist for the accountable person. If they do not intend them and only intend compliance, they will attain them as part of their compliance, and this action is purer and of a higher rank. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/231. (4) The same source. [Page 393] He said: "The accountable person (mukallaf) is only obligated to perform actions based on the intention of the legislator (shari') behind the command and prohibition. If the intention is something other than that, then it becomes, by the intention of the one intending (qasid), a means to what he intended, not the objectives, since he did not intend the intention of the legislator, so it becomes intended for another purpose, making the action or abstention a means to it. Thus, what is considered by the legislator as intended becomes a means for him, and what has this characteristic nullifies the legislator's decree and undermines what he has established" (1). He said: "The one who takes what is legislated (mashru') without the intention of the legislator towards that objective is indeed taking something that is not truly legislated, because the legislator only legislated it for a known purpose by obligation. Therefore, if he takes it with the intention of something other than that known purpose, he has not brought forth that legislated matter at all. If he has not brought it forth, he contradicts the legislator in that taking, as he becomes like one who acts contrary to what he was commanded and neglects what he was commanded" (2). Section Three Legal Devices (Hiyal) Definition: Al-Shatibi said in defining legal devices: "Its essence is presenting an action that appears permissible to invalidate a legal ruling and to transform it in appearance into another ruling" (3). He said: "Like the one who gifts his wealth at the end of the year to evade zakat. For the essence of the gift is permissible, and if zakat were to be prevented without a gift, it would be prohibited" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/232. (2) Same source. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/114. Ibn Najim al-Hanafi said in his book al-Ashbah wa al-Nazair: "The art of legal devices is the collection of hila, which is the skill in managing affairs. It is the turning of thought until one finds a solution." He said: "Our scholars, may Allah have mercy on them, differed in expressing this, with many choosing to express it as the Book of Legal Devices, while many chose the Book of Legal Loopholes," p. 477. (4) Same source. [Page 394] The rulings that can be reversed are those that exist or are lifted based on causes, conditions, or impediments, such that the accountable person (mukallaf) has a hand in creating or removing these causes, conditions, or impediments. If he does not have a hand in them because they are beyond his capacity, then legal stratagems (hiyal) do not apply, because a stratagem is an action of the accountable person. Al-Shatibi said: "The actions that occur in existence which necessitate matters for which they are legislated or established fall into two categories. One is beyond the capacity of the accountable person, and the other can be included within his capacity. The former can be a cause, a condition, or an impediment" (1). A cause is like the necessity that permits the consumption of carrion, the fear of hardship that permits the marriage of female slaves, the incontinence that exempts one from the obligation of ablution for each prayer in the presence of an external factor, and the setting or rising of the sun or the dawn that necessitates those prayers and similar matters. Conditions are like the passing of a year being a condition for the obligation of zakat, and reaching puberty being a condition for accountability in general, and the ability to deliver being a condition for the validity of a sale, and maturity being a condition for managing an orphan's wealth, and sending messengers being a condition for reward and punishment, and matters of that nature. An impediment is like menstruation being an impediment to sexual intercourse, divorce, circumambulation of the House, the obligation of prayers, and fasting, and insanity being an impediment to performing acts of worship and exercising control over affairs, and similar matters. __________ (1) The same source, 1/128 - 129. [Page 395] The second type is that which is within the capacity of the accountable person (mukallaf). They are able to create the cause, condition, or impediment, or they can remove it, thereby causing a change in the legal ruling. Examples of this include: "As for the cause, it is like the marriage being a cause for inheritance between the spouses, the prohibition of marriage relations by marriage (mahram) and the permissibility of enjoyment, and slaughter being a cause for the permissibility of eating, and travel being a cause for the permissibility of shortening prayers and breaking the fast, and killing and wounding being causes for retribution (qisas), and adultery, drinking alcohol, theft, and slander being causes for the imposition of those punishments, and similar matters" (1). Examples of the condition include the marriage being a condition for the occurrence of divorce or for the permissibility of reconciling with a divorced woman after three divorces, and the ability to defend oneself being a condition for stoning the adulterer, and purity being a condition for the validity of prayer, and intention being a condition for acts of worship" (2). Examples of the impediment include "the marriage to a sister being an impediment to marrying another sister, and the marriage to a woman being an impediment to marrying her aunt or maternal aunt, and faith being an impediment to retribution for the disbeliever, and disbelief being an impediment to the acceptance of good deeds" (3). Thus, in this second type, the accountable person can perform these actions which are causes, conditions, or impediments for others, thereby causing a change in the legal ruling. They may perform these actions with the intention of complying with the command of the legislator in them or achieving their legal objectives, or with the intention of changing the rulings. If it is with the intention of changing the rulings, it is termed legal stratagems (hiyal). Therefore, al-Shatibi frequently mentioned legal stratagems when discussing these three aspects of legal rulings: cause, condition, and impediment (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/129. (2) The same source, 1/130. (3) The same source, 1/130. (4) The same source, 1/ Book of Rulings. [Page 396] Al-Shatibi said in an additional explanation regarding legal stratagems for the purpose of examining the ruling of Sharia on them: "Before considering their validity or lack thereof, it is necessary to explain this stratagem. Allah, Exalted is He, has mandated certain things and prohibited others, either absolutely without any condition or arrangement based on a cause, such as the obligation of prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and similar acts, and as He has prohibited adultery, usury, murder, and the like. He has also mandated certain things contingent upon causes. Likewise, He has prohibited others, such as the obligation of zakat, expiations, fulfilling vows, and the right of preemption for a partner, as well as the prohibition of the divorced woman and the benefit from what is usurped or stolen, and similar matters. If a person responsible for fulfilling these obligations causes the removal of that obligation from himself or makes that which is prohibited permissible through some means of causation, so that the obligation appears not to be obligatory or the prohibition appears to be lawful, this causation is called a stratagem (hila) or legal stratagem (tahhil). For instance, if the time for prayer arrives while he is present, and it becomes obligatory for him to pray four units, he may seek to cause the removal of all of them by drinking alcohol or taking a mind-altering medicine until the time passes and he is devoid of his senses, like one who has fainted. Or he may shorten the prayer by initiating a journey to shorten it. Similarly, if someone is overshadowed by the month of Ramadan, he may travel to eat, or if he has wealth sufficient for pilgrimage, he may gift it away or destroy it in some manner to avoid the obligation of pilgrimage. Likewise, if he desires to have intercourse with another's slave girl, he may seize her and claim she has died, then be compensated for her value and have intercourse with her that way, or he may present false witnesses for the marriage of a virgin with her consent, and the judge rules accordingly. Or if he wishes to sell ten dirhams for twenty on credit, he may set the ten dirhams as the price for a garment and then sell the garment back to the original seller for twenty on credit. Or if he intends to kill someone, he may set a prepared trap for him, such as setting a spear or digging a well, and similarly, he may evade the obligation of zakat by gifting away the wealth or destroying it, or by gathering what is scattered or dispersing what is gathered, and so on with other examples of making the unlawful permissible and removing the obligatory."(1) The ruling of Sharia on stratagems according to al-Shatibi: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/265 - 266. [Page 397] Al-Shatibi (may Allah have mercy on him) held that legal stratagems (hiyal) in religion are generally not permissible, and this means that there are very few cases in which legal stratagems are allowed. Therefore, it is necessary to have a criterion to determine the cases in which legal stratagems are permissible. Legal stratagems are actions undertaken by a legally responsible person with the intention of changing a legal ruling, which contradicts the intention of the Lawgiver. So, what are the cases in which this contradiction is valid? Al-Shatibi's answer is that if this contradiction is intended to oppose the objectives of the Lawgiver, then it is prohibited. However, if this contradiction is intended to preserve the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), then it is permissible. He said: "The legal ruses (hiyal) in religion in the mentioned sense are not generally permissible"(1). It has been previously stated that legal ruses can occur in causes, conditions, and impediments. An example of this in causes is as he said: "In the school, if someone swears by divorce that so-and-so will pay his due by a certain time, then fears breaking his oath due to non-payment, he may divorce his wife until the time elapses and the oath is broken, and he is not considered to have a wife, as the breaking of the oath does not apply to him, even though his intention is blameworthy and his action is blameworthy because he has resorted to a ruse that invalidated a right. Thus, the violation is prohibited even if it resulted in the avoidance of breaking the oath"(2). Another example is: "The ruses of the people of 'aina in making the commodity an intermediary in selling one dinar for two dinars for a deferred payment"(3). __________ (1) The same source, 2/266. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/170. (3) The same location. [Page 398] Among the examples regarding conditions, he said: "If his action or inaction is intended as a condition to negate the effect of the cause so that no consequence follows from it, then this is an invalid action and a futile endeavor"(1). And he said: "This action renders what has established a cause for a legal ruling, whether for the sake of bringing about a benefit or preventing a harm, as mere play with no ruling or benefit in it. This contradicts what has been established in the principle of interests (masalih) that they are taken into account in rulings, and it is also contrary to the intention of the Legislator (Shari') in that when the cause has been established and exists, it becomes a legal requirement for its effect, but it is contingent upon the fulfillment of a condition that completes the cause. Thus, this actor or one who refrains, intending to negate the ruling of the cause, is aiming to oppose the Legislator in establishing a cause. It has become clear that opposing the intention of the Legislator is invalid, so this action is void"(2). Accordingly, if the accountable person (mukallaf) performs an action with the intention of nullifying a ruling, then their action is blameworthy because it opposes the intent of the Lawgiver. However, if they perform it for a reason related to lawful benefit (manfa'a mashru'a), then it is permissible even if it results in nullifying a cause or changing a ruling, and this does not fall under legal tricks (hiyal) at all. He said in response to those who claim that it is permissible to use legal tricks, such as spending all or part of one's wealth before the due date to avoid the obligation of zakat: "This reasoning only applies if one does not intend to negate the ruling of the cause; however, if the intention is to do so, it is an invalid reasoning because the Sharia has definitively annulled it"(3). He then said: "This is only because he has introduced a condition or removed a condition that negates what the first cause necessitated; likewise, the one who spends his due amount with the intention of negating what is required of him in terms of obligatory payment"(4). He then said: "Thus, bringing about conditions or removing them with that intention is what is prohibited, and if it is prohibited, it contradicts the intention of the Lawgiver, and therefore it is invalid"(5). __________ (1) The same source, 2/192. (2) The same source, 2/193, and see: al-Muwafaqat, vol. 1, issues 11, 12, 13, 14 from the discussion on causes in the second section of the book of rulings. (3) The same source, 1/193. (4) The same source, 1/194. (5) The same place. [Page 399] One of the examples of a barrier is a man who has the minimum threshold for zakat but is in debt; the debt prevents him from fulfilling his zakat obligation. If he incurred the debt out of necessity, there is no issue with that. However, if he took on debt to avoid the obligation of zakat, this is an incorrect action. He said: "And if it is the second case, which is that he does it, for example, as a means of preventing the effect of the cause that necessitates that what is required does not occur, then this is an incorrect action." (1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/201. [Page 400] This is al-Shatibi's position on legal tricks (hiyal), which is that they are not permissible based on the fact that they contradict the intent of the Legislator. As for his statement: "not permissible in general," it means that there are cases in which legal tricks are permissible. The decisive factor in this is the intention of the obligated person; if their intention in lifting or changing the ruling contradicts the intent of the Legislator, then it is a blameworthy trick, but if their intention in the trick, that is, in changing the ruling, preserves the intent of the Legislator, then it is a permissible trick. An example of a permissible trick according to him is a believer uttering a word of disbelief under compulsion with the intention of preserving their life. He says: "If this is established, then the tricks that have been previously invalidated, condemned, and prohibited are those that undermine a legal foundation and contradict a legal interest. If we assume that the trick does not undermine a legal foundation nor contradict a legal interest recognized by the Sharia, then it is not included in the prohibition and is not invalid" (1). This is the criterion or principle for him regarding the permissibility or invalidity of tricks. Based on this, tricks in terms of their ruling are divided into three categories. He said: "The matter regarding them is that they are of three categories: the first is unanimously agreed upon as invalid, such as the tricks of hypocrites and show-offs; the second is unanimously agreed upon as permissible, such as uttering a word of disbelief under compulsion, for the ratio of trickery in preserving blood with the first intention without believing in its implications is like the ratio of trickery with the word of Islam in preserving blood with the first intention as well. However, the latter is permitted due to being a worldly interest with no inherent corruption either in this world or the Hereafter, unlike the former, which is not permitted due to being an inherent corruption in the Hereafter. Worldly interests and corruptions in the Hereafter are prioritized in consideration over worldly interests and corruptions by consensus, as it is not valid to consider a worldly interest that undermines the interests of the Hereafter. It is known that what undermines the interests of the Hereafter is not in accordance with the intent of the Legislator, thus it is invalid. This is why there has come condemnation of hypocrisy and its people as it has. And likewise, all that follows this reasoning. Both categories reach the level of certainty. __________ (1) The same source, 2/270. [Page 401] As for the third, it is the place of ambiguity and confusion, and the views of the scholars have diverged regarding it, as there has not been a clear, definitive evidence to establish its connection to either the first or second category. Nor has a purpose been clarified by the legislator that is agreed upon as intended, nor has it been shown that it contradicts the public interest (maslaha) for which the Sharia was established concerning the specific issue at hand. Thus, this category has become a subject of dispute among the disputants, with some testifying that it does not contradict the public interest, making the trickery permissible, while others argue that it contradicts the public interest, rendering the trickery impermissible. It cannot be said that one who permits trickery in some issues acknowledges that it contradicts the intention of the legislator; rather, they permit it based on their understanding of his intention, and that their issue falls under the category of permissible trickery that the legislator intended" (1). It is well known that the opinion of permitting trickery is attributed to the Hanafis. Therefore, al-Shatibi's division of trickery into three categories serves as a basis for reconciling the disagreement regarding the ruling on trickery to an agreement, which is the agreement on considering the principle or rule that the ruling on trickery depends on whether it undermines a legal principle or contradicts a legal interest or not. The issues of trickery that have caused disagreement revert to this principle. He mentioned two examples of these issues. The first is the marriage in which trickery is employed to make permissible the divorced woman for her husband after three divorces. The second is the sales of deferred payments where trickery is used to sell one dirham for two dirhams on credit. He mentioned the arguments of those who permit these tricks and the arguments of those who prohibit them. He clarified while explaining the two opinions that they revert to the pursuit of aligning with the intention of the legislator and not contradicting it, as well as aligning with the legal interests that the Sharia has recognized and not contradicting them. He then said: "Let us suffice with these two examples, for they are among the most famous issues in the realm of trickery, and the reasoning applied to them can be applied to other matters" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/270 - 271. (2) The same source, 2/273. See also 2/270 - 273. [Page 402] It is worth mentioning here that the issues of legal tricks (hiyal) intertwine with the issues of legal means (dhara'i) since the trick itself is a means. Just as al-Shatibi categorized legal tricks into three types, the means are also categorized into three types. He said while discussing the tricks whose rulings are disputed: "The statement of the one who says that this is based on the principle of the means is not beneficial here, for the means are of three types: some of which are agreed upon to be prohibited ... some of which are not agreed upon to be prohibited ... and some of which are disputed" (1). Furthermore, the principle regarding the ruling on tricks is based on the original outcomes of actions. He said: "Among them (2) is the principle of tricks, for its well-known reality is the presentation of an action that appears permissible to nullify a legal ruling and to superficially transform it into another ruling, so the outcome of the action here is a breach of the principles of the Sharia in reality" (3). He then said: "But this is on the condition of intending to nullify the legal rulings, and those who permit tricks, like Abu Hanifa, also consider the outcome" (4). He then said: "But this is on the condition that one does not intend to nullify the ruling, for this specific intention is prohibited as it is defiance against the legislator, just as if one refrains from paying zakat. Abu Hanifa does not disagree that the intention to explicitly nullify the rulings is clearly prohibited. As for nullifying them implicitly, that is not the case; otherwise, gifting would be prohibited at the end of the year altogether, and no one among them would say this. Therefore, they agreed on the prohibition of intending through faith, prayer, and others merely to secure oneself and wealth, like the hypocrites and the show-offs, and the like. Thus, it becomes clear that trickery regarding legal rulings is generally invalid when considering the outcome" (5). __________ (1) The same source, 2/273. (2) That is: and among the principles based on the original outcomes of actions. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/114. (4) The same location. (5) The same location. [Page 403] He said: "Similarly, the same applies to legal tricks (hiyal) according to those who permit them unconditionally, for they base their allowance on the belief that the legislator (al-shari) has an intention in bringing about benefits (masalih) and preventing harms (mafasid). Indeed, the Sharia was established for this purpose. For example, if the marriage of the one who makes permissible (muhallil) is validated, it is validated on the assumption that it is likely that the intention of the legislator is to permit the attainment of the benefit of the two spouses in it, and likewise for other issues, as evidenced by the validity of pronouncing the word of disbelief (kufr) out of fear of killing or torture and in other general and specific benefits. It is not possible to establish a proof in the Sharia that invalidates every legal trick, just as there is no proof that validates every legal trick. Rather, only those that oppose the intention of the legislator are invalidated, and this is agreed upon by all the people of Islam, while there is disagreement in the issues where the evidences conflict."(1) The ruling on what is based on legal tricks: If what we have explained is the ruling on legal tricks, what is the ruling on what results from legal tricks in this world? Al-Shatibi mentions that the practice of legal tricks is of two types: either it is considered existent and results follow from it, or it is considered non-existent. If its existence is acknowledged, there is a disagreement on the matter. However, if it is deemed non-existent, nothing that the obligated person intends will result from it. He says: "The ruling that the cause necessitated remains as it was before this action, and the action is null and void, of no benefit and has no ruling, such as when one gifts property before a year to someone who has persuaded him to return it to him after the year as a gift or otherwise. And like the one who gathers the separated (things) until the messenger comes, then it is returned to separation, or the one who separates the gathered (things) likewise, then it is returned to what it was."(2) Thus, the action that is a legal trick in this case is considered as non-existent or not realized. However, if the action is deemed existent, there are three opinions on the matter: __________ (1) The same source, 2/234. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/194. [Page 404] The first: It is that the action is invalid because it contradicts the intention of the legislator, so its effects do not follow from it, and it is akin to what is considered non-existent in terms of its effects. The difference between them is that there was no agreement on the return of the gift, or it did not revert to the gathering after separation or to the separation after gathering. He said: "The intention in it has become non-legitimate, so the action in it is contrary to the intention of the legislator, and it is in the ruling of what has not been acted upon, and it is united with the first category(1) in ruling, so no ruling follows from this action. An example of this is if one spends the nisab before the year in its benefits or gifts it in a gift that he does not return, or gathers the separated or separates the gathered, all with the intention of evading zakat, but he did not return to what he was before the year."(2) Then he said: "So it is like the nonexistent, invalid, and it is joined with the first category."(3) The second: It is that this action with this intention is non-legitimate and involves disobedience, yet its effects do follow. So the one intending to travel for the purpose of breaking the fast and shortening the prayer achieves that, and the marriage of the divorced woman three times with the intention of making her lawful for her ex-husband is valid by her divorce. He said: "And upon this principle is based the validity of what al-Lakhmi says regarding the one who donates part of his wealth to exempt himself from zakat, or travels in Ramadan with the intention of breaking the fast, or delays a prayer that is due from its preferred time to pray it in travel as two rak'ahs. Or a woman delays a prayer after its time has entered in the hope that she will menstruate so that it is lifted from her. He said: All of this is disliked, and it is not obligatory upon this in travel to fast nor to pray four rak'ahs, nor for the menstruating woman to make up her prayer."(4) __________ (1) The first category is the one mentioned above where the action is considered as if it does not exist. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/195. (3) The same source. (4) The same source, 1/196. [Page 405] The third: differentiating between the rights of Allah and the rights of human beings. The rights of human beings refer to the rights of the servant himself who performs the action that is a means. The effects of the action are based on whether it is a right of the servant. Its effects are nullified if it is a right of Allah. An example of the right of the servant is traveling to shorten prayers or to break the fast. An example of the right of Allah is the distinction between the community and the gathering of those who are separated in zakat. He said: "And the third is to differentiate between the rights of Allah, Exalted is He, and the rights of human beings"(1). However, if both rights are combined in one action, the right of Allah, Exalted is He, and the right of the servant, then the matter becomes one of consideration and ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) to favor one of the two sides, and the ruling will be for the dominant side according to the jurist. He said: "And what remains is that if both rights are combined, it is a matter of consideration and ijtihad to favor one of the two sides according to what appears to the jurist, and Allah knows best"(2). The right of Allah and the right of the servant: These two expressions are used to refer to what the obligated person has no choice in, which is the right of Allah, and to what they have a choice in, which is the right of the servant. The meaning of the right of the servant is that he is legally free to either claim his right or to waive it. As for the right of Allah, the servant does not have the authority to waive it. The right of Allah also includes the rights of others among the servants, so the servant cannot waive the rights of others. Al-Shatibi said: "Everything that pertains to the rights of Allah does not allow for any choice on the part of the obligated person in any case, whereas what pertains to the right of the servant in himself allows him the choice. As for the rights of Allah, the evidence that they are not waived and do not revert to the choice of the obligated person is abundant, and the most prominent of it is the complete induction in the provisions of the Sharia and its sources, such as purification in its various forms, prayer, zakat, fasting, pilgrimage, enjoining good, and forbidding evil, the highest of which is jihad, as well as the related expiations, transactions, eating, drinking, clothing, and other acts of worship and customs that establish the right of Allah or the right of others among the servants. Likewise, all offenses are on this scale; it is not permissible to waive the right of Allah in them at all."(3) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/196. (2) The same source, 1/196. (3) The same source, 2/262. [Page 406] The right of the servant is not an inherent right, but rather it is by the decree of Allah - Exalted is He - that this right exists. Likewise, the right of the servant contains a right of Allah. Al-Shatibi said: "From here, the scholars say that some obligations are rights of Allah alone, which pertain to worship, and some are rights of the servant. They say regarding the latter that it also contains a right of Allah, as in the case of a murderer who is pardoned; he is to be struck one hundred times and imprisoned for a year"(1). He then said: "Thus, every obligation has become a right of Allah; what is for Allah is for Him, and what is for the servant returns to Allah in terms of Allah's right in it and in terms of the servant's right being one of Allah's rights, since it is within Allah's authority not to grant the servant any right at all"(2). Accordingly, the right of the servant is not absolute, for every obligation therein is a right of Allah. The rights of Allah are of two types. The first: what is a right of Allah that is purely His, which cannot be waived, such as acts of worship. The second: the rights of others, which the servant cannot waive on behalf of others; however, that other person has the right to waive their own right. Unlike the acts of worship from the first category, which cannot be waived. The rights of others include sales, exchanges, and expenditures, so the servant must fulfill the right that is owed to the one who has it. If that latter person waives their right, then that is their choice. The right of others over the servant is one of the rights of other servants, therefore it is not absolute, and it includes a right of Allah. If the other party waives their right, it is nullified, and the right of Allah remains. This is "as in the case of a murderer who commits intentional killing; if he is pardoned, he is struck with a hundred lashes and imprisoned for a year, and in the case of a murderer by treachery, there is no pardon for him. And in the punishments (hudud), if they reach the ruler regarding matters other than retribution, such as slander and theft, there is no pardon in them even if the one entitled to the right forgives"(3). __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/219. (2) The same source, 2/219. (3) The same place. [Page 407] The right of the servant manifests in two aspects. The first: it includes the right of Allah and the right of the servant, but the right of the servant is predominant. This is what Allah has granted the servant in terms of the right of choice, as in his choice of types of consumables, such as food, drinks, clothing, and other things that are lawful for him, as well as in types of sales, transactions, and claims to rights. He has the right to waive them, to exchange them, and to dispose of what is in his possession without restriction, provided that his actions align with the good customs he is accustomed to (1). However, it is not permissible to forfeit the right of Allah; thus, it is not valid for the accountable person to consume what Allah has prohibited of foods, drinks, or clothing, nor to engage in what Allah, Exalted is He, has forbidden in transactions or in what he possesses. The second: it includes the right of Allah and the right of the servant, but the right of Allah is predominant, yet the right of Allah has been waived, leaving only the right that Allah has granted to the servant. An example of this is the preservation of life and intellect, among other rights, which are rights of Allah over the servants and not rights of the servants over one another. The evidence for this is that Allah has not left this to their choice. If Allah, Exalted is He, completes a servant's life, body, and intellect, it is not valid for the servant to forfeit them. Unless the accountable person is afflicted with something of that nature without any fault or cause of his own, and as a result, he loses his life, intellect, or a member of his body, then the right of the servant is established, since the right of Allah has lapsed, as what has occurred cannot be reversed. What remains of the right of the servant is a right against others, like a debt among debts, which he may choose to collect or to forgo (2). An example of this is retribution (qisas) and blood money (diya), which serve as compensation for what the victim has lost in terms of his own interests or body. The right of Allah has lapsed, and there is no compensation for it, just as what has occurred that can be remedied, such as illnesses, if seeking medical treatment is not obligatory. Here, the right of Allah, Exalted is He, has lapsed because it cannot be fulfilled, and the right of the servant remains, which the Sharia has granted him the right to collect or to waive. __________ (1) The same source, 2/264. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/263. [Page 408] Based on the methodology of al-Shatibi, which holds that all obligations are for the benefit of the servants in this world or the Hereafter, every obligation contains a right for the servants either immediately or eventually. He said: "Just as every legal ruling contains a right for the servants either immediately or eventually, based on the premise that the Sharia was established for the interests of the servants" (1). As for what pertains to the servant from worldly benefits, it falls under the servant's right. And what pertains to him in the Hereafter is the right of Allah. He said: "The right of the servant is what pertains to his interests in this world; if it is from the interests of the Hereafter, it is included among what is referred to as the right of Allah" (2). The right of the servant or his shares that return to him due to the right of Allah are what are called the subsidiary objectives (maqasid al-tabi'a), and it is permissible for the servant to waive his right, such as waiving his right to inheritance or to the spoils of jihad or to blood money (diya) or retribution (qisas), or for a woman to waive her right to maintenance and similar matters. Based on the above, actions concerning the right of Allah and the right of the servant fall into three categories. Al-Shatibi says: "Actions concerning the right of Allah and the right of the human being are three categories: the first is what is purely the right of Allah, such as acts of worship, and its essence is devotion as previously mentioned; if the action conforms to the command, it is valid, otherwise it is not" (3). He then says: "The second is what includes both the right of Allah and the right of the servant, with the right of Allah being predominant, and its ruling reverts to the first" (4), because if the right of the servant is rendered legally insignificant, it is like that which is not considered; for if it were considered, it would be the one that is considered, and the assumption is the opposite, such as in the case of killing oneself, as the servant has no choice in surrendering himself to be killed without necessity, such as during trials and the like" (5). He then says: "The third is what both rights share, with the right of the servant being predominant" (6). The effect of intention in what is the right of Allah or the right of the servant: __________ (1) The same source, 2/221. (2) The same location. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/221. (4) That is, it is considered a right of Allah; if the action conforms to the command, it is valid, otherwise it is not. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/222. (6) The same source, 2/223. [Page 409] This has been detailed in the preceding part of this chapter, but I mention it here in terms of the division of actions into rights of Allah and rights of the servant. What pertains to the obligations that are a right of Allah or where Allah's right is predominant must be performed with intention, that is, with the aim of obedience and compliance. What pertains to the rights of the servant, where the servant's right is predominant, can be valid without intention; however, if it is done without intention, there is no reward for it, and if done with intention, there is a reward. Thus, the obligated person has performed the action for the sake of Allah's right therein. Al-Shatibi said: "It has been established that every obligation is not devoid of worship, and if it is not devoid, it requires intention, like purifications and other acts of worship. However, the obligations that involve the right of the servant include some that are valid without intention, which we understand from the legislator as prioritizing the servant's side, such as returning deposits, wrongful gains, and obligatory expenditures. Among them are those that are not valid except with intention, which we understand to prioritize Allah's right, such as zakat, sacrifices, and hunting. Those that are valid without intention, if done without intention, will not be rewarded; if done with the intention of compliance, they will be rewarded. Likewise, abstentions, if left with intention. This is agreed upon."(1) He said: "What predominates in the direction of the servant, the servant's right is obtained without intention, so the action here is valid without intention and is not worship of Allah. If the direction of the command is observed, then from that direction it is worship, so intention is necessary, meaning it does not become worship except by intention; it is not that intention is obligatory or required, but rather that the intention in compliance makes it worship, as if one lends in compliance with the command to facilitate for the Muslim or if one lends for a worldly purpose, as well as in buying, selling, eating, drinking, marriage, divorce, and others."(2) Chapter Seven The Methodology of Al-Shatibi in Understanding the Sharia It contains an introduction and three sections: Section One: The Methodology of Al-Shatibi in Understanding the Sharia. Section Two: The Methodology of Al-Shatibi in Understanding the Quran. Section Three: The Methodology of Al-Shatibi in Understanding the Sunnah. Chapter Seven The Methodology of Al-Shatibi in Understanding the Sharia Introduction: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 2/220. (2) The same source. [Page 410] The discussion of al-Shatibi's methodology in understanding the Sharia is a discussion about his innovations in this regard, and what he has raised and highlighted that distinguishes him from his predecessors among the imams of usul (principles) in the rules and foundations of understanding and deduction. The sources of legislation are the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas), and the methodology of understanding the Sharia is how to comprehend what these sources have brought. The rules that are relied upon for this purpose include those that relate to all these sources collectively, as well as those that pertain to each of them individually. In this chapter, al-Shatibi's methodology in this matter will be clarified in three sections. The first addresses the general rules in this regard, that is, those that pertain to all sources. The second discusses the rules for understanding the Qur'an, while the third addresses the rules for understanding the Sunnah. As for consensus and analogy, they refer back to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and therefore al-Shatibi did not examine them separately, but rather alluded to them in scattered references throughout his book. He said: "The book of legal proofs: and the consideration of them in general, and concerning each one of them in detail, which are the Book and the Sunnah, consensus, and analogy" (1). He also said: "The second part: concerning the proofs in detail, which are the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and opinion. And since the Book and the Sunnah are the foundation for everything else, we have limited our consideration to them" (2). The rules that al-Shatibi discusses regarding the sources of legislation in general are rules that pertain to the four sources, and those that relate to the Qur'an and the Sunnah are built upon and detailed from them. Therefore, I have titled the first section "al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding the Sharia," which is the title of the chapter itself. The second section is titled "al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding the Qur'an," and the third section is titled "al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding the Sunnah." The first section Al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding the Sharia The subject of this section: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/2. (2) The same source, 3/200. [Page 411] It has been mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that this discussion addresses the rules related to sources of legislation in general. That is, it pertains to all of them, and these rules are divided into two categories: the first relates to how to implement the legal texts from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, meaning how to apply the meanings of the texts to events and actions, and the same applies to how to implement the implications of analogy (qiyas) and what has been agreed upon. The second relates to the subsequent attributes of the texts in terms of definiteness and similarity, abrogation (naskh), generality and specification, commands and prohibitions, general and specific, and unrestricted and restricted. The first pertains to how to derive meanings, which are both general and specific meanings. The second pertains to how to determine these meanings, as it is influenced by similarity, ambiguity, abrogation, specification, or restriction. It should be noted that the discussion of these two categories here is only in relation to al-Shatibi's methodology specifically, that is, in terms of its novelty as a methodological approach. Al-Shatibi's perspective on the implications of legal texts: Al-Shatibi believes that the implication of individual texts on meanings is a probabilistic implication. He denies the existence of a definitive implication of the text on the meaning. As for the implication of rulings on their objectives or purposes, al-Shatibi completely denies considering them if reliance is placed on individual rulings. His denial of definitive implication is indicated by his statement: "The relied-upon in the primary intention is the legal evidence, and the existence of definiteness in it based on the commonly known usage is nonexistent, or extremely rare, I mean in individual evidences. If they are from the reports of individuals, then their failure to provide definiteness is evident. And if they are mutawatir (consecutively reported), then their provision of definiteness is contingent upon premises, all or most of which are probabilistic. What is contingent upon the probabilistic must be probabilistic, as it depends on the transmission of languages, grammatical opinions, the absence of ambiguity, the absence of metaphor, legal or customary transmission, implicitness, specification of the general, restriction of the unrestricted, the absence of abrogation, precedence and postponement, and rational opposition. The provision of definiteness while considering these matters is impossible." (1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/13. He has another similar text. See: 2/32. [Page 412] And what is not a definitive meaning cannot be applied. Al-Shatibi stipulates that for a proof to be applied, it must be definitive or refer to a definitive meaning (1). He says: "Every legal proof is either definitive or speculative. If it is definitive, there is no doubt in considering it, such as the proofs for the obligation of purification from ritual impurity, prayer, almsgiving, fasting, pilgrimage, enjoining good, forbidding wrong, unity of the community, justice, and similar matters. If it is speculative, it is either based on a definitive origin or not. If it is based on a definitive origin, it is also considered valid; if it is not, one must be cautious with it, and it is not correct to categorically accept it. However, it is of two types: one that opposes an origin, and one that neither opposes nor agrees with it. Thus, all of them fall into four categories. As for the first, it does not require explanation, while the second, which refers to a definitive origin, is also clearly applicable, and this applies to most reports of the individual narrators, as they clarify the Book" (2). He then says: "As for the third, which opposes a definitive origin and is not supported by a definitive origin, it is rejected without doubt. Two points serve as evidence for this: the first is that it contradicts the principles of the Sharia, and what contradicts the principles of the Sharia cannot be valid because it does not belong to it, and what does not belong to it cannot be considered part of it. The second is that it has no evidence supporting its validity, and what is like that is disregarded" (3). Let us pay attention here to the second point in the evidence for rejection. It is that it has no evidence supporting its validity. This indicates something new according to Al-Shatibi, which is that the legal meaning or legal proof requires a meaning that supports it in order to be accepted. It becomes clear in the context of the entire text that the supporting evidence must be a definitive meaning. He then says: "As for the fourth, which is speculative and neither supported by a definitive origin nor opposes a definitive origin, it is subject to consideration. Its category is that of the strange analogy. It may be said that it is not accepted because it establishes a law that is not consistent with what has been established in its like." __________ (1) This has been clarified earlier. See: the first section of the third chapter. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/7. (3) The same source, 3/8. [Page 413] And induction indicates that it is nonexistent, and these two points weaken the reliance on it absolutely, as it is in a state of doubt, thus there remains no presumption of its establishment. This is because it does not have a decisive original that opposes the principles of the Sharia, as the lack of agreement constitutes a violation, and everything that contradicts a decisive principle is rejected; thus, this is rejected (1). Let us examine this text. The legal evidence is considered contradictory, and one cannot categorically state its acceptance even if it does not oppose a decisive principle, and the reason for this is that it is not supported by a decisive original, even though this evidence is a legal text from the Qur'an or the Sunnah. Nevertheless, he stated that it is in a state of consideration. He continues: "One may argue that the application of conjecture in general is established in the details of the Sharia, and this is one of its instances, and although it does not conform to a principle, there is no contradiction in it either, for if the lack of agreement supports rejection, the lack of contradiction supports acceptance, and they oppose each other. The principle of working with conjecture is acknowledged. An example of this is found in the hadith where he (peace and blessings be upon him) said: 'The killer does not inherit' (2). Scholars have applied the appropriate and unusual in the chapters of analogy. Even if it is rare in its category, that does not harm if the evidence indicates its validity" (3). This text is significant in illustrating al-Shatibi's perspective on legal texts and how to derive meanings from them. He does not accept the meaning unless it is supported by a decisive meaning or falls under it. As for his statement: "One may argue that the application of conjecture is generally established," this is not his opinion, and thus he concluded the sentence with: "And although this is rare in its category, that does not harm if the evidence indicates its validity." In addition to his previous statement: "And induction indicates that it is nonexistent." __________ (1) The same source, 3/12. (2) Previously cited. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 3/12. [Page 414] It should be noted that he cites the hadith: "The killer does not inherit." The disagreement among the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) is regarding the consideration of the meaning of acting contrary to the intended purpose that the hadith supports. This meaning is not among the implications of the text of the hadith, while al-Shatibi discusses the application of the hadith itself, and his intent is that the idea of acting contrary to the intended purpose, if established definitively, would then allow for the application of the hadith because it would then refer back to a definitive meaning. We also observe that he considers this hadith to be an appropriate oddity, and we have previously explained that the scholars of usul who reason based on oddities regard the oddity as a description that is observed in a single ruling and does not have a witness, or has only one witness, and the term witness means a ruling that aligns with the meaning(1). Here, he has made the hadith odd, and it requires a definitive witness, meaning that the meaning of acting contrary to the intended purpose must be established definitively. Therefore, we found him in another place mentioning the principle of acting contrary to the intended purpose as a question with a tendency to accept it, as it has partial witnesses available to it, but it does not have the inductive reasoning that leads to certainty. He says: "But the question remains whether the causation should be considered as being contrary to the intention of the legislator in such a way that it does not result in what the cause intended, thus establishing the principle of acting contrary to the intended purpose, and the ruling is applied based on it if that intended purpose is determined, which is the implication of the hadith regarding the disinheritance of the killer, and the implication of the jurisprudence in the hadith prohibiting the gathering of the dispersed and the dispersing of the gathered out of fear of charity. Likewise, the inheritance of the divorced woman during illness, or the perpetuation of prohibition on one who marries during the waiting period, and many similar cases"(2). If acting contrary to the intended purpose were a universal principle that supports the meaning of the hadith "The killer does not inherit," then al-Shatibi's citation of the hadith as an example of the fourth category that does not have a universal principle supporting it would not be valid. __________ (1) See: Chapter One, p. 85. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/184. [Page 415] What confirms what we have mentioned is his saying: "The report of an individual (khabar al-wahid) is acceptable in practice if it is based on an established principle; otherwise, one should refrain from acting upon it. Its being based on an established principle refers to it being a particular under a general Qur'anic meaning" (1). His statement about refraining means not applying the hadith and not rejecting it, as there may be an inductive reasoning that makes its meaning refer back to a definitive meaning. His saying: "refers to it being a particular under a general Qur'anic meaning" means the Sunnah clarifying the Book, and any meaning that has no basis in the Book is not taken (2). However, al-Shatibi's intent goes further than that, as he requires that any meaning of any text must refer back to a definitive meaning, even if it is a Qur'anic text. Therefore, one should note his statement above: "under a general Qur'anic meaning." Not: "under a Qur'anic meaning." If we combine the issues that al-Shatibi asserts, which are that the meaning must be general, that individual pieces of evidence do not provide certainty, including the texts of the Qur'an, while knowing that all Qur'anic texts must be acted upon, a question arises: how is certainty established regarding the meanings of the Qur'an? This issue will be addressed in the next section - if Allah wills - which is al-Shatibi's methodology in understanding the Qur'an. The aim here is to establish al-Shatibi's position on the implications of texts regarding their meanings, which is that they are not taken or considered unless they refer back to a definitive meaning. These meanings are particulars, as are the meanings of rulings, which are the wisdoms. They are particulars, but not considering them does not mean rejecting them unless they oppose a definitive or general principle. If they do not oppose a general principle, there may be many particulars that agree with them and support them in meaning, thus making the meaning a definitive principle, and these particulars become branches referring back to it. Previously, he mentioned that the characteristic of his book (al-Muwafaqat) is how to capture the universals from the particulars (3). Both particulars and universals must be acted upon: __________ (1) The same source, 4/5. (2) Al-Shatibi's view that the Sunnah does not independently legislate will be clarified later. (3) See: the first section of the third chapter. And see: al-Muwafaqat, 4/194. [Page 416] The derivation of legal rulings requires the application of both particulars and universals together, and although the universals are established through the induction of particulars, it is not correct to apply the universal while neglecting the particular. For example: "If it is known that the preservation of necessities is considered, but knowledge of the specific means of preservation has not been attained, then there are various ways of preservation that the intellect may grasp or may not grasp, and if it does grasp them, it may do so in relation to one condition rather than another or one time rather than another" (1). An example of this is that knowledge of the principle of preserving wealth, for instance, is not sufficient to clarify the ruling on whether the thief should be imprisoned, executed, have a hand cut off, or something else, all of which are consistent with the principle, and it is not sufficient to distinguish between the deceiver, the usurper, and the thief in terms of ruling. Knowledge of particulars requires knowledge of universals for the validity of derivation, as particulars can have multiple meanings, and the correct meaning is the one that refers back to a universal, and if it contradicts a universal, it has contradicted a definitive one, which is not valid, and the negation of universals is also a negation of particulars. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/5. [Page 417] Al-Shatibi says: "If that is the case, and the particulars (1) are the foundations of the Sharia, then what is beneath them is derived from those general foundations, just as particulars relate to their generals in every type of existing thing. Therefore, it is necessary to consider those particulars in light of these generals when applying the specific evidences from the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and analogy, for it is impossible for those particulars to be independent of their generals. Thus, one who takes a text, for example, in a particular while disregarding its general has erred, and just as one who takes it for a particular while disregarding its general is mistaken, so too is one who takes the general while disregarding its particulars. The explanation of this is that acquiring knowledge of the general is only through the presentation of particulars and their examination. The general, in its essence, is not known to us before knowledge of the particulars, and it does not exist in the external world; rather, it is contained within the particulars as established in the rational sciences. Therefore, to stand with the general while disregarding the particular is to stand with something that has not yet been known without knowledge of the particular. The particular is the manifestation of knowledge of it. Furthermore, the particular is not designated as a particular except because the general is fully realized in it and is its basis. Thus, disregarding the particular as such is, in reality, disregarding the general itself, and that is a contradiction" (2). For the sake of preserving life, for example, which is a general principle, it is necessary to apply the particulars that indicate the permissibility of consuming pork or carrion in cases of necessity, or uttering disbelief under coercive duress, and the permissibility of redeeming one's life with wealth, and the prohibition of redeeming it with the life of another Muslim or by revealing secrets and plans that expose Muslims to defeat and extermination. __________ (1) The designation of particulars as foundations applies to what is particular in relation, but it is a general principle, such as the obligation of prayer, zakat, and the other five foundational rules in religion. All of these, according to al-Shatibi, are definitive foundations, but they are particular in relation to the principle of preserving religion, and what is beneath them are the particulars that are the sources of these rules. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/3. [Page 418] Thus, the universals cannot do without the particulars, and likewise, the particulars cannot do without the universals. For example, His saying, Exalted is He: {Say, "Be stones or iron"} (1), the verse. The text allows for meanings, including obligation and despair, but the prohibition of imposing obligations that cannot be borne or are impossible is a universal principle. To interpret the text as an obligation would contradict the universal, so it is necessary to apply the universal and interpret the text in another way, which is despair. Similarly, in His saying, Exalted is He: {Then bring a surah like it} (2), the verse. The universal principle, which is the prohibition of imposing what cannot be borne, must be preserved, so the meaning shifts from obligation to the challenge intended to induce incapacity. The same can be said for His saying, Exalted is He: {Taste, indeed you are the honored, the noble} (3), where the meaning shifts from obligation or otherwise to humiliation. In His saying, Exalted is He: {And Allah will never give the disbelievers a way over the believers} (4), the text allows for the meaning of reporting and the meaning of obligation, but the universal principle, which is the necessity of the truth of the reporter, shifts the meaning from reporting to obligation, which is prohibition. This is the meaning of al-Shatibi's statement: "It is necessary to consider those particulars in light of these universals when applying the specific evidences from the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and analogy." The universal is not violated by the opposition of individual particulars to it: __________ (1) Surah Al-Isra, 50. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 23. (3) Surah Ad-Dukhan, 49. (4) Surah An-Nisa, 141. [Page 419] This is an important issue in al-Shatibi's methodology, which is that if a meaning is established as a universal principle and then there are particular instances that contradict it, does this invalidate the entire induction, thereby nullifying the universal principle? This is similar to cases of retribution (qisas) or in jihad, and the expenditure of funds in that context, as well as the rulings on spoils and gains, while it is known that among the necessities are the preservation of life and the preservation of wealth. Al-Shatibi states that this does not undermine the principle because it has been established universally and definitively. He says: "These three universals, if they have been legislated for their specific interests, are not negated by the failure of individual particulars. There are examples of this: as for necessities, punishments are legislated for deterrence, even though we find some who are punished but do not desist from what they were punished for" (1). "As for needs, shortening the prayer during travel is legislated for alleviation and to avoid hardship, and the wealthy do not experience hardship, thus shortening is legislated for them. Loans are permitted for the sake of aiding the needy, even though they are also permissible without need. As for enhancements, purification is legislated for cleanliness in general, even though some forms contradict cleanliness, such as tayammum. All of this does not detract from the original permissibility because if the universal principle is established universally, the failure of some particulars to meet the requirements of the universal does not remove it from being universal. Furthermore, the predominant majority is considered in Sharia as a definitive generality because the individual exceptions do not form a universal that opposes this established universal" (2). He then said: "The individual exceptions may be absent due to a ruling outside the requirements of the universal, thus they are not included under it at all, or they may be included but their inclusion is not apparent to us, or they may be included in our view but are opposed by something that is more deserving of consideration. The wealthy may be said to experience hardship, but we do not rule that way due to its obscurity, or we may say regarding punishments that did not deter their subject that the interest is not solely for deterrence" (3). He then said: "In any case, the opposition of particulars does not negate the validity of the establishment of universals for interests" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/35. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/35. [Page 420] And if the universal (kulli) is neither annulled nor compromised, is the particular (juz'i) annulled? There is a detailed discussion on this, but in general, it is not annulled because it pertains to another universal principle. Annulment of it would disrupt the universal. He says: "Standing in prayer, for example, and all other concessions that undermine the firm commands and prohibitions are in accordance with the principle of necessities in urgent needs. Similarly, there are exceptions to the prohibitive rules such as 'araya (gifts of fruits), qard (loan), musaqa (sharecropping), salam (forward sale), and the like. If we were to consider all necessities, that would undermine the urgent needs or the necessities as well. However, if we consider the particulars at each level, that would preserve that level and others from the universals, for those three ranks support one another and specify one another" (1). Thus, al-Shatibi does not see the annulment of either the universal or the particular when a conflict arises, because it is a conflict from one side without the other, or in one situation without another, or in one place without another; it is an apparent conflict. He said: "The universal is considered in its specification of the general particular or its restriction of the absolute and similar cases, such that it does not disrupt the particular at all" (2). However, if the conflict between the particular and the universal is from every side and there is no way out, the particular must be annulled. He said: "It cannot be said that this is a contradiction because it leads to the particular being disregarded and considered together, for we say that this is from two sides, and because not every particular is considered in every situation" (3). The definitive and the similar: __________ (1) The same source, 3/5. (2) The same source, 3/6. (3) The same source, 3/6, and the reader can notice that the contradiction that al-Shatibi attempted to resolve is inevitable, for he had to say that it is possible to disregard the particular. These two principles - for him - cannot coexist or continue together, which are the application of the universals and particulars together and the non-compromise of the universal by the opposition of individual particulars. In cases where the conflict between the universal and the particular does not cease, one of these two principles must be invalidated, and we will discuss this issue in chapter ten. [Page 421] The purpose of including this research here is to clarify al-Shatibi's methodology in determining the meaning of a legal text when it is ambiguous. Therefore, we will first explain what al-Shatibi means by the definitive (muhkam) and the ambiguous (mutashabih). He says: "The definitive is used in two senses, general and specific. As for the specific, it refers to that which is intended to mean the opposite of the abrogated (mansukh)"(1). He then said: "As for the general, it refers to the clear and evident that does not depend on anything else to clarify its meaning. The ambiguous in the first sense is the abrogated, and in the second sense, it is that which cannot be understood from its wording, whether it can be comprehended through research and contemplation or not"(2). The intended meaning here is the second, meaning that the definitive is the clear and evident, and the ambiguous is that which cannot be understood from its wording. He said: "When one reflects on this usage, it becomes evident that the abrogated, the ambiguous, the apparent, the general, and the unrestricted are all included under the meaning of the ambiguous, just as the abrogating, what has a fixed ruling, the clarifying, the interpreted, the specified, and the restricted fall under the meaning of the definitive"(3). Al-Shatibi clarifies that most rulings of the Sharia are definitive. He states that ambiguity is rare, saying: "It is known that ambiguity does occur in legal matters, but the consideration of how much of it exists is whether it is little or much, and what is established is the little, not the much"(4). He also said: "If it were not for the evidence proving that there is ambiguity in it, the statement would not be valid"(5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/50. (2) The same source, 3/51. (3) The same location. (4) The same location. (5) The same source, 3/52. [Page 422] Al-Shatibi argues that the ambiguous (mutashabih) in the Sharia is abundant, based on the presence of abrogated (mansukh), ambiguous (mujmal), general (aam), and unrestricted (mutlaq) texts, which frequently occur in the Sharia. He counters this by stating that the abrogating (nasikh) is paired with the abrogated, the clarifying (bayyan) with the ambiguous, the specific (mukhassas) with the general, and the restricted (muqayyad) with the unrestricted; all of this is clarification. He says: "This is indicated by the statement of Ibn Abbas: 'There is no general except that it is specified.' So where is the ambiguity in it when clarification has been achieved? The same applies to other types. It is only considered ambiguous in the absence of clarification" (1). He further states: "If this is established, then clarification is coupled with the clarifier. If the clarifier is taken without clarification, it becomes ambiguous, but it is not inherently ambiguous in the Sharia" (2). __________ (1) The same source, 3/54. (2) The same location. [Page 423] Al-Shatibi divides the similarity in texts into two categories: real and additional. There is also a third category that does not pertain to the texts but rather to the legal basis (manat). He says: "The similarity that occurs in the Sharia is of two types: one is real and the other is additional, and this pertains to the Sharia itself. There is another type that relates to the legal basis upon which the rulings are applied; the first is what is meant by the verse (1), and its meaning refers to the fact that no way has been made for us to understand its meaning, nor has any evidence been established for what is meant by it" (2). He then said regarding the second type, which is additional: "Its explanation has been established in reality, but the observer has fallen short in their ijtihad (independent reasoning) or has deviated from the path of clarification following their desires, so it is incorrect to attribute the confusion to the evidences; rather, it should be attributed to the observers' shortcomings or ignorance" (3). As for the third category, he said: "The third type of similarity does not return to the evidences but rather to the legal basis of the evidences. The prohibition of eating carrion is clear, and the permission to eat the slaughtered animal is likewise clear. If carrion mixes with the slaughtered animal, confusion arises regarding what is eaten, not regarding the evidence for its permissibility or prohibition" (4). Similarity does not occur in the general principles (kulliyat) because these are definitive meanings (qat'iyyat) (5). Examples of real similarity include: "such as the issues of the Ascension (istawa), descent (nuzul), laughter (dhahik), hand (yad), foot (qadam), and similar matters" (6). Interpretation of the ambiguous: __________ (1) The verse: { He it is Who has sent down to you the Book; in it are verses that are clear, they are the foundation of the Book, and others ambiguous. } Surah Al-Imran, 7. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 3/54 - 55. (3) The same source, 3/55 - 56. (4) The same source, 3/56. (5) See: The same source, 3/58. (6) The same source, 3/57. [Page 424] If the resemblance is real, then it is not correct to interpret it. Seeking its interpretation is the work of those who deviate. However, if it is additional, then it should be interpreted. He says: "Applying interpretation to the ambiguous requires detail; it must either be from the truly ambiguous or from the additional. If it is from the additional, then it is necessary if it is determined by evidence, just as the general is clarified by the specific, the absolute by the restricted, and the necessary by the contingent, and similar cases, because their totality is the definitive, which has been previously explained. As for if it is from the truly ambiguous, then its interpretation is not necessary" (1). He said: "Moreover, the righteous predecessors among the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them), the Followers, and those who came after them who followed their example did not address these matters nor spoke about them in a way that necessitates determining an interpretation without evidence, and they are the model and example. To this, the verse indicates this by His saying, Exalted is He: { As for those in whose hearts is deviation, they follow what is ambiguous of it } (2) the verse" (3). If the ambiguous is something that should be interpreted, meaning its meaning should be specified, then the interpreted meaning has three conditions. He says: "When interpretation is applied to the ambiguous, three characteristics must be considered in the interpreted meaning: it must refer to a correct meaning in consideration, generally agreed upon among the differing parties, and the interpreted term must be capable of it" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 3/59. (2) Surah Al-Imran, 7. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/59. (4) The same source, 3/60. [Page 425] The first condition relates to what has been previously mentioned, that the legal evidence must be definitive (qat'i) or refer back to something definitive in order for it to be validly applied. Here, it is not required to refer back to something definitive, but rather to a meaning that is valid in consideration. If it refers back to a definitive meaning, there is no doubt that it is valid in consideration. For the interpreted meaning may be potentially acceptable, meaning it does not contradict a principle; if it cannot be validly applied, it cannot be rejected either. Rather, it is subject to induction (istiqra) or the observation of this meaning in other contexts. It is not necessary for it to reach definitiveness in order to be accepted; rather, it must be considered before reaching definitiveness, and this applies to others that share the same meaning, so that the possibility of useful induction for definitiveness is available. As for the third condition, that the interpreted term must be capable of the meaning, this is clear. As for the second condition, that the interpreted meaning must be generally agreed upon among the differing parties, it does not state that there is consensus (ijma), as consensus on one meaning among multiple possible meanings is difficult or rare. Therefore, this condition aims to ensure that the interpreted meaning is not generally dismissed, as this indicates its weakness and that there is a stronger opposing argument(1). Abrogation (naskh): It has been mentioned in the definition of the definitive (muhkam) and ambiguous (mutashabih) that the definitive has two meanings: general and specific. It opposes the ambiguous in the general sense and opposes abrogation in the specific sense. Al-Shatibi said in defining abrogation: "They said in the definition of abrogation: It is the lifting of the legal ruling by a later legal evidence"(2). And just as ambiguity does not occur in general principles, abrogation does not occur in them either. He said: "The general principles of necessities, needs, and enhancements have not been abrogated; rather, abrogation has occurred in specific matters based on the evidence of induction"(3). __________ (1) The same source, 3/61. (2) The same source, 3/64. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/70. [Page 426] Abrogation (naskh) can only occur in particulars that relate to universals, that is, in branches of law, because if they are not related to universals, then their application has not been established, and what has not been established cannot be subject to abrogation. Likewise, the abrogated (mansukh) in relation to the definitive (muhkam) in Islamic law is few. He said: "For the induction shows that the particular branches in which abrogation and abrogated occurred in relation to what remains definitive are few" (1). It is noted in this text his use of the expression "particular branches." Just as the abrogated must have been established in the law, so too must the abrogating, and its establishment must relate to a definitive meaning. He said: "If the rulings have been established upon the obligated person, then the claim of abrogation in them can only be made with a verified matter, because their establishment upon the obligated person is first verified, thus lifting them after knowledge of their establishment can only be with a verified knowledge" (2). Since what was revealed in the law in Mecca consists of universals, and what pertains to branches is few, therefore, in ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) and istinbat (deduction), there should be a tendency to exclude abrogation regarding what was revealed in Mecca. He then generalized this statement to all rulings, whether they are Meccan or Medinan. He said: "This necessitates that what was among the Meccan rulings claimed to be abrogated should not have that claim accepted except with a decisive proof of abrogation such that it is impossible to reconcile between the two evidences nor to claim definitiveness in both" (3). He then said: "And thus it is said regarding all rulings, whether Meccan or Medinan" (4). Commands and prohibitions: __________ (1) The same source, 3/63. (2) The same source, 3/64. (3) The same place. (4) The same place. [Page 427] The commands and prohibitions are among the discussions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. What is meant by discussing them here is to refer to al-Shatibi's methodology in determining the meanings of texts or formulations. A formulation may appear to imply a duty, while its intended meaning is different. It may indicate a command or prohibition, but it is necessary to specify the intended meaning of the command, whether it is obligation, recommendation, or permissibility, and the intended meaning of the prohibition, whether it is prohibition or dislike. Likewise, a term may arise that requires the observer to determine its meaning, whether it is literal or metaphorical, or if it contains an implied meaning or something else. Furthermore, the rulings have objectives, so are these objectives considered in the command and prohibition? Among these indications is what was previously mentioned, especially in the discussion of the intention of the legislator in establishing the Sharia for understanding (1). And there is what will come in the discussion of the principle of blocking the means (2). What we will discuss here is al-Shatibi's general methodology in determining the meanings of the formulations of command and prohibition. The command necessitates the performance of an action, and the prohibition necessitates refraining from an action, regardless of the intended purpose of the action or the abstention. The action or refraining from it is the primary objective of the legislator in the command and prohibition (3). He said: "The meaning of command and prohibition is the necessity of action and the necessity of abstention. The meaning of necessity is demand, and demand entails a desired outcome, with the intention of achieving that desired outcome, and there is no meaning to demand except this" (4). Until he said: "The command in this is clearer than to require evidence for it" (5). __________ (1) See: the third discussion of the fourth chapter. (2) The third discussion of the ninth chapter. (3) This meaning has been clarified in the first discussion of the fifth chapter. It is the intention of worship and compliance. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 3/73. (5) The same location. [Page 428] When commands and prohibitions come in a manner that is beyond one's ability, such as His saying, { and do not die except as Muslims } (1), or { say, "Be stones or iron" } (2), or in a way that we know cannot be required in our Sharia, such as His saying, { and whoever wills, let him disbelieve } (3), or { say, "Believe in it or do not believe" } (4), this does not mean the cancellation of obligation or the non-application of texts, or the neglect of forms. Rather, the matter was not an obligation in the first place, and the forms and texts did not imply obligation; rather, they were threats, despair, or impossibility, and this is one of the meanings of the forms themselves. It is a matter of applying both particulars and universals together to determine the intended meaning (5). He said: "As for the matter of impossibility and threat, it is not, in reality, a command, even if it is said to be a command metaphorically; for as previously mentioned, a command, even if metaphorical, necessitates intention, and thus it becomes a command in which the aspect of metaphor can be conceived; otherwise, it is not a command without the intention to bring about what is commanded in any way" (6). Commands and prohibitions convey their implications, which are the rulings, and the rulings have their objectives, which are the interests (masalih). However, the latter can only occur within the execution of what is requested to be executed and the abstention from what is requested to be abstained from. Indeed, the legal ruling concerning its intended purpose is like the original concerning the branch. It is not correct for the branch to invalidate the original. __________ (1) Surah Al-Imran, 102. (2) Surah Al-Isra, 50. (3) Surah Al-Kahf, 29. (4) Surah Al-Isra, 107. (5) We discussed this matter in the first section of chapter five. (6) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 3/74. [Page 429] If it is assumed regarding commands and prohibitions that the intention of the legislator is to preserve wisdom or public interest (maslaha), even if this leads to neglecting the form of the command or prohibition, this is not the case. Rather, it returns to the fact that some forms have meanings that are limited to the literal sense, while others are metaphorical. Employing the metaphor instead of the literal meaning is not neglecting the text or the form; rather, it is the very essence of employing them. However, what should be focused on is how to determine the intended meaning: the literal or the metaphorical. This is done by applying both particulars and universals, along with current and contextual indicators. He says: "Commands and prohibitions are of two types: explicit and implicit. As for the explicit, it has two perspectives: one is from the standpoint of its essence, where no consideration is given to a beneficial reason. This is the perspective of one who treats the mere form as a matter of pure devotion without any reasoning, so there is no difference in this view between one command and another, nor between one prohibition and another" (1). __________ (1) The same source, 3/85. [Page 430] He said: "There is no escape from considering whether we take into account the interests (masalih) in commands and prohibitions or not. If we do not consider them, then it is more likely that we will remain with them in their mere form, and if we do consider them, we will not obtain from their rational basis anything that we can grasp without considering the commands and prohibitions. For although we know the interest in general, we are ignorant of it in detail. We know that the punishment for adultery, for example, is stoning for the married person due to the deterrent effect, rather than beheading, or flogging to death, or a specified number of lashes, or imprisonment, or fasting, or paying a financial penalty like expiations. In the case of the unmarried person, it is one hundred lashes and exile for a year, rather than stoning or killing or increasing the number of lashes beyond one hundred or decreasing it, among other possible forms of deterrence that reason can conceive. All of this indicates that we have not reached a definitive understanding of the interest in what has been specifically defined, as opposed to others. And if we cannot comprehend that, and it is not possible for minds to do so, it indicates that there is an interest in what has been defined that we do not know. The same ruling applies to everything else that we can understand its meaning. As for acts of worship, they are even more so in this regard. Thus, we have no choice but to adhere to the mere commands and prohibitions. Often, an apparent interest may seem to arise from a command or prohibition, while in reality it is contrary to that, as clarified by another text that contradicts it; thus, we must refer back to that text without considering that meaning. Furthermore, it has been mentioned in the book of objectives (maqasid) that every command and prohibition must have a ritual meaning. If this is established, then there is no way to neglect it, as any meaning that leads to disregarding the mere command and prohibition cannot be referred back to. Therefore, if the understood meaning of the command and prohibition is neglected, there is no way to it; otherwise, the result is to revert to the command and prohibition without it. Thus, the matter in the discussion of considering interests is that there is no way to consider them alongside the command and prohibition, which is the point at hand."(1) __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 3/86 - 87. [Page 431] Al-Shatibi mentions cases that may be raised against his previous statement, where it is thought that the interests (masalih) or the intended meanings of the rulings are more deserving than the apparent text or wording. He says: "It cannot be said that neglecting the meanings is a disregard for the known objectives of the Legislator, as in the saying that it is not permissible to perform ablution with water that a person has urinated in; if he urinated in a vessel and then poured it into the water, it is permissible to perform ablution with it" (1), because the prohibition here regarding the second matter does not arise from following the meanings, that is, the meanings of the rulings, but rather from the indication of the wording itself; this is a type of linguistic indication (2). He said: "Following the very texts of the rulings, which are the original, is obligatory because they, along with the meanings, are like the original with the branch. It is not correct to follow the branch while disregarding the original" (3). However, it is the meaning of the wording that must be considered; its indication is not definitive, thus it must be understood in light of other matters that assist in this understanding. He said: "The second of the two considerations is from the perspective of what is understood from the commands and prohibitions as a legal intent based on induction and the accompanying contextual or verbal evidence that indicates the specific interests in the commanded actions and the harms in the prohibited actions" (4). He said: "Just as it may be understood from the essence of the command and prohibition that permissibility exists, even if the wording does not originally imply that. Like His saying, Exalted is He: { And when you have completed your rites, then hunt } (5), __________ (1) The same source, 3/87. (2) This is like His saying, Exalted is He: { And do not say to them [so much as], "uff," } (Al-Isra, 23), for it includes a prohibition against striking, and this is a hint from the lesser to the greater, thus it is one of the indications of language. Similarly, as in His saying, Exalted is He: { And if you give one of them a qintar, } (An-Nisa, 20), it is a hint from the greater to the lesser, and likewise His saying, Exalted is He: { So whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it } (Al-Zalzalah, 7), the indication of what is not mentioned is one of the indications of the wording. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/87. (4) The same source, 3/88. (5) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 2. [Page 432] { And when the prayer has been concluded, disperse throughout the land } (1). It is certainly known that the intent of the Legislator is not merely to engage in hunting upon the permissibility or to disperse after the conclusion of the prayer, but rather that the reason for the prohibition of these things has been removed, which is the conclusion of the prayer and the lifting of the state of ihram. This perspective is also supported by inductive reasoning (istiqra) (2). That is, the phrases "hunt" and "disperse" are in the imperative form, but the intent of the text is not a command but rather permissibility. This is not about following the meanings of rulings or interests, but rather it is the meaning of the text itself. This is based on the intent of the Legislator in the address, not in the legislation. Therefore, there must be a method for understanding commands and prohibitions, and al-Shatibi's approach in this regard is to return the particulars to definitive meanings and to apply both particulars and universals together, along with inductive reasoning for the meanings, and to utilize current and contextual indicators. He said: "Rather, we say: The speech of the Arabs in general must consider the meaning of the context in the indication of the forms, otherwise it would become a source of mockery and ridicule. Do you not see their saying, 'So-and-so is a lion or a donkey or a great ash or a cowardly dog,' and 'So-and-so is far from the place of the earring,' and countless other examples? If one were to consider the word in isolation, it would have no rational meaning. What do you think of the words of Allah and the words of His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him)? On this basis, the distinction between urination in stagnant water and pouring from a vessel into it is made" (3). Generality and specificity: The concept of generality and specificity in al-Shatibi's thought differs significantly from the conventional understanding in the science of usul al-fiqh. Although he uses these terms in his book, he has a different intention than other scholars of usul. For him, generality is one of the characteristics of universals, and universals can only be derived through inductive reasoning. Universals are consistently applicable to particulars and do not fail. Therefore, universals cannot be specified. When al-Shatibi uses these terms, as in his statement that necessities are specified by needs, it will become clear in a certain sense. __________ (1) Surah Al-Jumu'ah, 10. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/88. (3) The same source, 3/90 - 91. [Page 433] Thus, the issue of the forms of generality and whether generality has a form or not is not a significant matter for al-Shatibi, because generality is the generality of the overall meaning, and this is definitive. If the forms indicate generality according to linguistic usage, then definitive indications are not established by individual texts in his view. He says: "There must be a premise that clarifies the intended meaning of generality and specificity here, and the intended generality is whether it has a specific form or not. If we say regarding the obligation of prayer or other obligations, and regarding the prohibition of injustice or others that it is general, this means that it is established absolutely and generally, based on evidence that has a form of generality or not, on the basis that the evidence used here is merely inductive, which, when combined, leads to certainty in the ruling as clarified in the premises, and specificity is contrary to generality"(1). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/149. [Page 434] Since the general term means that it is established absolutely and universally based on beneficial induction that leads to certainty, this means here that the general is definitive, that it applies to all its particulars, and that it cannot be abrogated, nor can any part of it be abrogated. The universals cannot be abrogated, as previously demonstrated. Specification, in the sense of lifting the ruling from some particulars or in some cases, is considered a refutation of induction; therefore, there is no existence of specification in this sense. He says: "When a general or absolute principle is established, it is not affected by the cases of particulars or the narratives of situations, and the evidence for this consists of several points: the first is that the principle is definitively established by assumption, as we are discussing the definitive universal principles, while the cases of particulars are presumed or imagined, and the presumed does not stand against the definitive nor contradict it. The second is that the principle is not subject to doubt as it is based on definitive evidence, while the cases of particulars are subject to the possibility of being other than they appear or as they appear and are thus cut off and excluded from that principle; therefore, in this situation, it is not possible to invalidate the universality of the principle with something of this nature. The third is that the cases of particulars are specific, while the established principles are universals, and particulars cannot refute universals" (1). He then said: "The fourth is that if they oppose each other, either both must be applied together or both must be neglected, or one must be applied without the other, specifically in the area of opposition. Applying both together is invalid. Likewise, neglecting both is also invalid because it involves applying opposition between the presumed and the definitive, and applying the particular without the universal gives preference to the particular over the universal, which is contrary to the principle; thus, only the fourth option remains, which is to apply the universal without the particular, which is what is required" (2). __________ (1) The same source, 3/150. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/150. [Page 435] Therefore, the particular is raised because it opposes the universal entirely, and it has been previously established that the particular is only acted upon if it refers back to a definitive meaning, that is, to a universal. In our case of the opposition of the particular to the general, if the particular does not refer back to a definitive, then there is no issue. However, if the particular refers back to a definitive, then the opposition here is akin to the opposition of universals, that is, definitives, and this situation does not occur. Thus, the only way to resolve the opposition here is through specification (takhsees), by excluding from the general the instances or cases for which the particular has come, or that specification may have another meaning. Since lifting the application of the general from some instances or in some cases is considered a negation of the universal, there remains only the other meaning. Therefore, we find al-Shatibi using specification, but he does not mean what the usuliyyin (jurisprudents) intended; rather, he says that specification is metaphorical, not literal. He states: "The generalities of the resolute (al-‘azaim) may initially appear to be specified by the concessions (rukhsa), but they are not truly specified by them; rather, the resolute remains general even if it is said that the concessions have specified it, for this is a metaphorical expression, not a literal one" (1). The concessions referred to here are those that pertain to universals of the category of necessities, such as lifting hardship or harm or what is unbearable; thus, the concession here is akin to the resolute, and not to the other designation of concession, which is the specified instances that do not refer to universals (2). Therefore, the specification mentioned above is the specification of the resolute by concessions of the kind that is unbearable, such as the standing of one who cannot stand in prayer. __________ (1) The same source, 3/165. (2) See: Chapter Five, Section One, p. 236. [Page 436] Here we are faced with two general principles that appear to contradict each other, and al-Shatibi holds that reconciling them by specifying one or both of them is not permissible. Al-Shatibi's response is that the essence of this specification is clarification, meaning that the definitive general rule was not originally applicable to that particular case nor does it correspond to it. The seemingly opposing specific case is not truly opposing because it does not fall under that general rule. Therefore, its opposition to the general rule is not an exception to some of what the general rule indicates; rather, it clarifies what the general rule indicates, meaning that the generality did not encompass it at all. From this specific case, the clarification and elucidation of the limits of that generality increase. Thus, he said: "The rulings of those determinations are directed towards their generality without specification, and if it is said that the excuses specified them, it is in a figurative sense, not in reality" (1). Al-Shatibi provides examples to support his view, and the following is one of them for clarification: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/167. [Page 437] He said: "An example of this is when it was revealed: { Indeed, you and what you worship besides Allah are the fuel of Hell } (1), some of the disbelievers said: 'Then the angels are worshipped and the Messiah is worshipped.' So it was revealed: { Indeed, those for whom the good word has preceded from Us } (2), the verse" (3). Al-Shatibi refers to those who object to him and say that specification, meaning the exclusion of some of what the general term encompasses, occurs in the Sharia, evidenced by the fact that the first text indicated the punishment of those who are worshipped besides Allah, and that the second text came to exempt some of the worshipped ones from punishment, such as the angels and the Messiah. Al-Shatibi refutes this claim and affirms his opinion, saying: "As for His saying: { Indeed, you and what you worship } the verse, the people responded to Ibn al-Zubair's objection regarding it by pointing out his ignorance of its context, and what was narrated in the context that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said to him: 'How ignorant you are of the language of your people, O boy' "(4), because it came in the verse: { Indeed, you and what you worship }, and 'what' does not refer to that which is not rational, so how can it include the angels and the Messiah?" (5). Thus, the text originally does not include the angels or the Messiah. __________ (1) Surah Al-Anbiya, 98. (2) Surah Al-Anbiya, 101. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/156. (4) I did not find it in its wording or meaning. The meaning that is presented here is the opposite of what Al-Shatibi argued; for example, Al-Qurtubi says: "This verse is a foundation for the claim of generality, and that it has specific forms, contrary to those who said: it does not have a form designated to indicate it, which is false based on what this verse and others indicate. This Abdullah ibn al-Zubair understood 'what' in his ignorance to refer to all that was worshipped, and the Quraysh, who were eloquent Arabs, agreed with him on that. If there were no generality, it would not have been valid to exclude from it, and since it has been found, it is for generality, and this is clear." Al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an, 11/343. When interpreting His saying: { Indeed, you and what you worship } the verse. (5) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/158. [Page 438] Therefore, the arrival of the second text: { Indeed, those for whom the good word has preceded from Us } is an explanation and further clarification, and not an abrogation or cancellation of some of what the wording addressed. Accordingly, al-Shatibi rejects the specification (takhsees) that the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) speak of, whether it is specification by connection (muttasil) or by disconnection (munfasil). He says: "When what has preceded is established, specification is either by disconnection or by connection. If it is by connection, such as exception, description, limit, and substitution of part, and the like, it is not in reality an exclusion of anything but rather an explanation of the speaker's intent in the generality of the wording so that the listener does not misunderstand it as anything other than what was intended, as he refers to Sibawayh's statement: 'Zayd the red' to one who does not know him is like 'Zayd alone' to one who knows him" (1). He then said: "As for specification by disconnection, it is likewise a return to clarifying the intended meaning in the general forms as previously mentioned at the beginning of the issue, and it is not in the true sense of specification as mentioned by the usuliyun (scholars of usul)" (2). In order to reinforce his opinion, he aims to clarify a matter, which is that the forms established for generality in the language may be understood by some as general according to the linguistic convention. If a conflicting legal text is found, it is assumed that this is a specification in the sense of abrogating part of the linguistic meaning. He clarifies that what is relied upon in the meanings of words and structures is the pragmatic meaning, not the conventional meaning, and this has been clarified in the third section of the fourth chapter. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/162. (2) The same source, 3/163. [Page 439] Al-Shatibi explains that this is one of the reasons for the disagreement between him and the usuliyyin (jurisprudents) regarding the meaning of specification (takhsees). He says: "There is no doubt that generality has established forms" (1). He then states: "This is because the generality indicated by the forms, according to their establishment, has two perspectives: one is in consideration of what the form indicates in its original establishment absolutely, and to this perspective the usuliyyin aimed; therefore, specification occurs for them through reason, sensory experience, and other separate specifications. The second perspective is based on the practical objectives that customs dictate to be intended, even if the original establishment contradicts that. This consideration is practical, while the first is analogical" (2). He then adds: "The rule in Arabic principles is that if the practical origin conflicts with the analogical origin, the ruling is for the practical" (3). Understanding the practical meaning requires understanding the reasons for revelation, the current and contextual evidence, and the methods of the Arabs in expression and in understanding words and structures. At that point, what some present as an objection to his rejection of specification, he counters by asserting that the generality they understood does not exist at all. In the previously mentioned example regarding His saying: { Indeed, you and what you worship besides Allah are the fuel of Hell } he adds to what he said about "what" being for the non-rational, thus excluding the angels and Christ, stating: "What applies to our original issue is that the address appears to be directed at the disbelievers of Quraysh, who did not worship angels or Christ; rather, they worshipped idols. Thus, His saying: { And what you worship } is general concerning the idols they worshipped, and nothing else is included in the practical generality, so the objection of the objector was due to his ignorance of the context and negligence of what was intended in the verses" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 3/153. (2) The same location. (3) The same location. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/158. [Page 440] Among al-Shatibi's statements on this matter is: "The Arabs use general terms based on what they intend to generalize, which is indicated by the meaning of the speech itself, rather than what those terms indicate according to their individual usage. They also use them intending to generalize what they indicate in their original meaning, and all of this is indicated by the requirements of the situation" (1). An example of the specification that is rejected here is the specification by reason in the saying of Allah, Exalted is He: { Allah is the Creator of all things } (2). Reason dictates that neither His essence nor any of His attributes, Exalted is He, can be created; therefore, reason specifies the generality of the term "all." Al-Shatibi rejects this statement, arguing that the term "all" in this context does not encompass the essence of the Creator or anything in His attributes, stating: "The speaker may use a general term that includes, according to its usage, itself and others, while he does not intend itself nor does he mean that it is included in the implication of the general" (3). He further states: "Similarly, none of the attributes of the Creator, Exalted is He, falls under the statement in the verse: { Creator of all things } because the Arabs do not intend that nor do they imply it" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 3/153 - 154. (2) Surah Az-Zumar, 62. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/154. (4) The same location. [Page 441] Al-Shatibi asserts that he opposes the earlier usuliyyin (principle scholars) in his statement regarding specification (takhsis) and critiques them. He says: "If it is said: Thus the usuliyyin say that specification clarifies the intended meaning of the mentioned phrases, as it removes the misconception of the specific being included under the generality of the phrase in the listener's understanding, and it is not intended to be included under it; otherwise, specification would be abrogation (naskh)" (1). He goes on to say: "How do you differentiate between what I have mentioned and what the usuliyyin mention?" (2). Al-Shatibi answers: "The response is that the difference between them is apparent, as what is mentioned here pertains to clarifying the status of general phrases in the original Arabic or legal usage. What the usuliyyin mentioned pertains to clarifying the transition of the phrase from its general status to a specific one. We have clarified that it is an explanation of the status of the word, while they said it is an explanation of the departure of the word from its status, and there is a difference between the two" (3). He said: "If it is said: The essence of what has been discussed is that it is a debate over wording while the meaning is agreed upon, and such a matter does not lead to a ruling. The response is: No, rather it is a discussion that leads to rulings" (4). He stated that the methodology of the usuliyyin in specification is reprehensible. He said: "Indeed, the difficulty of this matter has led to another reprehensible issue (5), which is that the generalities of the Qur'an do not contain anything that is genuinely significant in its essence of generality, even if it is said to be a proof after specification, and it entails the invalidation of the Qur'anic universals and the invalidation of deriving evidence from it altogether, except through a form of leniency and good opinion, not based on thorough examination and certainty of the ruling. In this, if contemplated, it weakens the legal evidences and diminishes reliance upon them" (6). He then concluded by saying: "The truth regarding general phrases, when they are reported, is that they are in their original usage general, such that the place of their generality is understood in Arabic, with an understanding that is aware of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia)" (7). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/163. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) The same source. (5) The first reprehensible issue, in his view, is their disagreement on whether the general remains a proof after specification or not. (6) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/164 - 165. (7) The same source, 3/165. [Page 442] On this basis, al-Shatibi's position is established: is it permissible to act upon the general (al-am) before searching for a specific exception (mukhassas), or not? For the matter under consideration may be one that has been specified. He believes that if the general reaches the level of certainty (qat'), there is no need to search for a specific exception, as the general, if established—according to his methodology—this is through inductive reasoning (istiqra) that leads to certainty, and thus it does not contradict or lose its meaning in any situation or condition. However, if the texts that indicate the general do not come together in a way that leads to certainty, then the meaning requires further investigation and inquiry. This inquiry means searching for what agrees with or contradicts it, in order to reach the certain meaning and the limits of what this meaning encompasses. He states: "Generalities, if their meaning is unified and they spread across the branches of the Sharia or are repeated in contexts according to need without specification, they are to be applied in their generality in all cases, even if we say that specification by separation (al-takhssis bil-munfasal) is permissible" (1). His statement here, "even if we say that specification by separation is permissible," refers to before the meaning is repeated and established, and this will become clear in what follows. He says: "In general, every principle that is repeated in its affirmation and its matter is confirmed, and this is understood from the flow of speech, is taken according to its generality" (2). He then said: "As for if the general is neither repeated nor confirmed nor widespread in the branches of jurisprudence, then relying on it alone is questionable; it is necessary to search for what contradicts it or specifies it. The distinction between the two types arises because what has been repeated, confirmed, and widespread has its apparent meaning, supported by contextual evidence, elevated to the status of a definitive text (nass) that has no ambiguity, unlike what is not so, which is subject to possibilities, and thus one must refrain from making a definitive judgment based on it until it is compared with others and investigated for the existence of contradictions" (3). What is mentioned here about the general and the specific applies in his view to the unrestricted (mutlaq) and the restricted (muqayyad), because universals (kulliyat) are characterized by being unrestricted and general. Clarification and ambiguity: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/174. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. [Page 443] What has been mentioned earlier under the title: "The Definitive and the Ambiguous" suffices here for most of this research, as the general (mujmal) is ambiguous (mutashabih), while the definitive (muhkam) is the determined, established, and clarified meaning. Based on this, after the completion of religion and the perfection of grace, there is no general matter upon which a legal obligation (taklif) can be based. He says: "The general is either related to something upon which no obligation can be based, or it does not exist in the Sharia" (1), and his intention is not that there is no clarified general in the Sharia, but rather that after its perfection, there is no general, and if it exists, there is no obligation in it. He said: "If there exists in the Sharia something general or ambiguous in meaning or something that is not understood, it is not correct to impose an obligation based on it, because it is an obligation of the impossible and a request for what cannot be attained. This generality appears in the ambiguous matters that Allah, Exalted is He, mentioned, saying: { And others are ambiguous } (2). When Allah clarified that there are ambiguous matters in the Qur'an, He also indicated that there is no obligation except to believe in it according to the intended meaning, not according to what the obligated person understands from it" (3). The Qur'an contains the entirety of the Sharia (4), and the Sunnah serves to clarify what is in the Qur'an, without introducing any legislation beyond what is contained therein. Similarly, clarification occurs through the consensus (ijma) of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them). The consensus of the Companions is not akin to rational agreement or anything else among them regarding something they see without a basis in the Sharia, as there is nothing that requires a ruling except that it has a basis in the Sharia. Rather, consensus is their agreement that what has come in the Sharia is thus, meaning that consensus reveals evidence. Al-Shatibi said: "The clarification of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) is a correct clarification, with no doubt about its authenticity, because he was sent for that purpose. Allah, Exalted is He, said: { And We have sent down to you the Reminder that you may make clear to the people what was sent down to them } (5), and there is no disagreement in this. As for the clarification by the Companions, if they agree on what they have clarified, there is also no doubt about its authenticity" (6). __________ (1) The same source, 3/197. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/198. (3) This will be clarified in the next section. (4) Surah an-Nahl, 44. (5) Al-Muwafaqat, 3/195. [Page 444] This is because the understanding of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) is more complete than that of others and is more deserving of precedence. They witnessed the reasons for revelation and the contextual circumstances that others did not witness, and they were eloquent Arabs. He said: "Reliance on them in explanation is preferred for two reasons: the first is their knowledge of the Arabic language, for they are eloquent Arabs whose tongues have not changed, nor have they descended from their high rank of eloquence; thus, they are more knowledgeable in understanding the Book and the Sunnah than others"(1). Then he said: "The second is their direct engagement with events and incidents and the revelation of the divine guidance through the Book and the Sunnah; they are more adept at understanding the current contexts and are more knowledgeable about the reasons for revelation, and they perceive what others do not because of that. The witness sees what the absent does not see, so whenever there comes from them a specification of some generalities or a restriction of some absolutes, acting upon it is correct, unless there is a report of disagreement from any of them regarding the issue; if some of them disagree, then the matter is one of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning)"(2). Then he said: "However, if it is known that the situation is one of ijtihad that does not depend on those two matters, then they and others are equal in it"(3). The Second Topic The Methodology of al-Shatibi in Understanding the Qur'an The topic of this discussion: __________ (1) The same place. (2) The same place. (3) The same source, 3/197. [Page 445] Al-Shatibi has a specific or new opinion regarding how to establish the meanings of legal texts, including how to determine the meanings of the verses of the Noble Qur'an. This is based on his previously stated view that the legal evidence must be definitive (qat'i) or refer back to something definitive. This means that the meaning referred to must be definitive. His opinion has also been previously explained regarding the absence or impossibility of a definitive indication from the text, which raises a question about how Al-Shatibi derives evidence from the verses of the Qur'an. The fact that the indication is not definitive means that the meanings are potential, and determining one meaning over another without a preference or evidence supporting this meaning over others is not valid. In fact, this potential or apparent meaning, according to the meanings of the words and structure, cannot be considered unless it refers back to a definitive meaning established through induction. Since it is necessary to apply the texts and to engage in ijtihad (independent reasoning) to derive rulings in order to achieve the servitude of humans to their Creator, there must be a correct methodology for determining the meanings of the verses of the Qur'an. Therefore, there must be criteria for interpretation and means to assist in it. This discussion aims to clarify these criteria, means, and methodology according to Al-Shatibi. The Qur'an contains an explanation of everything in the Sharia: [Page 446] Al-Shatibi held that the Qur'an encompasses all the rulings of the Sharia (Islamic law); there is no issue except that its ruling can be derived from the Qur'an. He argued that other sources of Sharia are merely explanations and clarifications of what is contained within it, which may be obscure to those who have not reached a level of mastery in knowledge, or which may be confusing to scholars and jurists. Thus, there is no addition to it from other sources. He said: "The Qur'an contains the explanation of everything in that prior arrangement (1), so the one who knows it with certainty is knowledgeable about the entirety of the Sharia and lacks nothing from it. The evidence for this includes several matters, among them the Qur'anic texts, such as His saying: { This day I have perfected for you your religion } (2), and His saying: { And We have sent down to you the Book as a clarification for everything } (3), and His saying: { We have not neglected in the Book anything } (4), and His saying: { Indeed, this Qur'an guides to that which is most upright } (5), meaning the straight path. If it did not encompass all its meanings, it would not be correct to truly apply this meaning to it. And similar verses indicate that it is guidance and healing for what is in the hearts, and it cannot be healing for all that is in the hearts unless it contains clarification of everything" (6). He said: "The one who knows the Qur'an is knowledgeable about the entirety of the Sharia" (7). He said: "You will not find in the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet) any matter except that the Qur'an has indicated its meaning in either a general or detailed manner" (8). He said: "Because Allah made the Qur'an a clarification for everything, it follows that the Sunnah is included in it in general" (9). __________ (1) The prior arrangement: its intended meaning will become clear during this discussion. (2) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 3. (3) Surah An-Nahl, 89. (4) Surah Al-An'am, 38. (5) Surah Al-Isra, 9. (6) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/218. (7) The same source, 3/219. (8) The same source, 4/6. (9) The same location. [Page 447] And after mentioning the statements of some of the Companions and scholars on this matter, he said: "No scholar has turned to the Qur'an regarding an issue except that he found a basis for it therein. The closest group to the lack of issues is the people of the apparent (dhahir) who deny analogy (qiyas), and it has not been established that they were unable to provide evidence for any of the issues. Ibn Hazm al-Dhahiri said: 'Every chapter of jurisprudence has a basis in the Book and the Sunnah(1), which we know, and praise be to Allah, except for partnership (qirad), for which we have not found a basis in either of them at all,' up to the end of what he said. And you know that partnership is a type of rental (ijara), and the basis of rental in the Qur'an is established, as evidenced by the approval of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and the practice of the Companions."(2) And if the Qur'an contains an explanation of everything in the Sharia, it is comprehensive of it, even though its texts are finite. Therefore, its definition of legal rulings is not a text on the specifics of issues and occurrences, but rather a definition of general principles. He said: "The Qur'an, despite its brevity, is comprehensive, and it can only be comprehensive if the collection within it consists of general matters, because the Sharia was completed with its complete revelation, as Allah, Exalted is He, said: { This day I have perfected for you your religion }(3). And you know that the rulings of prayer, zakat, jihad, and similar matters are not all detailed in the Qur'an; rather, they were clarified by the Sunnah, as were the various types of marriages, contracts, retribution, punishments, and others. Furthermore, if we look at the return of the Sharia to its moral universals, we find that they are fully encompassed in the Qur'an, which includes necessities, needs, and enhancements, and each one of these is complete, and all of this is also evident."(4) The need for interpreting the Qur'an through opinion: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi's position is that he says: except that it has a basis in the Book, without adding the Sunnah. (2) The same source, 3/219. (3) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 3. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/217. [Page 448] The Qur'an is the primary source of legislation. It contains the entirety of the Sharia (Islamic law), and it clarifies everything within it. People are obligated to submit to its rulings until the Day of Resurrection, and occurrences and actions are ever-renewing. The previous jurists did not provide explanations for all rulings concerning every occurrence; therefore, it is necessary to derive meanings from the Qur'an, and it is essential to engage in ijtihad (independent reasoning) and express opinions about it. Al-Shatibi said: "The Book must be addressed by clarifying meanings, deriving rulings, interpreting words, and understanding intentions, and all of this has not been provided by those who came before. Thus, either this must be halted, resulting in the suspension of all or most rulings, which is impossible, or there must be discourse on it in a manner that is appropriate"(1). The interpretation of the Qur'an by opinion means understanding the intent of Allah from the text of the Qur'an where this has not been clarified by a statement from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), nor has it been conveyed to us by the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them). This requires conditions that must be met by the holder of the opinion and by the opinion itself. The discussion here is not about the mujtahid (scholar qualified to exercise independent judgment) or the interpreter and their conditions, as this will be addressed in a later chapter; rather, the focus here is on the opinion itself. Al-Shatibi said: "The application of opinion in the Qur'an has been condemned, and there has also come what necessitates its application"(2). He then said: "Opinion is of two types: one that aligns with the speech of the Arabs and conforms to the Book and the Sunnah; this cannot be neglected by one who is knowledgeable of them"(3). He then said: "As for the opinion that does not align with the Arabic language or that which aligns with the legal evidences, this is the opinion that is condemned without question"(4). __________ (1) The same source, 3/255. (2) The same source, 3/254. (3) The same source, 3/254 - 255. (4) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/255. [Page 449] But the interpretation of the Qur'an is a noble and serious task, and it should only be undertaken by those who are qualified for it. Those who are qualified must only speak based on knowledge and clarity, while being cautious of error, for speaking is in the clarification of the intent of Allah, Exalted is He. He said: "Be cautious in speaking about the Book of Allah, Exalted is He, except with clear evidence, for people are in knowledge of the tools needed for interpretation in three categories: the first is those who have reached the level of the firmly rooted in knowledge, such as the Companions (Sahaba) and the Followers (Tabi'in) and those who come after them. These individuals spoke with caution, restraint, reverence, and fear of making mistakes; thus, we are more deserving of this than they are if we think that we possess knowledge like theirs, and how far from that we are!"(1) __________ (1) The same source, 3/254. [Page 450] He said: "The statement regarding the Qur'an returns to the fact that Allah intended such and such or meant such and such with His revealed speech, and this is of great importance" (1). He said: "The one who looks at and interprets it must be aware that what he says is an intention from the speaker, and the Qur'an is the speech of Allah; he is saying with this clear expression that this is the intention of Allah from this speech, so let him be certain that he will be asked by Allah, 'From where did you say this about Me?'" (2). Therefore, if the interpreter does not verify the correctness of his statement, it is not permissible for him to assert it. Rather, it should be that the interpretation aligns with the speech of the Arabs, meaning that it should be something that the text can accommodate, and it should be in accordance with the Qur'an and the Sunnah, meaning that it should return to a meaning that is certain. If the text can accommodate more than one meaning, and the possible meanings each return to a certain meaning, then there must be evidence to prefer one meaning over another; otherwise, the meanings remain possible, and it is not permissible for him to assert a meaning or prefer one over another, and he may say: "It is possible that the meaning is this or that." He said: "Let him be certain that he will be asked by Allah, Exalted is He, 'From where did you say this about Me?' It is not permissible for him to do so except with the clarification of the evidence; otherwise, mere possibility suffices for him to say it is possible that the meaning is this or that, based also on the validity of those possibilities in the core of knowledge; otherwise, the possibilities that do not return to a valid origin are not considered. In any case, there must be evidence for every statement he asserts or interprets; otherwise, it is invalid, and its speaker falls under the category of the blameworthy opinion, and Allah knows best" (3). Accordingly, the accepted opinion in interpretation has two conditions. The first: it must align with the speech of the Arabs. The second: it must be in accordance with the Book and the Sunnah. The statement that fulfills the first condition is what al-Shatibi calls the apparent. As for the statement that fulfills both conditions, he calls it the hidden, which is what should be sought in interpretation, as will become clear. The Qur'an has an apparent and a hidden meaning: __________ (1) The same source, 3/257. (2) The same location. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/257. [Page 451] Al-Shatibi said: "Some people claim that the Qur'an has an apparent meaning and a hidden meaning" (1). He went on to state that this claim is valid in a specific sense and not in others, namely that the apparent meaning is the literal recitation or the words themselves and their meanings. As for the hidden meaning, it is what Allah, Exalted is He, intends from the discourse. He said: "The apparent meaning is the literal recitation, and the hidden meaning is the understanding of Allah's intent" (2). He also stated: "The apparent meaning refers to the Arabic understanding, while the hidden meaning is what Allah, Exalted is He, intends from His words and discourse. If the intent of those who used this phrase is what has been interpreted, then it is correct and there is no dispute about it. However, if they mean something else, then it is an assertion of something additional to what was known by the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) and those after them, and there must be conclusive evidence to support this claim, as it is a principle by which the Book is judged, and it cannot be speculative" (3). __________ (1) The same source, 3/227, and see: Al-Ghazali, Mishkat al-Anwar. (2) The same source, 3/227. (3) The same source, 3/228. The apparent meaning in this sense is what is attributed to the literalists, who adhere to it. As for what is avoided in terms of the hidden meaning, it is what is brought forth by those called the esoterics, who have claims and fantasies in interpretation that lack evidence. We will mention some of that. [Page 452] Therefore, the interpretation of the Qur'an and understanding the meanings of its texts is through understanding the inner meaning as mentioned, and not by merely stopping at the apparent meanings of the texts, because understanding the apparent is easy. He said: "For Allah, Exalted is He, said: { So what is [the matter] with those people that they hardly understand a statement? } (1), and the meaning is that they do not understand what Allah intends from the speech, and it is not intended that they do not understand the words themselves, how could they when it was revealed in their language, but they did not attain the understanding of Allah's intent from the speech" (2). Al-Shatibi clarifies his meaning of the inner (batin) with examples, including Ibn Abbas's interpretation of Allah's saying: { When comes the help of Allah and victory } (3) by saying: It is merely the end of the life of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), which he was informed of. And the saying of Umar (may Allah be pleased with him): By Allah, I do not know anything from it except what I have learned (4). Al-Shatibi said: "The apparent meaning of this surah is that Allah commanded His Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) to glorify and praise his Lord and seek His forgiveness when Allah granted him victory and opened for him, and its inner meaning is that Allah announced to him his own death" (5). He said: "And when the verse was revealed: { This day I have perfected for you your religion } (6), the companions rejoiced and Umar cried and said: There is nothing after perfection except deficiency, feeling the announcement of his (peace and blessings be upon him) death, and he lived thereafter only eighty-one days" (7). __________ (1) Surah An-Nisa, 78. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/227. (3) Surah An-Nasr, 1. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/228. (5) The same source, 3/228. (6) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 3. (7) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/228. [Page 453] He said: "Everything that pertains to the Arabic meanings, upon which the understanding of the Qur'an depends, falls under the apparent meaning. The rhetorical issues and the disputes of eloquence cannot be separated from the apparent meaning of the Qur'an" (1). He said: "And everything that pertains to the meanings that necessitate the realization of the addressee in the state of servitude and the acknowledgment of Allah's lordship is the intended inner meaning, which is the purpose for which the Qur'an was revealed" (2). Then he said: "In general, everyone who deviates and strays from the straight path does so to the extent that they miss out on understanding and knowledge of the inner meaning of the Qur'an. And everyone who attains the truth and hits the mark does so in proportion to the understanding they have gained of its inner meaning" (3). Understanding the intended meaning, that is the inner meaning, can only occur after understanding the apparent meaning. The intent of Allah in the address, even if it is not definitive according to the interpreter, must still be something that the apparent meaning can accommodate or necessitate. He said: "The fact that the apparent meaning is the Arabic concept in its abstract form is without doubt, as both the supporters and opponents agree that it was revealed in clear Arabic language" (4). He said: "Any meaning derived from the Qur'an that does not conform to the Arabic tongue is not part of the sciences of the Qur'an, neither in what can be derived from it nor in what can be derived by it" (5). __________ (1) The same source, 3/230. (2) The same source, 3/231. (3) The same source, 3/234. (4) The same source, 3/233. (5) The same place. [Page 454] Since understanding the inner meaning cannot be achieved without understanding the outer meaning, to grasp al-Shatibi's methodology in interpreting the Qur'an, one must understand his approach to both the outer and inner meanings. It is always important to note what he stipulates for the application of evidence, which is that the evidence must be either definitive (qat'i) or related to a definitive meaning; and here, the meaning is that the inner meaning must be either definitive or related to something definitive. He said: "In every issue for which one seeks to acquire knowledge in the most complete manner, one must refer to its origin in the Qur'an. If it is explicitly stated or its type or genus is mentioned, then that is sufficient; otherwise, the levels of consideration in it are multiple" (1). He then said: "It has been previously established in the first section of the Book of Evidence that every legal evidence is either definitive or related to something definitive, and the highest reference for the definitive is the Noble Qur'an, which is the first point of reference" (2). How to understand the outer meaning: The texts of the Qur'an are Arabic in their words, structures, and styles, and understanding their implications is constrained by this. Although they may not be definitively indicative, their possible implications are limited to the apparent meanings of the texts, as clarified earlier. He said: "The fact that the inner meaning is intended in the discourse has also been demonstrated from what was mentioned in the previous issue, but it is subject to two conditions. The first is that it must be valid according to the implications established in the Arabic language and must align with Arabic objectives" (3). He stated that this is "evident from the principle that the Qur'an is Arabic; for if it had an understanding that is not implied by the speech of the Arabs, it would not be described as Arabic in the absolute sense, and because it is a concept attributed to the Qur'an, there is nothing in its words or meanings that indicates it. What is like this cannot be attributed to it at all, as its attribution is not more valid than the attribution of its opposite, nor is there a criterion that indicates one over the other. Thus, affirming one of them is mere assumption and speculation about the apparent Qur'an, and in this case, its speaker falls under the sin of speaking about the Book of Allah without knowledge, and the evidence mentioned that the Qur'an is Arabic applies here" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/221. (2) The same source. (3) The same source, 3/235. (4) The same source. [Page 455] To achieve this condition, which is understanding the apparent meaning, that is, the implication of the text as it is an Arabic speech, one must know the reasons for revelation (asbab al-nuzul), and what they entail in terms of understanding the contextual clues of circumstances and statements. The meaning varies depending on the audience, and it is possible that the matter may indicate obligation, recommendation, permissibility, or it may pertain to duty, threat, frustration, or other meanings. An order may come in a general form intended for a specific case, and it may come with a word or phrase that has one implication in its original context and another in its usage. The word may be ambiguous, metaphorical, or have one meaning in its original usage, another in Islamic law, and another in common practice. In summary, the texts are revealed with contexts and accompanied by contextual clues that affect the meaning. He said: "Knowledge of the reasons for revelation is necessary for anyone who seeks to understand the Qur'an" (1). He also said: "The science of meanings and rhetoric, which is known by the miraculous arrangement of the Qur'an, in addition to understanding the objectives of the speech of the Arabs, is fundamentally based on understanding the implications of the circumstances of the speech from the perspective of the speech itself, the speaker, the audience, or all of them" (2). He said: "Like the interrogative, which is a single word but encompasses other meanings such as affirmation and reproach, and so forth. And like the command, which can imply permissibility, threat, frustration, and similar meanings, and its intended meaning is only indicated by external matters. Its essence lies in the implications of the circumstances, and not every circumstance is conveyed, nor is every clue associated with the very speech conveyed. If some of the indicative clues are missing, the understanding of the speech may be entirely lost or only partially understood. Understanding the reasons is essential for clarifying every form in this regard, and it is undoubtedly important for understanding the speech. The meaning of knowing the reason is the same as understanding the implications of the circumstances" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/201. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. [Page 456] Al-Shatibi provides examples of this, including the case of Qudamah ibn Muz'oon, who was one of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) and drank alcohol, becoming intoxicated. Evidence was presented against him regarding this. Al-Shatibi said: "Omar said: 'O Qudamah, I will punish you.' He replied: 'By Allah, if I had drunk as they say, you would not have the right to punish me.' Omar asked: 'Why not?' He said: 'Because Allah says: { There is no blame upon those who believe and do righteous deeds for what they have eaten, if they fear Allah and believe and do righteous deeds, and then fear Allah and believe and do righteous deeds, and then fear Allah and do good; and Allah loves the doers of good }' (1). Omar replied: 'You have misunderstood the interpretation, O Qudamah. If you fear Allah, you will avoid what Allah has prohibited.' (2) And he said: 'Omar then said: "Will you not respond to his statement?" Ibn Abbas said: "These verses were revealed as an excuse for those who came before and as a proof against those who remain. The excuse for those who came before is that they met Allah before alcohol was prohibited for them, and the proof against those who remain is that Allah says: { O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacrificing on] stone alters [to other than Allah], and divining arrows are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may be successful }' (3), and then he recited to the end of the other verse. If he is among those who have believed and done righteous deeds, then feared [Allah] and believed, and then feared [Allah] and did good, then Allah has prohibited drinking alcohol.' Omar said: 'You have spoken the truth.' " (4) Al-Shatibi mentioned a similar incident and then said: "In these two hadiths, there is an indication that neglecting the reasons for revelation leads to deviating from the intended meaning of the verses." (5) How to understand the inner meaning: __________ (1) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 93, and the full verse is: { There is no blame upon those who believe and do righteous deeds for what they have eaten, if they fear Allah and believe and do righteous deeds, and then fear Allah and believe and do righteous deeds, and then fear Allah and do good; and Allah loves the doers of good }. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/203. (3) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 90, and the full verse is: { O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacrificing on] stone alters [to other than Allah], and divining arrows are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may be successful }. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/203. (5) The same source. [Page 457] The first condition for understanding the inner meaning (batin) is understanding the outer meaning (zahir), and the indications of the texts regarding their meanings are not definitive according to al-Shatibi, but they are confined to the outer meanings of the texts. If the conditions for understanding the outer meaning are fulfilled as explained above, then there are other conditions to determine the intended meaning of the text, that is, the inner meaning, whether with certainty or preference. If these conditions are met, an understanding that is acceptable in Sharia is achieved. The text can have more than one meaning based on the outer meaning, and the potential outer meaning has conditions that must be met for it to be accepted. As previously explained, the meaning must refer to a definitive meaning established through induction, in that it must either be included within it or serve it. If this potential outer meaning contradicts a general principle in Sharia, it must be abandoned and disregarded. One of the conditions for accepting the potential outer meaning is that it has a witness that favors it over other possible meanings. This is because the potential meanings of the outer text—those meanings that meet the conditions of the outer meaning—may have more than one general principle associated with them, and selecting one over the others without a basis for preference is an unjustified preference, which is not valid, as it constitutes a statement in Sharia and in the Qur'an without evidence. The final condition is that there should be no opposition to the meaning, as opposition serves as an indication of its lesser validity. [Page 458] He said in explaining the conditions of the intended meaning of the speech, which is the inner meaning: "However, two conditions are required: the first is that it must be valid according to the implications of the apparent meaning established in the Arabic language and must align with the Arabic objectives. The second is that there must be a supporting evidence, either textual or apparent, in another place that attests to its validity without opposition"(1). As for the first condition, it has been discussed when talking about how to understand the apparent meaning. Regarding the second, he said: "As for the second, it is because if there is no supporting evidence in another place or if there is opposition, it becomes one of the claims made against the Qur'an, and mere claims are not accepted by the consensus of scholars"(2). As for the absence of mention here of the condition of referring to the definitive (qat'i), it is because this condition is general for every proof, and this matter has been emphasized previously. His discussion here is specific to the conditions of interpreting the texts of the Qur'an; therefore, this condition is implicitly considered. Issues with al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding the Meanings of the Qur'an: This is the methodology of al-Shatibi in interpreting the Qur'an or in explaining meanings, but there are interpretations of some texts given by the Companions (sahaba), the Successors (tabi'un), or recognized Imams that do not fully align with what he mentioned. Therefore, he finds them problematic and attempts to justify them or return them to his methodology if possible. He says: "The definition of the Qur'an in terms of legal rulings is mostly general, not specific, and where it is specific, its basis is on the generality either by consideration or by the meaning of the origin, except for what the evidence specifies, such as the characteristics of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him)"(3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/235. (2) The same source, 3/236. (3) The same source, 3/216. [Page 459] As for the definition of the Qur'an regarding rulings being general and not specific, it has been previously explained that the Noble Qur'an contains the explanation of everything; it is comprehensive despite its brevity, and it can only be so if it contains general principles that apply to many specific cases, even if they are not explicitly mentioned. This does not mean that specific cases are not mentioned (1). Therefore, it was said: "Most of it is general." However, these specific cases mentioned in the Qur'an must be definitive or refer back to definitive origins, and they can only be definitive if many specific cases support their meaning, which leads to them being general. This is in contrast to the claim that they are specific; thus, they are specific and must refer back to general principles. Hence, it was said: "Its basis is on the general," just as the prohibition of alcohol is related to the preservation of the intellect, and the prohibition of the worship of idols or specific idols like al-Lat and al-Uzza is related to the worship of Allah alone. This is the meaning of the statement: "Its basis is on the general in the sense of the origin." As for the statement: "Its basis is on the general with consideration," it is due to what may be questioned regarding interpretations or inferences, as will become clear. What is meant by consideration is that the meaning taken or interpreted must align with the correct meaning that is consistent with the apparent conditions and refers back to an origin, meaning it must be in agreement with it but not identical to it, which is the meaning of consideration as clarified in the first chapter. Therefore, the issue arises from two aspects. The first: the apparent text, as the interpretation may come in a manner not customary in the speech and styles of the Arabs, yet al-Shatibi accepts it. The second aspect of the issue is the internal aspect, such that the meaning may not refer back to a definitive origin and lacks evidence by consideration. Although al-Shatibi's methodology rejects it or suspends judgment on it, he stated that its acceptance is possible in cases where they exist, though they are few. The following are examples for clarification. __________ (1) As mentioned regarding alcohol, pork, gambling, and similar matters. [Page 460] As for what does not appear to be the case, al-Shatibi provided examples of it, including his statement: "There are problematic interpretations in the Qur'an that may fall into this category (1) or into the category of the correct hidden meanings, which are attributed to people among the scholars, and perhaps some of them are attributed to the righteous predecessors. Among these are the initials of the chapters such as { Alif } and { Lam } and { Meem } "(2). He said: "They narrate from Ibn Abbas that { Alif } is for Allah, { Lam } is for Gabriel, and { Meem } is for Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him). If this is correct in transmission, it is problematic because this pattern of interpretation has not been established in the speech of the Arabs in this manner at all; rather, it has appeared similarly only when supported by verbal or contextual evidence" (3). He said: "It has also been reported that these initials are secrets whose interpretation is known only to Allah, and this is the most apparent opinion, so they fall into the category of ambiguous verses" (4). Another example he provided is found in the interpretation of the verse { So do not make equals to Allah } (5), meaning opposites, where it was said that the greatest of the equals is the commanding soul (6). This is problematic for al-Shatibi, because the apparent meaning according to his conditions, based on the reasons for revelation and the implications of the contextual clues, is that the equals are the idols and not the soul. __________ (1) Of this kind: meaning of the kind that the Batiniyya brought forth, which contradicts both the hidden and the apparent. Such as their saying: "The Kaaba is the Prophet, and the door is Ali, and Safa is the Prophet and Marwah is Ali." And their saying: "Moses' staff is his proof that swallowed the sorcerers' illusions, and the splitting of the sea is Moses' knowledge among them, and the sea is the world." And their saying: "The glorification of the mountains is the strong men in religion." And the jinn that Solomon controlled are the Batiniyya of that time, and the devils are the Zahiriyya who were tasked with hard works. And others. See: al-Muwafaqat 3/236. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/237. (3) The same source. (4) The same source. (5) Surah Al-Baqarah, 22. (6) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/238. [Page 461] He said: "This is a very apparent problem since the context of the verse and the gathered evidence within it indicate that the partners (andad) are the idols or others that they used to worship, and they did not worship themselves nor take them as lords" (1). He then commented: "However, there is a valid interpretation, as he did not say that this is the interpretation of the verse, but rather brought forth what is a partner in legal consideration that the Qur'an has testified to from two aspects. One of them is that the observer may derive from the meaning of the verse a meaning from the perspective of legal consideration and apply it to something that it was not revealed about because it shares the same intent or is similar to it, as the essence of a partner is that which opposes its counterpart, and the commanding self (nafs al-ammara) is of this nature" (2). Thus, the meaning of consideration in his statement: "Its source is general by consideration" is to apply the meaning of the verse to something that shares the intent with the thing it was revealed about or is similar to it; this is from the perspective of the apparent meaning, while the problem from the perspective of the hidden meaning does not exist in this example. This is that the meaning which fulfills the conditions of the apparent does not revert to a general principle or does not have a witness by consideration, and it cannot be said to pause and not apply the text, because it is a Qur'anic text and upon it is built a legal obligation, thus applying it is obligatory and neglecting it is not valid. __________ (1) The same place. (2) The same source, 3/238 - 239. [Page 462] What al-Shatibi says in this case is that it is a hypothetical situation that does not exist, and if it does exist, its occurrence is rare and does not harm the methodology. He states: "The speculative (dhanni) that has no supporting definitive (qat'i) source and does not contradict a definitive source is in a state of scrutiny. Its category is that of the strange analogy (qiyas gharīb), and it may be said that it is not accepted because it establishes something contrary to what is customary in its like, and induction (istiqra) indicates that it does not exist, and these two weaken the reliance on it absolutely because it is in a state of doubt" (1). Thus, such a case has not occurred, and induction confirms this. If we assume its occurrence, what should be done? He says: "The scholars have employed the strange analogy in the chapters of analogy (qiyas), and although it is rare, that is not harmful if the evidence indicates its validity" (2). The resolution of the issue in this case is that the Qur'an has come with general principles (kulliyat) and its revelation is such that the subsequent verses clarify the preceding ones. Likewise, the Sunnah has come to clarify the Qur'an, as well as what has been transmitted from the righteous predecessors (salaf) who are more knowledgeable about the language and its implications and about the Sharia and its objectives (maqasid). Therefore, if something from the evidence is particular (juz'iyy), it is originally a clarification of the general principles. If we cannot relate it back to the general principles, we can rely on evidence from particulars, as it may have a meaning that establishes a general principle to which it returns. This does not harm or undermine the foundation of the methodology because if it exists, it is rare. Therefore, if there is no definitive source to which the meaning can be referred or any evidence by consideration, the general Arabic understanding of the text can be validly employed. He states: "Accordingly, in deriving rulings from the Qur'an, one should not limit oneself to it without considering its explanation, which is the Sunnah, because if it is general and contains general matters, as in the case of prayer, zakat, hajj, fasting, and the like, there is no alternative to looking at its clarification. After that, one should consider the interpretation of the righteous predecessors, for they are more knowledgeable about it than others; otherwise, the general Arabic understanding of whoever has acquired it suffices for what is lacking in that, and Allah knows best" (3). __________ (1) The same source, 3/12. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/12. (3) The same source, 3/217 - 218. [Page 463] He said: "In every issue where knowledge is sought in the most complete manner, one must turn to its origin in the Qur'an. If there is a text explicitly addressing it, its type, or its genus, then that is sufficient; otherwise, the levels of consideration in it are multiple" (1). He then said: "It has been established in the first section of the Book of Evidence that every legal proof is either definitive or refers back to something definitive, and the highest reference for the definitive is the Noble Qur'an, which is the first point of reference. However, if the matter only pertains to action specifically, it suffices to refer to the Sunnah transmitted by individual narrators, just as it suffices to refer to the opinion of the jurist, which is weaker. The reference to its origin in the Book is necessary due to its need for that in establishing it as a foundational source to be referred to, or as a religion through which Allah is worshipped; thus, it is not sufficient to receive it from the reports of individuals as previously mentioned" (2). Based on the above, the interpretation that poses a challenge to al-Shatibi's methodology is only apparent, and al-Shatibi rejects it. He exerted himself to clarify the possibility of considering it because it comes from someone whose statement is regarded as valid, and this is the source of the issue itself. Therefore, it should be noted that he rejected the interpretation of Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with him) regarding the opening letters of the surahs, as well as the interpretation of "partners" in the verse: { So do not make with Allah any equals } (3). Thus, he said regarding the opening letters of the surahs: "It has been reported that these letters are secrets whose interpretation only Allah knows, and this is the most evident opinion; they are among the ambiguous matters" (4). He also rejected the interpretation of "partners" by saying: "However, there is a valid perspective on this, which is that he did not say that this is the interpretation of the verse" (5). As for the difficulty of these statements and the effort to find a valid perspective for them, it is due to the prominence of those from whom they were reported. He said: "All of this was needed due to the prominence of those from whom this was transmitted among the virtuous" (6). __________ (1) The same source, 3/221. (2) The same location. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 22. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/237. (5) The same source, 3/238 - 239. (6) The same source, 3/242. [Page 464] Therefore, some interpretations have been rejected, even if they were issued by scholars, such as interpreting the neighbor who is near as the heart, the neighbor who is distant as the natural self, and the companion who is near as the intellect that is followed in the Sharia, and the wayfarer as the limbs that are obedient to Allah, Exalted is He. He said that this: "is not known by the Arabs, neither by those who believe among them nor by those who disbelieve, and the evidence for this is that nothing has been transmitted from the righteous predecessors among the Companions and the Followers that resembles or approaches this interpretation; if it had been known to them, it would have been transmitted. For they were more deserving of understanding the apparent and hidden meanings of the Qur'an, by the consensus of the imams, and no one from the end of this nation will come with guidance more than that which was with its beginning, nor are they more knowledgeable of the Sharia than them. There is also no evidence indicating the validity of this interpretation, neither from the context of the verse, as it contradicts it, nor from outside it, as there is no evidence for it either. Rather, such a thing is closer to what has been firmly rejected and denied from the Qur'an, like the words of the Batiniyya and those similar to them."(1) Examples of al-Shatibi's methodology in understanding the meanings of the Qur'an: All the rulings of the Sharia are present in the Qur'an in universals that serve one another. Therefore, it is necessary for anyone who wishes to acquire knowledge of the Sharia to know its universals that are compiled in the Qur'an, as this enables them to apply them to their particulars. Knowledge of the universals necessitates knowledge of the Qur'an and constant engagement with it in order to be aware of the meanings it contains that do not become obsolete, and the rulings and truths that continue to emerge for those who reflect upon it. This can only be achieved through continuous reading and contemplation of what is in it. He said: "If we look at the return of the Sharia to its moral universals, we find that they are fully encompassed in the Qur'an."(2) He said: "The Book has been established as the universal of the Sharia, the foundation of the religion, the fountain of wisdom, and the sign of the message."(3) He then said: "If that is the case, it is necessary for anyone who seeks to gain insight into the universals of the Sharia and aspires to grasp its objectives and join its people to take it as their companion and friend, and to make it their companion throughout the days and nights, both in contemplation and action, not limiting themselves to one of them."(4) __________ (1) The same source, 3/241. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/217. (3) The same source, 3/200. (4) The same location. [Page 465] From these two aspects of adherence and commitment, knowledge of the Qur'an, its methods, and meanings increases, leading to the benefit of understanding its meanings and a thorough exploration of them, which results in the comprehension of the overarching principles of the Qur'an. Al-Shatibi established two principles or foundations, perhaps intending to provide examples of what can be gained from engaging with the Qur'an and exploring its meanings. The first benefits the extraction of meanings by referring to a general principle. The second pertains to the conduct and etiquette of the Qur'an. As for the first, it is: "Every narrative that occurs in the Qur'an must either have a response before it or after it, which is more common, or not. If there is a response, there is no doubt about the invalidity or falsehood of that narrative. If there is no response accompanying it, that is evidence of the validity and truth of that narrative." (1) __________ (1) The same source, 3/206. [Page 466] The evidence of al-Shatibi on this matter is his examination of the narratives that appeared in the Qur'an and his thorough investigation of them, both those that were responded to and those that were not (1), upon which he based his aforementioned principle. He then said: "Due to the consistency of this principle, the scholars have relied on it, as a group of usul scholars have argued that disbelievers are addressed with the branches of the Sharia based on His saying, { They said, 'We were not of those who prayed (43) and we did not feed the poor.' } (2), for if their statement were false, it would have been refuted when narrated" (3). Among the interesting points he mentioned based on this principle is his argument that the companions of the cave were seven and their eighth was their dog. He said: "He argued that the companions of the cave were seven and their eighth was their dog because when Allah narrated their statement that they were three, with their dog being the fourth, and that they were five, with their dog being the sixth, He followed that with the statement: { A guess by mere conjecture } (4), meaning they had no evidence or knowledge other than following conjecture, and conjecture does not avail against the truth at all. And when He narrated their statement: 'Seven and their eighth is their dog,' He did not follow it with a refutation but rather said: { Say, 'My Lord knows best their number; none knows them except a few.' } (5), indicating the correctness of this statement over the first two. It has been narrated from Ibn Abbas that he used to say: 'I am among that few who know them' " (6). __________ (1) The same source, 3/206 - 208. (2) Surah Al-Muddathir, 43 - 44. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/208. (4) Surah Al-Kahf, 22. (5) Surah Al-Kahf, 22. (6) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/208. [Page 467] Among the evidence for the fact that tranquility of the heart is an increase in faith is the statement of Ibrahim (peace be upon him): { My Lord, show me how You give life to the dead } (1), and when he was asked: { He said, "Did you not believe?" He said, "Yes, but so that my heart may be at ease." } (2). If Allah, Exalted is He, had known that he had doubt, He would have made it evident, thus it is confirmed that tranquility was in the sense of an increase in faith. This is in contrast to what Allah mentioned about a group of the Bedouins in His saying: { The Bedouins say, "We have believed." } (3), for Allah, Exalted is He, responded to them: { Say, "You have not believed; rather, say, 'We have submitted,' for faith has not yet entered your hearts." } (4) (5). __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 260. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 260. (3) Surah Al-Hujurat, 14. (4) Surah Al-Hujurat, 14. (5) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/208. [Page 468] The second principle is: "When there is encouragement (targhib) in the Qur'an, it is accompanied by deterrence (tarhib) in its subsequent or preceding verses or in its context, or vice versa, as well as the combination of hope (tarjih) with fear (khawf), and what relates to this meaning is similar" (1). This is because a person is inclined to lean towards either the side of laxity or the side of strictness. Thus, encouragement and deterrence come as a form of discipline, guiding him towards what is moderate and just, keeping him between fear and hope. If he leans towards laxity, he is met with fear, and if he leans towards strictness, he is met with hope. Al-Shatibi mentioned that this principle is consistent in the Qur'an as it is one of the actions of the Wise and All-Aware Creator. He said: "And this is how he (peace and blessings be upon him) disciplined his companions. When a group of people became overly fearful, they were told: { O My servants who have believed, do not despair of the mercy of Allah } (2), and when another group neglected certain matters, they were warned and admonished, as in the saying: { Indeed, those who harm Allah and His Messenger - Allah has cursed them in this world and the Hereafter } (3). Therefore, if this is established from the arrangement of the Qur'an and the meanings of its verses, then it is upon the accountable person to act according to that discipline" (4). This pattern in deriving rulings regarding the principles of conduct and its etiquette has examples that al-Shatibi refers to in several places in his book, and they return - in his view - to a foundational principle he calls the principle of embodying the attributes of Allah and emulating His actions, where each of these attributes serves as a principle derived through induction. __________ (1) The same source, 3/210. (2) Surah Az-Zumar, 53. (3) Surah Al-Ahzab, 57. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/216. [Page 469] The origin itself also requires an examination that leads to certainty about it. He says: "The validity of the mentioned origin is clarified in the book of ijtihad, which is the origin of embodying the attributes of Allah and emulating His actions. It includes various types of foundational principles, subsidiary benefits, and literary merits. Let us mention examples that can assist in understanding the intended meaning. Among these is that non-punishment before warning indicates this, as He, Exalted is He, informed about Himself by saying: { And We did not punish until We sent a messenger } (1). It has become His custom with His creation that He does not hold them accountable for disobedience except after sending the messengers. Once the proof has been established against them, { So whoever wills, let him believe; and whoever wills, let him disbelieve } (2), and for each is a recompense like it" (3). Among these is also the thoroughness in establishing the proof, and the fact that one is not punished for a sin at the first instance, and the improvement of expression through euphemism and similar means in situations where it is necessary to mention what is typically considered shameful in our customs, such as His saying: { Or you have touched women } (4), and { And Mary, the daughter of Imran, who guarded her chastity, and We breathed into her } (5), and others (6). The methodology of al-Shatibi in deducing meanings in the Qur'an: __________ (1) Surah Al-Isra, 15. (2) Surah Al-Kahf, 29. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/223. (4) Surah An-Nisa, 43. (5) Surah At-Tahrim, 12. (6) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/224. [Page 470] Al-Shatibi sees that the general principles (kulliyat) are the first to be revealed in the Qur'an, and most of them were revealed in Mecca. Therefore, what was revealed afterward serves as an explanation and elaboration of those general principles. Thus, for anyone who wishes to explore the meanings and establish the general principles, they must follow the order of the Qur'an in its revelation. He said: "Know that the general rules are those that were established first and with which the Qur'an was revealed to its Prophet in Mecca, then followed by other matters in Medina that completed those rules whose origin was established in Mecca" (1). He said: "The specific rulings revealed in Mecca were few, while the general principles were more in terms of revelation and legislation" (2). He said: "The Qur'an contains an explanation of everything in that prior order" (3), and he said: "The Medinan surahs should be understood in relation to the Meccan ones, and likewise the Meccan ones among themselves, and the Medinan ones among themselves according to their order in revelation; otherwise, it would not be correct. The evidence for this is that the meaning of the Medinan address is generally based on the Meccan one, just as the later parts of each are based on their predecessors, as evidenced by induction" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/62. (2) The same source. (3) The same source, 3/218. (4) The same source, 3/244 - 245. [Page 471] Al-Shatibi affirms his statement by noting that one of the first surahs revealed in Mecca was Surah Al-An'am, and one of the first revealed in Medina was Surah Al-Baqarah. He says: "For indeed it (1) was revealed clarifying the foundations of beliefs and the principles of religion, and from it the scholars derived the principles of monotheism (tawhid) that the theologians classified, from the proof of the necessary existence to the proof of the Imamate. This is what they said" (2). He then stated: "And when the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) migrated to Medina, one of the first things revealed to him was Surah Al-Baqarah, which established the principles of piety based on the principles of Surah Al-An'am" (3). After mentioning some details regarding this, he said: "Other later Medina surahs are based on it, just as other later Meccan surahs are based on Al-An'am. And if you were to compare the other surahs with one another in order, you would find them similarly aligned, so let not the observer of the book overlook this meaning, for it is one of the secrets of the sciences of exegesis (tafsir), and according to one's knowledge of it, one gains knowledge of the words of his Lord, Exalted is He" (4). __________ (1) For indeed it: meaning Surah Al-An'am. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/245. (3) The same source. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/245. [Page 472] Thus, all branches of Sharia (Islamic law) return to general principles that are all found in the Qur'an, and these general principles were revealed earlier, just as these principles refer in their meanings to fundamental origins, and so on, until the Sharia returns to a single principle. These general principles are established through the many aspects that support them, as the following text shows: It states, "The majority of the Meccan (surahs) are established for three meanings, the root of which is one meaning, which is the call to the worship of Allah, Exalted is He. The first is the affirmation of the oneness of the one true God, although it comes in various forms, such as the negation of partners in general, or the negation of what the disbelievers claimed about it being a means of drawing closer to Allah or that He has taken a son, or other types of false claims. The second is the affirmation of the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) and that he is the Messenger of Allah to them all, truthful in what he has brought from Allah, although it also comes in various forms, such as affirming that he is truly a Messenger and refuting what they claimed against him, that he is a liar, a magician, or mad, or that he is taught by a human, or similar accusations from their disbelief and obstinacy. The third is the affirmation of the resurrection and the Hereafter, and that it is true without a doubt, with clear evidence and a refutation of those who deny it in every way that the disbeliever can deny it, responding in every way that establishes the proof and silences the opponent and clarifies the matter. These three meanings are what the Qur'an revealed in Mecca in general, and whatever seems at first glance to deviate from them should be referred back to them in the essence of the matter" (1). Due to the importance of this text - above - in his methodology, I have quoted it in full, and its meaning is spread throughout many places in his book, and he repeats himself in another place, saying: "This is because it (2) contains knowledge of three types, which are the primary objectives: the first is knowledge of the one to whom one is directed, the second is knowledge of how to direct oneself to Him. __________ (1) The same source, 3/251. This text is very important in clarifying his methodology as it shows how many details converge on a single general meaning. And how general principles converge and return to a single principle. (2) It: meaning the Noble Qur'an. [Page 473] The third: Knowing the outcome of the servant so that he fears Allah through it and hopes for Him. These three categories fall under one category, which is the intended purpose expressed in His saying, { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me }(1). Thus, worship is the primary intended purpose"(2). The Third Topic The Methodology of al-Shatibi in Understanding the Sunnah The subject of this research: The Sunnah is the second source of legislation after the Book, and it is an explanation of the Book. Al-Shatibi's opinion, as previously mentioned, is that there is no legislation in the Sunnah that is additional to the Book, meaning no legislation that does not have a basis in the Book. The purpose of this discussion is to clarify how the Sunnah explains the Book according to al-Shatibi, and how the established legal rulings in the Sunnah are traced back to their origins in the Book, especially those that may be used to object to his view that the Sunnah is independent in its legislation and has no basis in the Book. And what is also meant is to clarify his position that what reaches us from the Sunnah (tradition) that cannot be traced back to a source in the Book (Qur'an) must be paused upon, and it is not correct to act upon it. Likewise, this discussion aims to clarify al-Shatibi's view on the indication of actions regarding legal rulings, as the actions of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) are part of the Sunnah, and the indication of actions is not like the indication of words. Definition of the Sunnah according to al-Shatibi: Al-Shatibi uses the term "sunnah" as a source of legislation to refer to what has been transmitted from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) in terms of speech, action, or approval, as well as what has been reported from the Companions or the Rightly Guided Caliphs. __________ (1) Surah Adh-Dhariyat, 56. (2) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/225. [Page 474] As for what has come from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), it is clear and agreed upon that it is the Sunnah. As for what has come from the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them), it refers to their consensus as a source of legislation based on legal evidence that they recognized but has not been transmitted to us. The actions of the rightly guided caliphs also refer back to the reality of consensus. He said, after mentioning meanings that are referred to as Sunnah: "When the preceding is gathered, it results in four aspects in the general sense: his (peace and blessings be upon him) saying, his action, and his approval, all of which are either received by revelation or by ijtihad (independent reasoning) based on the validity of ijtihad in his case; these are three, and the fourth is what has come from the Companions or the caliphs" (1). He said: "The term Sunnah is also used for what the Companions acted upon, whether it is found in the Book or the Sunnah or not, as it is following a Sunnah that was established among them but has not been transmitted to us, or a consensus reached among them or their caliphs. For their consensus is consensus, and the actions of their caliphs also refer back to the reality of consensus as required by their considerations of public interest (maslaha), which includes under this term the public interests (masalih mursala) and preference (istihsan), as they did in the case of the punishment for wine, the liability of craftsmen, the compilation of the Qur'an, and compelling people to read from one of the seven readings, and the recording of records, and similar matters" (2). He means by consensus the consensus of the Companions, not those after them. He said: "The Sunnah of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) is a Sunnah that is acted upon and referred to, and evidence for this includes several matters, one of which is Allah's praise of them without exception and His commendation of their justice and what pertains to it" (3). He said: "It cannot be said that this is general for the Ummah and does not specifically pertain to the Companions over those after them, for we say: First, this is not the case based on the fact that they are the ones specifically addressed, and those after them do not enter with them except by analogy and another proof" (4). His intention is that they are the ones specifically addressed, meaning in praise and in commendation and what pertains to that. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/3. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/2. (3) The same source, 4/40. (4) The same location. [Page 475] He said: "The statement of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) is a correct statement, with no doubt about its authenticity, for he was sent for that purpose. Allah, Exalted is He, says { And We have sent down to you the Reminder that you may make clear to the people what was sent down to them } (1), and there is no disagreement about it. As for the statements of the Companions, if they all agree on what they have clarified, there is also no doubt about its authenticity" (2). As for the actions of the caliphs within the Sunnah, they are the actions of the rightly guided caliphs, as they pertain to consensus (ijma), and consensus is the consensus of the Companions. Thus, the actions of the caliphs can only be included in the consensus of the Companions if they are the rightly guided caliphs. This is because the caliph has the right to obedience from the Ummah. He compels the people to a legal matter, thereby achieving consensus. Al-Shatibi cites the actions of the rightly guided caliphs and the consensus of the Companions in more than one place in his book with the hadith: "Adhere to my Sunnah and the Sunnah of the rightly guided caliphs after me; cling to it with your molar teeth" (3)" (4). Accordingly, the Sunnah is: the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), his actions, his approvals, and what has come from the Companions by consensus and from the rightly guided caliphs. The latter does not refer to their consensus but rather to what has come from the rightly guided caliph in terms of saying, action, or approval, which has been accepted by the Companions by consensus, thus it returns to the consensus of the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them all. The Sunnah is an explanation of the Book: __________ (1) Surah An-Nahl, 44. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/195. (3) Narrated by al-Tirmidhi (2600) who said: It is حسن صحيح (hasan sahih). And Abu Dawood (3991), Ibn Majah (42, 43), Ahmad (16521), and al-Darimi (95). (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/196-197 and 4/3. [Page 476] Al-Shatibi says: "The Sunnah (tradition) refers back in its meaning to the Book (Qur'an); it is a detailed explanation of what is general, a clarification of what is ambiguous, and an elaboration of what is concise. This is because it is an explanation of it, as indicated by His saying, Exalted is He: { And We have sent down to you the Reminder that you may make clear to the people what was sent down to them } (1). You will not find in the Sunnah any matter except that the Qur'an has indicated its meaning either in a general or detailed way. Furthermore, everything that indicates that the Qur'an is the totality of the Sharia (Islamic law) and its source is evidence for that" (2). The Sunnah comes second in its indication of rulings after the Book, as it is an explanation and elaboration of it, so it cannot precede it. Also, the reports of the Sunnah are of uncertain authenticity, while the Qur'an is entirely definitive. The certainty in the Sunnah is in its authenticity as a source of legislation, that is, as a general proof. In fact, al-Shatibi, just as he denied the existence of definitive indications of the texts on meanings, he also denied—or nearly denied—the existence of mutawatir (consecutively reported) reports other than the Qur'an. Thus, the indication of the Sunnah is uncertain from two aspects: from the aspect of authenticity and from the aspect of indication. He said: "The rank of the Sunnah is to be lower than the Book in consideration, and the evidence for this is as follows: one of them is that the Book is definitive, while the Sunnah is presumed; and the certainty in it is valid in general, not in detail, unlike the Book, which is definitive in both general and detailed terms, and the definitive is prioritized over the presumed, so it follows that the Book is prioritized over the Sunnah" (3). He mentioned other matters. Regarding the existence of mutawatir reports transmitted from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), he said: "What has been mentioned about the mutawatir reports is mostly a hypothetical matter, and you may not find in the prophetic reports anything that can be adjudged as mutawatir up to the time of the incident. Thus, the discussion mentioned in the issue is a discussion about something that is not real or is rarely occurring, and there is little benefit in it, and Allah knows best" (4). __________ (1) Surah An-Nahl, 44. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/6. (3) The same source, 4/3. (4) The same source, 4/5 - 6. [Page 477] Returning to what was previously mentioned, that the legal evidence (dalil shar'i) is only accepted if it is definitive (qat'i) or refers to something definitive, it becomes evident to conclude that the prophetic hadith, even if its chain of transmission (sanad) is authentic, cannot be applied unless its meaning refers to a definitive universal meaning (kulli qat'i). Since all universals are found in the Qur'an, as demonstrated in the previous section, the hadith cannot be applied unless it has a basis in the Qur'an. Furthermore, one of the implications of this methodology is that the Sunnah does not contain additional legislation unless the addition is in the sense of detailing a general statement (mujmal) or interpreting an ambiguous one (mutashabih). Since the Qur'an is a clarification of everything { this is a clarification for the people } (1), { and We have sent down to you the Book as a clarification for everything } (2), what the Sunnah brings forth in terms of legislation is an additional clarification and explanation, and not something without a basis in the Qur'an. If something is presented in it that is thought to have no basis in the Qur'an, al-Shatibi refers it back to a Qur'anic origin; otherwise, he refrains from accepting it. This matter, according to al-Shatibi, contradicts what the imams and jurists (mujtahidun) hold, as it is customary that a hadith necessitates action even if its authenticity is presumed (dhanni), and it is not suspended or rejected unless it contradicts something that is stronger in authenticity to the extent that the contradiction cannot be resolved by specification (takhssis) or restriction (taqyeed). Thus, al-Shatibi differs from the established methodology in that he does not suffice with the condition that the application of a text of uncertain authenticity should not contradict or oppose something stronger in authenticity; rather, he requires, in addition to that, the existence of a definitive meaning from the Qur'an upon which the uncertain (dhanni) can rely. __________ (1) Surah Al-Imran, 138. (2) Surah An-Nahl, 89. [Page 478] He says: "It has been mentioned at the beginning of the Book of Evidence that the report of a single narrator (khabar al-wahid) is acceptable in practice if it is based on an established principle; otherwise, one should refrain from acting upon it, and the fact that it is based on an established principle refers to it being a particular case under a general Qur'anic meaning" (1). He also said: "Because Allah has made the Qur'an a clarification of all things, it follows that the Sunnah (tradition) must be included in it in general" (2). Then he said: "Thus, the Sunnah is, in essence, an explanation of what is contained therein, and this is the meaning of it being referred back to it; furthermore, complete induction (istiqra) indicates this" (3). He then stated: "It has been previously mentioned at the beginning of the Book of Evidence that the Sunnah refers back to the Book, and otherwise, one must refrain from accepting it, which is a sufficient principle in this regard" (4). Al-Shatibi responds to objections against him by asserting that although the Sunnah is an explanation, it contains additions because it includes what is not found in the Qur'an. He says: "And his statement in the question: 'It must be an addition' is accepted, but is this addition an increase in explanation of what is explained, since the explanation clarifies something not found in the explained text, or is it an addition of another meaning that does not exist in the Book? This is the point of contention" (5). He then clarifies that this addition is an increase in explanation, and since it is an explanation, there is something being explained; thus, there is a basis in the Book. He states: "All of this has its origin in the Qur'an, which the Book clarifies either in summary or in detail or in both ways, and the Sunnah has come to confirm all of that with what is clearer in understanding and more comprehensive in explanation" (6). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/5. (2) Ibid, 4/6. (3) The same source. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/6. (5) Ibid, 4/10. (6) Ibid, 4/18. [Page 479] Based on this, every legislation or obligation brought by the Sunnah must be presented to the Book (Qur'an); if it aligns with the Book, it is valid, and if it does not align, its validity is not established. He said: "Yes, it is permissible for the Sunnah to come with something that does not contradict or agree, but rather with what is silent about in the Qur'an, unless there is evidence to the contrary, which is what has been translated in this matter; at that point, it is necessary for every hadith to agree with the Book of Allah" (1). However, it is worth noting that the requirement for the Sunnah to agree with the Book, and that the Sunnah does not introduce an addition that is not an explanation or detail of what is in the Book, pertains only to the rulings of obligation, that is, commands, prohibitions, and permissions. Just as there is no ambiguous or unclear verse in the Qur'an that does not lead to an obligation, it is permissible for the Sunnah to come with something that has no basis in the Book, provided it does not lead to an obligation. He said: "Where we said that the Book indicates the Sunnah and that the Sunnah has come only to clarify it, this is in relation to commands, prohibitions, and permissions, or what necessitates that, and in general, what relates to the actions of the obligated in terms of obligation. As for what falls outside of that from the reports of what has happened or what will happen that does not relate to a command, prohibition, or permission, it is of two types: one is that it occurs in the Sunnah as an interpretation of the Qur'an; this is undoubtedly a clarification of it" (2). Then he said: "The second is that it does not occur as an interpretation nor does it contain a meaning of an obligatory belief or action, so it is not necessary for it to have a basis in the Qur'an because it is an additional matter beyond the sites of obligation, and the Qur'an was revealed for that. Therefore, if the Sunnah goes beyond that, there is no harm" (3). The Sunnah contains the clarification of everything from the legal rulings: __________ (1) The same source, 4/11. (2) The same source, 4/30. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 4/31. [Page 480] Just as it was previously mentioned that the Qur'an contains the clarification of all matters of legal rulings, so too does the Sunnah, as it includes what is in the Qur'an along with additional clarification and explanation. It should be noted that the difference is that the Qur'an is definitively established in its entirety and in detail, while the Sunnah, in terms of detail, is presumed. The Qur'an presents the general principles, and the Sunnah elaborates on them. Al-Shatibi states in the context of explaining how the Sunnah clarifies the Qur'an: "One should look at what the Book indicates in general, and that it is present in the Sunnah in full, in addition to what it contains of clarification and explanation. This is because the Noble Qur'an came with the definition of the interests of both abodes, bringing them forth, and the definition of their harms, repelling them" (1). He then said: "The Book presented these as foundational principles to which one can refer, while the Sunnah elaborated on the Book and clarified what is contained within it. Thus, you will find in the Sunnah only what pertains to those categories (2); the five necessities, as they are established in the Book, are detailed in the Sunnah" (3). After indicating that the same applies to the needs, enhancements, and complements, he said: "The principles of the Sharia have been completed in the Qur'an and in the Sunnah, and nothing has been omitted from them, and induction clarifies this" (4). How the Sunnah clarifies the Qur'an: __________ (1) The same source, 4/15. (2) That is, the necessities, needs, enhancements, and complements of each. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/15. (4) The same source, 4/16. [Page 481] The fact that the Sunnah (tradition) is an explanation of the Qur'an is indisputable, but the details of the meaning of explanation or how the Sunnah clarifies the Qur'an, although largely agreed upon, do contain some variation or disagreement in meaning among the scholars. For example, it is well-known that the Sunnah specifies the Qur'an, which is what is meant by it being an explanation. Al-Shatibi rejects specification as previously indicated, and among the scholars, there are those who do not see the specification of the definitive (qat'i) by the speculative (dhanni) (1). Likewise, the Sunnah may introduce independent legislation that has no basis in the Qur'an, and this does not exclude it from being an explanation, as it has a basis, which is the evidence indicating the obligation to adhere to the Sunnah. This meaning is not accepted by al-Shatibi, as for him, the Sunnah being an explanation means that there must be a basis in the Qur'an for what the Sunnah brings, and the obligation to adhere to the Sunnah is the obligation to follow the explanation and details that it provides. The scholars of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) have various opinions and details regarding the explanation of the Qur'an by the Sunnah, and the first of these, at the forefront, is Imam al-Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him), who made the first chapter in his book (al-Risala) titled "The Chapter on How Explanation Occurs." Under this title, he mentioned five types (2), and among what he mentioned that al-Shatibi does not agree with is the fourth type of explanation, which includes everything that the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) legislated that is not in the Book (3). He stated in his explanation of the types of explanation: "Among them is what he clarified from the Sunnah of his Prophet without a text from the Book" (4). Al-Shatibi mentioned meanings regarding what is meant by the Sunnah being an explanation of the Qur'an, accepting most of them as they are included in the meaning he advocates. He said: "The consideration remains in the aspect by which the Book indicated the Sunnah until it became inclusive of it in general, even though it is an explanation of it in detail" (5). He then remarked: "Indeed, people have various interpretations regarding this meaning" (6). He mentioned six interpretations or aspects: __________ (1) This is the position of the Hanafi scholars. (2) See: Imam al-Shafi'i, al-Risala, pp. 26-40, paragraph 53-125. (3) See: the same source, p. 32, paragraph 96. (4) The same source, p. 33, paragraph 100. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/13. (6) The same location. [Page 482] The first: His saying: "Some of it is very general, as if it were akin to taking evidence from the Book regarding the validity of acting upon the Sunnah and the necessity of adhering to it" (1). This meaning is based on the evidences that command taking the Sunnah, including His saying, Exalted is He: { And whatever the Messenger has given you, take it; and what he has forbidden you, refrain from it; and fear Allah } (2). This is an accepted meaning according to al-Shatibi, as taking the Sunnah is a definitive principle, but al-Shatibi requires more than that, which is that the specific meaning from the Sunnah returns to a Qur'anic meaning. Therefore, he provides an example here, saying: "And among those who adhered to it (3) is Abdullah ibn Mas'ud, for it was narrated that a woman from Banu Asad came to him and said: 'I have heard that you cursed so-and-so and so-and-so, the tattooer and the one who has tattoos, and I have read what is between the two boards and did not find what you say.' Abdullah said to her: 'Did you not read: { And whatever the Messenger has given you, take it; and what he has forbidden you, refrain from it; and fear Allah }?' She said: 'Yes.' He said: 'That is it' " (4). This is one of the meanings of clarification, which differs from what al-Shatibi intends, as previously explained. He indicates this here by saying: "The apparent statement to her is in the Book of Allah, then he explained that by saying: { And whatever the Messenger has given you, take it } , without mentioning the saying: { And I will surely order them to change the creation of Allah } (5), for that verse encompasses all that is in the prophetic hadith" (6). It appears in this statement that al-Shatibi relates the meaning of the prohibition of tattoos to the Qur'anic meaning { And I will surely order them to change the creation of Allah }. __________ (1) The same place. (2) Surah Al-Hashr, 7. (3) That is, in this meaning of clarification. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/13. (5) Surah An-Nisa, 119. (6) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/14. [Page 483] The second: He said: "Among them is the well-known aspect among scholars, as in the following hadiths, regarding what has been briefly mentioned of the rulings, whether according to the ways of action, its causes, its conditions, its impediments, or its attachments, or similar matters, such as the clarification of the prayers with their various timings, bowing, prostration, and all their rulings, and the clarification of zakat in its amounts, timings, the designated zakatable assets, and specifying what is zakatable and what is not" (1) etc. This meaning falls under the meaning intended by al-Shatibi, as it is an explanation and elaboration of the general. The third: This is the meaning intended by al-Shatibi, which is the return of the Sunnah to comprehensive Qur'anic meanings that all fall under necessities, needs, improvements, or complements of any of them (2). __________ (1) The same source, and this third type of the types mentioned by al-Shafi'i for clarification, see: al-Risala, p. 31, paragraph: 95. (2) The same source, 4/15 - 18. [Page 484] The fourth: what pertains to ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), including qiyas (analogy), where qiyas is the linking of a branch to a root. Ijtihad leads to giving a ruling on a matter after the mujtahid (jurist) sees that the legal meaning related to the ruling is such-and-such. Some matters are clear, and the jurist gives them a ruling based on the clear related meaning, or he refers it back to its clear root. In some matters, the jurist may be confused about which Qur'anic root to refer to, whether it is this root or that one. Here, the Sunnah (tradition) comes to clarify the confusion; otherwise, the matter remains a matter of ijtihad. This meaning falls under the category of clarification without dispute (1). Al-Shatibi said: "Among them is the consideration of the field of ijtihad that occurs between the two clear sides" (2). He then said: "And the field (3) of qiyas revolves between the roots and the branches" (4). He explained this meaning by saying: "This is because there is a text in the Book that addresses two sides clearly in it or in the Sunnah, as previously mentioned in the second source, and the intermediary remains subject to ijtihad. The difference arises from the interaction of the two sides, and perhaps the aspect of consideration in it is close to the source, so it is left to the views of the mujtahids as it becomes clear in the Book of Ijtihad. Perhaps it is far from the observer or is a matter of worship that does not follow the path of suitability, and the clarification comes from the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) regarding it, indicating that it is linked to one of the two sides or takes from each one of them in a precautionary manner or otherwise. This is the intended point here" (5). __________ (1) This meaning was indicated by al-Shafi'i in the Risala and is included in the fifth type of clarification according to him. See: Risala, pp. 34 - 40, paragraph: 104 - 125. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/18. (3) That is: among them is the consideration of the field of qiyas... etc. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/18. (5) The same source. [Page 485] This meaning of clarification is included in the meaning that al-Shatibi speaks of, because what the Sunnah brings clarifies the origin to which the issue returns; thus, the ruling of the Sunnah refers back to an origin. Within this meaning, al-Shatibi explains how to refer some meanings, which some claim the Sunnah has independently legislated, back to origins found in the Qur'an, which will be elaborated upon in the next discussion. Fifth: He said: "Among them is the consideration of what is composed of the scattered evidences of the Qur'an from combined meanings, for the evidences may come in different meanings, but they are encompassed by one meaning similar to the command in public interest (maslaha) and preference (istihsan). The Sunnah comes in accordance with that one meaning, and it is known or presumed that this meaning is derived from the totality of those individuals based on the validity of the evidence indicating that the Sunnah has come to clarify the Book" (1). The meaning contained in this text is generally accepted by the imams of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), but there is nothing in it that necessitates mention among them; however, it is important to al-Shatibi. If we examine it, we find it composed of two premises and a conclusion. The first premise is that a new meaning is derived from the totality of evidences that is not indicated by any one of the evidences alone, which is called the indication of the sign from the concept. An example of this is His saying, Exalted is He: { And his gestation and weaning [period] is thirty months } (2), and His saying: { And weaning is in two years } (3). From these two texts, it is understood that the minimum duration of gestation is six months. The second premise is that the Sunnah comes in accordance with this derived meaning, meaning that its meaning refers back to the derived meaning. As for the conclusion, it is that the meaning brought by the Sunnah is a clarification that has an origin in the Qur'an. This is what al-Shatibi seeks, and this meaning mentioned here for clarification is not customary among the imams, as they do not need to prove that the meaning returns to a Qur'anic meaning for it to be considered a clarification. However, al-Shatibi uses this type of indication to establish Qur'anic meanings. Thus, he can refer what is thought to be independently legislated by the Sunnah back to Qur'anic origins. The intention here is not to belittle what al-Shatibi does, for the indication of the sign is one of the accepted indications, but rather to clarify the intent of al-Shatibi. Therefore, attention should be paid to what he said in the above text; he did not say: "the consideration of what is composed of scattered evidences," but rather said: "from the scattered evidences of the Qur'an." __________ (1) The same source, 4/26. (2) Surah Al-Ahqaf, 15. (3) Surah Luqman, 14. [Page 486] Therefore, al-Shatibi's example of this type of clarification has a specificity that aligns with his methodology. He said: "An example of this aspect is what was mentioned at the beginning of the book of legal proofs regarding the meaning of his saying (peace and blessings be upon him): 'There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm' (1) from the book" (2). The meaning is that the hadith must refer back to a definitive source in the Qur'an, otherwise it is not accepted. By referring to the verses of the Qur'an that prohibit harm, a general principle emerges that elevates harm, and thus the hadith can be applied without deviating from being a clarification; this meaning falls under the intention he seeks, and it is indeed the secret of his methodology (3). The sixth point is that the Sunnah clarifies what is in the Qur'an without adding further explanation or detail to it. The Qur'an contains the explanation of everything, including the number of units of prayer and the times of prayers, the details of zakat, and similar matters. All of this is present in the Qur'an, but knowledge of it requires scholars who understand and delve into the secrets of the meanings of the Qur'an. Al-Shatibi's apparent statement refutes this meaning. He said: "Among them is the consideration of the details of the hadiths in the details of the Qur'an, and although the Sunnah provides additional clarification, the holder of this view seeks to find every meaning in the Sunnah indicated linguistically, not from another perspective or explicitly stated in the Qur'an" (4). He then said: "However, the Qur'an does not fulfill this purpose based on the Arabic text and indications that the Arabs use or similar" (5). He said: "Thus, the one who adheres to this does not fulfill what he claims unless he makes efforts in sources that the speech of the Arabs does not accept, nor does it align with what the righteous predecessors or the scholars firmly grounded in knowledge would agree upon" (6). Responses to objections: __________ (1) Refer to its citation. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/26. (3) The same source, 3/8, and see: the first discussion of the third chapter of this book. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/26. (5) The same source, 4/28. (6) The same location. [Page 487] The position of al-Shatibi is that the Sunnah does not bring about legislation that has no basis in the Qur'an. He faces objections that there are many things in the Sunnah that have no basis in the Book, so he mentions these objections to refute them and to affirm his position. He said, providing examples of what is objected to: "Induction has shown that there are countless things in the Sunnah that are not mentioned in the Noble Qur'an, such as the prohibition of marrying a woman’s aunt or maternal aunt, the prohibition of domestic donkeys, and every carnivorous animal with fangs, the ransom of a captive, and that a Muslim should not be killed for a disbeliever"(1). He responded to the issue of the prohibition of marrying a woman’s aunt or maternal aunt by saying: "Indeed, Allah, Exalted is He, has prohibited the combining of a mother and her daughter in marriage and between two sisters, and it has come in the Qur'an: { And lawful for you is what is beyond that } (2). Thus, the prohibition by the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) of combining a woman with her aunt or maternal aunt is based on analogy (qiyas), because the reason for which the combination of those mentioned is condemned is present here. It may be narrated in this hadith: 'For indeed, if you do that, you will sever your ties of kinship'(3). The reasoning indicates the basis of the analogy"(4). __________ (1) The same source, 4/8. (2) Surah an-Nisa, 24. (3) Al-Zaylai, Nasb al-Rayah, vol. 3, Book of Marriage, section on prohibited relationships. And in al-Tabarani's al-Mu'jam al-Kabir, chapter on the letter dhā. It is also mentioned in Musnad Ahmad (9202): "Beware of oppression, for oppression will be darkness on the Day of Resurrection, and beware of obscenity and indecency, and beware of stinginess, for it led those before you to make lawful their prohibitions, shed their blood, and sever their ties of kinship." (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/23. [Page 488] He said regarding the issue of the prohibition of domesticated donkeys and all predatory animals with fangs: "Indeed, Allah, Exalted is He, has permitted the good things and prohibited the evil things, and between these two principles are matters that can be categorized under one of them. The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) clarified this matter. He prohibited the consumption of all predatory animals with fangs and all birds with talons, and he prohibited the consumption of the flesh of domesticated donkeys" (1). He said: "All of this relates to the meaning of being categorized under the principle of evil things, just as the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) categorized the monitor lizard, the bustard, the rabbit, and similar animals under the principle of good things" (2). __________ (1) The same source, 4/18 - 19. (2) The same source, 4/19. [Page 489] As for the soul, which has a blood money (diya), al-Shatibi addressed it and mentioned in addition to it the blood money for limbs, saying: "The blood money for the soul was mentioned by Allah, Exalted is He, in the Qur'an (1), but the blood money for limbs was not mentioned, and it is something that is difficult to analogize to the intellects. The hadith (2) clarifies the blood money for them in a way that seems to follow the analogy that is difficult to determine, so it is necessary to refer to it and to follow its example" (3). The blood money for the fetus is also included with the soul. He said: "Indeed, Allah, Exalted is He, made the soul equal to the soul and distinguished between the limbs in His saying: { And We ordained for them therein a life for a life }" (4) __________ (1) Allah, Exalted is He, said: { And whoever kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, wherein he will abide eternally therein, and Allah will be angry with him and curse him and prepare for him a great punishment. } Surah an-Nisa, 92. (2) Al-Nasa'i narrated from Amr ibn Hazm from his father from his grandfather: "That the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) wrote to the people of Yemen a letter, and in his letter was that whoever kills a believer intentionally, there is retaliation unless the guardians of the slain agree to forgive, and that the blood money for the soul is one hundred camels, and that for the nose if it is cut off, there is blood money, and for the tongue there is blood money, and for the lips there is blood money, and for the testicles there is blood money, and for the back there is blood money, and for the eyes there is blood money, and for one leg there is half the blood money, and for the ma'muma (a wound in the abdomen) there is one third of the blood money, and for the ja'ifa (a deep wound) there is one third of the blood money, and for the manqala (a wound that causes a limb to be severed) there are fifteen camels, and for each finger of the hands and feet there are ten camels, and for a tooth there are five camels, and for a wound on the face there are five camels, and that a man is killed for a woman, and for the people of gold, there is one thousand dinars" (4770). He said: "Ibtat: killed without justification." (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/23. (4) And the complete verse is { And We ordained for them therein a life for a life and an eye for an eye and a nose for a nose and an ear for an ear and a tooth for a tooth and for wounds is legal retribution. } Surah al-Ma'idah, 45. [Page 490] To the end of the verse, this pertains to intentional acts, whereas for mistakes, the blood money (diya) is due, as He says: { The freeing of a believing slave and a compensation paid to his family } (1). And the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) clarified the blood money for limbs "(2). Then he said: "Two parties came into conflict regarding the fetus if the mother aborts it due to a blow or something similar, for it resembles a part of a human being like other limbs and resembles a complete human in its creation. The Sunnah has clarified that its blood money is a quarter of a slave (3) and that it has the same ruling as a person due to the lack of a clear determination of one party over it" (4). Thus, the basis of blood money and the basis of retribution (qisas) are mentioned in the Qur'an; what applies to other limbs has a basis in the Book, and it should be understood through analogy, but its analogy is complex, and the Prophet (peace be upon him) clarified it. After it has been established that the ruling of limbs returns to the Book, the ruling regarding the fetus remains: does it revert to the ruling of a person since it is a complete soul, or does it revert to the limbs since it is a part of its mother? This is something that poses a challenge for the jurist, and the Sunnah has clarified it and provided it with a specific ruling between the two (5). __________ (1) Surah An-Nisa, 92. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat. 4/21. (3) Narrated by Abu Huraira (may Allah be pleased with him) who said: "The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) ruled regarding the fetus of a woman from Banu Lihyan that fell dead with the blood money of a quarter of a slave or a female slave." Bukhari (6343), (6395) and Muslim (3183), (3184) and Tirmidhi (1330) who said: It is hasan sahih. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 4/21. (5) This and what preceded from Al-Shatibi's responses refer to the fourth meaning of clarification; see: Al-Muwafaqat, 4/18 - 29, and see: p. 375 of this book. [Page 491] As for the issue of freeing the captive and that a Muslim should not be killed for a disbeliever, he said: "As for freeing the captive, it is derived from His saying, Exalted is He: { And if they seek your help in religion, it is your duty to help them } (1), and this applies to those who have not emigrated if they cannot emigrate except by seeking assistance from others; thus, it is upon others to assist. The captive in this regard is more deserving of assistance, and this falls under the reasoning based on analogy (qiyas). As for the prohibition of killing a Muslim for a disbeliever, the scholars have derived it from the Book, such as His saying: { And Allah will never give the disbelievers a way over the believers } (2), and His saying: { The companions of the Fire and the companions of Paradise are not equal } (3), and this verse is more distant" (4). The clarification through speech, action, and approval: This is because the Sunnah clarifies the Qur'an, and the Sunnah consists of the sayings, actions, and approvals of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). The clarification occurs through these three together and separately. Al-Shatibi said: "The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was a clarifier through his saying, action, and approval" (5). Each of these three has a specific characteristic in indication or clarification that the others do not possess, and the most eloquent clarification is when the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) aligns with his action, and likewise, when the action of the Messenger aligns with his approval; this indicates the highest level of emulation. __________ (1) Surah Al-Anfal, 72. (2) Surah An-Nisa, 141. (3) Surah Al-Hashr, 20. (4) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 4/29. (5) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 4/175. [Page 492] He said: "If the clarification is achieved through speech and action that corresponds to the speech, then it is the ultimate in clarification" (1). In purification (taharah), for example, and in prayer (salah), fasting (sawm), pilgrimage (hajj), and other acts of worship and customs, speech does not convey the manner as action does, just as action does not convey what speech conveys in terms of generality or specificity, or in terms of recommendation, obligation, or permissibility (2). He said: "Speech clarifies generality and specificity in circumstances, times, and persons, for speech has forms that necessitate these matters and similar ones, while action is confined to its doer and his state and does not extend beyond its place at all" (3). Action, unlike speech, indicates absolute permission of obligation, recommendation, or permissibility, and does not include dislike, because dislike falls under prohibition, and the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) does not do what is prohibited. Action is distinguished from speech in that it is more eloquent in demonstrating emulation and compliance (4). He said: "Absolute permission includes the obligatory, the recommended, and the permissible; thus, his actions (peace be upon him) do not fall outside of that; they are either obligatory, recommended, or permissible" (5). __________ (1) The same source, 3/177. (2) The same source, 3/177 - 178. (3) The same location. (4) The same source, 4/32. (5) The same location. [Page 493] As for the approval of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) regarding an action, it can be understood that the action may be obligatory, recommended, or permissible. The permissible (mubah) may be permissible in part while being required in total, or it may be permissible in part while being prohibited in total. In this case, if it is prohibited in total, it is permissible in the sense that there is no harm in it. This meaning has been clarified in the third chapter of this book. Therefore, approval does not indicate absolute permissibility but rather indicates that there is no harm in the action. He said: "In summary, the approval itself does not indicate absolute permissibility without consideration" (1). He also said: "As for approval, it is understood to mean that there is no harm in the action that he (peace and blessings be upon him) saw and approved of, or heard about and approved of" (2). He said: "What is not harmful is a category that includes types: the obligatory, the recommended, and the permissible in the sense of being allowed and in the sense of there being no harm in it. As for the disliked (makruh), it is not included in this context, because his silence about it indicates its permissibility, equating the action with abstention, and the disliked action cannot be treated that way because the disliked action is prohibited" (3). Accordingly, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) does not do what is disliked nor does he approve of what is disliked. He may approve of an action and do it, which represents the highest level of emulation. He said: "His approval (peace and blessings be upon him) when it coincides with the action is valid in emulation, without any blemish or degradation from the highest levels of emulation" (4). He may approve of an action without doing it; his approval indicates that the action falls within the four types mentioned above, and his not doing it negates its being obligatory, recommended, or permissible in the sense of being allowed. It remains that it is permissible with no harm in it, and he does not do it because he (peace and blessings be upon him) is at the highest levels of following and emulation. Al-Shatibi said: "An example of this is his turning away from listening to entertainment, even though it is permissible, and his distance from indulging in it, even if he does not feel any harm in using it" (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/39. (2) The same source, 4/36. (3) The same location. (4) The same source, 4/39. (5) The same source, 4/39. [Page 494] The conflict between statement and action has a detailed discussion that is not our focus here; what is intended here is to clarify the significance of statement, action, and acknowledgment according to al-Shatibi. Consensus (ijma): It has been clarified previously that consensus according to al-Shatibi is from the Sunnah. The consensus referred to is the consensus of the Companions, and it is considered an explanation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah as it reveals a proof that has not been transmitted. He said: "The Sunnah of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) is a Sunnah that is acted upon and referred to" (1). He also said: "For they were the first to receive that from the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), and they were the direct recipients of the revelation" (2). Therefore, for the validity of considering consensus in explanation, it must be the consensus of the Companions and must refer back to a general Qur'anic principle. It cannot be said that consensus is an absolute source, as the subject here is not consensus itself, but rather the issue that has been reported to have consensus upon it. This is similar to the Sunnah, which is an absolute source, but in detail, it consists of reports from individuals, and likewise, the transmitted consensus of the Companions is reports from individuals. Analogy (qiyas): __________ (1) The same source, 4/40. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/40. [Page 495] It relies on the cause (illah), so if it comes through the pathways of text or indication and hint, it returns to the meanings of words and structures, and what was previously stated applies regarding the necessity of referring its meaning to a general principle established through induction. If it comes through the pathway of consensus (ijma), then what was mentioned a moment ago applies regarding the necessity of referring the transmitted matter to a definitive origin. However, if the cause comes through any of the other pathways that rely on the principle of reasoning, it has become clear from his methodology that this is a conjecture that is not supported by any legal evidence, and thus it is among the illusory interests (masalih mawhuma). Therefore, he does not accept any of these causes unless they are established with absolute certainty through the induction of the meaning being reasoned in many particulars, an induction that provides certainty, as mere conjecture is not sufficient for this purpose. He said: "It cannot be said that conjecture is also considered legally in legal rulings, as inferred from the reports of the singular narrators (akhbar al-ahad), analogy (qiyas), and others. What we are discussing, if it is conceded that it does not provide knowledge with consistency and conformity, then it provides conjecture and is thus considered. We say: What is considered among conjectures legally must be based on a legal origin as previously mentioned in its place in this book (1), and what we are discussing has not been based on a definitive or conjectural origin" (2). Chapter Eight Ijtihad and Taqlid It contains an introduction and three sections: Section One: Criteria of Ijtihad. Section Two: Criteria of Taqlid and Fatwa. Section Three: The Principle of the Consequences of Actions. Chapter Eight Ijtihad and Taqlid Introduction: __________ (1) The same source, 3/7 - 12. (2) The same source, 4/46, and this text conveys exactly what the texts mentioned earlier from some of the Imams of the Hanafis convey in response to reasoning based on imaginary attributes and suitability and others based on the principle of reasoning. See: Chapters Two and Three of this book. [Page 496] One of the aspects that enhances the concept of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) in al-Shatibi's work is his clarification of his views on ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), its types, and its conditions, as well as on the mujtahid (jurist) or scholar and their ranks, and on taqlid (following a legal authority) and how to take opinions or fatwas (legal rulings). Likewise, he addresses the fatwa or legal ruling provided by the scholar, distinguishing what can be accepted legally from what must be rejected. This includes his stance on fatwas that adopt ease, permissibility, necessities, needs, leniency, and the choice between opinions as a methodology to be generalized and applied where it is valid and where it is not. Among the most important aspects that clarify al-Shatibi's methodology and affirm what has been mentioned is the condition he deems essential for the mujtahid, which is that it is not valid for him to issue a ruling without considering the consequences of actions. This is because the Sharia was revealed to bring about benefits and avert harms, and these are its consequences and the consequences of its rulings. Therefore, it is not valid for the mujtahid to give a ruling on an action without considering its outcome. For this reason, I have structured this chapter into three sections: the first on the criteria for ijtihad, the second on the criteria for fatwa, and the third on explaining and elucidating the principle of the consequences of actions. Due to the importance of the principle of the consequences of actions in al-Shatibi's thought and its role as the foundation upon which he builds his argument for the rationale of the Sharia, I have followed this chapter with a section that explains three rules that are among the most important he has established based on the principle of the consequences of actions. These are applications of his idea in the objectives of the Sharia: the rule of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i), the rule of public interest (maslaha mursala), and the rule of juristic preference (istihsan). These three rules will, God willing, be the subject of the eighth chapter. [Page 497] It is worth noting that what is being discussed here pertains only to the methodology of al-Shatibi or what he distinguished or focused on, and it is not intended to present or refute the opinions of the imams on this matter, as al-Shatibi himself refers to them and their books in matters where he agrees with them. The First Topic The Conditions of Ijtihad Definition according to al-Shatibi: Al-Shatibi defines ijtihad by saying: "Ijtihad is the exertion of effort in acquiring knowledge or conjecture about a ruling" (1). There is no doubt that he refers to the exertion of effort by the mujtahid (jurist) who has reached a level where his statements can be trusted. Al-Shatibi does not disagree that there is no ijtihad in definitive matters, as will be clarified, but his statement "in acquiring knowledge" relates to the conditions of the mujtahid, including the acquisition of knowledge of the general principles, and in this regard, he exerts effort. However, this effort does not grant him the authority to engage in ijtihad on detailed contentious issues nor to have a respected opinion in them to issue fatwas (legal opinions) for the people, as he is still progressing in knowledge and completing his understanding of the objectives (maqasid) of the Sharia. He said: "The ijtihad that occurs in the Sharia is of two types: one is the ijtihad that is legally recognized, which is issued by those qualified who have undertaken to understand what is required for ijtihad" (2). He then said: "The second is the unrecognized type, which is issued by someone who is not knowledgeable about what is required for ijtihad" (3). Conditions of ijtihad: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 4/59. (2) The same source, 4/93. (3) The same location. [Page 498] As for what is necessary for ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), it is essentially - according to al-Shatibi - a single comprehensive matter that encompasses various aspects, which is the complete understanding of the objectives of the Sharia (Islamic law), namely the general principles and the objectives of the rulings pertaining to them. The other matters mentioned as conditions for ijtihad are included in this matter: he said, "The degree of ijtihad is attained by one who possesses two characteristics: the first is a complete understanding of the objectives of the Sharia, and the second is the ability to derive rulings based on that understanding" (1). As for the first characteristic, it means the general principles of the Sharia that fall into three categories and their complements, and it also refers to the detailed rulings and their objectives, which are the branches that relate to those general principles; thus, he said: "on its completeness." All of these relate to achieving benefits and preventing harms. Among what is necessitated by a complete understanding of the objectives is understanding what al-Shatibi meant by benefits and harms, which is that they are based on the designation of the Lawgiver and not according to personal interests, desires, and whims. This has been clarified previously, and al-Shatibi reiterated it here, thus bringing together the reasoning based on benefits and the intention of worship and compliance. He said, "It has been established in the book of the legal objectives that the Sharia is based on considering benefits, and that benefits are only considered based on how the Lawgiver has designated them, not based on the perception of the obligated person" (2). He said, "It has been established through thorough observation that benefits fall into three categories, and when a person reaches a level where he understands the Lawgiver's intention in every issue of the Sharia and in every chapter of its rulings, he has attained a characteristic that qualifies him to take the place of the Prophet's successor - peace and blessings be upon him - in teaching, issuing fatwas, and judging by what Allah has shown him" (3). As for the second characteristic, it cannot be attained except after the first characteristic is achieved, but he made it a second condition because it is a fruit of the first, and the realization of the first cannot occur without the existence of the second. He said, "As for the second, it is like a servant to the first" (4). __________ (1) The same source, 4/56. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/56. (3) The same location. (4) The same location. [Page 499] Then he said: "However, the fruit of understanding only appears in inference, and for this reason it is made a second condition; the first condition is the cause for reaching this rank because it is the intended goal, while the second is a means" (1). Among the conditions for a mujtahid (jurist) is to attain the level of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) in the sciences of the Arabic language, which is included in the condition of understanding the objectives (maqasid) since it is necessary for the inference from texts and for understanding the objectives. Whoever does not reach this level is merely a follower (muqallid) in language, and his statements regarding the meanings of texts will not be authoritative; he will rely on others whose statements are authoritative, thus lowering his status in understanding the objectives. He says: "If we assume a beginner in understanding Arabic, he is a beginner in understanding the Sharia (Islamic law), or if he is intermediate, he is intermediate in understanding the Sharia, and the intermediate has not reached the level of completion. If he reaches the ultimate level in Arabic, he will likewise in the Sharia, and his understanding therein will be authoritative" (2). He said: "Whoever's understanding is limited is not considered authoritative, nor is his statement accepted; thus, he must reach in Arabic the level of the imams (leaders) in it, such as al-Khalil, Sibawayh, al-Akhfash, al-Jurjani, al-Mazani, and others" (3). Al-Shatibi clarifies that he does not mean that one must be like these imams in all the sciences of language or to delve as deeply as they did in grammar, the subtleties of syntax, and the complexities of language, and so on. Rather, he should be capable of understanding the texts and what they may imply in terms of meanings, what they do not imply, and their generality or specificity, precedence or postponement, metaphor or ambiguity, and so forth, and to reach their level in this so that he may be authoritative in it. He said: "It cannot be said that the usuliyyin (scholars of Islamic legal theory) have denied this exaggeration in understanding Arabic" (4). Then he said: "The aim is to refine understanding so that it parallels that of the Arab to that extent, and it is not a condition for the Arab to know all of the language" (5). __________ (1) The same source. (2) The same source, 4/60. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/60. (4) The same source, 4/61. (5) The same source. [Page 500] Then he clarified his intention with a text from al-Shafi'i, saying: "Al-Shafi'i indicated in his Risala (Message) this meaning, that Allah addressed the Arabs in His Book in their own language according to what they know of its meanings. He then mentioned what is known of its meanings, the vastness of their language, and that they are addressed in the general with the intention of the general, which includes the specific, and he proves this with some of what is included in the speech. And the general is intended to mean the specific and is known by the context, and the speech informs its beginning about its end and its end about its beginning. And that one speaks of something known by its meaning without the wording, just as one knows by indication, and one may call a single thing by many names and many meanings by a single name. He then said: Whoever is ignorant of this from their language, and in their language the Book was revealed and the Sunnah came, then to attempt to speak in its knowledge is to attempt what some of it is unknown to him. And whoever attempts what he does not know, and what his knowledge does not confirm, then his agreement with the truth, if it agrees with him from where he does not know, is not commendable, and he is not excused for his error if he speaks in matters of which he does not have knowledge of the distinction between error and truth in it. This is his statement, and it is the truth from which there is no escape" (1). Understanding the objectives (maqasid) includes understanding the reasons for revelation, as they are a condition for understanding the meanings of the texts, and this was clarified in the first discussion of the previous chapter. __________ (1) The same source, 4/61 - 62. [Page 501] It is not a condition for ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) that the mujtahid (jurist) be proficient in every science that is necessary for it. Some of what is required for ijtihad can be acquired by the mujtahid from others and accepted from them. He said: "We take the four imams as examples; al-Shafi'i is considered a follower in hadith, having not reached the level of ijtihad in critiquing and understanding it, and Abu Hanifa is the same. Only Malik is counted among them, and you see him in rulings referring to others, such as those knowledgeable in experience, medicine, menstruation, and so on, and he builds upon that" (1). He said: "Most of what has been written in the principles of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) consists of Arabic topics that the mujtahid is responsible for answering, while other preliminaries may suffice with following, such as discussions on rulings in terms of conception and affirmation, like the rulings of abrogation and the rulings of hadith and similar matters" (2). Types and levels of ijtihad: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/75. Note that he said: "We take the four imams as examples," but he did not mention Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (may Allah have mercy on him) and did not count him among those capable of ijtihad in hadith. (2) The same source, 4/62. See also: p. 58. [Page 502] These were the conditions for ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) for those who wished to derive rulings from the texts based on their understanding of them. There is a lower rank for the mujtahid (jurist) in which knowledge of Arabic is not a requirement; he may even be a non-Arabic speaker. However, what is required in this case is knowledge of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) in general and in detail. There is also a type of ijtihad, as al-Shatibi calls it, which does not require knowledge of Arabic or knowledge of the objectives of the Sharia; this is the ijtihad in determining the context of the ruling. He says: "If ijtihad pertains to deriving rulings from the texts, then knowledge of Arabic must be a condition. However, if it pertains to the meanings of benefits and harms, abstracted from the texts or accepted from the one who has derived rulings from the texts, then knowledge of Arabic is not required; rather, knowledge of the objectives of the Sharia in general and in detail is necessary" (1). He also said: "Thus, whoever understands the objectives of the Sharia in establishing rulings and reaches a level of knowledge of them, even if his understanding comes through translation in a non-Arabic tongue, there is no difference between him and one who understands them through the Arabic language" (2). This rank is lower than the first rank, and its holder does not engage in ijtihad to reach the objectives, nor does he derive rulings based on his understanding of them; rather, he receives the general principles and foundations and learns them from those who have derived them, so he is constrained by his understanding and his school of thought. Likewise, he cannot apply both the general principles and the specific cases together; rather, he only applies the general principles. __________ (1) The same source, 4/90. (2) The same source, 4/91. [Page 503] And this can only occur in the application of ready-made rulings to their occurrences and in analogy (qiyas). He says: "Thus, the jurists apply the legal rulings to verbal occurrences that are not in Arabic, and they consider the terms in many of the new issues. Furthermore, the analogical reasoning does not require the implications of the terms except in relation to the basis of comparison, which is the original case, and it may be accepted as a given or based on the stated reason or one that is alluded to. This is accepted as a given, while everything else refers back to rational consideration, and to this type belongs the ijtihad (juristic reasoning) attributed to the followers of the imams of ijtihad" (1). Ijtihad, according to him, is divided into ijtihad for deriving the reasons and general principles, ijtihad for branching them out and applying them to their occurrences, and a third ijtihad for determining their occurrences. The latter does not require knowledge of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) or knowledge of Arabic. He says: "Ijtihad may relate to the determination of the subject matter, and it does not depend on knowledge of the objectives of the legislator, just as it does not depend on knowledge of the science of Arabic" (2). This is like investigating whether this is wine, which is prohibited, or a beverage, which is permissible, or whether this witness is just, so his testimony is accepted, or a transgressor, so it is not accepted, or whether this person is poor, deserving of charity, or not, so he is not given from it. This does not require knowledge of the Sharia or Arabic, but rather requires knowledge of the subject of the research. Therefore, the person must be knowledgeable in identifying wine, in understanding justice, and in recognizing poverty. If he needs legal information, he can accept it as a given. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/91. The followers of the imams of ijtihad are the jurists of the school, and they follow the methodology of the imam of the school in adhering to its principles, rules, and ijtihadat (juristic opinions). This does not prevent them from differing with him in some opinions. The imam of the school who derives the principles, rules, and rulings is the absolute mujtahid (jurist). (2) The same source, 4/92. [Page 504] He said: "The scholars have always relied on those who are not jurists in these matters, but they considered the people of knowledge regarding what they followed specifically, which is the imitation (taqlid) in determining the applicable rule" (1). The process of independent reasoning (ijtihad) that leads to knowing the ruling involves the three types of ijtihad, and it is not necessary for a single jurist to perform all of them or to be capable of doing so. What becomes clear, whether in terms of the types of ijtihad or the conditions of each type, does not imply that it is permissible for the jurist to give an opinion or to issue a fatwa, nor is it permissible to take his statement or fatwa, as these conditions indicate his competence in understanding and giving an opinion. He may not issue a fatwa unless he is formally appointed for fatwa through his words and actions; otherwise, the ability to engage in ijtihad may be possessed by a disbeliever. He said: "The scholars have permitted that ijtihad in the Sharia can occur from a disbeliever who denies the existence of the Creator, the message, and the Sharia, if the ijtihad is based on premises whose correctness is assumed, whether they are so in reality or not" (2). And he said: "The mufti stands in the community in the place of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him)" (3). And he said: "The fatwa from the mufti is obtained through speech, action, and acknowledgment" (4). Based on this, he stated: "The fatwa is not valid from one who contradicts the requirements of knowledge" (5). And he said: "As for his actions, if they are contrary to the actions of the people of religion and knowledge, it is not valid to follow them or to make them a model among the actions of the righteous predecessors, just as his acknowledgment is part of his actions" (6). Then he said: "For the one who contradicts with his limbs indicates his contradiction with his words, and the one who contradicts with his words indicates his contradiction with his limbs, for all derive from one heart matter; this is a clarification of the invalidity of his fatwa in general" (7). Legitimate ijtihad in Sharia: __________ (1) The same source, 4/93. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/58. (3) The same source, 4/140. (4) The same source, 4/141. (5) The same source, 4/144. (6) The same source, 4/145. (7) The same place. [Page 505] If these are the types of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), then the ijtihad that is relied upon and has the desired goal is the ijtihad that clarifies the ruling when it is ambiguous for the obligated individuals. This is a matter of differing opinions and does not occur in definitive matters where there is no room for disagreement. It is the ijtihad that requires an understanding of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) and the ability to derive rulings from the texts based on this understanding. Thus, the ijtihad that is considered valid in Islamic law is that which is issued by its qualified scholars who possess its conditions first and foremost. It is the ijtihad that aims to clarify the legal ruling in matters that are not definitive, especially those issues that lie in between two differing principles, making it difficult to categorize them under one or the other. This is in contrast to matters that are speculative, where there is no definitive ruling, but one side is evidently favored, while the weaker side is a slight possibility. In any case, one who approaches definitive matters without ijtihad is like one who is circling around a protected area and is close to falling into it. He said: "The ijtihad that occurs in the Sharia is of two types: one is the ijtihad that is considered valid in Islamic law, which is issued by its scholars who are knowledgeable about what is required for ijtihad, and this is what has been previously discussed. The second is the invalid ijtihad, which is issued by someone who is not knowledgeable about what is required for ijtihad, for its essence is merely an opinion based on desire and personal interests, a stumbling in blindness and following whims. Thus, any opinion issued in this manner is undoubtedly not considered valid because it is contrary to the truth that Allah has revealed" (1). As for what is required for this ijtihad, it has been previously clarified as: "Understanding the objectives of the Sharia in their entirety and the ability to derive rulings based on that understanding." __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/93. [Page 506] As for what one exerts effort in (ijtihad), he said: "The places of valid ijtihad are those that oscillate between two extremes, where the intention of the Legislator is clear in affirming one and negating the other, so it does not definitively lean towards the side of negation or the side of affirmation" (1). He also said regarding the actions of the accountable person (mukallaf): "If there is a command regarding them, it may either show the intention of the Legislator in negation or in affirmation, or it may not show any intention at all. If no intention is shown at all, it falls under the category of ambiguous matters (mutashabihat), and if it does show intention, it may sometimes be definitive (qat'i) and sometimes non-definitive (ghayr qat'i). As for the definitive, there is no room for consideration after the truth is clear in negation or affirmation, and it is not a place for ijtihad; it is a category of clear matters (wadhihat) because the ruling is truly clear, and anyone who deviates from it is certainly mistaken" (2). It has been mentioned in the previous chapter when discussing the various opinions on how the Sunnah clarifies the Qur'an that one of them is clarifying what is ambiguous and oscillates between two origins, where the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) clarified the origin that should be adhered to. For example, Allah, Exalted is He, has permitted good things (tayyibat) and prohibited harmful things (khaba'ith), so the status of some items, such as those with fangs among beasts and those with claws among birds, became ambiguous: should they be classified with the good or with the harmful? The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) clarified this in hadiths that prohibit those with fangs among beasts and those with claws among birds, as well as the flesh of domesticated donkeys (3). Thus, the valid ijtihad is that which clarifies what is ambiguous to people regarding its ruling and oscillates between two origins that appear to be equal in terms of classification. __________ (1) The same source, 4/86. (2) The same source, 4/87. (3) Bukhari (5101), (5104), and Muslim (3570), (3575), and Tirmidhi (1374), (1397) who said it is good and authentic, and Nasai (4251), (4273), and Nasai (4267). [Page 507] One example of this is the sale of uncertainty (gharar), which the Sharia has prohibited. Among transactions, some are clearly uncertain, while others are clearly not, and there are those that are ambiguous as to whether they are uncertain or not. The determination of this is for the qualified jurist (mujtahid). He said: "Among these is the prohibition of selling uncertainty, and we see that the scholars unanimously agree on the prohibition of selling unborn offspring, birds in the air, and fish in the water. And it is permissible to sell a garment that is filled with something concealed from sight, even though if the filling were sold separately, it would be prohibited. It is also permissible to rent a house for a month with the possibility that the month may be thirty or twenty-nine days, and to enter the bathhouse with the differing customs of people regarding the use of water and the duration of stay" (1). He then said: "Every issue in which there is disagreement in the matter of uncertainty is intermediate between the two extremes, taking on a resemblance from each of them" (2). Another example is the zakat on jewelry, the testimony of an unknown person, and the ownership of a slave, among others. He said: "They all agreed on the absence of zakat on goods and on the presence of zakat on the two currencies, so the permissible jewelry is situated between the two extremes, which is why there is disagreement regarding it. They agreed on accepting the narration and testimony of the just person and on not accepting that from the corrupt person, so the unknown person is situated between them, leading to disagreement about him. They agreed that a free person owns property while an animal does not own property, and when the slave takes on characteristics from both sides, they disagreed on whether he owns property or not, based on the predominance of the ruling of one side" (3). He then said: "You may not find a significant disagreement among rational people regarding intellectual matters or transmitted matters that is not based on conjecture or certainty, except that it revolves between two extremes in which the disputants do not differ" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/88. (2) The same source. (3) The same source, 4/88. (4) The same source, 4/89. [Page 508] This does not mean that there is no ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) in other areas. Rather, this is the recognized ijtihad, which leads to clarifying Allah's ruling regarding an action. As for ijtihad in other matters, it occurs during the pursuit of knowledge and advancement in it and understanding the objectives (maqasid) of the Sharia. The student of knowledge learns, studies, and strives to understand the objectives and the reasons behind the Sharia, which includes the necessity of acquiring knowledge of language, hadith, understanding the reasons for revelation, and all other necessary sciences. During this process, he strives to attain knowledge of the objectives in their completeness, but before achieving complete knowledge of the objectives, if he engages in ijtihad in the aforementioned areas, his ijtihad is not considered valid. Therefore, we find him stating in previous texts that ijtihad is the exertion of effort in seeking certainty or conjecture regarding the ruling. We also find him denying ijtihad in definitive matters. The difference among the mujtahids (those who engage in ijtihad): The mujtahid exerts his effort to know Allah's ruling regarding an action. What he arrives at is a conjectural ruling, for if it were definitive, it would not require ijtihad, nor would there be room for differing opinions and views. Al-Shatibi said: "As for the definitive, there is no room for discussion about it" (1). He also said: "Whoever goes beyond it is certainly mistaken" (2). Hence, it is said: there is no ijtihad alongside the text, meaning one that is definitive in both its authenticity and its indication. If the ruling is conjectural, then this is a matter in which the mujtahids differ, and their opinions vary. The ruling regarding an action is the intention of the legislator concerning the related discourse, and it is one and not multiple, which is a definitive matter. Thus, it cannot be that all mujtahids, despite their differences, are correct; rather, only one is correct. This is the case for every ruling in the Sharia. The multiplicity of the legislator's intention regarding a single issue is impossible. Allah, Exalted is He, said: { And if it had been from other than Allah, they would have found within it much contradiction } (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/187. (2) Same source. (3) Surah An-Nisa, 82. [Page 509] The jurists (mujtahidun) are rewarded, both the one who errs and the one who is correct. The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "If a ruler exercises ijtihad and errs, he will have one reward, and if he is correct, he will have two rewards" (1). What the jurist arrives at through his ijtihad is what he is most certain is the ruling of Allah, and it becomes the ruling of Allah in his case. It is not permissible for him to abandon it for the opinion of another jurist nor to issue a fatwa except based on it (2). Al-Shatibi said: "The entire Sharia returns to one opinion in its branches, even if there is much disagreement, just as it does in its foundations, and nothing else is valid in it" (3). He also said: "Correctness is in accordance with the intention of the legislator, and error is in opposition to it" (4). He stated: "If it is said that all are correct, it is not absolute but rather relative to each jurist or to those who follow him, as they all agree that no jurist is permitted to retract what his ijtihad has led him to nor to issue a fatwa except based on it" (5). He remarked: "To allow for the existence of two contradictory proofs, if those who advocate this mean contradiction in appearance and in the views of the jurists, not in reality, then what they say is permissible; however, this does not imply the permissibility of contradiction in the proofs of the Sharia. If they intend to allow this in reality, then this is not something that anyone who understands the Sharia would adopt, given the evidence that has been presented against it, and I do not think any of them would say it" (6). It was narrated from Malik (may Allah be pleased with him) that he said: "This cannot be two differing correct opinions" (7). Error in Ijtihad: __________ (1) Bukhari (6805), Muslim (3240), Tirmidhi (1240) who said: it is good and strange, Nasai (5286), Abu Dawood (3103), Ibn Majah (2305), Ahmad (17106). The text of the hadith according to them is: "If a ruler judges and exercises ijtihad and is correct, he will have two rewards, and if he judges and exercises ijtihad and errs, he will have one reward." (2) This is the principle, but it is not absolute in every case. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/63. (4) The same source, 4/68. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/69. (6) The same location. (7) The same source, 4/70, and the phrase appears in the edition verified by Dr. Daraz as follows: "This cannot be two differing correct opinions." 4/129. [Page 510] It has been established that the mistaken mujtahid (jurist) is rewarded. However, this applies to the mujtahid who has reached the level that enables him to engage in ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning). Thus, following him is permissible even if the possibility of his error exists, as the correct answer is not definitively established nor is it determined with a specific individual. However, this does not mean that it is permissible to accept the opinion of the mujtahid unconditionally. Some opinions are definitively wrong, even if they are issued by a recognized mujtahid, and this is what al-Shatibi refers to as the scholar's slip. There are also opinions that are judged to be erroneous, even if they may have a chance of being correct or aligned with the intent of the Lawgiver. These are the opinions issued by those whose ijtihad is not valid, meaning those who have not fulfilled the requirements necessary for ijtihad. As for the first case, his ijtihad is originally valid, but he may misinterpret the text, mistakenly assuming something that the Lawgiver did not intend, or he may not be aware of the text at all. He may even retract his statement, but the statement is known while the retraction is not, so it is not permissible to follow a scholar in their slip or to imitate him in it. As for ijtihad that comes from those who are not qualified, it is the source of deviation, innovation, disagreement, and division in religion. Those who do not fully understand the objectives (maqasid) tend to cling to aspects of particulars while undermining the universals. Al-Shatibi has warned against such opinions and statements with great caution, repeatedly refuting them and warning against them in al-Muwafaqat, and he elaborated on this extensively in al-I'tisam. [Page 511] As for the error that arises from a valid ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), he said: "The error in ijtihad may occur either due to the obscurity of some evidence, leading to misconceptions about what was not intended, or due to a complete lack of awareness of it" (1). He warned against it, citing the saying of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him): "I fear for my nation after me from three actions." They asked, "What are they, O Messenger of Allah?" He said: "I fear for them from the slip of a scholar, from an unjust ruler, and from a following of desires" (2). He also said: "And from Ibn Abbas: Woe to the followers from the missteps of the scholar. It was said: How is that? He said: A scholar may say something based on his opinion, then finds someone who is more knowledgeable about the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) than he is, and he abandons his statement, and then the followers proceed" (3). After clarifying the necessity of being cautious about this, he said: "This is most prevalent when there is negligence regarding the consideration of the objectives of the Lawgiver (Shari) in that matter in which he has exerted effort, and stopping short of the utmost diligence in researching the texts concerning it. Although it may not be intentional and the one who commits it is excused and rewarded, it nonetheless carries a great danger in terms of following his statement" (4). Based on this, he said: "The slip of a scholar cannot be relied upon from any angle, nor can it be taken as a tradition from him, because it is based on a contradiction to the Sharia" (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/93. (2) Al-Hafiz al-Haythami, Majma al-Zawa'id wa Manba al-Fawa'id, Book of Leadership, Chapter on the Imams of Oppression and Injustice and the Imams of Misguidance, (9220), and Al-Tabarani's Great Dictionary, Chapter on the letter Dhad. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/94. (4) The same source, 4/95. (5) The same location. [Page 512] However, how does the follower (muqallid) recognize the error? He said: "If it is said, how does one know which of the opinions is such and which is not? The answer is that this is one of the duties of the jurists (mujtahidin), for they are the ones who know what conforms to or contradicts the truth, while others have no distinction in this regard." (1) He also said: "If it is asked whether there is a criterion for those who are not jurists but are knowledgeable in this matter, the answer is that there is a relative criterion. It is that what is considered an error or a slip is very rare in the Sharia." (2) Then he said: "If a person holds an opinion that is isolated from the majority of the ummah, then your belief should be that the truth is with the vast majority of the jurists, not with the followers." (3) As for the jurist who makes an error, he should not be disparaged. It has been mentioned in previous texts that he is excused and rewarded. He said: "Just as it is not appropriate to attribute deficiency to him or to disparage him for it, nor to think that he is bold in opposing the truth, for all of this contradicts what his rank in religion necessitates." (4) __________ (1) The same source, 4/97. (2) The same location. (3) The same location. Among what he transmitted regarding this: "Mu'adh ibn Jabal used to say in his sermon: Beware of the deviation of the wise, for the devil may speak through the tongue of the wise with a word of misguidance, and the hypocrite may say it. So receive the truth from whoever brings it, for the truth has light. They asked: How is the deviation of the wise? He said: It is a word that terrifies you and you reject it, and you say: What is this? So beware of his deviation and do not be turned away from it, for it is likely that he will return and acknowledge the truth," 4/94. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/95. He mentioned examples of these slips attributed to some of the Companions and Followers, including drinking nabidh and selling one dirham for two dirhams in hand-to-hand transactions, and he said that these cannot be relied upon as differences in legal matters. See: 4/96. [Page 513] As for the ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) issued by someone who is not qualified for it, where he believes himself or others believe him to be qualified, he said: "It is likely that he believes about himself or he believes others believe about him that he is among the people of ijtihad and that his opinion is valid, and his opposition may sometimes be in a particular matter, which is lighter, and sometimes in a general principle of the Sharia and its overarching foundations, whether they are from the fundamentals of beliefs or actions. You see him taking some particulars that undermine its universals until he reaches what appears to him from his initial opinion without comprehending its meanings nor referring back to the necessity of relying on them" (1). He then said: "What drives this is some hidden desires in the souls" (2). He said: "And this ignorance is aided by a lack of understanding of the objectives of the Sharia" (3). He said: "The root of this category is mentioned in the saying of Allah, Exalted is He: { He it is Who has sent down to you the Book; in it are verses that are precise—they are the foundation of the Book—and others that are ambiguous } (4), and in the authentic narration: 'The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) recited this verse and then said: When you see those who follow what is ambiguous therein, they are the ones whom Allah has named, so beware of them' " (5) "(6). Al-Shatibi clarified that such ijtihad is the source of innovations (bid'ah) and sects. It is the cause of differences in religion and division within it. From it emerged the Khawarij (secessionists), and its signs include division, which is the separation from the community, and then the fragmentation among them, and deviation, which is the following of desires and the following of ambiguous matters (7). __________ (1) The same source, 4/98. (2) The same location. (3) The same location. (4) Surah Al-Imran, 7. (5) Narrated by Tirmidhi (2920) and he said: This is a good and authentic hadith. And Abu Dawood (3682) and Ahmad (32079). (6) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 4/98. (7) See: Al-Muwafaqat, pp. 4/104 - 105. [Page 514] This is unlike the permissible and praiseworthy differences. He said: "We found the companions of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) after him differing in the rulings of the religion, yet they did not separate nor become factions because they did not deviate from the religion. Rather, they differed in what they were permitted to do in exercising independent judgment (ijtihad) and deriving rulings from the Book and the Sunnah in matters for which they did not find a text. Their opinions differed on this, and they became praiseworthy because they exerted effort in what they were commanded."(1) The sign of valid ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning): It has become clear that the one who possesses valid ijtihad (ijtihad mu'tabar) is the one who understands the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) in their entirety and is capable of deriving rulings from the texts based on his understanding of them. The question that arises is how it can be known that he has attained this rank. Al-Shatibi says: "The consideration remains regarding the extent to which, if he reaches it, the address of ijtihad will be directed to him as Allah has shown him"(2). What appears from the examination of al-Shatibi's methodology is that the sign of valid ijtihad consists of three matters: The first: the application of both universals and particulars together. The second: considering the consequences of actions. The third: examining the conditions of the legally responsible individuals in particular. These three matters arise from the understanding of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), and they must manifest during the derivation of rulings, which is the fruit of that understanding. As for the first, it has been clarified previously, and understanding the objectives (maqasid) is essential; for one who does not understand them cannot apply them, and one who understands the general principles cannot do without the specific details. Thus, understanding the objectives includes understanding the objectives of the detailed rulings. For example, applying the principle of preserving wealth, which is a general principle, in the act of theft, usurpation, or fraud without considering the specific texts regarding these actions is a mistake, as the punishments of amputation, execution, imprisonment, or others all revert to the general principle. This is a clear error; it is not sufficient to apply the general principle alone. Likewise, it is not sufficient to apply the specific details without considering the general principles; this, as has been shown a moment ago, is an entry point for destruction in the Sharia. The concept of objectives refutes it. __________ (1) The same source, 4/105. (2) The same source, 4/127. [Page 515] As for the second point, which is the consideration of the consequences of actions, it also relates to the alignment with the intention of the Legislator (Shari') from the Sharia. The Legislator has enacted the ruling for a purpose. There may be situations where the ruling itself undermines the purpose for which it was originally established, as in the case of legal tricks (hiyal) and means (dhara'i). Therefore, it is incumbent upon the jurist (mujtahid) during the process of deriving legal rulings to consider the action itself and its consequences. Otherwise, he would undermine the intention of the Legislator in his legislation. He said: "The consideration of the consequences of actions is a legally intended objective, whether the actions are in agreement or in opposition. This is because the jurist does not rule on an action performed by the accountable person (mukallaf) with either approval or disapproval except after considering what that action will lead to. It may be permissible due to a benefit it brings or a harm it prevents, but it has consequences contrary to what was intended. Conversely, it may be impermissible due to a harm that arises from it or a benefit that is repelled by it, but it has consequences contrary to that." (1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/110. [Page 516] The third is the consideration of the conditions of the accountable individuals in particular. This relates to understanding the objectives (maqasid) but with a finer focus. The jurist (mujtahid) issues rulings on the accountable individuals based on their specific circumstances, relying on what Allah has granted him of wisdom and the light He has bestowed upon him. This is related to the realization of the legal ruling (tahqiq al-manat) - according to al-Shatibi - but it is a specific type of it. He said: "The realization of the legal ruling is of two types: a general realization, which has been mentioned(1), and a specific realization from that general one"(2). As for the first, which is general, it has been clarified previously. As for the second, he said: "The second, which is the specific consideration, is higher and more precise than this and is, in fact, derived from the result of piety mentioned in His saying, Exalted is He: { If you fear Allah, He will grant you a criterion }(3). It may also be referred to as wisdom, as indicated in His saying, Exalted is He: { He gives wisdom to whom He wills, and whoever is given wisdom has certainly been given much good }(4)"(5). He said: "The possessor of this specific realization is the one who has been granted light by which he understands the souls and their intentions, the differences in their perceptions, their capacity to bear obligations, and their patience in enduring their burdens or their weakness. He knows their inclination towards immediate gains or their lack of inclination, so he applies to each soul from the rulings of the texts what is appropriate for it, based on the understanding that this is the legal objective in receiving obligations. It is as if he specifies the generality of the accountable individuals and the obligations with this realization"(6). He then said: "This is the meaning of the realization of the legal ruling here"(7). Al-Shatibi supported this type with examples from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). __________ (1) Its meaning has been clarified in the first chapter and in this section as well. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/50. (3) Surah Al-Anfal, 29. (4) Surah Al-Baqarah, 269. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/51. (6) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/51-52. (7) The same location. [Page 517] He said: "Among these is that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was asked at different times about the best deeds and the best actions, and he made this known at certain times without being asked. He responded with different answers, each of which, if taken in its absolute or general sense, would imply contradiction with others in detail. In the authentic narrations, it is reported that he (peace and blessings be upon him) was asked, 'Which deeds are best?' He said, 'Faith in Allah.' He was asked, 'Then what?' He said, 'Jihad in the way of Allah.' He was asked, 'Then what?' He said, 'A righteous pilgrimage' (1). He was also asked, 'Which deeds are best?' He said, 'Prayer at its proper time.' He was asked, 'Then what?' He said, 'Kindness to parents.' He was asked, 'Then what?' He said, 'Jihad in the way of Allah' (2). In al-Nasa'i, it is narrated from Abu Umamah that he said: I came to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and said, 'Command me with something that I may take from you.' He said, 'You should fast, for there is nothing like it' (3). In al-Tirmidhi: 'Which deeds are of the highest rank with Allah on the Day of Resurrection?' He said, 'Those who remember Allah much, and the women who remember' (4) (5). This shows that the answers varied according to the circumstances of the accountable individuals, and this is what al-Shatibi intended by the verification of the specific context. These three signs must all be present in the mujtahid (jurist); having only two, for example, is not sufficient, even if their presence is significantly established. If all are present, then the degree of the mujtahid's mastery of them will elevate his rank, allowing him to reach the pinnacle of excellence in ijtihad (independent reasoning). __________ (1) Bukhari (1422), Muslim (118), and Tirmidhi (1820) who said: It is a good and authentic hadith. Al-Nasa'i (2577), Ahmad (7273), and al-Darimi (2286). (2) Tirmidhi (1820) who said: It is a good and authentic hadith. One (3776). (3) Al-Nasa'i (2190). It is also narrated with the wording: 'There is no equivalent to it' in Al-Nasa'i (2192) and Ahmad (21128). (4) Tirmidhi (3298) who said: It is a strange hadith. Ahmad (11295) without the word 'and the women who remember.' (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/52. [Page 518] To verify that the mujtahid (jurist) has reached the degree of consideration, it is said that the student of knowledge has three states: a state in which it is clear that he is not among those qualified for valid ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), and thus he must follow (taqlid) without disagreement. A second state in which it is clear that he is among those qualified for valid ijtihad without disagreement, and between these two states lies a third state that is ambiguous and whose matter is unclear, leading to disagreement regarding it. As for the one in the first state, he is someone who is still examining the particulars and is beginning to grasp the general meanings, but they are not yet complete. He continues to reflect and deduce to understand the objectives (maqasid), allowing his mind to roam within them. Some of these objectives are consistent and established, while others are contradicted by texts, thus failing to establish a universal principle. Therefore, he cannot engage in ijtihad. It was said: "He must alert his mind to reflect on what he has memorized and to investigate its causes, and this arises from a feeling of understanding something that has been acquired, but it remains vague."(1) It was also said: "This student, while remaining in this state, wrestles with the legal sources and is wrestled by them, opposing them and being opposed by them, in the hope of grasping their foundations and connecting with their rulings and objectives, which have not yet been clarified for him. He cannot engage in ijtihad regarding what he is examining because he has not yet established the basis for ijtihad, nor is he in a position where his heart is at ease with what he is trying to ijtihad in; thus, he must refrain and follow (taqlid)."(2) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/127. (2) The same source. [Page 519] As for the one who has a clear state on the other side, he is the one who exhibits the three signs. It is said about him: "He achieves through the legal meanings a status concerning the particular subsidiary issues such that the depth of insight into one side does not prevent him from the depth of insight into the other side; he does not adhere to the generality of one of them without comparing it to the other, and he then reflects on the application of what he has summarized to what is appropriate in the actions of the obligated" (1). And it is said: "There is no disagreement regarding the validity of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) from one who possesses this rank" (2). It is said about him: "And among his characteristics are two matters: the first is that he answers the questioner according to what is appropriate for him in his particular state" (3). "The second is that he considers the outcomes before answering the questions" (4). As for the one whose state is unclear, he is situated between the two clear sides. He has completed the understanding of the legal universals and the extrapolation of the particulars, and he has not fallen short in this regard at all. However, when he examines the issues, he applies the universals without paying attention to the particulars. It is said about him: "He should conclude by examining what has been established according to what the legal proof has led him to, such that he attains certainty without being opposed by doubt; rather, doubts that arise against him become like the proofs indicating the correctness of what he holds" (5). Then it was said: "But he remains in this state until his memorization slips from his retention of a ruling, even if it is present with him, so he does not care about definitively ruling on the issues, whether he has stated them or opposed them" (6). And it was remarked: "So if the student reaches this rank, is it valid for him to exercise ijtihad in the legal rulings or not? This is a matter of consideration and ambiguity, and it is one in which disagreement arises" (7). __________ (1) The same source, 4/131. (2) The same location. (3) The same source, 4/132. (4) The same source, 4/132. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/127. (6) The same source, 4/128. (7) The same location. [Page 520] Al-Shatibi presents arguments from those who claim that one in this condition is very capable of deriving legal rulings, and all of these arguments return to the fact that there is no necessity to apply the particulars since they are encompassed within the universals. If we assume that the universals are complete in his understanding, then applying the universals is equivalent to applying the particulars (1). As for the arguments of those who prohibit ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) for one in this condition, they all return to the notion that he is not capable of applying the particulars or that he does not apply them. Thus, he does not consider the specifics of circumstances, actions, and the obligated individuals, making it inconsistent for him to be among the people of ijtihad (2). Al-Shatibi provides two examples of individuals at this level, stating: "Among the examples of this level is the position of those who entirely reject qiyas (analogy) and rely on the texts absolutely, and the position of those who apply qiyas absolutely without considering what contradicts it from the reports in general" (3). He then said: "The people of opinion stripped the meanings and looked at the Sharia through them, discarding the specifics of the words, while the literalists stripped the implications of the words and looked at the Sharia through them, discarding the specifics of the meanings of analogy" (4). The discontinuation of ijtihad cannot be total: It has been clarified that ijtihad is of three types, one of which is ijtihad for the purpose of determining the applicable rule (tahqiq al-manat), and this has two types: general meaning and specific meaning. Al-Shatibi argued that all types of ijtihad can cease except for ijtihad in determining the applicable rule in the general sense. If this ceases, it leads to the complete cessation of obligation, unlike the other types. The explanation for this is that determining the applicable rule must occur in every incident; if it is absent, it becomes impossible to apply the rulings. However, if the other types of ijtihad cease, the breadth of the ijtihads of the early scholars suffices for the actions of the obligated individuals, and the new issues that may require rulings are few in comparison to them, which, according to him, does not cause any harm. __________ (1) The same source. ... (2) The same source, 4/128 - 129. (3) The same source, 4/129. (4) The same source, 4/130. [Page 521] He said: "Ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) is of two types: one that cannot cease until the foundation of obligation ceases, which is at the Day of Judgment, and the second that can cease before the end of the world. As for the first, it is the ijtihad related to the determination of the legal rule" (1). As for the fact that the determination of the legal rule requires ijtihad, it has been previously established. Among what he said in this context is: "When the legislator said: { And bring to witness two just men from among you } (2) and it is established for us that the meaning of justice is a legal one, we need to specify who possesses this attribute. People are not equal in the description of justice; rather, it varies significantly. For when we contemplate the just, we find that their characterization has extremes and a mean: an upper extreme in justice that is undoubtedly clear, like Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, and a lower extreme which is the first degree of deviating from the requirements of the description" (3). Then he said: "Between them are ranks that cannot be enumerated, and this middle ground is ambiguous; it is necessary to reach the limit of capacity, which is ijtihad. This is what the judge requires in every witness" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/47. (2) Surah al-Talaq, 2. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/47. (4) The same source. [Page 522] As for the necessity of achieving the relevant criteria (tahqiq al-manat) in every incident, even if its ruling is known, he said: "Actions do not occur in existence in an absolute manner, but rather they occur in a specific and defined manner, so the ruling does not apply to them except after knowing that this specific case falls under that absolute or that general ruling" (1). When this reasoning ceases, knowledge of the rulings is impossible, and thus the obligation is lifted. He said: "The obligation to act is lifted from the one seeking a ruling when the mufti is absent if he has no knowledge of it either through valid reasoning or through imitation" (2). This reasoning does not practically cease because it is attainable and only requires rational consideration and the necessary information that can be derived from the reasoning of the predecessors. He said: "This reasoning is necessary in every time, as the obligation cannot be established without it. If the obligation were to be assumed while the possibility of this reasoning ceasing exists, it would be an obligation to do the impossible, which is not permissible in Sharia just as it is not permissible rationally" (3). As for the reasoning that can cease, it is of three types. He said: "The reasoning that can cease is of three types: the first is what is called the refinement of the relevant criteria (tanqih al-manat)" (4). Then he said: "The second is what is called the derivation of the relevant criteria (takhrij al-manat)" (5). These two types are useful in claiming the causes and in their examination and validation or rejection. Then he said: "The third is a type of achieving the relevant criteria" (6), and what he means is the specific achievement of the relevant criteria, which has been previously explained. __________ (1) The same source, 4/49. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/172. (3) The same location. (4) The same source, 4/49; the refinement of the relevant criteria, the derivation of the relevant criteria, and the achievement of the relevant criteria have been explained in Chapter One. (5) The same source, 4/50. (6) The same location. [Page 523] These three types can be interrupted by the cessation of the mujtahids (scholars capable of independent reasoning), but the obligation does not cease with their interruption. He said: "The new occurrences that have no precedent in earlier times are few compared to what has preceded due to the broad scope of understanding and ijtihad (independent reasoning) among the earlier scholars, so it is permissible to follow them in this matter because it is the essence of the Sharia (Islamic law). The Sharia does not become inactive due to the cessation of some particulars, just as if one were to assume the inability to establish the criteria in some particulars while others remain, there is no harm to the Sharia in that."(1) The Second Topic Conditions of Ijtihad(2) and Fatwa The subject of this topic: The intention of the legislator in enacting laws is to free the obligated person from the call of their desires so that they may be a servant of Allah by choice. Therefore, they must seek the ruling of Allah in their actions. If they are capable of deriving the rulings themselves, they are a mujtahid; if not, they are a muqallid (follower) and must strive to know the ruling of Allah through someone capable of doing so, which is the mujtahid. The mujtahids are not infallible from error, and they differ in knowledge, jurisprudence, and piety, as well as in what makes them mujtahids whose opinions can be followed. They also differ in their ijtihadat (independent reasoning) and fatwas (legal opinions). Just as the mujtahid must strive to understand the intention of the legislator through the understanding of the legal evidences, so too must the muqallid strive to align with the intention of the legislator by following the one whom they believe will achieve that for them. Therefore, it is necessary to know the characteristics and signs that the muqallid must verify or seek assistance with in order to identify the mujtahid they will follow or the fatwa they will adhere to. __________ (1) The same source, 4/55. (2) Al-Zarkashi said: "They differed on its reality: is it the acceptance of the statement of the speaker while knowing from where they said it, i.e., from a book, or a Sunnah, or analogy, or is it the acceptance of the statement without evidence appearing for it?" Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/554. [Page 524] Likewise, some muftis rely in their fatwas on principles or foundations that they pursue for their own purposes, or they mistakenly believe them to be correct or legitimate when they are not. Therefore, it is necessary to warn these muftis about their methodologies or what they do in issuing fatwas, as well as to caution against such fatwas, and to inform the inquirer or the follower of this so that it becomes a sign of distinction between the mujtahids (scholars capable of independent reasoning). In order to clarify how to ascertain the condition of the mufti or mujtahid, as well as to indicate the places or some places of deviation in fatwas, this section was written. The mujtahids and the evidence for the followers: Since people are obligated to follow the rulings, and the sources of rulings are the legal texts, the followers do not have the capacity to derive rulings from the texts; thus, the texts are nonexistent for them, and they must understand the rulings through someone who comprehends them from the texts. The loss of the mujtahid for the follower is like the loss of evidence for the mujtahid. Al-Shatibi said: "The fatwas of the mujtahids for the common people are like the legal evidences for the mujtahids, and the evidence for this is that the existence of evidences for the followers and their absence is the same since they do not benefit from them at all; thus, examining the evidences and deriving rulings is not within their capacity, nor is it permissible for them at all" (1). He also said: "They are, therefore, the ones who stand in the place of the Legislator, and their statements stand in the place of the Legislator" (2). He further stated: "There is no obligation except with evidence; if there is no evidence for an action, the obligation is lifted. Likewise, if there is no mufti for the action, he is not obligated to it. Thus, it is established that the statement of the mujtahid is evidence for the common person, and Allah knows best" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/173. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. [Page 525] And based on that, if a follower (muqallid) is faced with an issue, he should not proceed until he knows Allah's ruling on it, and this is the requirement of obligation and piety (taqwa) (1). Therefore, he must ask those who are knowledgeable about it, who are the people of insight and deduction. He said: "When a religious issue arises for the follower, it is not permissible for him in religion except to ask about it" (2). And he said: "The questioner should not ask someone whose answer is not considered valid in the Sharia" (3). And he said: "If it becomes necessary for him to ask, it is his right to ask only from someone who is among the people of that particular matter he is inquiring about" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi argued that Allah's statement: { And fear Allah, and Allah will teach you } (Surah Al-Baqarah, 282) is not as many people understand, but rather as the scholars in the field of grammar establish, meaning that Allah teaches you in every case, so fear Him. Thus, the second, which is knowledge, is the cause of the first, which is piety. The command to be pious is therefore contingent upon the attainment of knowledge, indicating that knowledge precedes action in a meaningful way. See: Al-Muwafaqat, 4/151-152. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 4/151. (3) The same source, 4/152. (4) The same location. [Page 526] The follower (muqallid) may find someone to clarify the ruling for him, or he may not find anyone. If he does not find anyone, he is relieved of the obligation according to al-Shatibi. If he does find someone, the opinions regarding his issue may either be unified or varied. If they are unified, there is no problem; but if they are varied, he must prefer one over the others, and he must have a legal basis for his preference; it is not permissible for him to choose arbitrarily. Al-Shatibi said: "There is no difference between the case of the mujtahid encountering evidence and the case of the layman encountering a mufti. The conflict between the two fatwas is upon him just as the conflict between two pieces of evidence is upon the mujtahid. Just as it is not permissible for the mujtahid to follow both pieces of evidence together or to follow one of them without exerting effort (ijtihad) or preference, it is likewise not permissible for the layman to follow both muftis together or to follow one of them without exerting effort or preference. The statement of those who said that if they conflict he may choose (1) is incorrect." (2) Preference among the mujtahids: __________ (1) Al-Shawkani said that this is the view of most of al-Shafi'i's followers, Irshad al-Fuhul: 271. There are many opinions on this issue; see: al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/592. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/71. [Page 527] The preference of the follower (muqallid) among the jurists (mujtahidin) occurs when their opinions conflict on a particular issue. It is a preference among jurists and not among opinions or fatwas, and this preference among the jurists must be based on characteristics within them that can be discerned and judged. Therefore, the preference of the follower for a jurist depends on their actions. This relates to piety, scrupulousness, and understanding. There is no doubt that knowledge or being more knowledgeable is one of the means of preference, but this matter may be obscure to the follower, or the opinions may conflict, and two scholars may be equal or close in knowledge. Thus, preference can only be based on actions, which indicate the scrupulousness and understanding of the jurist regarding the importance of their actions in front of the public or those who follow them. They realize that they must stand as a jurist through their words, actions, and approvals, not just through their words. This is because "the mufti stands in the community in the place of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him)"(1), for he has inherited knowledge from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and conveys it. For the followers, he is like the legislator through his ijtihad(2). Therefore, it is said: "The fatwa from the mufti is derived from the aspects of speech, action, and approval"(3). Accordingly, the preference of the follower depends on characteristics in the jurist that are: 1. Their actions do not contradict the legal rulings, which is a requirement of justice. 2. Their actions do not contradict their statements, even if the contradiction is within what is permissible, which is a requirement for standing as a mufti. 3. They guide people with their fatwa towards the middle ground, which is the norm of the Sharia and the intent of the legislator. 4. They fear the consequences of issuing a fatwa, which is a requirement of piety, scrupulousness, and fear of contradicting the intent of the legislator. __________ (1) The same source, 4/140. (2) The same source, 4/140 - 141. (3) The same source, 4/141. [Page 528] The first description, which is justice, is recognized by the follower (muqallid) through the behavior of the mufti in his words and actions. If he contradicts what is upheld by the people of religion and knowledge, he should not be followed, and his statements should not be taken. This disqualifies him from being preferred over others, as he lacks justice. He said: "As for his fatwas in speech, if his statements are contrary to what is lawful, and this is among his statements, it is possible for them to be contrary to what is lawful, so they should not be trusted" (1). The meaning of the text is that if his statements, which are outside the scope of fatwas, contradict the Sharia, then the same applies to his statements in fatwas, and they may also contradict the Sharia, thus they should not be considered valid. He said: "As for his actions, if they are contrary to the actions of the people of religion and knowledge, it is not permissible to follow them or to take them as a model among the actions of the righteous predecessors, and likewise his approval, as it is among his actions" (2). He said: "For the one who contradicts with his limbs indicates his contradiction in speech, and the one who contradicts in speech indicates his contradiction with his limbs, for all derive from one heart matter. This is a clarification of the invalidity of his fatwa in general" (3). Therefore, the principle he establishes is: "That a fatwa is not valid from one who contradicts the requirements of knowledge" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/145. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) The same source, 4/144. [Page 529] As for the second description, if the actions of the mufti (Islamic legal scholar) align with his statements perfectly, he is in the highest ranks in this description. If there is a contradiction, this is a descent from that rank, and it is necessary to weigh the extent of this contradiction or its locations among the jurists. However, it should be noted here that this opposition does not undermine justice (adala), because if it did, the fatwa (legal opinion) would not be trustworthy at all. He said: "Whoever meets the conditions for being appointed to issue fatwas falls into two categories: one of them is the one whose actions, statements, and conditions are in accordance with his fatwa; he is characterized by the attributes of knowledge and stands in the position of complete compliance, so that if you wish to follow him without asking, you are often free from the need to ask in many actions, just as the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) was followed in knowledge through his words, actions, and approvals. This category, when found, is more deserving than one who is not like that" (1). He also said: "Whoever has renounced the superfluous matters that do not undermine justice and is ascetic in them, his renunciation is more beneficial than the renunciation of one who has renounced them but is not abandoning them, for that is a contradiction, even if it is permissible. In opposing the statement with the action here, it prevents reaching the rank of one whose statement matches his action" (2). As for when the jurists descend from this rank, the one who is preferred among them is the one whose statements align with his actions most frequently. He said: "If the ranks of the muftis differ in this alignment, it is preferable for the follower (muqallid) to follow the one whose statement predominates in alignment with his action" (3). Among the factors for preference is that the follower looks at the locations of alignment and contradiction, for alignment in prohibitions is more preferable than alignment in commands. He said: "The alignment or lack thereof is considered in relation to commands and prohibitions. If he aligns in both, that is perfection; if there is a difference in this regard, meaning aside from the conditions of justice, the alignment in prohibitions is more preferable" (4). This is because avoiding prohibitions is more emphatic and significant in the legal intent (5). __________ (1) The same source, 4/158. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/159. (3) The same location. (4) The same location. (5) The same location. [Page 530] The third description, which is to guide people towards the middle ground, is that people differ in the extent of their ability to bear obligations and hardships, in their inclination towards acts of obedience and their detachment from worldly matters, and in their relinquishment of interests and rights, or in their pursuit of worldly gains and their insistence on their rights and efforts towards their interests. However, the legislator has set limits for everyone regarding the obligations they must fulfill and the prohibitions they must avoid. Therefore, one who renounces worldly matters and his interests and rights is not permitted to neglect the preservation of his own self and body, nor to obtain what is necessary for his sustenance and that of his family and those whom the legislator has entrusted him to care for and provide for, and so on; he cannot abandon these responsibilities in favor of worship, for example. Likewise, one who is inclined towards the world and its adornments, and what Allah has permitted him from it, has obligations that he must fulfill and rights that he must uphold. Between these two extremes, people vary in their inclination towards permissible and recommended actions and their distance from disliked actions, or their abstention from them, and the state of people in this regard is not uniform. They also differ in their physical and mental capabilities, just as they differ in their spiritual and material motivations. Based on this, it is not permissible for the mufti to exceed the limits of obligations or prohibitions in his fatwa, and what lies between these limits constitutes the middle ground, where what is suitable for one obligated person may not be suitable for another. The assessment of the state of the obligated person returns to the specific determination of the relevant criteria, which has been clarified in the previous discussion. Some obligated individuals may take themselves to task with strict resolutions, distancing themselves from concessions, and they may treat recommended actions as if they were obligatory and abandon disliked actions as if they were prohibited, while such resolutions and recommendations may be burdensome for others, and neglecting disliked actions may be detrimental to them and could lead to sins. The knowledgeable and grounded mufti issues a fatwa that is appropriate for the state of the obligated person in what the law has allowed for flexibility, and when he issues a fatwa concerning a public interest or a matter affecting the community or the public, he guides them towards the middle ground, that is, not according to the state of the least capable among them nor according to the state of the most capable. [Page 531] One does not issue a fatwa (legal opinion) based on the weakest among them in body, spirit, or pursuit of the Hereafter, nor based on the strongest among them in that regard, but rather adopts the well-known middle path among them. The term "well-known" refers to what is established in the Sharia regarding guiding people towards this middle ground from what is permitted by law. The follower (muqallid) weighs the opinions of the jurists based on what he observes in their general fatwas, not those specific to individual obligations, as he is not among those qualified to deliberate on that. What is permitted is what the legislator intended to allow, and the middle ground in this context is the most precise intention of the legislator. Al-Shatibi said: "The mufti who reaches the pinnacle of the rank is the one who guides people towards the well-known middle path that is suitable for the public; he does not lead them towards extremism nor incline them towards the side of laxity" (1). He also said: "If he deviates from that with the questioners, he has strayed from the intention of the legislator, and thus what deviates from the middle path is condemned among the knowledgeable scholars" (2). He stated: "If the questioner is led towards hardship and difficulty, it will cause him to resent the religion and lead to a cessation from following the path of the Hereafter, which is evident" (3). As for the mufti whose rank leads him to adopt a position above the middle ground, people may mistakenly think they should emulate him, causing them to take on burdens that are unsuitable for them. Therefore, he should conceal from the people what he imposes on himself that is above the middle ground, or he should alert them to it. He said: "It may be permissible for the jurist to impose upon himself obligations that are above the middle ground" (4). He then said: "Since he is a mufti by his words and actions, he has the right to conceal what may be emulated from him, for perhaps someone who cannot bear that action will follow him, leading to their downfall. If it happens to be known to the people, he should alert them to it, as the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) used to do, for he surpassed the people in worship and character" (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/149. (2) Same source. (3) Same source. (4) Same source, 4/150. (5) Same source. [Page 532] After clarifying that urging people towards moderation is the highest degree in ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), he said: "If it is established that urging towards moderation aligns with the intent of the Lawgiver and is what the righteous predecessors adhered to, then the follower should consider which school of thought is most consistent with this path; it is more deserving of adherence and consideration. Although all schools of thought are paths to Allah, preference among them is necessary because it is further from following whims, as previously mentioned, and closer to discerning the intent of the Lawgiver in matters of ijtihad" (1). As for the fourth description, which is the fear of issuing fatwas (legal opinions), some renowned scholars have mentioned this, specifically Imam Malik ibn Anas (may Allah have mercy on him). They noted their fear of fatwas or of making mistakes in them. Among these characteristics is their frequent saying: "I do not know," and the change in the mujtahid's (jurist's) color when a question is posed to him, and that before answering, he seems as if he is standing between Paradise and Hell. Additionally, he may defer the questioner and postpone the answer until he reflects on it, gather knowledgeable individuals for consultation, and be cautious of his opinion if it appears erroneous or contradicts a legal text. He may also regret if he issues many fatwas, among other things. Regarding this matter, it was reported from Imam Malik (may Allah have mercy on him) that he said: "I have pondered a matter for over a decade, and I have yet to reach a conclusion on it." He also said: "Sometimes a question comes to me, and I think about it for nights." When he was asked about a matter, he would tell the questioner: "Go away until I reflect on it," and the questioner would leave and ponder it. When this was mentioned to him, he wept and said: "I fear that I will have questions on the Day of Judgment, and what a day that will be." When he would sit, he would lower his head and move his lips in remembrance of Allah, not turning right or left. If he was asked about a matter, his color would change; he would turn red, then pale, lower his head, and move his lips, then say: "What Allah wills; there is no power and no strength except with Allah." He might be asked about fifty matters and not answer a single one. He would say: "Whoever wishes to answer a question should consider his own fate before answering, in terms of Paradise and Hell, and how he will be saved in the Hereafter, then he should answer" (2). __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/155. (2) The same source, 4/169. [Page 533] And after mentioning a number of these attributes, he said: "These are a set of characteristics that indicate to a person who among the scholars is more worthy of issuing fatwas and being followed, and the differences in these attributes clarify the preferred from the less preferred." (1) Rejected principles in fatwa: __________ (1) The same source, 4/172. Many scholars have expressed various opinions regarding the importance and virtue of fatwa, as well as its dangers and the necessity of being cautious about it. Among these is the saying of al-Nawawi: "Know that issuing fatwas is of great danger, significant status, and much virtue, for the mufti is the inheritor of the prophets (peace and blessings be upon them) and is fulfilling a communal obligation, yet he is susceptible to error. For this reason, they said: the mufti speaks on behalf of Allah." He also said: "From Ibn Mas'ud and Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them), whoever issues a fatwa on everything he is asked about is a fool." He mentioned: "From Ibn Abbas and Muhammad ibn Ajlan, if a scholar neglects to say 'I do not know,' he has struck his own neck." He also said: "And al-Shafi'i, when asked about a matter, did not respond, and when asked why, he said: Until I know whether the virtue lies in silence or in answering." And from al-Athram: I heard Ahmad ibn Hanbal frequently say: 'I do not know,' and that was regarding matters he was familiar with the opinions on. And from al-Haytham ibn Jamil: I witnessed Malik being asked about forty-eight matters, and he said 'I do not know' in thirty-two of them." He said: "And Abu Hanifa said: Were it not for the distinction from Allah, the Exalted, that knowledge would be lost, I would not issue fatwas; they would have the reward and I would bear the burden." See: The Etiquettes of Fatwa, the Mufti, and the Inquirer by Abu Zakariya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi al-Dimashqi (631 - 676 AH/1233 - 1277 CE), edited by Bassam Abdul Wahab al-Jabi. Dar al-Bashair al-Islamiyya, 2nd edition, 1411 AH - 1990 CE, which is concise and beneficial on its subject. [Page 534] It has become clear that the Sharia (Islamic law) returns to a single intention in its foundations and branches, meaning that the purpose of the legislator in every incident is one, and it is upon the jurist (mujtahid) to exert their utmost effort to align with it in their reasoning (ijtihad). Likewise, it is upon the obligated person (mukallaf) to seek the intention of the legislator by weighing the opinions of the jurists. Accordingly, al-Shatibi rejects fatwas (legal opinions) that do not rely on weighing the evidence. He also rejects the principles that some scholars rely on in issuing fatwas that do not rest on the basis of exerting effort to align with the intention of the legislator. This includes, for example, the follower (muqallid) choosing between the opinions of the jurists when they differ, or the scholar choosing between the opinions of the Companions or the recognized imams, or the mufti selecting for the questioner the easier and lighter option based on the notion that religion is ease and there is no hardship in it, and that the Sharia is lenient and the differences among the imams are a mercy, as well as the generalization of the principle that necessities permit the prohibited and applying it in inappropriate contexts. This also includes pursuing the concessions of the schools of thought (madhahib) and making the differences in a matter a proof for permissibility. Al-Shatibi has followed such opinions and elaborated on them in detail and in refutation. It should be noted that such fatwas are clearly present in our time, but what is striking is that some of their proponents claim to base them on al-Shatibi and his methodology. They issue fatwas that align with personal desires or the interests of the ruler, sometimes justifying it with renewal and at other times with necessities and needs, citing public interests (masalih) at one time and objectives (maqasid) and the chief of objectives (Sheikh al-Maqasid) at other times, undermining the rulings of the Sharia under the pretext of its objectives, oblivious to the fact that the primary objective of the Sharia is the application of the Sharia itself, and that one of the most important points emphasized by al-Shatibi is that there is no path to the objectives of the Sharia except through the Sharia. Furthermore, they are either neglectful or ignorant of al-Shatibi's concept of public interests and harms and his methodology in reasoning and establishing the objectives based on inductive reasoning that leads to certainty, as well as the fact that the objectives are those of the legislator and not the objectives of those with personal interests and agendas. [Page 535] Therefore, this research, in addition to clarifying some of al-Shatibi's views, warns those who mistakenly claim to rely on al-Shatibi and his methodology that al-Shatibi was in opposition to these views and claims. As for the prohibition of choosing between opinions when they conflict, whether for the mujtahid (independent jurist) or the muqallid (follower), he states: "The benefit of establishing the Sharia is to remove the obligated person from the call of his desires, and allowing him to choose between two opinions contradicts that principle, which is not permissible. The Sharia has been established to encompass a specific benefit in every issue and a general benefit in general. As for the specific, it is expressed by the evidence of each ruling and its wisdom, and as for the general, it is that the obligated person should be under a specific law of the Sharia in all his actions, beliefs, and statements, so that he is not following his desires like a free-roaming animal until he is trained by the reins of the Sharia. If we allow the muqallid to choose from the schools of the imams to select what is most pleasing to them, they will have no reference except to follow their desires in their choices, and this contradicts the objective of establishing the Sharia, so the claim of permissibility in choosing is not valid" (1). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/71. [Page 536] As for what some rely on, such as the saying that "differing is a mercy," and what is narrated about the caliph Umar ibn Abdul Aziz that he said: "I would not have liked that the companions of the Messenger of Allah did not differ," and the interpretation of this as indicating the permissibility of choosing between the sayings of the companions and the sayings of the imams, al-Shatibi refutes this meaning and clarifies that the meaning is that if the companions (may Allah be pleased with them) had not differed and their opinion had been one on every issue, it would indicate the prohibition of differing and consequently the prohibition of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning). Thus, the door to ijtihad was opened after them; the breadth and mercy in the differing of the companions lies in the opening of the door to ijtihad and in the fact that the mujtahid (jurist) acts according to what he believes is correct, and among his actions is his fatwa (legal opinion). After mentioning the opinions of some scholars that support his view, he said: "If it were assumed that the companions did not consider these ambiguous subsidiary issues and did not speak about them, while they are the role models in understanding the Sharia and acting according to its objectives, then those who came after them would not have the right to open that door" (1). He then said: "The field would have narrowed for those after the companions, but when they exercised ijtihad and the differing that arose from their striving for correctness made it easier for those who came after them to follow the path. Therefore, Umar ibn Abdul Aziz - and Allah knows best - said: 'I would not be pleased to have the differing of them equivalent to the red camels,' and he said: 'I would not have liked that the companions of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) did not differ'" (2). It is narrated from Imam Malik (may Allah have mercy on him) that he said: "There is no breadth in the differing of the companions of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), rather the truth is in one" (3). __________ (1) The same source. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/71. (3) The same source, 4/69. [Page 537] He says based on the principle of the prohibition of preference: "The neglect of this principle has led many followers of the jurists to give fatwas to their relatives or friends that they do not give to others, following their own desires and whims or the desires of that relative or friend. This has been observed in past times, let alone in our own time, as has the pursuit of the concessions of the schools of thought in accordance with desire and whim" (1). After mentioning examples of these fatwas and condemning them strongly, he said: "This is something upon which there is no disagreement among Muslims who are considered credible in consensus, that it is not permissible, nor is it lawful for anyone to give a fatwa in the religion of Allah except with the truth that he believes to be true, which is accepted by those who accept it and rejected by those who reject it. The mufti is merely a reporter about Allah, Exalted is He, in His rulings, so how can he report except what he believes to be the ruling He has decreed and made obligatory" (2). __________ (1) The same source, 4/73. (2) The same source, 4/77. [Page 538] As for the claim that disagreement on a matter is evidence of its permissibility, this exceeds the limit, and it is something that al-Shatibi finds objectionable. He says: "This matter has exceeded the limit of sufficiency to the point that disagreement on issues has been counted among the evidences of permissibility, and reliance on the permissibility of an action based on it being disputed among the scholars has occurred both in the past and in the future" (1). He also said: "Sometimes a fatwa is issued prohibiting a matter, and it is said: Why do you prohibit it when the matter is disputed? Thus, disagreement is made a proof of permissibility merely because it is disputed, not due to any evidence" (2). An example of this is the statement of those who said that since people have disagreed about drinks and have unanimously agreed on the prohibition of grape wine while differing on other drinks, we have prohibited what they have agreed upon and permitted what is otherwise (3). After he quoted such statements as being a gross error, and that if they were correct, similar reasoning would apply to usury (riba), currency exchange (sarf), and temporary marriage (nikah al-mut'ah) because the community has disagreed on them, and that disagreement is not a proof (4), he said: "The one who says this is returning to following his desires and making the opinion that aligns with him a proof for himself, using it to shield himself; he has taken the opinion as a means to follow his whims, not as a means to attain piety, and this is further from being one who is obeying the command of the Lord and closer to being one who has taken his desires as his god" (5). What is surprising is that the proponents of these opinions criticize those who adhere to what they see as correct or preferable. He said: "Sometimes the proponent of this opinion explicitly criticizes those who adhere to the well-known opinion or the one that aligns with the evidence or is preferred among the scholars and that which the majority of Muslims follow, saying to them: You have restricted what is vast and led the people to hardship, and there is no hardship in religion, and similar statements" (6). He then commented: "All of this opinion is erroneous and ignorant of what the Sharia was established for" (7). __________ (1) The same source, 4/78. (2) The same location. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/78. (4) The same location. (5) The same location. (6) The same source, 4/79. (7) The same source. [Page 539] Al-Shatibi addresses the fatwas of those who are lenient and follow the concessions of the schools of thought, arguing that the Sharia is accommodating. He cites their statement, among which is: "His saying (peace and blessings be upon him): 'I was sent with the lenient Hanifiyyah'" (1) implies the permissibility of that because it is a type of kindness towards the servant, and the Sharia was not intended to cause hardship to the servants but to achieve benefits" (2). He responds by saying: "And you know from what has preceded in this discussion that the leniency of the Hanifiyyah is only found within the bounds of its principles, and that following concessions or choosing opinions based on desire is not established from its foundations; what has been said is merely a claim. Then we say: Following concessions is a deviation aligned with the whims of the souls, and the Sharia has come with a prohibition against following desires" (3). As for leniency under the pretext of necessity or need where there is no necessity, he responds by reiterating the hadith regarding the lack of religion and piety among some who assume the role of issuing fatwas. He says: "Perhaps some of them permit this in situations where they claim necessity and urgent need based on the principle that necessities permit the prohibited, so they take what aligns with their interests until the issue arises in a situation where there is no necessity or need to adopt the weaker opinion or one that is outside the school of thought, and then they take the opinion that is established in the school or the stronger opinion in the school. This is also from that earlier category, as its essence is taking what aligns with the present desire, and the conditions of necessity are well known in the Sharia" (4). He then said: "The lack of piety and religion is evident in many who assume the role of disseminating knowledge and issuing fatwas, as previously exemplified. If this door were opened for them, the ties of the school would unravel, indeed all schools of thought, because what is obligatory for one thing is obligatory for its like, and it has become clear that the necessity claimed in the question is not a necessity" (5). __________ (1) Its narration has been previously mentioned. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/81. (3) The same location. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/81. (5) The same source, 4/82. [Page 540] Among the invalid fatwas that al-Shatibi clarifies and warns against are those fatwas that deviate from the preferred opinion under the pretext of ease and alleviating hardship, which are based on legal principles. This leads to a question: should one adopt the lighter of the two opinions or the heavier? Thus, the choice is not based on what is preferred in accordance with the intent of the Lawgiver, but rather on the lighter or heavier opinion. Those who advocate for the lighter opinion cite the evidence of ease, alleviation of hardship, removal of harm, and the leniency of the Sharia (1). In response to this, he states: "The answer to this has been previously mentioned, and it also leads to the necessity of completely lifting the obligation" (2). He further states: "If hardship arises in the obligation, it necessitates alleviation based on these proofs, then this should apply to purifications, prayers, zakat, pilgrimage, jihad, and others, and it does not stop at a limit except when there remains no obligation on the servant, and this is impossible; thus, what it leads to is similar" (3). Al-Shatibi summarized some of the harms that arise from leniency in fatwa and the selection among opinions and the pursuit of concessions, mentioning among them: 1 - "Detachment from religion by abandoning adherence to evidence in favor of following dissent." 2 - "Disregard for religion, as it becomes, in this regard, fluid and unregulated." 3 - "Abandoning what is known for what is not known." 4 - "Disruption of the law of public interest (maslaha) by abandoning adherence to what is known." 5 - "Leading to the claim of mixing the schools of thought in a manner that violates their consensus. And other harms that can be enumerated" (4). Section Three The Origin of the Consequences of Actions Its Importance in Al-Shatibi's Methodology: Al-Shatibi made consideration of the consequences of actions one of the signs of a credible mujtahid (jurist), and he made it obligatory for the mujtahid when considering and deriving rulings, as it is one of the objectives of the Lawgiver. He said: "Considering the consequences of actions is a legally recognized objective" (5). __________ (1) The same source, 4/83. (2) The same location. (3) The same location. (4) The same source, 4/82. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/110. [Page 541] The idea of the consequences of actions (ma'alat al-af'al) is one of the most important concepts in al-Shatibi's methodology, and many rules are built upon it. In fact, considering the consequences is the primary foundation of his approach. The essence of his idea is that the Sharia (Islamic law) was revealed for the benefit of the servants, thus the Sharia has consequences, and the rulings have consequences. For the sake of these consequences, the Sharia was established, making the Sharia and its rulings causes for certain effects. Furthermore, al-Shatibi's assertion that the actions of Allah (Exalted is He) and His rulings are based on reasoning was derived from a survey of the texts whose explicit meanings indicate the purpose behind the action or ruling. The permissible action is permitted for the sake of a goal intended by the legislator, which is the intended benefit from the ruling. The prohibited action has a consequence or result that the legislator intended to eliminate, which is the harm intended to be removed by the prohibition. These benefits and harms are the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), meaning they are the objectives of the Legislator in establishing the Sharia from the outset. This is a foundation or principle in legislation according to al-Shatibi's methodology. Actions are sought to be performed or abandoned for the sake of their outcomes. Permissible actions may lead to results that are not intended by the Legislator, and likewise, actions that are prohibited may lead to the removal of results that the Legislator did not intend to remove. Therefore, not everything that results from an action is intended by the Legislator. The intended outcome, whether it is to be established or removed, is understood through induction. This has been explained in detail previously. The outcome that is established through beneficial induction to the point of certainty is what the Legislator intends, whether in existence or removal. This is a basis for legislation or a reason for legislation, or a benefit intended by the Legislator through a command, or a harm intended to be removed by prohibition. In summary, these are the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) or the rulings or outcomes of the Sharia or the rulings. [Page 542] However, these permitted or prohibited actions may have situations or circumstances, whether related to the individual obligated (mukallaf) or the circumstances of reality, that do not lead to their intended outcomes in Sharia, or they may lead to outcomes but with results that the legislator did not intend. Here, it is noted that the ruling on the action was for a specific outcome, but the action has resulted in one or more outcomes that may contradict what the legislator intended through legislation. It is also noted that the original principle in legislation is that rulings were established for the sake of their benefits or objectives (maqasid). Thus, the rulings and their outcomes are linked as cause and effect. If this is a fundamental principle in legislation, then when the legislator commanded or prohibited, he did so intending the outcome. Therefore, one who studies the Sharia to understand it must do so on this very basis, because the ruling on the action that the legislator clarified is intended to be adhered to, and likewise, the outcome of the action is intended by the legislator. The action and its outcome are connected as cause and effect, and the legislator intends the cause and its effect. If a disconnection occurs between the action and its outcome in certain situations, or if a connection occurs between the action and an unintended outcome in certain situations, then the jurist (mujtahid) must consider this matter and take it into account when deliberating and exercising ijtihad, because it is significant in the eyes of the legislator, and when the jurist clarifies the rulings for the followers (muqallidin), he is as if he is the legislator. [Page 543] This principle, the principle of considering the outcomes of actions, is not a principle like other principles or rules in al-Shatibi's methodology; rather, it is the foundation of his approach and the essence of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia). Most of the other principles and rules that he considers in ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) and legislation are built upon it. The rules of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i), preference (istihsan), public interest (maslaha), removing harm (raf' al-darar), alleviating hardship (raf' al-haraj), and not imposing what is beyond one's capacity or burdensome difficulties, as well as the rule of legal tricks (hiyal) and others, are all based on this principle, since the objectives of the Sharia are its outcomes, and this principle pertains to the outcomes of actions, and the rulings are indeed rulings on actions. His proofs: Thus, we see that al-Shatibi, when he obligated the mujtahid (jurist) to consider the outcomes of actions and provided evidence for this, used the same proofs he employed to establish that the Sharia was enacted for the benefit of the servants. He cited three matters. He said: "The evidence for its validity consists of three matters. The first is that the obligations, as previously mentioned, are legislated for the interests of the servants, and the interests of the servants are either worldly or otherworldly. As for the otherworldly, it pertains to the outcome of the obligated person in the Hereafter" (1), and he said: "As for the worldly, if you contemplate actions, they are precedents for the results of interests, for they are causes for effects that are intended by the legislator, and the effects are the outcomes of the causes, so considering them in the flow of causes is necessary, which is the meaning of considering the outcomes" (2). As for his second proof, he stated that not considering the outcomes of actions contradicts the fact that obligations were legislated for the interests of the servants (3). He added: "Moreover, this leads to not seeking benefit through a permissible action nor expecting harm from a prohibited action, which is contrary to the purpose of the Sharia" (4). It is clear that these two proofs return to the core of his idea that the Sharia was enacted for the interests of the servants. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/111. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) The same source. [Page 544] His third evidence is the induction that the Sharia (Islamic law) was established for the sake of goals or outcomes intended by the Legislator. If we refer back to his concept of benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid), which is what the Legislator intended through legislation, and to his discussions on causes that were clarified previously, it becomes evident that this evidence here is his proof that the rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, are justified by their objectives. This is what he mentioned at the beginning of the book on the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), and it is not something close to it or based upon it, but rather it is the same. He said: "The third is the legal evidences and complete induction that the outcomes are considered in the essence of legality, as His saying, { O mankind, worship your Lord, who created you and those before you, that you may become righteous } (1). And His saying, { Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, that you may become righteous } (2). And His saying, { And do not consume one another's wealth unjustly or send it [in bribery] to the rulers } (3). And His saying, { And do not insult those whom they invoke besides Allah } (4). And His saying, { Messengers as bringers of good tidings and warners } (5). __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 21. The intended meaning is that the command to worship is for the sake of its outcome, which is righteousness. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 183. The intended inference is that Allah commanded fasting for its outcome, which is righteousness. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 188. The complete verse is { so that you may consume a portion of the wealth of the people }. The intended meaning is the prohibition of the act to prevent its outcome, which is the oppression of people and the consumption of their rights. (4) Surah Al-An'am, 108. The complete verse is { and they insult Allah in enmity without knowledge }. The intended meaning is to prevent the outcome by removing its cause, and the outcome is that they insult Allah, Exalted is He. (5) Surah An-Nisa, 165. The complete verse is { so that there will be for the people no argument against Allah after the messengers }. The intended meaning is that the sending of messengers has an outcome, which is that there will be no argument for the people against Allah. [Page 545] And His saying: { Fighting has been prescribed for you, and it is a great hardship for you } (1) the verse. And His saying: { And there is for you in retaliation (qisas) life } (2). This is something that considers the outcome in general (3). These texts are indeed used to establish induction, and the evidence in them is that the ruling has appeared and the intended outcome has been made clear. This evidence is itself the proof that the Sharia was legislated for the sake of the interests of the servants (4). In fact, some of these texts used as evidence here are also used as evidence there. One can critique al-Shatibi's arguments here, as his first and second proofs refer back to the third; they are essentially one proof in reality. This evidence is itself the proof for the reasoning of the Sharia in bringing about benefits and averting harms, so he has not introduced anything new in establishing the consideration of the outcomes of actions, and he did not need to provide evidence. Anyone who adopts his methodology from its origin is obligated to adhere to the principle of the outcomes of actions, and whoever rejects the principle of the outcomes of actions must also reject the methodology from its origin. Its meaning and application: __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 216. The complete verse is { And perhaps you hate a thing while it is good for you, and perhaps you love a thing while it is bad for you. And Allah knows while you do not know. }. The intended meaning is that the ruling has an outcome that is good for you. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 179. The intended meaning is that retaliation has an outcome, which is life. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 4/112. (4) The same source, 2/3. [Page 546] It is important to remind ourselves of certain matters at this point, namely that the outcomes of actions are their causes, benefits, rulings, or meanings, and al-Shatibi does not accept them as either beneficial or harmful unless they are established with certainty through induction. The outcomes are definitive universal principles, and without this, they are not considered. The outcome that must be taken into account when examining an action and its result is that which is established with certainty. Since actions are particulars and their results are particulars, considering the outcome is akin to considering the universal principle to which these particular results refer. This is part of the details of his methodology, as previously explained. Below are some of his texts to remind us of this matter, as it is essential for understanding the essence of the outcomes of actions. It is also crucial to remain constantly aware when reading al-Shatibi of what he means by benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid), which are what the legislator intended, regardless of human attributes. They are so in terms of what the legislator has established, not in terms of the whims of souls. He said: "The legitimate causes were established for the benefits of the servants, and they are the wisdom of legislation" (1). He said: "What is prohibited is prohibited due to a harm that results from its action. If it is acted upon, it is under the condition that it leads to the benefits or harms under the cause; ignorance of the benefit or harm or their quantities does not exempt one from this. The matter entails that there is a harm in committing the prohibited act that Allah knows, and for that reason, He prohibited it. The doer is obligated to all that results from that cause of benefits or harms, even if he is unaware of the details of that" (2). He said: "It is necessary to pay attention to the meanings for which the rulings were established. The meanings are the causes of the rulings" (3). He said: "The legal rulings were established to bring about benefits or to avert harms, and they are their causes definitively" (4). He said: "It is established in these matters that the considered benefits are the universals, not the particulars" (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/178. (2) The same source, 1/149. (3) The same source, 1/138. (4) The same source, 1/135. (5) The same source, 1/91. [Page 547] Based on this, the obligation to consider the outcomes (mālat) arises because there may be situations where an action deemed permissible is intended for a benefit that is not achieved and may lead to harm, or it may lead to both benefit and harm. Conversely, an action that is prohibited due to harm may lead to a benefit, or its abandonment may result in a greater harm than the harm it causes. Therefore, the jurist (mujtahid) must examine these occurrences and situations, and all of this relates to the realization of the relevant criteria (taḥqīq al-manāṭ), either in a general sense or in a specific sense. In the general sense, it means that the reality has circumstances and conditions that allow for different outcomes of the action, such as going to markets, schools, and attending funerals, and similar activities. These are permissible or legally desired, but these actions may lead to immoralities, such as witnessing nakedness or unlawful mixing, which transforms this reality into a new situation that requires consideration. Similarly, visiting beaches and swimming pools is originally permissible; however, if these places are frequented by naked men and women, then the outcome of this action is witnessing nakedness. Therefore, the jurist must consider the outcome of the action along with the action itself, as this required or permitted action may lead to harm. This does not mean that the action has become forbidden because it has a forbidden outcome; rather, it means that it is necessary to consider the outcome, as considering the outcome is legally required and intended just as considering the action is required and intended. The degree of this harm varies; it is different in visiting beaches frequented by naked individuals compared to public markets where some immoralities may occur or some nakedness may be exposed. Likewise, the benefits that are compared to these harms differ in degree; they are different in leisure and visiting public places and beaches compared to seeking knowledge or attending funerals, and they are different in attending Friday prayers and congregational prayers. [Page 548] Similarly, in the case of prohibited actions, their outcome may, in some instances, lead to a benefit (maslaha), or the avoidance of such actions may result in a greater harm than the harm they cause. There are many examples of this, including the avoidance of consuming what is unlawful in a situation where one is on the brink of destruction, or the amputation of a limb that poses a threat to the entire body. Additionally, killing a Muslim without justification is a major sin, but if the disbelievers use him as a shield in war and begin killing Muslims in such a way that he can only be stopped by his death, the matter requires careful consideration, which may lead to the obligation of killing him, or its permissibility, or its prohibition (1). As for what pertains to the realization of the specific context, it relates to understanding the condition and intention of the obligated person. An action may be recommended (mandub) but could lead the obligated person to cease worship, or it may be obligatory (wajib) but result in harm to his body or impairment of his mind. There are many examples of this. Al-Shatibi said: "In the hadith of the Bedouin who urinated in the mosque, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) commanded that he be left until he finishes urinating, and said: 'Do not interrupt him' (2)" (3). And there is the hadith that prohibits being overly strict with oneself in worship for fear of ceasing it. All that has been mentioned regarding the realization of the specific context carries this meaning, where an action is originally permissible but is prohibited due to the harm it may lead to, or it is forbidden but the prohibition is overlooked due to the benefit it entails. Likewise, all the evidence indicating the closure of avenues (sadd al-dhara'i) generally involves a permissible act leading to an impermissible one. The original ruling is permissibility, but its outcome is impermissible. The evidence indicating expansion and the lifting of hardship generally allows for actions that are originally impermissible due to the benefit they lead to that is permissible (4). __________ (1) See: Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam, Qawaid al-Ahkam fi Masalih al-Anam. 1/1009. (2) Ibn Majah (528) and al-Nasa'i in the Book of Purification. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/112. (4) The same source. [Page 549] Considering this principle does not mean permitting the unlawful (haram) because its outcome is permissible, nor does it mean prohibiting the lawful (halal) because its outcome is forbidden. Rather, it means examining to understand the ruling of the Lawgiver in cases of differing circumstances. Therefore, this is part of the work of the mujtahid (jurist) in his capacity as a mujtahid, who examines the action and its outcome, free from personal desires. Requiring the mujtahid to consider the outcomes is akin to exerting utmost effort and thorough examination. Al-Shatibi said: "The consideration of the outcomes of actions is a legally intended objective, whether the actions are in agreement or in opposition. This is because the mujtahid does not rule on an action performed by the obligated individuals, whether to engage in it or refrain from it, except after considering what that action will lead to. It may be permissible due to a benefit that it brings or a harm that it averts, but it has an outcome contrary to what was intended. It may also be impermissible due to a harm that arises from it or a harm that it prevents, but it has an outcome contrary to that. If one were to declare the first as permissible, it might lead to a benefit that equals or exceeds the harm, thus preventing the declaration of permissibility. Similarly, if one were to declare the second as impermissible, it might lead to averting a harm that equals or exceeds the benefit, so it would not be correct to declare it impermissible. This is a domain for the mujtahid, difficult in its source, yet sweet in taste, praiseworthy in its outcome, in accordance with the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia)"(1). This is the text of al-Shatibi regarding the principle of the outcomes of actions. It is directed to the mujtahid and not to others. He says: "This is because the mujtahid does not rule" and he says: "This is a domain for the mujtahid, difficult in its source." It is also clear that he does not say that the outcome of the action determines its ruling. Rather, he states that it is necessary to consider the outcome when examining, so one should not declare based solely on the examination of the action, nor should one declare based solely on the examination of the outcome. Rather, it is necessary to consider both aspects, based on the legal principles of necessities, needs, and enhancements. And based on the consideration of both general and specific outcomes. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/110 - 111. [Page 550] Here, one can refer to some of his statements in the Book of Rulings regarding causes and effects, which may seem contradictory to his text above, where he said: "It is not necessary for the one responsible (mukallaf) to pay attention to the effects or to intend them when engaging in the causes." (1) He also said: "If it is established that there is no obligation to intend the effect, then the one responsible may abandon the intention to it in general, and he may also intend it." (2) From these texts and others, it is understood that although the effect results from the cause, the one responsible is not concerned with the effects or the outcomes; rather, he is concerned with knowing the ruling and adhering to it, regardless of its outcomes. Al-Shatibi responds by saying: "It cannot be said that it has been mentioned in the Book of Rulings that the effects do not need to be considered when entering into the causes, for we say, and it has also been established that it is necessary to consider the effects in the causes, and the discussion has been made regarding that and reconciling the two matters. Our issue is of the second type, not the first, as it pertains to the jurist (mujtahid) who is looking into the ruling of others with regard to being free from personal interests. The jurist is a representative of the legislator in ruling on the actions of the responsible individuals, and it has been established that the legislator intends the effects in the causes." (3) __________ (1) The same source, 1/133. (2) The same source, 1/135. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/111. [Page 551] The meaning of this text is that the legal ruling (hukm) regarding the actions of a responsible person (mukallaf) when it comes from the legislator (al-shari) is such that the mukallaf should not consider the outcomes (ma'alat) or the benefits or harms that may result from it. This is because the legislator has already taken these into account in the ruling and has judged the mukallaf considering his condition and outcome, along with everything that must be considered. As for the jurist (mujtahid), when he exerts effort to understand the ruling, he must take into account the action and the outcome of the action because, in this regard, he is in the position of the legislator. He, the mujtahid, is responsible when he is making his ijtihad; he is responsible in considering the action and its outcome. Therefore, it is not his place to assume the role of the legislator and change the ruling based on the outcome of the action. Rather, his duty or obligation is to know the ruling of the legislator according to both the action and the outcome together. An example of this is the ruling on carrion (mayta), which is prohibited, but in some cases, such as extreme hunger (khumsa), abstaining from it may lead to the loss of life or to neglecting a necessity (darura). In this case, the ruling changes based on the change in the outcome. The mujtahid did not change the ruling based on benefit or outcome; rather, he derived and understood the ruling of the Sharia. The change in the ruling here is due to a change in the cause (sabab), just as it changes with the change in the action or the basis (manat). Similarly, fasting in Ramadan is obligatory, but in some cases, such as during jihad or for someone afflicted with a certain illness, fasting may lead to neglecting a more important obligation or to compromising a necessity, thus changing the ruling based on what it leads to. The application of this principle, the principle of the outcomes of actions, does not grant the mukallaf or the mujtahid the right to change rulings based on whims. Rather, the ruling changes only where the Sharia indicates that it should. If there is no evidence for changing the ruling, even if it leads to harm, then the ruling does not change. Likewise, the harm does not become permissible or excusable; rather, one should strive to avoid the harm as much as possible. If the Sharia does not indicate a change in the ruling, it does not change, even if it has an outcome contrary to what was intended. Just as the outcome is intended, the ruling itself is intended. He says: "From this principle (the principle of the outcomes of actions) another rule is derived, which is that necessary matters or other needs (hajiyat) or complementary matters (takamuliyat) if they are surrounded by external matters that do not... [Page 552] It is legally permissible, as taking on beneficial actions is correct on the condition of exercising caution to the best of one's ability without hardship (1). This means that the required or permitted actions that fall within these categories, even if they lead to harmful outcomes, do not change their rulings, and it is permissible to undertake them despite the harms involved; neither do their rulings change, nor do the harms become benefits. In other words, prohibitions do not become permissible, but one should engage in what is lawful while avoiding what is forbidden as much as possible. If the avoidance reaches a point of hardship or harm or exceeds one's capacity, then the ruling may change based on legal principles, such as the principle that necessity permits the prohibited, or that one is not obliged to do what is beyond their ability, or due to the lifting of harm, or similar considerations. Al-Shatibi provides an example, stating: "Like marriage, which necessitates seeking sustenance for dependents amidst the narrow paths of what is lawful and the vast avenues of what is unlawful and questionable. Often, this compels one to engage in earning for them through means that are not permissible, yet this does not prevent the avoidance of the harm that arises from the expectation of facing the harm of exposure. If such considerations were applied to marriage in our time, it would lead to the invalidation of its essence, which is incorrect. Similarly, seeking knowledge if it involves witnessing immoral acts that one hears and sees, and attending funerals and performing religious duties if one can only do so by witnessing what is not acceptable, does not remove these occurrences from their foundational principles because they are the foundations of religion and the principles of benefits" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/118. (2) The same source, 4/119. [Page 553] The importance of clarifying al-Shatibi's (may Allah have mercy on him) intent regarding the principle of the outcomes of actions in our research lies in the grave errors that are attributed to the Sharia or are adopted as a methodology in the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), upon which rulings are based that directly conflict with the texts. This is attributed to al-Shatibi and his methodology, such that un-Islamic ideas become legitimate juristic opinions under the pretext of objectives (maqasid) and beneficial outcomes (mamalat). The examples of the excesses of some contemporary scholars are numerous, and below is one of them, where reliance was placed on al-Shatibi and his ideas regarding benefits (masalih) and harms (mafasid) in terms of bringing about and repelling, especially concerning the principle of the outcomes of actions, where his statements were cited in contradiction to their intended meaning. Discussion of a Misunderstanding of the Principle of Considering Outcomes: The magazine "Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqim," published in America, in its issue "59" in the year 1417 AH, published an article titled: "Political Action in American Society" by Dr. Salah Al-Saawi, the director of the Open Islamic University in Virginia. The magazine described the published article as: a foundational jurisprudential perspective being published for the first time. The magazine stated that this study was a response to a question sent by Mr. Nihad Awad, the executive director of the American Islamic Relations Council. What is important here is not the question or the answers but rather the methodology of understanding and deduction. In this foundational perspective, there were many strange statements such as: "Since means take the ruling of objectives, and means take the ruling of ends," etc. He also stated: "Thus, considering means is one of the established principles in determining rulings, and means are those that lead to something permissible or prohibited, so the path to the forbidden is forbidden, and the path to the permissible is permissible," etc. Among what the author claimed was the permissibility of committing a wrongdoing under the pretext of intending a benefit, and that this wrongdoing is excusable in light of the intended benefit. He attributed this understanding to al-Shatibi and cited his statements mentioned on the previous page. Therefore, I will proceed to explain this text in detail, as it further clarifies al-Shatibi's intent in the text. [Page 554] Explanation of the text: His saying: "The necessary matters or others that are of a needful or complementary nature, if they are surrounded by external matters that do not please the Sharia, then the act of bringing about benefits is valid on the condition of taking precautions according to one's ability without hardship." This means that the actions which the evidence indicates are permissible, whether by obligation, recommendation, or permissibility, do not fall outside the categories of necessity, need, or complementarity; they are benefits that fall under these three categories. These actions, if they have an outcome that is prohibited, then performing them is valid with the possibility of that outcome, meaning that the original consideration of outcomes does not affect the ruling on these actions. And since these actions may lead to something forbidden, one must take precautions against falling into these outcomes or prohibitions to the best of their ability, meaning one must avoid these prohibitions just as one must avoid any forbidden act. And Allah, Exalted is He, does not burden a soul beyond its capacity, so this text does not permit the commission of wrongdoing. His saying: "Like marriage, which necessitates seeking sustenance for dependents amidst the narrow paths of what is lawful, and the vast avenues of what is unlawful and questionable, often forcing one to earn for them through what is not permissible, but this does not prevent it." Marriage, for example, is permissible, and according to al-Shatibi, it is a legal ruling concerning the individual in its particularity, and it is a general, definitive principle concerning the public in its service to necessity. If it is established that it may lead in some cases to something prohibited, such as seeking sustenance for dependents through unlawful means, and it may lead to earning through what is forbidden, then the particularity conflicts with the principle, which is the permissibility of this marriage with regard to outcomes. In these cases, the outcomes of marriage do not invalidate the legal ruling on marriage; this act remains as it is, and its ruling is not changed by its outcomes. The obligated person strives to avoid falling into these outcomes according to their ability, and this does not mean that engaging with these outcomes becomes permissible. And his saying: "For what it leads to, taking precautions against the harm that is greater than the harm of exposure; if such a thing were considered in our time, it would lead to the invalidation of its principle, which is not correct." [Page 555] Indeed, these outcomes do not prevent marriage, and if we were to consider the ruling based on this outcome in our time, it would lead to the prohibition of marriage, which is incorrect because it contradicts the established ruling supported by evidence. His statement: "and that is not correct" means that it is not permissible to invalidate or change a legal ruling under the pretext of outcomes. Furthermore, if we were to prohibit marriage, which is a legal ruling, we would fall into greater evils than those of these outcomes. The outcomes are considered in light of the Sharia, and we do not change rulings based on them; rather, we discover the Sharia's consideration of them. Since marriage is permissible, and every permissible matter is a benefit, its invalidation is a harm, whether we realize it or not. According to al-Shatibi, it is a fundamental principle, whether necessary, urgent, or complementary. Thus, if the consideration of these outcomes implies changing the ruling, it leads to the invalidation of a principle, which is incorrect. His statement: "Similarly, seeking knowledge, if it involves hearing disapproved matters, attending funerals, and performing religious duties if they can only be fulfilled by witnessing what is not acceptable, does not remove these matters from their principles" means that what has been said regarding marriage applies to seeking knowledge and the other mentioned matters. All of these are particulars that have been established as permissible by evidence. The fact that they may lead to something prohibited, such as viewing nakedness or hearing what is not permissible to listen to, does not invalidate the legality of these actions, because what invalidates or does not invalidate is the Sharia, and the Sharia has not invalidated them despite the existence of these outcomes. The Sharia has considered the outcomes, and with its consideration of the outcomes, thus were its rulings; they should not be tampered with under the pretext of outcomes, and it is permissible to engage in them with the possibility of their outcomes. This principle, that is, the consideration of outcomes, does not change a legal ruling; it neither makes the unlawful lawful nor prohibits the lawful. If a servant engages in these actions, they must avoid the prohibitions that may result from these actions to the best of their ability. His statement: "Because they are the foundations of religion and the principles of benefits, which is understood from the objectives of the Legislator" means that the foundations are not invalidated by particulars, because the foundations are general. [Page 556] The principles of religion, like the beliefs, are definitive and cannot be contradicted by anything. Likewise, the three categories—necessities (darurat), needs (hajiyat), and enhancements (tahsinat)—are understood from the Sharia. The general principle is not invalidated by the opposition of some particulars to it. His statement: "It is necessary to understand them correctly, for they are the basis of disagreement and contention," means that these established principles, which are derived through induction, are contested by some who reject them based on particular cases that contradict them. Therefore, it is essential to understand correctly that particulars do not invalidate the principles. What he means is that there are those who dispute and oppose the validity of the principle of considering the consequences of actions (mala'at al-af'al), based on what has been mentioned in the texts regarding these rejected consequences, which have not affected rulings such as marriage and the pursuit of knowledge, nor have they changed the ruling. Thus, they claim that this principle has fallen. This claim is invalid because the principle is a definitive generality, while what they assert are particular cases and specific issues that do not reach the level of being definitive. His statement: "What is transmitted from the righteous predecessors that contradicts this are specific cases that have no evidence in themselves until their meaning is understood, and they align with what has been established, if Allah wills," means that what the disputants raise in refuting these principles, including the principle of considering consequences, has no evidence, as it is based on particulars. If these particulars converge on a specific meaning and this meaning is subjected to an induction that yields certainty, then it will become clear that this certain meaning and these particulars related to it will align with the principle of considering consequences. This is because the principles are definitive generalities and do not contradict each other, and since they are particulars that have not yet reached this level, they remain speculative in their opposition to the definitive principle and are subject to interpretation. [Page 557] And this interpretation of this text is one that observes and considers its methodology and principles that have been established. As for the claim that it is permissible to commit wrong based on the principle of outcomes, this is rejected, and one can refer to al-Shatibi's texts in the discussion of the objectives of the legally responsible (maqasid al-mukallaf), where his views on this matter are clarified in the sixth chapter of this book, where his opinion is that these statements can only arise from ignorance, and if that is not the case, then it is an innovation. Chapter Nine On the Application of the Idea: Three General Principles This chapter contains a brief definition of the subject of this chapter and three discussions: Discussion One: The Considered Interests (masalih mursala). Discussion Two: Preference (istihsan). Discussion Three: Blocking the Means (sadd al-dhara'i). The third discussion includes a study of the principle of removing harm. Chapter Nine On the Application of the Idea: Three General Principles The subject of this chapter: After clarifying al-Shatibi's methodology in understanding the Sharia and his approach in establishing the general principles and rules, which is the beneficial induction leading to certainty, this chapter comes to explain three general principles that are among the most important rules in al-Shatibi's methodology, which are the considered interests, preference, and blocking the means. This is done in three discussions, and the principle of removing harm is examined within the discussion on blocking the means. The aim of discussing these principles is: 1 - To further clarify al-Shatibi's methodology in understanding the Sharia and deriving rulings, as these principles are universals that he established through applying his idea of inductively extracting meanings and capturing universals, as he expressed it. Since these principles are objectives or reasons, and based on them rulings branch out, they are therefore considered principles for the jurist when deriving rulings. [Page 558] 2 - Clarifying how al-Shatibi's consideration of these principles differs from that of other imams who acknowledge them, through their specification, and if one may say, the narrowing of their applicability so that he can claim certainty regarding them. After that, he claimed that they are acknowledged and practiced by all, even if they explicitly state their rejection. Among this is his assertion multiple times that the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) is practiced by Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with them), while their failure to apply it in many instances does not detract from its validity, as it is not due to their disregard for the principle but rather for other reasons. 3 - Clarifying the reality of these principles in al-Shatibi's methodology, as these terms: public interest (maslaha mursala), juristic preference (istihsan), and blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) are names for the principles and not their texts. The name does not reveal the true meaning, the context of its application, or its conditions. Therefore, it is incorrect to invoke al-Shatibi or his methodology or the titles of his principles or rules without understanding the reality of all of it, and then issuing opinions or fatwas that permit the unlawful or prohibit the lawful merely by using the name of the principle; this is ignorance, not knowledge, and does not yield true knowledge. The first section Public interest (maslaha mursala) The meaning of public interest (maslaha mursala): The principle of public interest (maslaha mursala) is based on the unrestricted reasoning (istidlal mursel), which in turn is based on the unrestricted suitability (munasib mursel). The unrestricted suitability is one of the categories of suitability, and suitability is the description that can be claimed as a cause by those who adhere to the path of suitability in analogy (qiyas). It leads to analogy after its conditions are met. However, reasoning is not from analogy because the description that is suitable for reasoning, even if it exists in a branch, does not exist in a specific origin to be compared to. Rather, it is a meaning that is observed to correspond with many rulings or the application of many rulings that correspond to it, thus establishing the description and considering it a valid principle in legislation, supported by many rulings that cannot be traced back to any one of them, as in each of the rulings that testify to its validity, it cannot be a cause since the ruling may be one that is not subject to reasoning or one that has another cause or there may be a description that is more suitable than it. (1) Public interest (maslaha mursala) according to the imams: __________ (1) See: the second and third chapters of this book. [Page 559] The disagreement regarding public interest (maslaha) in the context of the unregulated interests (masalih mursala) partly stems from the differences in the validity of reasoning based on the sent analogy (al-munasib al-mursil) or the analogy itself. This matter has been discussed in detail. On the other hand, it also relates to differences in terminologies. If we establish that unregulated interests do not revert to analogy, which is the correct view, but rather to reasoning, then the differing opinions on this matter are almost merely disagreements in terms and terminologies. This is without taking into account the position of those who reject analogy, and the application of the meaning of unregulated interests — in that case — is almost unanimously agreed upon(1). The meaning that was rejected by those who opposed unregulated interests is not the same as that intended by those who advocate for it in the context of reasoning. The meaning intended by its proponents was also acknowledged by its opponents under different names. For example, al-Amidi rejected unregulated interests, stating: "The interests, as we have explained, are divided into those that the legislator has recognized and those that he has annulled. This category (i.e., unregulated interests)(2) is ambiguous between the two categories, and it is not more appropriate to associate it with one than the other, thus it is not permissible to use it as evidence without a witness of recognition that indicates it belongs to the recognized rather than the annulled"(3). It has been previously established that al-Amidi and the Imams of the Shafi'i school were among the most ardent defenders of the principle of analogy and its consideration in reasoning, as well as the consideration of the nature of the description in relation to the nature of the ruling, which is what unregulated interests signify for those who advocate for them in reasoning and analogy. __________ (1) I say: it is almost, and not it is, because it may apply to some in a way that it does not apply to others. (2) What is in parentheses is an addition by the researcher. (3) Al-Amidi, al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, 4/395. [Page 560] What al-Amidi intended by the response in this text is to consider public interest (maslaha) when there is no evidence to indicate it, and this is unanimously rejected. However, what is meant by those who advocate for the unqualified public interest is accepted by all, including those who have rejected it. Al-Qarafi confirms this by stating: "As for the unqualified public interest, it is reported that it is specific to us, and when the schools of thought are lacking, they find that when they compare and differentiate between the two issues, they do not seek evidence by consideration for that meaning by which they compared and differentiated, but rather they suffice with mere suitability. This is the unqualified public interest, and thus it exists in all schools of thought" (1). He also said: "It has been established that the unqualified public interest exists in all schools of thought upon investigation, for they compare and differentiate based on suitability and do not seek evidence by consideration, and we mean by the unqualified public interest only that. What further confirms the practice of the unqualified public interest is that the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them) undertook matters for the sake of pure public interest, not due to the presence of evidence by consideration, such as the compilation of the Qur'an, for there was no prior command or analogy regarding it. Likewise, the matter of leaving the caliphate to consultation, the recording of the registers, the minting of currency for Muslims, and the establishment of prisons were actions taken by Umar (may Allah be pleased with him), as well as the demolition of the endowments adjacent to the Mosque of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) and the expansion of the mosque when it became cramped, which was done by Uthman (may Allah be pleased with him), and the renewal of the call to prayer on Friday in the market, which is the first call to prayer" (2). He then said: "And this is very common for pure public interest, and the Imam of the Two Holy Sanctuaries has addressed in his book titled Al-Ghayathi matters that he permitted and ruled upon, while the Malikis are distant from them and have crossed over them for the sake of pure public interest, as well as Al-Ghazali in Shifa al-Ghalil, even though both of them strongly deny our stance on the unqualified public interest" (3). __________ (1) Al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih al-Fusul, p. 394. (2) The same source, p. 446. (3) The same source, p. 447. [Page 561] This text indicates that those who reject public interest (maslaha) are rejecting something other than what its proponents intend. If the examples mentioned by al-Qarafi above refer to the topics of public interest, then these examples are matters of consensus, even if there is disagreement regarding detailed legal reasoning. Those who do not accept public interest refer it to other principles, such as the preservation of necessities or the principle that whatever is necessary for fulfilling an obligation is itself obligatory, or the principle of alleviating hardship or harm, or similar concepts. Therefore, there is no real disagreement regarding the principle of public interest; the source of the disagreement lies in the differing understandings of the principle among those who disagree. The significant disagreement, however, is as previously mentioned, regarding the justification of legal rulings by their purposes or by their benefits. This may lead some followers of the imams and those studying the books of usul to misunderstand and impose their understanding on the school of thought or its imam, or to exploit the idea and use it without its constraints and inappropriately, perhaps even in a way that misrepresents its meaning. For instance, to understand public interest as merely the fact that something is beneficial or leads to a benefit is evidence of its permissibility, or to understand that there is a vacuum in the Sharia, and that there are occurrences without rulings, and that this is left to us to determine its ruling based on benefit or harm—such statements have no basis among any of the recognized imams. It is reported that there is consensus on rejecting this, and this matter will become clear upon the completion of this discussion, if Allah wills. [Page 562] The concept of public interest (maslaha) according to al-Shatibi: The public interest (maslaha) according to al-Shatibi relates to the meaning of unrestricted reasoning, and it contains new elements as does his methodology. For a public interest to be considered, it must be established as valid by the Sharia with absolute certainty through induction, or it must pertain to a general, definitive meaning that has been established in that manner. He stated in his third introduction, after clarifying that the principles must be certain and that mere conjecture is insufficient, and that the path to certainty is through induction: "Based on this premise, there is another meaning, which is that every legal principle that does not have a specific text to support it and is consistent with the actions of the Sharia, and whose meaning is derived from its evidences, is valid and can be relied upon if that principle has become certain through its collective evidences. This is because the evidences do not necessarily have to indicate certainty about the ruling in isolation without the addition of others to them, as previously mentioned, since that is nearly impossible. This includes a type of unrestricted reasoning that was adopted by Malik and al-Shafi'i, for although the branch does not have a specific principle to support it, it has been supported by a general principle. A general principle, if it is definitive, may equal a specific principle or may surpass it depending on the strength or weakness of the specific principle" (1). Accordingly, an action that is not explicitly mentioned in the Sharia as either permitted or prohibited will have its ruling based on the principle that has been established with certainty and has become a foundation to rely upon if this action falls under this meaning or serves it or leads to it. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/16. [Page 563] He said: "The legal proofs (adillah shar'iyyah) are of two types: the first is what pertains to pure transmission, and the second is what pertains to pure opinion" (1). Then he said: "As for the first type, it is the Book and the Sunnah, and as for the second, it is analogy (qiyas) and reasoning (istidlal). Each of these can be associated with various aspects, either by consensus (ijma) or by disagreement. The consensus, regardless of how it is articulated, is included in the first type, as is the opinion of a Companion (sahabi) and the legislation of those before us, because all of this and similar matters relate to worship based on a transmitted command, with no personal interpretation involved. The second type includes juristic preference (istihsan) and public interest (maslaha mursala) if we say that they pertain to a rational matter, and they may revert to the first type if we witness that they relate to general meanings" (2). The point here is that public interest (maslaha mursala) relates to pure transmission and also to reasoning; the first is to establish that this interest is a definitive legal interest, and this is derived from the examination of legal texts. Thus, it is related to the first type. The second is to establish that this action falls under this interest and leads to it, meaning that its relationship to the meaning or interest, which is a general principle, is like the relationship of a cause to its effect or outcome. Accordingly, public interest (maslaha mursala) is one of the types of reasoning (istidlal) according to al-Shatibi, and it is termed "mursala" because it does not have a specific evidence that indicates it or to which it returns, but the interest is definitively established by numerous evidences that exceed enumeration. Thus, public interest (maslaha mursala) becomes a principle upon which the rulings of actions that are causes or means for the interest are built, according to legal controls and limits that will be clarified, God willing. Places of applying the principle: __________ (1) The same source, 3/21. (2) The same place. [Page 564] The principle of public interest (maslaha mursala) is based on the combination of two foundations: the foundation of worship and compliance, and the foundation of alleviating hardship. When a mandatory command comes from the legislator, compliance is required; if it is possible, there is no issue. If it is not possible, it may be either because it is not feasible to carry it out and persist in it, which constitutes hardship, or because it can only be performed after fulfilling another obligation. These two scenarios, if they arise in relation to the obligation, necessitate other rulings. If the matter pertains to hardship, then hardship must be alleviated through facilitation. If it pertains to the fact that the action cannot be performed except after fulfilling another, then this other action becomes obligatory just like the first action. The second scenario falls under the first, because if performing an action is only possible through first performing another, then the obligation to do it without fulfilling what is necessary for it is an obligation to do what is impossible or what involves hardship. Therefore, both scenarios relate to alleviating hardship. This is the foundation of the principle of public interest as articulated by al-Shatibi. It is applied in necessities and needs, but not in enhancements. It is applied in necessities to actions that cannot preserve the necessity except through them, thus the action takes the ruling of preserving the necessity, which is obligation. In needs, it pertains to alleviating hardship and similar matters, leading to facilitation based on the evidence's indications. The rulings of acts of worship are excluded from its application in these contexts; thus, there is no place for public interest in acts of worship. As for what has been mentioned above regarding the foundation of the principle of public interest, al-Shatibi mentioned in his thirteenth introduction a matter, which is that the foundations and principles do not fail or break. If it becomes necessary for them to break or fail, then they are not valid. This is evident in certain instances, including what he termed "entering into actions." By "entering into actions," he means that the actions required of the obligated person must be within the capacity of the obligated person from beginning to end. If they are not, then the command to perform them is not an obligation. He states: "As for entering into actions, it is the crux of the matter and the foundation of preference (istihsan) and public interest, because if the principle leads to a conclusion that entails hardship or something that is not possible legally or rationally, it does not proceed in a straight or consistent manner."(1) __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/64. [Page 565] One example of the principle in necessities is the compilation of the Qur'an. He said: "The compilation of the Qur'an was something that was not addressed during his time (peace and blessings be upon him), but when disagreements about the Qur'an arose and became widespread to the extent that one would say to another: 'I disbelieve in what you read,' the compilation of the Qur'an became obligatory; otherwise, it would follow that examining every incident that did not occur in the earlier times would be considered an innovation (bid'a), which is unanimously false. However, such examination falls under the category of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) that aligns with the principles of the Sharia, even if there is no specific text supporting it, and this is what is referred to as public interest (maslaha). Everything that the righteous predecessors introduced in this regard does not differ from it in any way" (1). The evidence here is in his statement: "The compilation of the Qur'an became obligatory," as it was previously permissible, but a situation arose that put the preservation of the religion at risk unless the Qur'an was compiled. He said: "There is no text from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) regarding what they did in this matter, but they saw it as a public interest that aligns with the actions of the Sharia, undoubtedly, as it pertains to the preservation of the Sharia, and the command to preserve it is well known, and to prevent the means to disagreement regarding its foundation, which is the Qur'an, and it is known that there is a prohibition against disagreement in that, with no further elaboration" (2). __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/237. (2) al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 2/377. [Page 566] Among the examples of necessities (hajiyat) is the liability of craftsmen. He said: "The rightly guided caliphs ruled that craftsmen should be held liable. Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) said: 'People cannot be right without that.' The rationale behind this necessity is that people have a need for craftsmen, and they are often absent from the goods, and they are mostly negligent and fail to safeguard them. If their liability were not established, despite the pressing need to employ them, it would lead to one of two outcomes: either a complete abandonment of contracting craftsmen, which would be burdensome for the people, or they would work without being held liable, claiming loss and destruction, leading to the loss of property, reduced caution, and the possibility of betrayal. Thus, the interest lies in establishing liability" (1). This example regarding the public interests (masalih mursala) is a subject of debate and has led to criticism of the principle, as it resulted in a false condition, which is the liability of the craftsman (2). The truth is that this does not pertain to the principle but rather to the disagreement over the detailed evidence. His statement here about the liability of craftsmen does not indicate that this matter is forbidden and permitted by the principle; rather, it is originally permissible, and due to the need to alleviate hardship, it became obligatory. Note his statement at the beginning of the example that the rightly guided caliphs did this; if this is authentic, it serves as a legal proof, as none of the Companions denied it. However, this is not authentic, and what he attributed to Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) is not established (3). __________ (1) The same source, 2/378. (2) It is mentioned in al-Mabsut by al-Sarakhsi: "From Amr ibn Shu'ayb from his father from his grandfather that the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) said: 'Whoever deposits a trust and it is lost, he is not liable.' And it was reported from Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) that he said: 'There is no liability on a shepherd or on a trustee.' 11/109. Al-Shafi'i said in al-Umm: 'The trustee is not liable unless he violates.' 3/245, and the hadith was narrated by Ibn Majah in the chapter on deposits without the phrase 'and it is lost.' (3) Al-Shafi'i (may Allah be pleased with him) does not find an excuse for one who considers the hired worker liable because it contradicts the hadith, unless he says, for example: 'The trustworthy person is one to whom you have given something willingly, trusting in his honesty, not for a fee for anything of what you have given, and giving me this fee distinguishes him from the trustworthy person who took what he was entrusted with without compensation.' Al-Umm, 4/37-38. [Page 567] ... It has been attributed to Ali ibn Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him) his statement regarding the liability of craftsmen: "People cannot be right except for that." If this is established from him, it is understood in the context of sales, not leasing. Al-Shafi'i said in al-Um: "It may be narrated from a source that the scholars of hadith do not affirm, that Ali ibn Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him) held the washer and dyer liable, saying: 'People cannot be right except for that.'" He also said: "It is narrated from Umar that he held craftsmen liable from a weaker source than this, and we do not know of either of them being established. It has been narrated from Ali ibn Abi Talib that he did not hold any of the laborers liable from a source that is not established." 7/88. ... Al-Shatibi said: "In the hadith: 'There should be neither harm nor reciprocating harm' (2), the principles support it in general, for the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) 'forbade a resident to sell to a nomad' (3), and he said: 'Let people be provided for by one another' (4), and he said: 'Do not throw goods until they have descended to the market' (5). This is a matter of prioritizing the public interest over the private one, thus the liability of craftsmen falls into that category." Al-I'tisam 2/378. This statement from Al-Shatibi, based on these proofs, is refuted because these proofs are general on the subject, while there are specific proofs regarding liability that prohibit it. Therefore, holding craftsmen liable is contrary to the Sharia and is not permissible. (2) Its narration has been previously mentioned. (3) There are many chains for it, including: Bukhari (2014), Muslim (2799), Tirmidhi (1144) who said: "Hasan Sahih," Nasai (4419), Ibn Majah (2176), Ahmad (13820), and Malik in al-Muwatta (1189). (4) The same narration, and with these numbers, it is the same hadith: "A resident should not sell to a nomad; let people be provided for by one another," except for Malik's narration: "A resident should not sell to a nomad." [Page 568] (5) Narrated by al-Bukhari in the chapter on selling food before it is received and in the chapter on selling what you do not have (2020), Abu Dawood (2979), and al-Darimi (2454). Based on this, the principle of public interest (maslaha mursala) is a foundational principle of Islamic law according to al-Shatibi and is not a fifth source in itself; it is not a source of rulings but rather a legal methodology applied or utilized during deduction, similar to the principle of presumption of continuity (istishab), the principle of permissibility of things (asl fi al-ashya), or the principle of removing harm. However, if it is taken as a source of rulings such that the requirement of legislation becomes merely looking at whether an action is beneficial or harmful, or whether it is so with the slightest difficulty or cost, then this is a method of innovation (bid'ah) and not legislation. Categories of interests: Al-Shatibi discussed in his book (al-I'tisam) those who invoked public interest (maslaha mursala) for their violations and innovations, clarifying the matter further. He said: "Since the place is a slippery slope for the people of innovation to argue for their innovation from this angle, the right approach is to examine the basis of the error that occurs for these people until it becomes clear that public interest is not part of innovation in its origin or conclusion, by the will of Allah" (1). He then said: "The appropriate meaning that connects the ruling does not escape three categories: The first is that the Sharia witnesses to its acceptance; there is no doubt about its validity nor disagreement in its application, otherwise it would contradict the Sharia, such as the law of retribution (qisas) for the preservation of lives and limbs, among others" (2). This is not part of public interest but rather what is considered either by the testimony of evidence or by the testimony of the ruling. For al-Shatibi, consideration is by the testimony of evidence, or by numerous rulings that collectively form evidence in his view, and consideration is not accepted by the testimony of few rulings. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 2/374. (2) The same source. [Page 569] Then he said: "The second is what the Sharia has witnessed to reject; there is no way to accept it since the analogy does not necessitate the ruling for itself, but rather this is the view of the proponents of rational improvement. Rather, if the meaning becomes apparent and we understand from the Sharia that it is to be considered in necessitating rulings, then we accept it. For what we mean by public interest (maslaha) is what is understood to be taken into account in relation to people by bringing about benefits and repelling harms in a manner that reason cannot independently grasp. Therefore, if the Sharia does not witness the consideration of that meaning, but rather rejects it, it is rejected by the consensus of Muslims" (1). This text indicates that analogy is neither a proof of consideration nor a condition for it; rather, the proof of that is the Sharia's consideration of the meaning, which is understood through induction. This category here is the canceled analogy, so it has no consideration. Among the aberrations of this time, and among the tyranny of ignorance, are the statements and opinions that some consider fatwas, which permit prohibitions under the pretext that they are interests or aimed at interests, attributing this to the unregulated interests (masalih mursala) and to the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) and sometimes to al-Shatibi. How astonishing! Then he said: "The third: what the specific evidences have remained silent about, neither witnessing its consideration nor its cancellation; this has two aspects: one of them is that a text is reported in accordance with that meaning, such as the reasoning for prohibiting killing for inheritance. The application of the opposite of the intended purpose is to assume that if a text is not reported in accordance with it, then this reasoning has no precedent in the actions of the Sharia by assumption nor in its compatible matters, such that there exists a recognized type for it; thus, it is not valid to reason with it, nor to base a ruling upon it by consensus. Such a thing is legislation by the one who claims it, so it cannot be accepted" (2). __________ (1) The same source, and his statement: "the analogy does not necessitate the ruling for itself, but rather this is the view of the proponents of rational improvement" means that it is not permissible to argue based on public interest, but rather to argue based on the evidence that established this interest, whether the evidence is specific or not. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 2/375. [Page 570] The mentioned point in this regard often leads to error, as it is considered among the public interest (maslaha) based on its definition, which states that it is something that the Sharia has remained silent about, neither affirming nor negating it. Here, it is rejected, and consensus on this is conveyed. Then it clarifies what the public interests (masalih mursala) are that the specific evidences have remained silent about, neither affirming nor negating them, saying: "Secondly, it must align with the actions of the Sharia, which means that there exists a type of this meaning that the legislator has considered in general without specific evidence, which is the general reasoning known as public interests (masalih mursala)" (1). Thus, it is incorrect to define public interests as those that the legislator has left unclarified and has not mentioned either affirmatively or negatively. With this definition, it is rejected without disagreement, and therefore, it is not correct to make a public interest a proof merely because it is a public interest. Rather, this is the view of the proponents of rational good and evil, and this issue is fundamentally resolved. Among the evidences in this topic is al-Shatibi's statement: "The correspondence does not necessitate a ruling for itself; rather, this is the view of the proponents of rational good." He also conveyed the consensus on the prohibition of reasoning solely based on public interest, even if it were not negated, as stated earlier regarding what the specific evidences have not affirmed or negated: "Thus, it is not correct to justify it or base a ruling upon it by consensus, and such a thing is legislation from the one who claims it, so it cannot be accepted." Al-Razi conveyed the consensus on this matter when he said: "It is appropriate, but does not align, nor does it have a specific foundational evidence; thus, this is rejected by consensus. An example of this is the disinheritance of the killer, opposing him with the contradiction of his intention, if we assume that there is no text regarding it" (2). Conditions of the rule: __________ (1) The same location. (2) Al-Razi, al-Mahsool, 5/167. [Page 571] As for the conditions for applying the principle of public interest (maslaha mursala) and the contexts in which it is applied, he said there are three matters: "The first is that it must be compatible with the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) in such a way that it does not contradict any of its fundamental principles or any of its evidences. The second is that the general consideration of it is based on what is rational and aligns with reasonable circumstances that, when presented to the intellects, are accepted. Thus, it has no place in acts of worship or matters that are similar to them in the realm of religious rulings" (1). "The third is that the essence of public interests returns to preserving a necessary matter and alleviating a necessary hardship in religion, and it also refers to preserving a necessary matter in the context of 'what is necessary for the fulfillment of an obligation.' Thus, it is a means and not an end, and its relation to alleviating hardship pertains to the realm of facilitation and not to that of strictness" (2). In matters of necessity, the ruling on an action based on public interest means that the action is a means to a known obligatory cause, and a condition for this is that the action itself is not obligatory in essence; otherwise, there would be no place for public interests. He states: "As for it being in the realm of necessity as a means, and what is necessary for the fulfillment of an obligation, if it is stipulated, then it is a legal condition, and thus it has no place in this regard because the text of the legislator has relieved us from further consideration. If it is not stipulated, then it is either rational or customary, and it does not necessarily have to be legal, just as it does not have to be in a known manner. For instance, if we assume the preservation of the Qur'an and knowledge without books is valid, that would be acceptable. Likewise, other necessary interests can be preserved, just as if we assume the attainment of the interest of the greater leadership without an imam, on the condition that there is no text regarding it, that would also be valid" (3). He then said: "If this is established, it is not valid to derive from its domain any of the religious objectives that are not means" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, Al-I'tisam, 2/386. (2) The same source, 2/389. (3) The same location. (4) The same location. [Page 572] As for its application in necessities, he said: "And as for it being in the realm of necessity as a form of alleviation, this is also evident and is a stronger proof for lifting hardship, for there is nothing in it that indicates strictness or an increase in obligation" (1). Based on this, the principle of public interest (maslaha) is not a justification for claiming that there is a zone of ambiguity in the Sharia or that there are matters about which the Sharia has remained silent without clarifying their ruling, and that rulings are applied based on public interests. Such a claim is rejected by al-Shatibi because the interests themselves can only be known through the Sharia. This is one aspect. On the other hand, there is nothing that the Sharia has remained silent about in the sense of not clarifying its ruling; rather, there are matters for which no specific evidence has been provided, but they are indicated by general principles and analogies. They fall under general or comprehensive rules, and there is no silence from the Sharia in the sense of lack of clarification. It has been previously established that the Sharia contains clarification of everything. Al-Shatibi said: "The silence of the legislator regarding a ruling is of two types: one is that he remains silent about it because there is no compelling reason for it or necessity for it, such as the events that occurred after the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), for these did not exist and then were silent about with their existence; rather, they occurred later, and the people of the Sharia needed to consider them and apply them based on what has been established in its general principles. What the righteous predecessors initiated falls under this category, such as compiling the Qur'an, recording knowledge, and the inclusion of craftsmen, and similar matters that were not mentioned during the time of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him), and they were not among the events of his time nor was there a necessity for them to be acted upon. This category has its branches that follow its established principles in the Sharia without any doubt" (2). __________ (1) The same place. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/288. [Page 573] This silence is not silence in the sense of not clarifying; rather, it is like the silence regarding the ruling on computers, the use of weapons of mass destruction, cars, or cloning. The clarification of these matters is not like the clarification of the ruling on carrion, jihad, marriage, or adultery, as they did not exist during the time of the Prophethood. However, their clarification exists in the Sharia, through the general texts and descriptions and reasons it has brought. This is the meaning of the silence mentioned here. As for the second category of what is left unaddressed, it states: "The second is that it is left unaddressed while the reason for it is present, and no ruling has been established regarding it at the time of the incident, beyond what was in that era. This type of silence is like a text indicating that the intention of the Legislator is not to add to it or reduce from it, because when this reason necessitating the establishment of a practical ruling is present and yet the ruling is not legislated in reference to it, it is explicit that any addition to what was there is an innovation (bid'a) and contrary to what the Legislator intended, as it is understood from His intention to remain at what was defined there, neither adding to it nor diminishing from it" (1). Therefore, al-Shatibi completely refutes the claim that public interest (maslaha) is a proof for the ruling of an action. He also counters what might be expected to be said, that public interest is the arbitration of interests in the areas where the Legislator has remained silent about clarifying them. He presents the rejected statement: "What is left unaddressed by the Legislator does not imply a contradiction nor does it indicate a specific intention from the Legislator without its opposite and contrary. If that is the case, we return to examining the aspects of interests; whatever we find to be beneficial, we accept it in the application of public interests, and whatever we find to be harmful, we abandon it in the application of public interests. What we do not find in this regard, either way, is like all other permissible matters in the application of public interests as well" (2). __________ (1) The same location. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/289. [Page 574] Al-Shatibi's response to this is: "The explanation of the answer is what Malik mentioned, that silence regarding the ruling of an action or abstention here, when the meaning necessitating the action or abstention is present, is an agreement from all who are silent that there is nothing additional to what existed, which is the ultimate in this meaning" (1). He said: "The existence of the necessitating meaning along with the absence of legislation is evidence of the intent of the Legislator to not add to what was already present. If there is an addition, it becomes evident that it contradicts the intent of the Legislator, and thus it is invalid" (2). The implication of this statement and what preceded it is that if there is to be an addition or change, it must be according to the evidence of the Sharia and its principles. In summary, the principle of public interest (maslaha) according to al-Shatibi is applied to jurisprudence that is based on the principle "what is necessary for the fulfillment of an obligation is itself an obligation" in matters of necessity, and on the principle of alleviating hardship in matters of need, and it does not apply in acts of worship. Section Two Istihsan Istihsan and the positions of the imams regarding it: Istihsan, according to al-Shatibi, is a foundational principle (usuli) like public interest (maslaha), and it is a method in applying evidence and in legal reasoning. Its definitions are varied and differ. Before delving into it in detail, it is worth noting that its essence does not stray from acting upon the stronger of two evidences when they conflict. This was affirmed by Imam Abu Hanifa (may Allah have mercy on him) and his followers. It is well-known that it was rejected by al-Shafi'i and the Shafi'is, who strongly criticized it, considering it mere preference based on opinion, or abandoning evidence for opinion. However, in its essence as understood by the Hanafis, they accept it and consider it an act based on evidence. The practice of istihsan has also been attributed to the two imams, Malik and Ahmad (may Allah have mercy on them). __________ (1) The same source, 2/289 - 290. (2) The same source, 2/291. [Page 575] As for Imam Malik, al-Shatibi attributed to him in several places in the Muwafaqat that "istihsan (juridical preference) is nine-tenths of knowledge" (1). Al-Zarkashi said: "And from Ibn al-Qasim: Malik said: 'Nine-tenths of knowledge is istihsan.' Asbagh ibn al-Faraj said: 'Istihsan in knowledge can be more effective than qiyas (analogy)' "(2). Among what al-Zarkashi reported is: "The istihsan that Malik referred to is the opinion based on the stronger of the two evidences" (3). He also said: "Al-Abyari stated: What appears from Malik's school is the opinion of istihsan not as previously mentioned, but its essence is the use of a partial benefit (maslaha) in contrast to a general qiyas, thus preferring the unqualified evidence over the qiyas" (4). As for Imam Ahmad, Dr. Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsen al-Turki clarified his position in his book (The Foundations of Imam Ahmad's School), where he cited the opinions of prominent Hanbalis and their imams regarding the principles, then concluded that the majority of them chose from the definitions of istihsan that it is abandoning qiyas for a stronger evidence than it, and some say it is the stronger of the two qiyas. They all, based on this definition, affirm istihsan and consider it, stating that it is the position of Ahmad and that it is not an independent evidence, but rather a matter of weighing the evidences against one another. However, if it is based on mere desire, they reject it and consider it as legislating what Allah has not permitted (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, Muwafaqat, 4/118. (2) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/387. (3) The same source. (4) The same source, 4/388. (5) Abdullah bin Abdul Mohsen al-Turki, The Foundations of Imam Ahmad's School, p. 570, a comparative foundational study, 4th ed., 1416 AH - 1996 CE, Al-Risalah Foundation, Beirut. [Page 576] As for al-Shafi'i, he rejected it as previously mentioned, saying: "And he does not say what is preferred, for saying what is preferred is something that is newly introduced without a previous example" (1). He also said: "Indeed, preference (istihsan) is mere indulgence" (2). His companions followed him in this. It has been said that the majority rejected it; al-Zarkashi said: "The majority rejected it to the extent that al-Shafi'i said: Whoever prefers has legislated" (3). He then said: "Our companions said: And whoever legislates has disbelieved, and al-Shafi'i remained silent about the second premise due to its clarity" (4). The correct view is that if it were mere indulgence and a statement in religion without evidence, the majority would not have rejected it alone; rather, Abu Hanifa and his companions would have rejected it as well. The rejection of preference became severe, even affecting Imam Abu Hanifa and his companions. Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari said: "Know that some of those who criticize Muslims have attacked Abu Hanifa and his companions - may Allah have mercy on them - for abandoning analogy (qiyas) in favor of preference, saying that the evidences of the Sharia are the Book, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy, and that preference is a fifth category that no one among the scholars of the Sharia, except for Abu Hanifa and his companions, has recognized as a proof of the Sharia, and no evidence has been established for it; rather, it is a statement based on desire. Thus, abandoning analogy for it is abandoning a proof to follow whims or the desires of the soul, which is invalid. He then said: If the analogy they abandoned for preference is a legal proof, then the legal proof is true, and what is after the truth except misguidance" (5). He said: "It has also been reported from al-Shafi'i that he was extreme in rejecting preference, saying: Whoever prefers has legislated, and all of this is an attack without reflection, and a criticism without understanding the intended meaning, for Abu Hanifa - may Allah have mercy on him - is of greater stature and more pious than to speak in religion based on desire" (6). __________ (1) Al-Shafi'i, al-Risala, p. 25, paragraph 70. (2) The same source, p. 507, paragraph 1464. (3) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/386. (4) The same location. (5) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 4/4; see also: al-Sarakhsi, Usul al-Sarakhsi, 2/200. (6) The same location. [Page 577] Zarkashi said: "Know that when the intended meaning of istihsan (juridical preference) is clarified, the criticism disappears, and Abu Hanifa is innocent before Allah of establishing a ruling without evidence" (1). Al-Bazdawi said under the title: (The Chapter on Qiyas and Istihsan): "Both are of two types. As for one type of qiyas (analogy), it is that which has a weak effect, and the second type is that which has appeared to be corrupt while its validity and effect are concealed. One type of istihsan is that which has a strong effect, even if it is hidden. The second is that which has an apparent effect while its corruption is concealed. Istihsan, according to us, is one of the types of qiyas" (2). From here, we understand that the istihsan criticized by al-Shafi'i and others is different from the istihsan advocated by Abu Hanifa. It should not be assumed that Abu Hanifa (may Allah have mercy on him) or any respected imam would abandon the evidence of the Sharia for his opinion, nor would he speak about the Sharia based solely on his opinion without legal evidence. So what is the istihsan intended by the Hanafis? What is istihsan: There have been multiple definitions of istihsan among them, all of which revolve around the idea that istihsan is a process of specification, and it is applied when there is a conflict of evidence. It has been said regarding its essence that it is acting upon the stronger of the two qiyas, that it is the specification of the cause, and that it is the specification of qiyas by the Sunnah (3). It has also been said that it is the separation of a matter from its counterparts due to a specific evidence that necessitates departing from the first ruling to the second, whether it is based on qiyas or text, as stated by Abu al-Hasan al-Karkhi, and it has been said that this is the best explanation of istihsan (4). It has been said that it is abandoning qiyas and adopting what is more convenient for the people (5). __________ (1) Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/387. (2) Al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazdawi, 4/4. (3) Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/390. (4) Same source. (5) Al-Jurjani, Al-Ta'rifat, p. 22, authored by the noble Sharif Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Husayni al-Jurjani al-Hanafi, 816 AH. Edited by Muhammad Basel Ayyoun al-Sud. 1st ed. 1421 AH - 2000 CE, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, Beirut. [Page 578] The definition of al-Karakhi appears to be the most precise, as it encompasses all examples of istihsan (juridical preference). What reinforces this matter is that they say istihsan is one of the types of qiyas (analogy) or the strongest type of qiyas, but when they provide examples, we see them referring to the application of the general rule to its specific instances, or the general rule applying to its instances as qiyas, even though there is no qiyas or cause in the legal sense, which will become clear through the examples. Categories of Istihsan: They also categorize istihsan into sections, including istihsan based on the Sunnah, istihsan based on consensus (ijma), and istihsan based on necessity (darura). These examples do not involve qiyas, nor is it necessary for them to have any qiyas at all. Al-Bazdawi said: "Istihsan has categories, one of which is what is established by evidence, such as salam (forward sale) and ijara (lease), and the continuation of fasting with the action of the forgetful. Among them is what is established by consensus, which is istisna (manufacturing contract), and among them is what is established by necessity, which is the purification of water troughs, wells, and utensils" (1). The commentator in Kashf al-Asrar regarding istihsan based on evidence said: "For qiyas rejects the permissibility of salam because the subject of the contract, which is the object of the contract, is truly nonexistent at the time of the contract, and the contract does not take place outside its subject unless we abandon it based on the evidence that necessitates concession, which is the saying of the narrator: 'And he permitted salam' (2). And his saying, peace be upon him: 'Whoever among you sells, let him sell in a known measure' (3)." (4). His statement in the text: "For qiyas rejects salam" does not refer to legal qiyas, but rather to the generality of the text: "Do not sell what you do not possess" (5), which contradicts the sale of salam. Here, he refers to the application of the text to its instances as qiyas, where each instance is affirmed what is affirmed for others, which is the ruling. This is due to the generality of the text in its instances, so each instance takes the ruling of the other instance itself, as if the application of the ruling to all instances is qiyas. While the matter is, in reality, a general text that applies to its instances and is not qiyas. __________ (1) Al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazdawi, 4/6 - 7. (2) See: the following hadith, footnote number (3). (3) Narrated by al-Bukhari in the Book of Salam, Chapter on Salam in a Known Measure (2086), and Muslim in the Chapter on Salam (3011), and al-Tirmidhi in the Sales (1232) and said: it is good and authentic, and Ahmad (1836), all with the wording of 'salam' instead of 'salam'. They are of the same meaning. (4) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 4/7. (5) Narrated by al-Tirmidhi in the Sales (1153), Abu Dawood in the Lease (3040), Ibn Majah in the Trades, Chapter on the Prohibition of Selling What You Do Not Possess and Earning What You Have Not Guaranteed (2178), and Imam Ahmad in the Musnad (4772). [Page 579] The specification in the sale of salam means that the text did not apply to the sale of salam, which is one of the forms of sale, so it was a specification of a general text and not a specification of analogy (qiyas). It is a separation of the sale of salam from its counterparts and granting it a ruling different from that of its counterparts. Therefore, it is said that the definition of Abu al-Hasan al-Karakhī is the most precise of definitions. The same applies to leasing (ijara) and the continuation of fasting (sawm); the lease contract is a contract for a benefit that does not exist at the time of the contract and is only fulfilled later. He believes that analogy necessitates the prohibition of the lease contract. The implication is that leasing is a type of sale, and applying the rules of sale to it contradicts the lease contract. This is what he calls analogy, and since the texts have permitted leasing, it takes precedence over analogy. This is, in fact, a specification, and specification always involves a conflict between the general and the specific. Here, there is a conflict between the general text that he called analogy and the specific text, which can also be referred to as its application in its instances as analogy. Therefore, this process of specification, in which the specific is given precedence over the general, is called acting according to the stronger of the two analogies, and he refers to it as istihsan (juridical preference). Some have called it acting according to the stronger of the two evidences. Hence, it was also said that the strongest opinion is the opinion of al-Karakhī: it is the separation of the issue from its counterparts, etc. This is more clearly illustrated in his example regarding the continuation of fasting with the act of one who forgets. He said in Kashf al-Asrar: "Similarly, eating forgetfully invalidates the fast according to analogy because something cannot remain in existence with the presence of what contradicts it, like purity with ritual impurity and seclusion (i'tikaf) with exiting without necessity. However, it is set aside by the evidence, which is his saying (peace and blessings be upon him): 'Continue your fast, for indeed Allah has fed you and given you drink' "(1), and this indicates the implication of Abu Hanifa (may Allah be pleased with him): 'Were it not for the saying of the people, I would have said: he must make up the fast,' referring to the narration of the evidence "(2). Here, too, there is, in fact, no analogy that necessitates the invalidation of the fast, which means that what is meant by analogy is not the legal analogy in the technical sense, but rather the application of the ruling in all its instances. The ruling is that eating invalidates fasting, and eating forgetfully is still eating, so it should invalidate the fast. What is meant by analogy is the general text, and then it was specified by the evidence, so he did not rule on this eating as he would on its counterparts because it was forgetful eating, and the evidence exempted the forgetful person. Thus, istihsan was a specification and a separation of the issue from its counterparts. __________ (1) Narrated by al-Bukhari (1797) with the wording: "Let him complete his fast, for indeed Allah has fed him and given him drink," and Muslim (1952), with the same wording, and Abu Dawood (2046). (2) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 4/7. [Page 580] As for istihsan (juridical preference) by consensus, it is exemplified by istisna (manufacturing contract). The point intended here is that the analogy (qiyas) in question implies the prohibition of istisna, but consensus (ijma) has indicated its permissibility, thus this is a specification by consensus. It is also said here that there is no analogy stronger than analogy itself; rather, there is a consensus that specifies the ruling. It is stated in Kashf al-Asrar: "Among the istihsan is what has been established by consensus, such as istisna, meaning in matters where people engage in transactions, like when a person orders someone to make him a shoe, for example, for a certain price, specifying its characteristics and size, without mentioning a deadline, and whether he hands over the money or not, it is permissible. The analogy implies its prohibition because it is a sale of something non-existent in the present, and it is non-existent in description in the liability. It is not permissible to sell something except after it has been specified in reality, that is, its establishment in liability like salam (forward sale). As for the absence from every aspect, a contract cannot be conceived, but they preferred to leave it by consensus established through the transactions of the community without objection."(1) This is also a specification, and it is not a specification of an analogy but rather of a generality. What is confirmed from this is that istihsan is a specification, and since specification is nothing but a conflict between generality and specificity, the action is taken according to the stronger of the conflicting parties. Therefore, istihsan is acting according to the stronger evidence, which is the specific one. Since it is an action based on the specific and a disregard for the general, it separates the issue from its counterparts and judges it with the specific ruling. The precedence of the specific effect over the general is istihsan. From this, it may be said: the abandonment of the evidence, meaning the general evidence, in favor of istihsan, which may lead one who does not scrutinize to think that it is an abandonment of the legal evidence in favor of personal opinion, but this is not the case at all. It was said: "If it is said: the consensus has opposed the text, which is his saying (peace and blessings be upon him): 'Do not sell what you do not have.'"(2) We say: the text has become specific in regard to this ruling by consensus, so the analogy negating permissibility remains in opposition to the consensus, thus its consideration is nullified by the opposition of the consensus."(3) __________ (1) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 4/7. (2) Previously cited. (3) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 4/8. [Page 581] As for the necessity of preference (istihsan) due to necessity, it is stated: "Among them is what is established by necessity, which is the purification of ponds, wells, and vessels. For analogy (qiyas) negates the purity of these things after they have become impure because it is not possible to pour water on the pond or well to purify it. Likewise, the water entering the pond or springing from the well becomes impure upon contact with the impure, and the bucket also becomes impure upon contact with the water, thus returning to a state of impurity. Similarly, the vessel, if it does not have a hole at its bottom to let the water out when poured from above, will have the impure water collect at its bottom, so its purity cannot be established. However, they preferred to abandon the application of the analogy due to the necessity that requires it for the general public. And necessity has an effect in the abrogation of the ruling" (1). Here, too, there is no analogy in the legal sense, but rather it is a discussion of reality or the basis, which is that the water has become impure and will not be purified. However, this ruling of the impurity of ponds, vessels, and wells is difficult for the people, so it is ruled to be pure due to necessity. Thus, the ruling of their impurity is specified by necessity, and necessity has its ruling and effect in Sharia. This is a type of preference, and it is evident that it is a specification. It is also evident that it is not a specification of analogy nor an application of the stronger of the two analogies. Although they have referred to the abandoned ruling as analogy and the applied ruling as preference, it is a naming they have given while knowing that there is no analogy or cause. However, there may be a resemblance between the application of the ruling in its various instances by general evidence and the extension of the ruling to different places through the cause. Likewise, the importance of the cause lies in its effect on the ruling; if the effect of a thing appears, it resembles the cause in that regard. Al-Bazdawi said: "Our aim here is to categorize the aspects of causes in relation to rulings. When the cause becomes a cause by its effect, we call that which weakens its effect analogy and that which strengthens its effect preference, meaning a preferred analogy. We give precedence to the latter even if it is hidden over the former even if it is apparent, for the consideration is for the strength of the effect rather than its appearance and clarity" (2). __________ (1) The same place. (2) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 4/8. [Page 582] And if this is the concept of istihsan (juridical preference) according to Abu Hanifa (may Allah have mercy on him), then there is no disagreement between him and those who criticize istihsan. However, the question is: why this terminology? Is there a relationship between this term and the act of leaving the general for the specific or taking the stronger of the two evidences? Al-Zarkashi mentioned statements that indicate this inquiry, including: "The disagreement between us and them is merely verbal, for the interpretation of istihsan in a way that they criticize is not something they accept. What they do accept is the deviation in ruling from one evidence to another that is stronger than it. This is something that has not been denied. However, we do not recognize this name as a term for what is said based on such evidence" (1). What I see regarding this matter is that this terminology may relate to a particularity within the school, as it is reported from Abu Hanifa and the majority of the school that they do not consider the specification of the general by the specific unless the specific is later than the general. If the general is the later one, it abrogates the specific. However, it may be unknown which is later, or it may be presumed that the general is later, but the specific is accompanied by indications that make it more impactful and necessitate its application in consideration and ijtihad (independent reasoning), such as when it is reported that the Companions practiced it. In this case, the principles of the school dictate adherence to the general and neglect of the specific, but the indications accompanying the specific strengthen it, and ijtihad leads to its application and the specification of the general by it. From here - and Allah knows best - expressions like: "what has a strong effect even if it is hidden" and "what has a visible effect and hidden corruption" emerge, and perhaps this is a valid justification for the use of the term istihsan. __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/388. [Page 583] As for what has been mentioned above regarding the principles of the school in general and specific matters, al-Bazdawi said: "Abu Hanifa (may Allah have mercy on him) said: The specific does not abrogate the general, but it is permissible for the specific to be abrogated by it" (1), and Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari said: "The response to Abu Hanifa (may Allah have mercy on him) is that the general in establishing a ruling is like the specific, then if both are presented in a case and their dates are known, the latter is abrogating if it is the general and is a specification if it is the specific" (2). If istihsan (juridical preference) is nothing but acting according to the Sharia and acting upon the stronger of the two evidences in cases of conflict, which is the specification, then there is no room for disparaging istihsan or those who advocate for it. However, it may be said that the examples presented for istihsan contain instances that appear to show a deviation from the evidence to something without evidence or a preference for the weaker over the stronger. The response is that this does not pertain to istihsan or its meaning, but rather it relates to the differences in jurisprudential opinions regarding the details of the evidence. A jurist may abandon what is considered evidence from the perspective of another, while it is not considered evidence from his own perspective, and he may advocate for an opinion that his opponent believes has no supporting evidence, leading to the misconception that it is mere caprice and following desires. Additionally, it may be that some followers of the school do not grasp the true statement of their Imam or his evidence, building upon that which is not valid, and this may serve as a pretext for disparaging the school. Istihsan according to al-Shatibi: __________ (1) Al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazdawi, 1/426. (2) Alaa al-Din al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrar, 1/452. [Page 584] Al-Istihsan (juridical preference) according to al-Shatibi does not differ from what has been mentioned above except in that it is a general principle, and general principles are definitive. For him, istihsan is a departure from applying the general principle in one or some of its particulars. Accordingly, the ruling in this particular that deviates from the general must refer back to another general meaning; otherwise, this deviation is not valid. It is the removal of the particular from its dependence on one general to another general, and this is akin to a conflict between general principles or the specification of some general principles by others. General principles are definitive and do not conflict, nor can they be specified, as has been previously explained. Therefore, this conflict is not real but rather exists from one perspective or in one state rather than another. Similarly, specification, in his view, means clarification; thus, the specification of some general principles by others is the clarification of the limits and conditions of the application of each one. As for the fact that istihsan is a definitive general principle and that which is preferred (mustahsan) refers to a meaning that is definitively established through induction, the evidence for it is akin to the evidence of the unqualified (mursal) evidence, as indicated by his statement: "For although it does not have a specific origin that testifies for the branch, it has a general origin that testifies for it. And the general origin, if it is definitive, may equal the specific origin or exceed it depending on the strength or weakness of the specific origin, just as it may be the case that in some issues, the ruling of all the specific origins that conflict in the matter of preference may exist. Likewise, the principle of istihsan according to Malik is based on this principle because its meaning refers to giving precedence to unqualified evidence over analogy" (1). He also said: "And what is based on this principle (i.e., the principle of the outcomes of actions) (2) is the principle of istihsan, which in Malik's school is taking a partial interest in opposition to a general evidence, and its implication is to return to giving precedence to unqualified evidence over analogy. For the one who prefers does not revert to mere taste or desire but rather to what is known of the intent of the Legislator in general in similar hypothetical matters, such as issues that analogy would require a matter unless that matter leads to the loss of an interest from another perspective or brings about a harm as well" (3). Thus, giving precedence to the partial interest over the general evidence is not istihsan based merely on opinion or desire but rather through the precedence of unqualified evidence; the partial interest refers back to a general meaning that is established by Sharia. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/16. (2) The text in parentheses is an addition by the researcher. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/116. [Page 585] What has been reported from the Hanafis is that it is a preference for the narration (athar), consensus (ijma), or necessity (darura), and here it states the preference for the unqualified reasoning (istidlal al-mursal), which includes these things and others, as it encompasses every interest (maslaha) or meaning that returns to a general meaning through induction (istiqra). The general meanings in the outcomes of actions do not fall outside of necessities (darurat), needs (hajiyat), enhancements (tahsinat), and the complements of each. However, in istihsan (juridical preference) as in the unqualified interests, there is no effect of the interests or particulars that return to enhancements or their complements. It states: "This (i.e., istihsan or the preference for unqualified reasoning over analogy) often coincides with the necessary in relation to the needy, and the needy with the complementary, so that applying analogy absolutely in the necessary leads to hardship and difficulty in some of its instances, thus the place of hardship is exempted, as well as in the needy with the complementary, or the necessary with the complementary, which is evident" (1). Al-Shatibi has provided numerous examples of istihsan in his two books, al-Muwafaqat and al-I'tisam (2). He said: "There are many examples in the Sharia, such as the loan (qard), for it is usury (riba) in its essence because it is a dirham for a dirham for a term, but it has been permitted due to the convenience and expansion it provides to the needy, such that if it remained on the original prohibition, it would cause hardship for the obligated" (3). Thus, a dirham for a dirham for a term is forbidden in sale because it is one of the six usurious categories, and the generality of this ruling necessitates the prohibition of lending a dirham. The prohibition of usury relates to the preservation of wealth from necessities, while the permissibility of the loan relates to needs because needs revolve around expansion and facilitation. Therefore, this particularity, which is lending a dirham, did not follow the prohibition of usury in the necessary but followed the permissibility in the needy, and this is istihsan. If we understand that establishing whether it is from the necessities or from the needs returns to the induction of the texts of the Sharia and their outcomes, we realize that the process of specification or clarification here does not return to mere desire but to the Sharia, and likewise in other examples. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/116. (2) The same source, 4/117 - 118, and al-I'tisam, 2/393 - 400. (3) The same source, 4/117. [Page 586] He says, for example: "And similar to this is the combining of Maghrib and Isha prayers due to rain, the combining of prayers for a traveler, shortening the prayer, and breaking the fast during a long journey, as well as the prayer of fear and all other concessions that follow this path, for their essence returns to considering the outcome in achieving benefits or preventing harms in particular, where the general evidence would necessitate prohibiting that, for if we were to remain with the original general evidence, it would lead to the negation of what that evidence necessitated in terms of benefit" (1). And he said: "And similar to this is the exposure of private parts in medical treatment, partnership, and cultivation, even if the general evidence necessitates prohibition, and there are many things of this kind" (2). All these examples, even if they are said to be based on preference (istihsan), are ultimately referred back to the evidences of the Sharia. Therefore, after al-Shatibi presented examples of preference, he mentioned Ibn al-Arabi's interpretation of it, saying: "Ibn al-Arabi said in his interpretation of preference that it is the preference for abandoning the implications of the evidence through exception and concession due to opposition to what is opposed in some of its implications" (3). Accordingly, it can be said about preference what was said about public interest (maslaha), which is that it is not a means to speak about the religion of Allah without evidence from the Sharia. Al-Shatibi said: "For preference can only be by one who prefers, which is either reason or the Sharia. As for the Sharia, its preference and disapproval have been settled because the evidences necessitated that, so there is no benefit in calling it preference, nor in establishing a definition for it that is additional to the Book, the Sunnah, and consensus, and what arises from them in terms of analogy and reasoning. Thus, only reason remains as the one who prefers; if it is based on evidence, then there is no benefit in this naming as it returns to the evidences and not to anything else, and if it is without evidence, then that is the innovation that is preferred" (4). His intention is that there is no benefit in speaking about the Sharia without evidence, even if one claims that it is preference, and whoever thinks that he is preferring in that way is indeed innovating. The difference between public interest (maslaha) and preference (istihsan): __________ (1) The same place. (2) The same place. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/116. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-I'tisam, 2/390. [Page 587] The difference between public interest (maslaha mursala) and juristic preference (istihsan) is that public interest is based on the principle that what is necessary for fulfilling an obligation is itself an obligation for achieving something in necessities, and on the principle of alleviating hardship in needs. As for juristic preference, it involves the specification of the necessary by the need or by the complementary, or the specification of the need by the complementary. Accordingly, they may converge in some cases. The issue may become ambiguous as to whether it is from public interest or from juristic preference, or it may be validly associated with both principles, in the case where the alleviation of hardship in needs from public interest coincides with the specification of needs from juristic preference. An example of this is what al-Shatibi mentioned among his examples of istihsan (juridical preference), which is the liability of the common worker. He said: "The abandonment of evidence for a benefit, as in the liability of the common worker, even if he is not a craftsman, for the position of Malik in this matter is based on two opinions, like the liability of the bathhouse owner for the garments"(1). Then he said: "If it is said: This is from the category of maslaha mursal (unrestricted public interest) and not from the category of istihsan, we say: Yes, except that they framed istihsan as an exception to the rules, unlike masalih mursal. Such a situation can be envisioned in the matter of liability, as the workers are entrusted by evidence and not by original innocence, so their liability falls within the scope of the exception from that evidence, thus it is included under the meaning of istihsan in that regard"(2). The Third Section Blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) Definition: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, Al-I'tisam, 2/394. (2) The same place, 2/394. [Page 588] The blocking of means (sadd al-dhara'i) is the prohibition of what is permissible in order to prevent reaching what is prohibited. Al-Shatibi said: "It pertains to the request to abandon what has been established as a request to perform due to a hindrance that arises, and this is a principle generally agreed upon" (1). Al-Zarkashi quoted: "It is the issue that appears to be permissible but leads to the commission of the prohibited, such as selling an item for one hundred on credit and buying it back for fifty in cash; thus, he has reached fifty by mentioning the item" (2). Al-Qarafi said: "Blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) means cutting off the sources of corrupt means to prevent them. Whenever an action that is free from corruption serves as a means to corruption, the owner is prohibited from that action in many cases" (3). The means (dhara'i) are actions that are causes for others, thus they are means. Al-Qarafi said: "And sometimes the means are referred to as dhara'i, which is a terminology of our scholars" (4). The position of the schools of thought on blocking the means: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/126. (2) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/382. (3) Al-Qarafi, al-Furuq, 2/32. Difference 58. (4) The same source. [Page 589] Al-Qarafi said: "The blocking of means (sadd al-dhara'i) is not a distinctive feature of the Maliki school as many Malikis mistakenly believe. Rather, the means are divided into three categories: the first category is one that the ummah has unanimously agreed to block and prohibit, such as digging wells in the paths of Muslims, as it is a means to their destruction, and likewise, poisoning their food and insulting idols when it is known that such insults are directed at Allah, Exalted is He. The second category is one that the ummah has unanimously agreed not to prohibit, as it is a means that should not be blocked, such as preventing the cultivation of grapes for fear of wine, as no one has ever said this. Similarly, preventing cohabitation in houses for fear of adultery. The third category is one in which scholars have differed on whether it should be blocked or not, such as deferred sales in our view, like someone who sells a commodity for ten dirhams to be paid in a month, having bought it for five before the month. Malik says that he has given away five now and will take ten at the end of the month, so this is a means of lending five for ten with a deferred payment by means of showing the form of sale for that. Al-Shafi'i says that one should look at the form of the sale and take the matter at face value, so it is permissible. These sales are said to reach a thousand issues that are specific to Malik, in which he disagreed with Al-Shafi'i."(1) Similarly, Abu Hanifa disagrees with the Malikis in this regard, as his opinion on the permissibility of legal tricks (hiyal) means he does not adhere to blocking means. Although those who advocate for it are the Malikis, others disagree with them, Al-Shatibi, Al-Qarafi, and others say that it is applied by all, and the intention is: in some cases. These are the cases that fall under the first category of the three categories of means mentioned by Al-Qarafi. __________ (1) Al-Qarafi, Al-Furuq, 2/32. Difference 58. [Page 590] The principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) is based, according to al-Shatibi, on the foundation of the outcomes of actions (mālat al-afʿāl). This means that if an action leads to something forbidden or prohibited, then it may be deemed necessary to prohibit that action. The means that are blocked are actions that, upon consideration, necessitate their prohibition based on the outcome. However, this generalization does not apply uniformly in Islamic law, and the majority of legal theorists (usuliyyin) argue against it. Nevertheless, al-Shatibi states that both al-Shafi'i and Abu Hanifa have applied this principle, even though it is explicitly stated by them that it is rejected. He mentions that the scholars have agreed on its application in general, and it is consistent among them. The disagreement lies only in certain cases. He responded to al-Qarafi regarding the contention among scholars about considering the blocking of means: "There are many arguments they use, but they do not benefit, as they indicate the consideration of the law in blocking the means in general, which is a consensus. The dispute is only about specific means, such as deferred sales and the like" (1). He said: "As for al-Shafi'i, it is presumed that he has conducted a general induction regarding the means" (2). He stated: "As for Abu Hanifa, if it is established that he permitted the use of legal tricks (hiyal), then his original stance on deferred sales is only permissibility, and this does not necessitate abandoning the principle of blocking the means, and this is clear" (3). He also said: "The scholars have relied on this meaning and made it a principle that is consistent, which returns to the blocking of means that the scholars have agreed to apply in general, even if they differ in details" (4). Since the induction of legal rulings prevents the unrestricted assertion of prohibiting the permissible to avoid leading to the prohibited, al-Shatibi concluded that the means are divided into three categories, which are the same categories mentioned earlier regarding al-Qarafi: some means are blocked by consensus, some are not blocked by consensus, and some are disputed. Evidence for the principle: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 3/173. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) The same source, 3/188. [Page 591] Al-Shatibi holds that the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) is definitive through induction and is applied. It is indicated by the meanings of the rulings derived from the texts, such as His saying, Exalted is He: {And do not insult those they invoke besides Allah, lest they insult Allah in enmity without knowledge.} (1). And His saying, Exalted is He: {O you who have believed, do not say [to the Messenger], "Consider us," but say, "Look at us," and listen.} (2). And the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said in the authentic narration: "Indeed, among the greatest sins is cursing a man's parents." They said, "O Messenger of Allah, can a man curse his parents?" He said, "Yes, he insults the father of a man, and thus he insults his father, and he insults his mother, and thus he insults his mother." (3). And he (peace be upon him) refrained from killing the hypocrites because it would lead to the hypocrites saying, "Muhammad is killing his companions." (4) (5). __________ (1) Surah Al-An'am, 108. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 104. (3) Bukhari (5516) with the wording "curses" instead of "curses," and Muslim (130) with the same wording, and Tirmidhi (1824), who said: Hasan Sahih, and Ahmad (6243). (4) Bukhari (3527) and (4525), and Muslim (4682) and (1761), which mention the hypocrites and the Khawarij, and Tirmidhi (3237) who said: Hasan Sahih, and Ahmad (14292). (5) For a review of the evidence for the principle according to Al-Shatibi, see Al-Muwafaqat: 1/72, 2/250, 3/126, 127. [Page 592] The principle is also based on what is called the principle of cooperation, and one of its evidences is His saying, Exalted is He: { And cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression } (1). Thus, an action that is permissible, if it leads to something forbidden, is a means to it and is considered as assisting in the forbidden objective; therefore, the means takes the ruling of the objective. If it leads to something that is commanded, it is a means to righteousness and assists in the legally required objective, and it also takes the ruling of the objective. If the action is not a means to anything, it is the absolute permissible (mubah). He said: "The permissible, as it is permissible, is equal on both sides" (2). Then he said: "If it is a means to something prohibited, it becomes prohibited in terms of blocking the means, not in terms of being permissible" (3). Then he said that the permissible: "is of three categories: one category is a means to something forbidden, and thus from that perspective, it is required to be abandoned. A second category is a means to something commanded, like what is assisted in an otherworldly matter" (4). Then he said: "A third category is not a means to anything, and it is the absolute permissible. In general, if it is assumed to be a means to something else, its ruling is the ruling of that other thing" (5). It must be noted that the action he is discussing is the action that is originally permissible. And his saying: "in general" means that it is not absolute. For often an action does not take the ruling of the objective. And when the outcome or objective is prohibited and the action takes the ruling of the objective based on the principle of cooperation, this is also an application of the principle of blocking the means. He said: "The principle of blocking the means applies based on the principle of cooperation in obedience or disobedience, for this principle is agreed upon in consideration, and there are matters in which there is disagreement, such as the means in sales and similar matters, although the principle of blocking the means is also agreed upon, and it also includes the principle of conflicting original and predominant" (6). __________ (1) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 2. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 1/71. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 1/71. (4) The same source, 1/72. (5) The same location. (6) The same source, 3/126, 127. [Page 593] And the discussion on the conflict between the original ruling and the predominant ruling will come within the discussion of the controls of the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i). Controls for applying the principle of blocking the means: The place for applying the principle is in the permissible (mubah), as has been clarified. It is in the permissible that leads to something forbidden (haram). However, this is not applicable to any permissible act, nor to any manner of reaching the forbidden, nor to any forbidden act. Therefore, it is necessary to specify the controls and restrictions for applying this principle. The first control: That the permissible act is not permissible due to necessity or need. For what is such, opposing it with the forbidden outcome or with any objections it may encounter from evils is not valid. This is because the assumption is that the obligated person is compelled to it, and necessities are generally excused in the Sharia. In fact, this permissible act may have become obligatory, such as consuming carrion in a state of starvation, or it is needed to the extent that if it is abandoned, hardship will ensue. The Sharia has indicated the removal of hardship, and prohibiting an action due to its outcome leads to hardship for the obligated person. This indicates that the permissible action taken out of necessity or need is not a place for applying the principle of blocking the means. [Page 594] This does not only pertain to cases of necessity or hardship but also to what serves a necessary or need-based purpose, such as marriage, which necessitates the sustenance of dependents and may lead to obtaining sustenance through what Allah has forbidden, as well as walking to mosques and in public places where the walker may encounter hearing forbidden things and seeing nakedness. Preventing marriage and walking in the markets places the obligated person in a hardship that the legislator has alleviated and leads to the prohibition of what is originally permissible. He said: "What is originally permissible due to necessity or need is subject to opposing circumstances that may affect the original permissibility, either in reality or in expectation, whether it reverts to the original permissibility through negation or not? This is a matter of consideration and difficulty. The ruling on it is that it is either that one is compelled to that permissible act or not, and if one is not compelled, then either one experiences hardship from leaving it or not. These are three categories. The first is that one is compelled to perform that permissible act, so it is necessary to revert to that original and not consider the opposing circumstance" (1). "The second category is that one is not compelled to it but experiences hardship from leaving it, so the consideration necessitates reverting to the original permissibility and disregarding the emergencies, as the prohibited things have been permitted to alleviate hardship" (2). As for the third category, "it is that one is not compelled to the original permissibility and does not experience hardship from leaving it; this is a matter of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), and the principle of means (dhara'i) applies based on the original cooperation on obedience or disobedience" (3). However, al-Shatibi elaborates on the second category, which is when leaving the permissible act places the obligated person in hardship, as the hardship in undertaking actions or refraining from them is not of a single degree, and the Sharia has not come to remove all hardship; the harm of the hardship resulting from prohibiting the permissible may be less than the harm of engaging in the prohibited outcome. Al-Shatibi questions: "Does the hardship that follows from leaving the original act equate to the hardship that follows from engaging with the opposing circumstances or not?" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/124. (2) The same source, 1/125. (3) The same source, 1/126. (4) The same source, 1/125. [Page 595] The answer - according to his methodology - is that what is originally permissible serves a necessary, need-based, or enhancement principle, and the prohibited outcome is also a servant to a necessary, need-based, or enhancement principle, and its occurrence is contrary to the occurrence of the original permissible. If the permissible action - which is a cause - and the prohibited outcome are both referring to or serving the same original principle, then this is not a place for applying the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i), because the prohibition pertains to the complements of the original and not to the original itself, while the permissible refers to the original. Therefore, it is preferable not to consider what pertains to the complement, and it has been established in the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) that the collapse of the complement does not destroy the original, whereas the collapse of the original does destroy its complements. Thus, here too, the permissible remains permissible and is not affected by incidental matters. However, if the permissible and the prohibited outcome refer to two different originals, then this is something where the outcome may be considered, but it is not in the context of blocking the means; rather, it is in the context of conflict and preference. Al-Shatibi, responding to the aforementioned question, says: "The absence of incidental matters concerning this original must either be a complement to it in its category or from another category that is an original in itself. If it is the latter, then it is either actual or anticipated. If it is anticipated, it has no effect in the presence of hardship, because hardship from abandonment is actual and is a corruption, while the corruption of the incidental matter is anticipated and imagined, thus it does not oppose the actual at all. As for if it is actual, it is truly a matter of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), and the corruption of the incidental matters therein may be greater than the corruption of abandoning the permissible, and the matter may be the opposite, and the consideration here pertains to conflict and preference. If it is the first case, then there is no valid conflict nor equivalence of the two corruptions, rather the corruption of losing the original is greater, and the evidence for this is as follows: one, that the complement with its complement is like the attribute with the attributed" (1). He then said: "And if the loss of the attribute does not return with the loss of the attributed in general, unlike the opposite, the side of the attributed is stronger in existence and non-existence" (2). "And the second is that the original with its complements is like the universal with the particular, and it is known that when the universal is opposed by the particular, the particular has no effect; likewise here, the corruption of losing the complement has no effect in the presence of the benefit of the complemented" (3). Thus, the first criterion for applying the principle is established, which is "that one should not be compelled to the original permissible nor should hardship be attached to abandoning it; this is a place for ijtihad and the principle of blocking the means applies here" (4). As for his statement: "this is a place for ijtihad," it indicates that in this case there are two opinions: one considers the original permissibility and does not consider the opposing incidental matter, while the other considers the opposing incidental matter and negates the permissibility to block the means. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/126. (2) The same source. (3) The same source. (4) The same source. [Page 596] He says: "For one who argues based on the principle of permissibility that the original permission relates to a necessary meaning, it has been established that the essence of permissibility, which is choice, is a reality that pertains to necessities, and it is the foundation of interests (masalih); it is, in effect, a servant to them, if it is not, in reality, the same as them. Thus, considering the opposition in the permissible is akin to considering the opposition of the necessary in general, even if it does not appear in detail to be necessary. If this is the case, then the side of the permissible becomes more preferable than its opposition" (1). As for the second opinion, it states: "For the one who favors the side of the opposition, he may argue that the interest of the permissible, inasmuch as it is permissible, is optional in its attainment or non-attainment, which is evidence that it does not reach the level of necessities. It is always so, because once it reaches that level, it would no longer be optional" (2). What al-Shatibi intends to indicate by presenting these two opinions is to point out that the one who does not apply the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) here does not do so because he does not accept the principle, but rather because blocking the means was deemed less preferable. For further detail on this principle, one can refer to what al-Shatibi has elaborated regarding the ruling of permissibility, which is that the permissible may be permissible in part, recommended in total, or permissible in part, obligatory in total, or permissible in part, disliked in total, or permissible in part, prohibited in total. What is permissible in part and recommended or obligatory in total is the permissible for necessity or need, and in this case, the principle of blocking the means does not apply. It remains that if the principle of blocking the means is to be applied, it is applied to what is permissible in part, disliked or prohibited in total. The second principle: That the means to the prohibited is intended by the obligated in the permissible action. If this is the case, the permissible action becomes non-permissible. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/127. (2) The same source. [Page 597] If an action is permissible in its essence, this means that it has a desired outcome which is intended by the legislator in enacting the action. If another intention is concomitant with this intended outcome, then this other outcome is either permitted or prohibited. If it is permitted, there is no issue; but if it is prohibited, this means that both a command and a prohibition converge on two concomitant outcomes, which is the subject here. Al-Shatibi states that one of the intentions is subordinate while the other is the principal one, and the ruling is that of the principal one, with its subordinate being attached to it in ruling. This is similar to contracts concerning properties and their benefits; for instance, a contract for ownership of the land entails that the benefits of the land are subordinate to the ownership. Conversely, a contract for the benefits of the land means that the ownership is subordinate to the benefits in some manner, but not entirely. He said: "If the benefits are what is intended, then the ownership is subordinate as it is a means to the intended goal. If he meant that it is entirely subordinate to them, then that is prohibited" (1). He then said: "And if he meant some form of subordination, that is accepted and does not entail any prohibition, for general matters are related to their particulars in some way, and this does not necessitate their complete subordination to them" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/101. (2) The same source, 3/102. [Page 598] This example is to demonstrate al-Shatibi's intended meaning regarding the ruling of the principal (matbu) and its application to the subordinate (tabi). The mentioned issue is based on the assumption of the permissibility of the contract on the person (raqabah) and its permissibility on the benefit, such that if a contract is established on one of them, the other is considered subordinate to the contracted matter, meaning that the subordinate and the principal, which are interrelated, are both permissible. Our issue is whether one of the interrelated matters is permissible and the other is prohibited. In this case, al-Shatibi also states that the ruling applies to the principal, and the subordinate is given the same ruling. He says: "When a command and a prohibition pertain to interrelated matters, and one of them is commanded and the other is prohibited in the case of separation, and one of them is in the status of a subordinate to the other in existence and non-existence, then what is considered from the two implications is what pertains to the principal, while what pertains to the subordinate is nullified and has no legal consideration" (1). For example, the purchase of grapes may be intended for a permissible purpose, such as eating, or it may be intended for something prohibited, such as making intoxicants. The purchase of a female slave may be intended for concubinage or for service, or it may be intended for prostitution. So, which of the intended purposes is the one that is considered, and which is the principal and which is the subordinate? The intention of the obligated person is not something that can be discerned; it is a purpose that varies from person to person, and this is something that the jurist does not know. Rather, the obligated person is the jurist of himself and knows the prohibition of his action from his intended unlawful purpose. Therefore, the jurist in such cases looks at what is primarily intended according to common understanding and custom, and that is the principal, while he nullifies the consideration of the subordinate and gives the ruling based on the principal. For instance, the original intention behind the purchase of grapes, according to common understanding and custom, is not for wine; the purchase of weapons is not for highway robbery; and the purchase of a female slave is not for prostitution, thus this purchase remains permissible. __________ (1) The same source, 3/96. [Page 599] The original ruling regarding the purchase of wine is, by custom and habit, that it is for drinking, and thus it remains prohibited even if the intention is to ferment it. The same applies to the purchase of the fat of carrion, even if the intention is to use it for painting ships or for lighting. Accordingly, al-Shatibi does not see in the meaning of the principle the prohibition of what is permissible merely because the obligated person may intend to use it to reach something prohibited, even if the intended purpose is religiously forbidden. He says: "In the matter of dependency, what is related to it in terms of demand is disregarded; likewise here, unless the contracting party has a specific intention towards the prohibited, for this has two possibilities: the first is to consider the original intention and disregard the dependent one even if it is intended, and the second is to consider the incidental intention if it becomes prior or as if it were prior, and anything else is like the dependent, so the ruling applies to it. An example of the original permissibility of benefits is the purchase of a female slave with the intention of converting her to prostitution for profit, and the purchase of a boy for immoral acts, and the purchase of grapes to press into wine, and weapons to rob, and some items for deception. In terms of the original prohibition of benefits, the purchase of a dog for hunting and for grazing and farming according to the opinion of those who prohibit that. The purchase of carrion to destroy farms, and the purchase of wine for fermentation, and the purchase of carrion to paint ships or for people to use for light, and similar matters. The regulated principle is the first, and the evidence for it is more, because considering what is intended in terms of originality and habit is what has been established in the Sharia regarding what is intended for permissibility and prohibition, for the purchase of a female slave for benefit in concubinage if she is from the noble class of slaves, or for service if she is from the low class, and the purchase of wine for drinking, and carrion, blood, and pork for eating is the common and usual practice among the Arabs to whom the Qur'an was revealed. Therefore, the related matters of prohibition and permissibility are omitted in the verse: { Prohibited to you are your mothers } (1), until the verse: { And lawful for you is what is beyond that } (2)."(3). __________ (1) Surah An-Nisa, 23. (2) Surah An-Nisa, 24. (3) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/108. [Page 600] And his statement above: "And the regulated is the first" means that if some of those obligated (mukallaf) show an intention towards the prohibited, they are not judged by that, but rather by what is original or the original intention, which is predominant by custom and habit in society. Then he said: "If the follower becomes predominant in intention and precedes in the custom of some times until what was originally the case becomes like the nonexistent, then the ruling changes. I do not think this can happen universally, but if it is assumed to happen, the ruling changes. The principle remains established as it was set in the Sharia, and if it does not happen but the intention towards the follower is prevalent, then the original consideration is what is intended like it by custom. The matter is generally disputed regarding the two possibilities, and the principle of means (dhara'i) is also based on the precedence of intention towards the prohibited" (1). These texts clarify al-Shatibi's intent regarding the intended follower; it is not specifically the intention of the obligated person but rather the intention of the general public regarding the action. If the custom in society changes such that the original intention of someone buying grapes is that they buy them for wine, and for someone buying weapons that they buy them to commit robbery, then the ruling changes accordingly to the change in intention, and the follower becomes the followed. The considered intention is the original intention, and the ruling follows it. Al-Shatibi's statement: "And the principle of means is also based on the precedence of intention towards the followed" means that this reversal in ruling is supported by the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i). This is the meaning of the second criterion for applying the principle, which is the emergence of intention towards that in society such that it becomes the original and everything else is the exception. What strengthens the consideration of this criterion for him is his statement: "For the principle of means is strengthened here since the intention towards the prohibited has been established" (2). The third criterion: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/109 - 110. (2) The same source, 3/110. [Page 601] The third criterion for applying the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) according to al-Shatibi is that the action permitted by Sharia must lead to harm frequently, not rarely. If its leading to harm is rare, then this does not render it prohibited; that is, the jurist does not issue a fatwa declaring it unlawful. Even if this harm is intended for a specific accountable person, this is something the jurist cannot ascertain and thus cannot rule upon. The condition that the leading to harm must be frequent, not rare, is based on the principle that rulings are made based on the majority, not the rare occurrences, just as the intention is considered based on what is commonly prevalent in society. If the action leads to the unlawful frequently, it may be predominant, or it may be frequent but not predominant or rare; this is treated as predominant in his view and is prohibited under the principle of blocking the means if the first two criteria are met (1). This condition has appeared in several places in al-Shatibi's book, most clearly in his elaboration on the principle of removing harm. Below is an explanation of how al-Shatibi applies the principle of removing harm and the overlap between it and the principle of blocking the means. The principle of removing harm: Due to the detailed nature of this principle, a structured format with numbers will be used to indicate the various cases of its application and to clarify the instances of blocking the means within it. Al-Shatibi states in his discussion of the fifth issue regarding the objectives of the accountable person in obligation (2): "Bringing about benefit or repelling harm, if permitted, is of two types: 1. One type is that it does not result in harming others. The second type is that it does result in harming others, and this second type is of two categories: 2. One category is when the one bringing about the benefit or repelling the harm intends that harm, such as the one permitted in his commodity with the intention of seeking his livelihood, and his intention includes harming others. The second category is when he does not intend to harm anyone, which is of two types: 3. One type is when the harm is general, such as receiving goods and selling to those present for those absent, and refraining from selling his house or land when people are in need of it for a mosque or otherwise. The second type is when the harm is specific, which is of two kinds: __________ (1) This criterion will be clarified by explaining the principle of removing harm. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/241. [Page 602] 4. One of them is that the buyer or the defender incurs harm from being prevented from that action, so he is in need of performing it, like the one defending himself against an injustice that he knows will befall another, or rushing to purchase food or something he needs, or to hunt, or to gather firewood, or water, or anything else, knowing that if he obtains it, another will be harmed by its absence; and if it is taken from his hand, he will be harmed. The second: that he does not incur harm from it, and this is of three types: 5. One of them is what leads to a certain harm, meaning a normal certainty, such as digging a well behind the door of the house in the dark, so that anyone entering will inevitably fall into it, and similar situations. 6. The second: that which its performance leads to harm rarely, such as digging a well in a manner that does not usually result in someone falling into it, and consuming foods that are mostly not harmful to anyone, and similar matters. The third: what is performed that leads to harm frequently rather than rarely, and it has two aspects: 7. One of them is that it should be predominant, like the sale of weapons from the people of war, and grapes from the wine seller, and what is mixed with it by those whose nature is to deceive, and similar matters. 8. The second condition is that it should be abundant but not predominant, like the issue of deferred sales. These are eight categories"(1). Then al-Shatibi clarifies the ruling in each of these eight sections and establishes that the last two sections, the seventh and eighth, are where the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) is applied. The following is a statement of his opinion on each of these sections, assisted by the numbers placed next to each section and the diagram drawn after three pages: 1 - The first section: Al-Shatibi says, "As for the first, it remains on its original basis of permission, and there is no doubt about it"(2). __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/241 - 242. (2) The same source, 2/242. [Page 603] 2 - The second section: He says: "As for the second, there is no doubt about the prohibition of intending harm in itself, as there is evidence that there is no harm and no reciprocating harm in Islam. However, the consideration remains regarding this action that combines the intention of benefiting oneself and the intention of harming others. Should it be prohibited, thus becoming impermissible, or does it remain under its original ruling of permissibility while the one who intends it bears the sin of their intention? Al-Shatibi believes that this is a matter where disagreement can be imagined and where detailed ijtihad (jurisprudential reasoning) is possible. If preventing the obligated person from acting does not prevent them from achieving their goal through another action, then there is no doubt about their prohibition, as there is no meaning in insisting on the first action except to harm others. However, if they have no alternative to the first action, their right to act takes precedence over the right of others to eliminate the harm, but they remain prohibited from the intention" (1). 3 - The third section: He states: "If the harm is general and unintended, in this case, it is considered. If preventing the action leads to harm that cannot be compensated, then their right takes precedence absolutely, and the action remains permissible. If it can be compensated, then considering the general harm is preferable, and they are prohibited from the action. He said: 'They have increased in the Mosque of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) from other than what its people approved and what they did not. This necessitates prioritizing the public interest over the private interest, but in a way that does not cause harm to the private interest'" (2). 4 - The fourth section: He says: "The right of the one who brings or repels is prioritized even if it causes harm to others, because bringing benefit or repelling harm is desired and intended by the legislator" (3). He said: "Thus, it has become clear that prioritizing the right of the one who is late over the one who is early is not intended by the Sharia except with the waiver of the right of the one who is early, and that is not obligatory for them" (4). __________ (1) The same place. (2) The same source, 2/243. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/243. (4) The same place. [Page 604] 5 – The fifth category: It is that the action permitted by Sharia leads to a certain harm and that this harm is not intended. It is said that the one who brings about the benefit or averts the harm, if he acts without paying attention to the consequences and without intending to cause harm, and only focused on the fact that the action is permitted, then it is permissible and there is no prohibition in it. However, if he is aware that his action will cause harm to others while he does not suffer harm from refraining from it, then he is prohibited from acting. If he proceeds with the action, he is considered to have transgressed and is liable for the damages of the transgressor in general. Al-Shatibi does not conceive of such an action except in two cases: the first is that the one bringing about the benefit or averting the harm has failed to consider the required perspective, and the second is that he intends to cause harm himself, and both are prohibited by Sharia (1). 6 – The sixth category: He says, "As for the sixth, it is that its outcome leads to harm rarely; it is, in its essence, permitted because if the benefit is predominant, then the rarity of its breach is not considered" (2). He then said, "Thus, the action remains based on the principle of permissibility" (3). 7 – The seventh category: It is when the action leads to harm frequently and predominantly, he says: "It is what leads to harm in a way that is probable, and it allows for disagreement; either the original ruling is permissibility and allowance as previously mentioned in the sixth, or the harm and corruption are likely to occur" (4). Al-Shatibi sees here the application of probability and the lifting of the principle of permission and permissibility. He says: "However, considering probability is more preferable for several reasons: one of them is that probability in matters of actions is treated like knowledge, and it seems to apply here. The second is that what is explicitly stated regarding the prohibition of means is included in this category, such as His saying, Exalted is He: { And do not insult those they invoke besides Allah, lest they insult Allah in enmity without knowledge }" (5) etc., and he mentioned some evidences for the principle of prohibiting means. __________ (1) The same source, 2/249. (2) The same source, 2/250. (3) The same location. (4) The same location. (5) Surah Al-An'am, 108. [Page 605] Al-Shatibi mentions in this section that the prevailing principle here is the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) more than the principle of removing harm (raf' al-darar), based on the fact that the obligated person does not intend harm but rather seeks permissible benefits. Therefore, the principle of blocking the means operates on the basis that the intention of harm, which is prohibited, has become the norm, and it has become predominant in this action that it cooperates in sin and transgression or is a ruse (1). 8 - The eighth section: He says, "As for the eighth, which is that its performance leads to corruption frequently, not predominantly or rarely, this is a matter of consideration and ambiguity, and the original ruling is to carry it on the basis of the validity of permission, as per the school of al-Shafi'i and others. This is because knowledge and suspicion of the occurrence of corruption are absent, as there is only a mere possibility between occurrence and non-occurrence, and there is no evidence to favor one side over the other. The possibility of intending corruption and harm does not equate to the actual intention nor necessitate it" (2). He said, "Moreover, it is not correct to consider the one who brings or pushes it here as negligent or intentional, as in knowledge and suspicion, because carrying it on the intention towards them is no more valid than carrying it on the lack of intention towards either of them. If that is the case, then the permitted causation is very strong" (3). What he has stated indicates the continuation of the action on its original permissibility, although he leans towards applying the principle of blocking the means based on the fact that Malik (may Allah be pleased with him) applied it here. He then mentioned examples that justify or permit the application of blocking the means, but not necessitating it. He said, "If that is the case, then the permitted causation is very strong, except that Malik considered it in blocking the means based on the frequency of intention in occurrence" (4). He then said, "The Sharia is based on precaution, taking measures, and guarding against what may lead to corruption. If this is known in general and in detail, then acting upon it is not an innovation in the Sharia, but rather it is a principle of its principles that relates to what is complementary, whether it is necessary, need-based, or improvement-oriented" (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/250 - 251. (2) The same source, 2/251. (3) The same location. (4) The same location. (5) The same source, 2/253. [Page 606] Issues or Branches of the Principle of Removing Harm When the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) and its regulations are clarified, as well as its area of application, which is the permissible (mubah), it follows that what is in the category of permissibles includes that which is at the level of concession (afw). It does not apply to the recommended (mandubat), and not every change that affects rulings falls under the category of blocking the means. However, it is worth mentioning the actions that al-Shatibi has associated with blocking the means, which include the necessity of abandoning the recommended or supererogatory acts and the necessity of performing the disliked (makruh) in certain cases, and this is in the case of the jurist (faqih) who is to be followed, so that the follower does not mistakenly understand that the continuous practice of the recommended or supererogatory acts without interruption is an obligation, nor that the continuous abandonment of the disliked is forbidden. This is to block the means, and he has established principles regarding this. He said: "The essence of the recommended is that it should not be equated with the obligatory" (1). He said: "The permissibles, in terms of their essence, should not be equated with the recommended or the disliked" (2). He said: "The disliked, in terms of their essence, should not be equated with the forbidden or with the permissibles" (3). It should not be said here that the principle has been applied to the recommended or the disliked; rather, the application of the principle here is focused on the continuity that may unintentionally suggest otherwise to the legislator. Chapter Ten The Concept of Objectives (Maqasid) According to al-Shatibi Presentation and Discussion This chapter contains a brief definition of the subject of this chapter and three sections: Section One: A brief presentation of the concept of objectives according to al-Shatibi. Section Two: Discussion of al-Shatibi's idea: the universals and induction. Section Three: Discussion of al-Shatibi's idea: objectives and causes. Chapter Ten The Concept of Objectives (Maqasid) According to al-Shatibi Presentation and Discussion Subject of this chapter: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/183. (2) The same source, 3/189. (3) The same source, 3/190. [Page 607] After clarifying the meaning of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) according to al-Shatibi, their categories and types, and how to attain them, as well as how to understand the Sharia and derive rulings based on it, and after establishing al-Shatibi's comprehensive methodology in this regard, which attempts to integrate previous methodologies or principles and foundations of various kinds through the new principles he established for understanding, it remains to examine this idea and these principles and discuss them. Although he diverged in his innovations from all his predecessors among the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) and presented an unprecedented methodology, he sought to relate the various principles back to his own, even though he sometimes explicitly stated his disagreement with them and insisted that it was a disagreement in substance and not merely in wording. During this process, al-Shatibi emerged as a profound scholar and jurist, deeply versed in the sciences of the Sharia, knowledgeable about human nature and the conditions of communities, insightful in discerning implications, diving deep into the pearls of meanings, submissive to the evidence and committed to it, eager to understand both the general and specific objectives, warning against extremism just as he warned against laxity. In light of all this, a question arises that was raised by Dr. Abdullah Darraz in his introduction to his commentary on the book al-Muwafaqat: "If the status of the book is as you mentioned, and its virtue in the Sharia is as you described, then why has it been obscured from view for all these years and not received its due attention, let alone the dedication to its exposition?"(1). The question may go further: why did al-Shatibi's ideas not appear among other scholars, whether his students or others? Why did no one follow him in this regard? Did his ideas die immediately after their birth? Or are his ideas so profound and his methodology so complex that there were no followers for his ideas or practitioners of his methodology? __________ (1) Al-Muwafaqat, 1/11, edited by Dr. Abdullah Darraz. [Page 608] Dr. Darraz answered the question by stating that this is due to two matters: the first is that al-Shatibi's discussions are innovative and unprecedented, while the known sciences of usul (principles of jurisprudence) were well-established and their path was paved, so those engaged in the sciences of Sharia relied on the well-known explanations and did not feel any deficiency, nor did their ambition extend to addressing the book and exercising thought upon it. The second matter is the difficulty of the book, as if there is a meaning under every word in it(1). However, the matter—as I see it—does not return to either of the mentioned reasons. For al-Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him) authored the Risala, which was like a spark that ignited a revolution in the science of usul, and had the idea of al-Shatibi succeeded, it might have been a spark of a similar revolution. It is inevitable that there exist many students of knowledge and scholars who would be interested in it. Al-Shatibi must have had students and scholars who revered him and learned from him. If his methodology had the potential for dissemination, it would have spread; as for the difficulty of the book, this would not prevent its understanding, explanation, and development upon it, so the reason must be something else. The reason relates to the methodology itself, that is, to al-Shatibi's ideas. Although what is in his book is of high value, quality, and level, and most of it adheres to the established norms of the science of usul, it contains what is new, and this newness is foundational, indeed the foundations of the foundations upon which the rules and principles are built. The first of these is the method of induction, the rejection of certainty in Sharia without it, and the rejection of specification in Sharia in the conventional sense. It also introduces new meanings in returning to the certain, and although his new ideas are few in number, they are principles that dominate and govern many branches, and thus the few new principles are significant enough to form an independent methodology that stands on its own and is fundamentally different from all other known methodologies. __________ (1) Al-Muwafaqat, 1/11, edited by Dr. Abdullah Darraz. [Page 609] The awareness of al-Shatibi regarding this led him to attempt to trace the roots of the various schools of thought back to their origins, meaning that his methodology should serve as a foundation for all. This is where the name of his book, al-Muwafaqat, comes from, which will be clarified in the next section. The innovation and depth in al-Shatibi's research, along with his seriousness and discipline, have motivated many in our time to highlight al-Muwafaqat and its author. Perhaps some have even attempted to draw from it and rely on it. However, the reality is that no one has built upon his methodology or adopted it; on the contrary, what has been attributed to him is what he consistently warned against. Indeed, what he feared has occurred, as he said: "And thus, it is not permissible for the one who examines this book to look at it with a beneficial or advantageous perspective until he is well-versed in the knowledge of Sharia, its principles and branches, both transmitted and rational, not clinging to imitation and partisanship to a school of thought. For if it is like this, there is a fear that what has been deposited in it may turn into a trial by mere appearance, and if it is wisdom in itself" (1). The reason for the lack of dissemination of the methodology and its development is, and Allah knows best, due to the methodology itself, specifically the novelty of the methodology that may make the student of knowledge feel a thirst to understand it; once he understands it, he turns away from it. He stated in the conclusion of his book: "The intended purpose has been achieved, and thanks to Allah, the promised accomplishment has been realized, although there remain things that could not be included, as it has not been easy for many of the seekers to grasp them, and few are those who, despite their great thirst for them, have sought them. I feared that they would not reach their source and that they would not be organized in the path of verification of its stray points" (2). If the matter is as al-Shatibi said in this text: "Few are those who, despite their great thirst for them, have sought them," it seems to indicate that the methodology was born dead. This will be clarified through discussion in this chapter. It may also be beneficial before that to briefly present al-Shatibi's idea and highlight its novelty in a comprehensive manner in an independent section, which will be the first section of this chapter, followed by a discussion in the next two sections, and upon Allah we rely. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/53. (2) The same source, 4/202. [Page 610] The First Topic A brief overview of the concept of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) according to al-Shatibi. The meaning of the Muwafaqat: The choice of the name "al-Muwafaqat" (The Concurrences) refers to a meaning intended by al-Shatibi, which is the reconciliation between the schools of thought by clarifying that although they differ in branches, they all revert to recognized principles and foundations among all. The reason for the disagreement is the differing opinions of the imams in tracing issues back to their origins; one favors tracing it back to one origin while another favors tracing it back to a different origin. As for the principles, all of them are recognized and relied upon by the imams. Despite the novelty and provocative nature of his methodology, he states that it is acknowledged by the recognized imams even if they do not mention it or draw attention to it, so it should not be dismissed by those who are unaware of it on the grounds that they have not heard of its like. As for the meaning of reconciling between the schools of thought, he referred to this by mentioning a striking story. He said: "Due to the secrets of obligation related to this noble Sharia that I have embedded in it, I named it 'The Title of Introduction to the Secrets of Obligation.' Then I transitioned from this theme to a strange chain of narration that astonishes the perceptive and astute. The essence of it is that one day I met some of the scholars whom I had allowed to take a place of benefit from me, and I made my scientific gatherings with them a destination for travel and a place for receiving knowledge. I had begun to arrange and classify the book, casting aside distractions without refining or composing it. He said to me, 'I saw you last night in a dream with a book you authored. I asked you about it, and you told me it was "The Book of Al-Muwafaqat." He said, 'I was going to ask you about the meaning of this elegant title, and you informed me that you reconciled between the opinions of Ibn al-Qasim and Abu Hanifa.' I said to him, 'You have hit the mark with a share of the righteous vision, and you have taken from the prophetic glad tidings a good portion and share, for I have begun to compose these meanings, intending to establish those foundations, for they are the recognized principles among the scholars and the rules upon which the ancients built.' The sheikh was astonished by the strangeness of this agreement, just as I was astonished by traversing this wilderness and accompanying these companions."(1) __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/7 - 8. [Page 611] As for his methodology, despite its novelty, it is considered and relied upon by scholars. In addition to his statement in the text above: "For these are the accepted principles among scholars, and the rules established by the ancients," his assertion that "if someone opposes you with anything other than this book, it is an opposition of denial, and they are blind to the aspect of innovation and creativity in it, and they are deceived by the thought that it is something unheard of, nor has anything in the original or subsidiary Islamic sciences been composed in its manner or shaped like it, and you have enough of the evil of hearing it, and of every innovation in the Sharia that it has introduced, so do not pay attention to the objection without testing it, nor throw the possibility of benefit onto something unconsidered, for it is, by the grace of Allah, a matter established by the verses and reports, and its foundations have been built by the insights of the observers. When the path is clear, denial is not required, and acceptance of what it contains and consideration of the validity of what it has presented and acknowledgment of it is necessary, except for what may occur to humans of error and misstep" (1), etc. His attempts at reconciliation appear in many places, including those related to the reasoning of rulings by the purposes and beneficial meanings. He spoke of reasoning after establishing that the described attribute used for reasoning returns to a meaning that is accepted in Sharia, and he conditioned the acceptance of the meaning on certainty regarding it. Thus, he did not disregard reasoning by the purposes, nor did he leave the matter to mere opinion. He thus approached the Shafi'is by accepting reasoning by the purpose, and he approached the Hanafis by rejecting the notion that the purpose is speculative. However, in reality, he did not agree with either of them; he was distant from the Shafi'is by his condition of certainty regarding the meaning and his rejection of the speculative meaning in several rulings, and he remained distant from the Hanafis as well, for they do not say this type of certainty, as the abundance of analogies does not yield strength in the description according to them (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/9. (2) This matter has been previously explained and detailed in chapters two and three. [Page 612] Among his attempts at reconciliation is his statement regarding generality and specificity. It is known that the Hanafis do not restrict the definitive (qat'i) by the speculative (dhanni); they do not restrict the Qur'an or the mutawatir (consecutively transmitted) Sunnah by a single report (khabar ahad) or analogy (qiyas). This is based on their belief that the indication of the general (al-'amm) towards its specific instances (afrad) is definitive, so nothing from these instances can be excluded by speculative evidence. This is in contrast to the majority of usul scholars, who do restrict the definitive general by the speculative. What al-Shatibi brings forth here is the denial of restriction in its entirety; wherever he speaks of it, it is in the sense of clarification (bayān) (1). Thus, if some instances are specified from the general, this does not mean they are excluded from the generality of the text; rather, it clarifies that they were not included in it from the outset. Here, he approaches the Shafi'is in that the indication of the general towards all its instances is speculative. He has reiterated the texts of al-Shafi'i, stating that the general is used and intended to mean the specific. This is speculative in his view, as he denies definitive indication in the texts, and thus, he does not affirm definitiveness in meaning except through induction (istiqra). He also aligns with the Hanafis in stating that if the meaning is definitively established, it is not restricted. Thus, it becomes a universal principle, and universals cannot be restricted; therefore, the definitive universal cannot be restricted by a particular or by the speculative. While he approaches both groups, he differs from them; he differs from the Shafi'is by rejecting restriction altogether and by not restricting universals by particulars, that is, the definitive by the speculative. He also differs from the Hanafis by rejecting restriction altogether, which means not restricting the universal by the universal, that is, the definitive by the definitive. Wherever he speaks of restricting some universals by others, he does not intend exclusion but rather clarification, as previously mentioned. One can observe the approximation and reconciliation in the two mentioned examples, but the reality is that he was different—in both cases—with both groups; therefore, his statement will not be accepted by either of them. This may be one of the factors for the lack of spread of this methodology and its development. In both cases, the method of definitiveness, whether through wisdom or through the indication of the general towards its instances, can only be through induction, which is not customary among either of the groups. Definitiveness in principles according to al-Shatibi: __________ (1) See: the first section of chapter seven. [Page 613] One of the most important principles according to al-Shatibi is that the foundations must be definitive. He said: "The principles of jurisprudence in religion are definitive, not speculative, and the evidence for this is that they pertain to the universals of the Sharia, and whatever is thus is definitive. The proof of the first is evident through the inductive reasoning that leads to certainty, and the proof of the second is from several aspects: one of them is that they return either to rational foundations, which are definitive, or to the general inductive reasoning from the evidences of the Sharia, which is also definitive, and there is no third option other than the combination of the two, and the composite of definitives is definitive" (1). The requirement for definitiveness in the foundations is well-known and agreed upon among the imams, but there is a significant difference between what al-Shatibi intended and what they intended, a difference that gives his methodology a direction distinct from theirs. The definitiveness in the foundations that the imams referred to is not about general or universal rules but rather about the sources of legislation, namely the general evidences which are four: the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and analogy. These are general evidences from which detailed evidences are derived and from which rules and foundations are understood. For example, the obligation to adhere to the Sunnah is established with definitive certainty, as it is a source of legislation. However, the reports or narrations that come in the Sunnah, or the reports of individual narrators, do not require definitive certainty regarding their authenticity in relation to the Prophet, but rather are taken based on a preponderance of evidence. The same applies to the meanings or implications of the texts, whether from the Qur'an or the Sunnah; it is not required for the implication of a text to be definitive for it to be acted upon, but rather it must be preferred over others. As for what al-Shatibi intended, it encompasses what they intended and more. Every jurisprudential or foundational rule must be definitive according to him, and every meaning or principle relied upon in the Sharia must be definitive, and the meanings of the texts are the objectives of the Legislator, so they must be definitive or refer back to a definitive meaning that serves it, or be included within the definitive meaning. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/10. [Page 614] Therefore, the five necessities are definitive principles of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence), and likewise, the rules for removing harm, hardship, and difficulty, and similar matters are definitive rules in the needs (hajiyat). Additionally, the principle of the outcomes of actions (mala'at al-af'al) and the rules of public interest (maslaha mursala), preference (istihsan), and blocking the means (sadd al-dhara'i) are all definitive, both in their reality and in their conditions. This is not what the imams of usul intended when they stipulated definitiveness for the principles of jurisprudence; rather, they limited that to what is considered a source for legislation. Al-Shatibi indicates that his intention differs from others in this regard; at times, he directs his words to indicate that his meaning is what is relied upon by the earlier usulists, but they neglected to point it out. At other times, he explicitly states that his intention differs from theirs. He said: "However, the earlier usulists may have neglected this meaning and the indication of it, leading to its being overlooked by some later scholars, which caused confusion in deriving evidence from the verses in their singularity and from the hadiths in their isolation, as they did not take them in a collective manner, thus they were subjected to objections text by text. They weakened the evidence from them regarding the principles of usul intended for definitiveness" (1). He said in another place: "Every legal evidence is either definitive or speculative; if it is definitive, there is no doubt in considering it" (2). Then he said: "And if it is speculative, it is either related to a definitive principle or not. If it is related to a definitive principle, it is also considered; and if it is not related, one must be cautious about it, and it is not correct to broadly state its acceptance" (3). He said: "Know that the purpose of referring to the definitive principle is not to establish definitive evidence for the validity of acting upon it, like the evidence that acting upon the report of a single narrator or by analogy is obligatory, for example, but rather what is more specific than that, as previously mentioned in the hadith: 'There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm' (4), and the issues mentioned with it, which is a meaning contrary to that intended by the usulists, and Allah knows best" (5). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat. 1/15. (2) The same source, 3/7. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/7. (4) Previously referenced. (5) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/12. [Page 615] This meaning is spread throughout various places in his book, including what was mentioned above, and one of the most important is the ninth issue of the first type of the objectives of the legislator (maqasid al-shari). He said: "The legislator's intention to preserve the three essential, necessary, and embellishing principles must be based on evidence, and the evidence for that can either be definitive or speculative. The speculative nature of it is invalid, as it is a fundamental principle of the Sharia, and indeed it is the foundation of its foundations. The foundations of the Sharia are definitive, as clarified in its place, so the foundations of its foundations are more deserving of being definitive. If it were permissible to establish them based on speculation, the Sharia would be speculative in both its roots and branches, and this is invalid."(1) Characteristics of the foundations: __________ (1) The same source, 2/32. [Page 616] The principles (usul) according to al-Shatibi are definitive matters intended by the Legislator. They are established through the induction of particulars, and the particulars are meanings that the texts can bear, or wisdoms and interests that may be intended by the Legislator through the rulings. If many particulars are surveyed and a definitive meaning is established based on the induction, then this meaning is a universal principle. The particulars whose meanings relate to this principle, that is, those that are included in it or serve it, are branches of the principle. However, before the definitive meaning is derived, the particular remains a particular and cannot be considered a branch nor can it be deemed as legislation. Accordingly, the principles are definitive universals. He said: "Some knowledge is from the essence of knowledge, and some is from the embellishments of knowledge, not from its essence, and some is neither from its essence nor from its embellishments. These are three categories: the first category is the principle and the relied-upon, which is the basis of inquiry and to which the objectives of the firmly rooted (rasikhun) ultimately lead, and that is what is definitive or related to a definitive principle. The blessed Muhammadan Sharia is revealed in this manner. Therefore, it is preserved in its principles and branches" (1). He then said: "They are the necessities, the needs, and the enhancements, and what completes them and supplements their aspects, and these are the principles of the Sharia, and definitive evidence has been established for their consideration, and all branches are based upon them, so there is no doubt that it is a foundational science with a solid basis and stable pillars" (2). He then said: "Because knowledge of them is derived from the general induction that organizes the scattered individuals until they become in the mind a collection of consistent, general, stable universals, not vanishing or changing, and ruling rather than being ruled upon, and these are the characteristics of rational universals. Furthermore, the universals are derived from existence, which is a conventional matter, not a rational one, thus they are equal to the legal universals in this regard, and the distinction between them is removed" (3). He said: "Because the guaranteed preservation in the saying of Allah, Exalted is He: { Indeed, We have sent down the Reminder, and indeed, We will preserve it } (4), __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/43, 44. (2) The same source, 1/44. (3) The same location. (4) Surah al-Hijr, 9. [Page 617] The intended meaning here is the preservation of its general principles as stated, which is what is meant by His saying, Exalted is He: { This day I have perfected for you your religion } (1) as well; it is not intended to refer to specific issues. If that were the case, no specific detail of the Sharia would be exempt from preservation, and this is not the case, as we assert the permissibility and support it with occurrences due to the differences in conjectures and the possibilities that arise in specific texts, and the occurrence of errors in them is certain. Errors have been found in the reports of the singular narrators and in the meanings of the verses, which indicates that what is meant by the preserved mention is that which is general in nature (2). The comparison between the texts mentioned above indicates the stated difference between the specific and the branch. __________ (1) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 3. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 1/12. [Page 618] Thus, what is relied upon in Sharia is the roots and their branches, and the particular is not relied upon unless it refers back to a root to be a branch. The root has characteristics that must be noted, which are mentioned above: "general, consistent, established, unchanging, and governing rather than governed." He explained what he meant by these characteristics, saying: "The generality and consistency; thus, the legal rulings regarding the actions of the obligated individuals are absolute, even if their specific instances are countless. There is no action that is mandated nor any stillness that is claimed except that the Sharia governs it individually and collectively, which is the meaning of its generality. And if there is a specific case in its texts or its rationales, it refers back to the general" (1). That is, if a particular exists that can be considered and specifies this general, it must refer back to another general, and the specification of some generals by others is a form of clarification, which is confirmed by the second characteristic of the generals. He said: "The second is permanence without change; therefore, you will not find in them, after their completeness, any abrogation or specification of their generality, nor restriction of their absoluteness, nor lifting of any of their rulings" (2). He said: "Rather, what has been established as a cause is always a cause that does not cease, and what was a condition is always a condition, and what is obligatory is always obligatory, or recommended is recommended, and so on for all rulings; there is no cessation or change for them, and if the obligation were to remain indefinitely, its rulings would be the same" (3). As for the third characteristic, which is that the generals are governing and not governed, its meaning is that there is nothing in the texts of Sharia that necessitates diverting its meaning to a meaning that the texts do not support. He said: "You will never find in practice anything that governs over the Sharia; otherwise, its being governing would turn into being governed" (4). These are the three characteristics that distinguish the roots, and any meaning stated in the sciences of Sharia that loses one of these characteristics is not a root and cannot be referred to. The generals are not contradicted by particulars: __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/44. (2) The same source, 1/45. (3) The same location. (4) The same location. [Page 619] This is a necessary conclusion after clarifying the characteristics of universals; the universal is established through the induction of particulars that converge on a meaning, thus becoming a universal principle. If thereafter a particular is found that contradicts or opposes this universal, this does not invalidate the universal, because the universal has been established definitively, and there is no dispute regarding its establishment. As for the particular, it is either related to something definitive or it is not. If it is related to something definitive, this is a case of conflicting definitives, which cannot occur; rather, each has a context in which it is applicable. If the particular is not related to something definitive, it can be interpreted to relate back to something definitive in order to resolve the conflict, or one may refrain from judgment on it, or it may be rejected. Therefore, the universal is not affected by the opposition of particulars and continues to apply as it is. He said: "These three universals, if they have been legislated for specific interests, are not negated by the absence of individual particulars" (1). He said: "If the universal matter is established universally, then the absence of some particulars from the implications of the universal does not remove it from being universal. Furthermore, the predominant majority is considered in Sharia just as the definitive general is, because the absent particulars do not form a universal that opposes this established universal; this is the nature of inductive universals" (2). He said: "The issues of specific entities are particulars, while the consistent rules are universals, and particulars cannot invalidate universals. Therefore, the rulings of universals remain applicable to particulars even if the meaning of the universals does not specifically appear in them" (3). Induction is the only way to certainty: __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/34. (2) The same source, 2/35. (3) The same source, 3/149 - 150. [Page 620] It is clear that al-Shatibi does not accept evidence unless it is definitive or refers back to something definitive, and the detailed evidences do not indicate the intended purpose of the legislator with definitive indication. So how can certainty be achieved knowing that the detailed evidences are the evidences of rulings? He said: "The relied upon in the first intention is the legal evidences, and the existence of certainty in them based on the commonly used is nonexistent or extremely rare, I mean in the individual evidences. If they are from the reports of the individual narrators, then their failure to provide certainty is evident. And if they are mutawatir (consecutively reported), then their provision of certainty is contingent upon all or most of its premises being speculative, and what is contingent upon the speculative must necessarily be speculative" (1). He then said: "The only considered evidences here are those that have been extrapolated from a group of speculative evidences that converge on one meaning until they provide certainty in it, for the gathering has a strength that separation does not have, and for this reason, the mutawatir provides certainty. This is a type of it. So if a compilation of the evidences of the issue is obtained that provides knowledge, it is the required evidence, and it is similar to the moral mutawatir, like the knowledge of the bravery of Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) and the existence of Hatim, which is derived from the multitude of incidents reported about them" (2). He held that this is the only way to establish certainties in the Sharia. He said: "From this path, the obligation of the five foundations such as prayer and zakat and others has been established with certainty. If someone were to argue for the obligation of prayer by citing His saying, the Exalted, { Establish the prayer } (3) or something similar, it would be a matter of consideration in the argument by itself from several angles" (4). This certainty, and consequently this extrapolation, is required to establish anything from the necessities, needs, or enhancements (5), and these and what falls under them are the objectives of the Sharia or its foundations. They do not deviate or falter as previously mentioned. Indicators of the legal texts: __________ (1) The same source, 1/31, and see: 2/32. (2) The same source, 1/14. (3) Al-Baqarah, 11, 43, 83, and others. (4) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/14. (5) The same source, 2/32. [Page 621] It has become clear that the indication of the singular texts (akhbar al-ahad) is speculative, and this alone does not warrant their consideration according to al-Shatibi. The texts of the Noble Qur'an are speculative in their indication, and the same applies to the mutawatir (consecutively transmitted) Sunnah, while the reports of singular narrations are even more so. Thus, a singular report, even if its authenticity is established, must be approached with caution unless its meaning returns to a definitive meaning. He does not say: "unless it contradicts something stronger than it," but rather: "unless it is definitive or returns to a definitive meaning." Similarly, the texts of the Qur'an can bear multiple meanings, and one cannot definitively assert one of them merely by considering the text. The way to understand the text and apply it is by understanding it in light of what preceded it in revelation, as the revelation of the Qur'an was such that the later verses come as clarification and explanation of the earlier ones. The general principles were revealed first in Mecca. Therefore, the Medinan texts are understood in light of the Meccan ones, and the later Meccan texts are understood in light of the earlier ones, and the same applies to the Medinan texts (1). It is necessary to gather the meanings through the abundance of texts that indicate them. __________ (1) See: the second section of chapter seven. [Page 622] And the Sunnah does not contain new legislation; it does not independently legislate but rather clarifies the Qur'an. Therefore, it corrects the meaning of the hadith: "Whatever comes to you from me, compare it to the Book of Allah. If it agrees with the Book of Allah, then I said it; and if it contradicts the Book of Allah, then I did not say it. How could I contradict the Book of Allah, by which Allah guided me?" (1), and it is relied upon. If it is not authentically narrated, its meaning is still established and definitive for him. He said: "Its meaning is correct whether its chain of narration is sound or not" (2). Among his examples regarding the consideration of the implications of texts through induction is what he mentioned about the establishment of necessities, including his statement about prayer: "When we look at prayer, we find the command to establish prayer in various forms, and we find praise for those who establish it and condemnation for those who abandon it, and the obligation for the accountable to perform it, establishing it while standing, sitting, and lying on their sides, and fighting against those who abandon it or oppose its abandonment, and other matters of this nature" (3). He then said that through this: "We have certainly learned the obligation of prayer" (4). He said: "And likewise for all other evidences in the principles of Sharia, and this is how the principles differ from the branches, as the branches are based on individual evidences and specific sources, remaining on their original basis of reliance on conjecture, unlike the principles which are derived from the induction of the implications of the evidences in general, not from their individual cases specifically" (5). This is an example of reasoning with the texts of the Qur'an. As for the Sunnah, one of its examples is his saying: "His saying, peace be upon him: 'There should be neither harm nor reciprocating harm'" (6), for it falls under a definitive principle in this regard, as harm and reciprocating harm are prohibited throughout the Sharia in specific incidents and general rules, such as His saying, Exalted is He: { And do not hold them to hurt them, so that you may transgress } (7), and { And do not harm them, so that you may make it difficult for them } (8), __________ (1) The statements regarding it will be clarified in the following section. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/11. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/15. (4) The same source, 1/16. (5) The same location. (6) Its narration has been previously mentioned. (7) Surah Al-Baqarah, 231. (8) Surah At-Talaq, 6. [Page 623] And { a mother should not be harmed by her child } (1) is the verse, and from it comes the prohibition against transgressing upon souls, properties, and honor, as well as against usurpation and injustice, and everything that is in the meaning of causing harm or injury. This includes offenses against the soul, intellect, lineage, or wealth, which is a meaning that is extremely general in the Sharia, with no dispute or doubt about it. And when you consider the reports of the singular narrations (akhbar al-ahad), you will find them to be so (2). Thus, the intention of the Legislator to eliminate harm is definitive in the Sharia, and this hadith relates its meaning to this definitive meaning; therefore, it is accepted. This is also the case for all reports of singular narrations according to his statement above. Indications of rulings: __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 233. (2) Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 3/8. [Page 624] Among the meanings that can be definitively established are the meanings of rulings, not just the meanings of texts. The meanings of rulings are what one can imagine as intended by the ruling, such as wisdom, benefit, cause, or outcome. All of these, if they are what the text can accommodate, must be established through induction, as has been clarified. However, if there is no indication from the text, neither in its explicit wording nor in its implied meaning, then this is something that can be imagined as intended by the legislator in the ruling and can be used to justify the ruling, even if it does not fall under one of the established paths of reasoning, which are the text, consensus, or hints and implications. Yet, it is only acceptable if it is established with certainty, which is done by examining many rulings or particulars that can accommodate this meaning or this reason. Without useful induction for certainty, these meanings are mere illusions and fantasies, and they are not considered because they do not return to a definitive origin; they may even contradict a foundational principle. Among his statements regarding such meanings or justifications is: "What is counted among the salt of knowledge is not part of its essence unless it is definitive and does not return to a definitive origin, but rather to something speculative, or it returns to something definitive but lacks a specific characteristic of those characteristics (1) or more than one characteristic; it is an illusion and something that provokes the intellect at first glance and initial consideration without compromising its essence or the meaning of another" (2). He also said: "Because if it is valid in minds, it does not yield any present benefit other than mere comfort for the souls" (3). The imagined meaning may also contradict a definitive principle; he said: "What is not part of the essence nor the salt: what does not return to a definitive or speculative origin, but rather its nature is to contradict its origin or another by nullification" (4). __________ (1) That is, the three characteristics of the principles. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/45. (3) The same source, 1/46. (4) The same source, 1/50. [Page 625] He said: "This, if it inclines towards a people and they find it pleasing and seek it, is due to a superficial resemblance and confusion between it and what preceded it, so the foolish may consider it based on an original principle and thus lean towards it for that reason. The reality of its origin is delusion and imagination, with no truth to it, along with the additional interests and desires that accompany it" (1). Accordingly, the indications of rulings are the objectives or interests (masalih) that the observer imagines are intended by them; these must be established through induction. This is what is meant by his statement: "similar to moral transmission (tawatur ma'nawi)." However, it should be noted that there is a difference between this transmission and moral transmission in the terminology of hadith science. In hadith science, moral transmission refers to the abundance of texts indicating a specific meaning with variations in wording and narrations; it is an indication of texts, while the transmission that al-Shatibi refers to is an indication of rulings. Therefore, he did not describe his intent as moral transmission; rather, he said: "similar to moral transmission." This meaning that al-Shatibi seeks to establish through the abundance of rulings that align with it has no indication in the text whatsoever. Searching for it and proving that it is intended by the Legislator requires evidence. It has been previously mentioned that there are those who reject the claim of these reasons and attribute them to mere opinion and the imaginations of hearts. So what is the evidence for the legitimacy of reasoning with them and the permissibility of seeking their induction in rulings? The answer lies in the reasoning behind the actions and rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, and that He does not legislate except for the interests of the servants. The reasoning of the Sharia with its objectives: __________ (1) The same source, 1/51. [Page 626] The issue of justifying rulings through wisdom, interests, and appropriate descriptions has been the subject of considerable debate among theologians. This issue was introduced into the science of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) due to its impact on the discussions regarding the pathways of causation, which are the non-prescriptive pathways (1). Al-Shatibi came into this fray to establish a definitive principle, which is that the actions and rulings of Allah, Exalted is He, have purposes, and that He does not act except for a purpose He intends. He aimed to respond to those who rejected this justification, particularly Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, who himself firmly denied the notion that the actions of Allah are justified, while maintaining the claim of justifying rulings and through analogy. Al-Shatibi said: "The establishment of the laws is for the interests of the servants in both the immediate and the ultimate. This is a claim that must be substantiated as true or false, and this is not the place for that. Disagreement has arisen regarding it in the science of theology. Al-Razi claimed that the rulings of Allah are not justified by any cause whatsoever, just as His actions are not. And the Mu'tazila agreed that His rulings are justified by considering the interests of the servants, and this is the choice of most later jurists" (2). He then said: "What is relied upon is that we have inferred from the Sharia that it was established for the interests of the servants through an inference that al-Razi and others do not dispute" (3). Thus, the justification of the Sharia by the interests of the servants, according to him, can only be achieved through inference, which differs from the reasoning of the earlier scholars who advocated for this justification (4). __________ (1) See: the first chapter of this book. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/2. (3) The same source, 2/3. (4) See: the third discussion of the third chapter of this book. [Page 627] The objectives of the Legislator (al-Shari) are broader than the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), as the reasoning behind God's actions means that the Legislator has an objective in every action He performs. He has objectives in the creation of the heavens and the earth and in the creation of man, and these are objectives of the Legislator, not objectives of the Sharia. Among the objectives of the Legislator are also His objectives regarding how to understand the discourse, meaning the principles of understanding the meanings of words and structures, and these are not objectives of the Sharia. Therefore, the objectives in His view are of different types, and all of them are only considered valid if established through induction. Objectives: The objectives (maqasid) are of two types: the objective of the legislator (al-shari) and the objective of the obligated person (al-mukallaf). The objective of the legislator has four types. He said: "The objectives that are considered are of two types: one relates to the objective of the legislator and the other relates to the objective of the obligated person. The first is considered from the perspective of the legislator's intention in establishing the Sharia (law) from the outset, and from the perspective of his intention in establishing it for understanding, and from the perspective of his intention in establishing it for obligation according to it, and from the perspective of his intention in bringing the obligated person under its ruling. These are four types."(1) The first type is the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), which are the necessary, need-based, and enhancement-related interests, along with what is supplementary and complementary to them(2). The second type pertains to the foundational and linguistic rules relied upon to understand the implications of the legal text. The third type is to clarify that the legislator did not intend hardship with the obligation, even though it may be a consequence of the obligation, and to distinguish between the hardships that the legislator intended to alleviate and those that the legislator did not intend to alleviate. The fourth type is that one of the objectives of the legislator is the servitude of the servants and their submission to the command of the legislator, and to divert them from the inclinations of their desires, even if this contradicts what they perceive to be in their interest. However, two new matters stand out and should be noted regarding al-Shatibi that differ from other scholars of usul (usul al-fiqh) who argue for the justification of rulings based on public interest (maslaha) or the pursuit of benefits and the prevention of harms. These are his understanding of public interest and harm, as well as the meaning of justifying the Sharia (Sharia) based on public interest. The concept of al-Shatibi regarding public interest (maslaha) and harm (mafsada): __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/2. (2) The same source, 2/3 - 4 - 5. [Page 628] The public interest (maslaha) according to al-Shatibi is what has been established as being intended by the legislator through the ruling. The harm (mafsada) is what has been established as being intended by the legislator through the ruling when it does not occur. This is known through the examination of texts and rulings. If it is established that an action is commanded, then the action is a public interest; if it is established that it is prohibited, then it is a harm. The same applies to the results, outcomes, or causes of the action. What is established through examination to be the reason for the ruling of the laws is a public interest, as actions are causes for outcomes, as are the rulings of actions. What is established through examination to be the reason for the prohibition of the laws is a harm. This is confirmed by looking at the causal relationship between the ruling and its results and implications. The public interest, according to him, is not merely what brings benefit or what makes the obligated person feel aligned with human inclinations and needs, nor is it a condition for the public interest to be a suitable description. The same applies to the harm; rather, there must be a causal relationship between the ruling and what it is connected to. This meaning is extensively discussed in many places in his book, particularly in his discussions on causes and effects in the Book of Rulings, as well as in his discussions on the fourth type of objectives of the legislator. He said: "Prohibited causes are causes of harms, not of public interests, just as permissible causes are causes of public interests, not of harms" (1). He also said: "If that is the case, it is not correct for anyone to claim that the Sharia was established according to the desires and objectives of the people" (2). He stated: "The fact that the public interest is a public interest intended by the ruling and the harm is a harm likewise is something specific to the legislator, and there is no room for reason in this based on the principle of negation of good and evil. If the legislator has established a ruling for a certain public interest, then he is the one who has established it as a public interest; otherwise, it could logically be that it is not so, as all things are equal in relation to their original status, and reason has no jurisdiction over them in terms of goodness or badness." __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/167. (2) The same source, 2/116. [Page 629] Thus, the fact that the public interest (maslaha) is a public interest is from the perspective of the legislator, such that reason affirms it and the soul finds reassurance in it. The interests, as they are interests, have been viewed as acts of worship (ta'abudiyyat), and what is based on the act of worship can only be an act of worship (1). Accordingly, al-Shatibi's reasoning for the Sharia based on interests means that it must be established for him that the intention of the legislator is present; if it is established, then it is a public interest regardless of human sentiment. This is a new perspective that contradicts the conventional understanding of the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) regarding public interest, and the same can be said for harm (mafsada). The meaning of reasoning for the Sharia based on interests: The rulings are causes for effects that are the intended goals of the legislator, and the rulings are established based on this intended goal. From here, this intended goal becomes a reason for legislation, and the jurists discover these reasons through examining the outcomes and effects of the rulings. The intended goal of the legislator exists prior to the rulings, and based on it, the rulings were revealed. For the jurist, the intended goal can only be known through the rulings. Hence, al-Shatibi considers the intended goal to be a reason, even though in meaning, the reason for an action precedes it, while the intended goal comes after it. This meaning of reasoning, along with the previously mentioned meaning of public interest, leads to the conclusion that the appropriateness of the described attributes is not a condition. If the reason or intended goal is a suitable description that makes the obligated person feel that it aligns with their human nature and purposes, then this is an incidental matter and not the original basis according to the principle of negating beautification and vilification. This differs from the intention of the scholars of usul who spoke of reasoning for the Sharia based on interests; indeed, even if it resembles their expressions, it undermines their idea. __________ (1) The same source, 2/219. [Page 630] Therefore, al-Shatibi refutes all the statements of his predecessors on this matter, saying that if one observes the consideration of the Sharia for the purposes of the servants and their inclinations, and what aligns with what they strive for, this is incidental and not the essence. The essence is that Allah - Exalted is He - created man for His worship, but He favored them by assisting them in their worship by creating in them desires and inclinations that drive them towards obedience. He said: "If it is said: The establishment of laws is either in vain or for wisdom, the first is invalid by consensus" (1), and he continued in his statement: "Because every rational person seeks the benefit of himself and what aligns with his desires in this world and the Hereafter, and the Sharia has guaranteed them this demand within the framework of obligation. So how can it be denied that the Sharia is established in accordance with the purposes of the servants and the motivations of their desires? Moreover, it has already been clarified that the Sharia came in accordance with the purposes of the servants and confirmed their shares" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/117. (2) The same source. [Page 631] Then he responds to this objection by saying: "The answer is that if we concede that the purpose of the Sharia (law) is for the interests of the servants, then it returns to them according to the command of the Lawgiver and within the limits He has set, not according to their whims and desires. Therefore, the legal obligations are heavy on the souls" (1). He said: "The wisdom of the All-Wise, All-Aware has decreed that the establishment of religion and the world can only be rectified and sustained by motivations from the human side that drive him to acquire what he needs for himself and others. Thus, He created for him the desire for food and drink when he is afflicted by hunger and thirst to motivate him to seek to fulfill this need as much as he can. Similarly, He created for him the desire for women to motivate him to acquire the means that lead to them" (2), and so on. He then said: "If Allah had willed, He could have imposed this with disregard for desires, or He could have imposed it while removing the innate motivations. However, He has favored His servants by making it a means to cultivate the world for the Hereafter and has made the acquisition of these desires permissible, not prohibited, but according to legal rules that are more effective in achieving benefits and more enduring than what the servant considers to be beneficial" (3). These two ideas in al-Shatibi's thought, namely his concept of benefit (maslaha) and harm (mafsada), and his intention in saying that the Sharia was established for the interests of the servants, represent a reversal of what is commonly understood by the scholars of Usul (principles of jurisprudence) who assert that the Sharia is justified by bringing about benefits and preventing harms. Ijtihad and Taqlid: Allah created people for His worship, and there is no action except that there is a ruling from Allah regarding it. Therefore, it is upon the obligated person, whether he is an independent jurist (mujtahid) or a follower (muqallid), to seek the ruling of Allah. The ruling of Allah is His intention, which is understood according to what has been previously explained. The ruling of Allah, Exalted is He, is understood by the recognized jurist who comprehends the objectives of the Sharia in general and in detail, and who works with both the general principles and the specific cases when exercising ijtihad. He is the one whose conduct aligns with his fatwa, being pious and committed in his statements and actions according to what he issues in fatwas and according to what is known of the characteristics of the righteous predecessors and others among the pious and righteous in religion. __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 2/117. (2) The same source, 2/122. (3) The same source, 2/123. [Page 632] As for the follower (muqallid), he has no consideration of the legal evidence (adillah shar'iyyah), and his pursuit of the intention of the Legislator (al-shari') is through weighing the opinions of the jurists (mujtahidin), as they serve as legal evidence for him. It is not permissible for him to choose between the opinions, as this would be following his desires. As for the condition of understanding the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) in general and in detail, when the mujtahid (jurist) reaches this understanding, he can issue a fatwa (legal opinion), and his statement will be considered valid if he is pious, even if he does not know the Arabic language, as he can understand the objectives through reception and translation. He said: "If ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) is related to deriving rulings from texts, then knowledge of Arabic is a must. However, if it is related to the meanings of benefits and harms, abstracted from the texts or accepted from the one who exercises ijtihad in the texts, then knowledge of Arabic is not required; rather, knowledge of the objectives of the Sharia in general and in detail is necessary"(1). He said: "Therefore, whoever understands the objectives of the Sharia from the establishment of rulings and reaches the rank of knowledge of them, even if his understanding comes through translation in a non-Arabic tongue, there is no difference between him and one who understands them through the Arabic language"(2). The Second Topic Discussion of al-Shatibi's Idea Universals and Induction The topic of this section: After presenting the idea of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) according to al-Shatibi in detail, and then presenting and highlighting its foundation and pillars briefly in the previous section, we will discuss this foundation and these pillars in this section and the next. The ideas that will be discussed in this section are: 1 - Al-Shatibi's condition that the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) must be definitive. 2 - Induction and its being the only path to certainty. 3 - His statement that the universals (kulliyat) are not violated by the particulars (juz'iyat). 4 - The conceptual transmission (al-tawatur al-ma'nawi). __________ (1) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/90. (2) The same source, 4/91. [Page 633] These ideas are the pillars of al-Shatibi's (may Allah be pleased with him) concept. Through discussing them, the correctness or incorrectness of some of his ideas becomes evident, such as the meaning of returning to the definitive (qat'i) in his view, and that the legal evidence is only accepted if it is definitive or refers back to something definitive. As for the next section, it will be - if Allah wills - a discussion of the foundation of the idea, which is the principle of reasoning behind the actions of Allah (Exalted is He), and to discuss a necessary consequence of his methodology, which is the possibility for the jurist (mujtahid) who is well-versed in the general principles of the Sharia to dispense with examining its particulars. This includes the non-requirement of knowledge of Arabic for the jurist who is knowledgeable about the objectives of the Sharia in general and in detail. The requirement of certainty in the principles of jurisprudence: Al-Shatibi held that the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) must be definitive (qat'i) and that they are associated in this regard with beliefs (aqa'id). He clarified that his understanding of the principles differs from that of other scholars of usul. His understanding of the principles refers to the definitive meanings that jurisprudence relies upon or derives from. Yes, he differs in this from the imams of usul (principles) and the jurists, and this is one of his novelties. This is something I see as a mistake. The seriousness of this mistake is magnified because it is in the principles, and it is not merely a principle among the principles, but rather a principle that governs the principles, indeed it governs the entire methodology. The error in it is not in its being new, nor in its contradicting the methodology established by the imams, but rather in its subject matter, that is, in the meaning of this principle. [Page 634] Indeed, al-Shatibi did not provide evidence for this statement; rather, he presented it as a report, linking the principles to the beliefs in a formulation that could be accepted at first glance. When reading his statements on this matter, the mind shifts to the commonly understood meaning in the words of the imams regarding the necessity of certainty in the principles, which are the sources of legislation, namely the general evidences of jurisprudence, which are the four evidences: the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). However, al-Shatibi went further, intending the principles and rules of jurisprudence in the sense of the discussions of the principles of jurisprudence, such as the indication of a command for obligation or otherwise, or the rule that what is necessary for the obligation to be fulfilled is itself obligatory, or the rule that the default state of things is permissibility unless there is evidence for prohibition, or the rule of public interest (maslaha), or preference (istihsan), or presumption of continuity (istishab). These rules could indeed be subjected to the condition of certainty if they were meant as sources of legislation, that is, evidences standing on their own; however, this is not what al-Shatibi intended. The linking of the principles in the sense of sources of legislation to beliefs and the condition of certainty in them is based on Allah's condemnation of following conjecture and the reproach of those who follow conjecture, and this pertains to beliefs. Allah, Exalted is He, said: { They are nothing but names you have named them, you and your forefathers; Allah has not sent down any authority for them. They follow nothing but conjecture and what their souls desire, and guidance has certainly come to them from their Lord } (1). And He, Exalted is He, said: { Indeed, those who do not believe in the Hereafter will name the angels with female names (27) and they have no knowledge of it; they follow nothing but conjecture, and indeed, conjecture does not avail against the truth at all } (2). And He, Exalted is He, said: { And most of them follow nothing but conjecture; indeed, conjecture does not avail against the truth at all } (3). __________ (1) Surah An-Najm, 23. (2) Surah An-Najm, 27 - 28. (3) Surah Yunus, 36. [Page 635] And Allah, Exalted is He, said: {Indeed, those who have differed concerning it are in doubt about it; they have no knowledge of it except the following of assumption.} (1). And Allah, Exalted is He, said: {And if you obey most of those upon the earth, they will mislead you from the way of Allah. They follow not except assumption, and they are not but falsifying.} (2). And Allah, Exalted is He, said: {Say, "Do you have any knowledge that you can produce for us? You follow not except assumption, and you are not but falsifying."} (3). And Allah, Exalted is He, said: {Are you disputing with me concerning names you have named, you and your forefathers, for which Allah has not sent down any authority?} (4). And Allah, Exalted is He, said: {Say, "Produce your proof, if you should be among the truthful."} (5). These verses and others are explicit in condemning assumption and in condemning the belief and faith in things without authority or proof, and the authority and proof is the decisive evidence, for if it is based on assumption, it is condemned. However, this applies to beliefs and not to legal rulings, as it has been established in the latter— as will be clarified— that it is permissible to follow assumption based on certainty. The principles that are related to beliefs are the general sources of jurisprudence, for if someone claims that legal obligations are derived from such-and-such person or from such-and-such book or from any source without a decisive proof for that, this is following assumption, which is condemned. This leads to the permissibility of deriving legislations from visions and dreams if there is an assumption that they are good visions for the righteous, and it may lead to the permissibility of deriving legislations from the Torah and the Gospel if there is an assumption regarding some of their texts that they are not altered. All of these are general sources, but these are assumptions, and no decisive proof has been provided to validate these assumptions, and therefore they are rejected. __________ (1) Surah An-Nisa, 157. (2) Surah Al-An'am, 116. (3) Surah Al-An'am, 148. (4) Surah Al-A'raf, 71. (5) Surah Al-Baqarah, 111, and Surah An-Naml, 64. [Page 636] The principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) that are related to beliefs (aqa'id) are those that resemble beliefs in that they are foundational for other matters, while they themselves are not built upon anything else. If they are built upon something else, then they are considered branches, and their validity or invalidity depends on that other matter. Accordingly, the scholars of usul have classified the principles of jurisprudence as the four general proofs. Additionally, there are other rules and principles that are relied upon in ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) and istinbat (deduction), for which certainty is not a prerequisite, as they are based on other matters that have been established with certainty. Some have even excluded qiyas (analogy) from the requirement of certainty, considering that qiyas relies on the cause (illah) and its extension, and the source of the cause is the three proofs: the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and consensus (ijma). Thus, reliance on the cause and its extension goes back to these three, and qiyas thereafter is merely the action of the one making the analogy, which is speculative. This is similar to reasoning based on reports of the individual narrators (akhbar al-ahad), which is also speculative, but its foundation, which is the Sunnah, is certain, and the obligation to act upon reports of the individual narrators is certain. [Page 637] Therefore, the scholars of usul (usul al-fiqh) did not refer to the speculative evidences as proofs, but rather considered them to be indicators; they are signs that point to their meanings. However, the obligation to act upon them or to follow them does not depend on them, but rather on something else, which is the conclusive evidence for acting upon them. The conclusive evidences are the definitive proofs for the obligation to adhere to the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), and analogy (qiyas). The conclusive evidence is not the detailed proof itself, which is different from the jurists, as these indicators are considered proofs by the scholars of usul and the theologians. Al-Asnawi said: "Know that the expression of proofs excludes many principles of jurisprudence such as generalities, reports of the singular (akhbar al-ahad), analogy, presumption of continuity (istihsan), and others. For the scholars of usul, even if they acknowledge them, they are not considered proofs for jurisprudence but rather indicators of it, as the term proof is only applied to that which is certain" (1). He also said: "I say: The proofs of jurisprudence are divided into those agreed upon by the imams and those disputed. The agreed upon are four: the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and analogy, while everything else such as presumption of continuity, public interests (masalih mursala), preference (istihsan), reverse analogy (qiyas al-aks), and taking the lesser of what has been said, and others that will come are disputed among them" (2). He further stated: "As for the auditory evidences, if they are disputed, they only provide conjecture according to those who advocate them, while the agreed upon among the imams are the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and analogy. As for analogy, it is clear that it only provides conjecture, and as for consensus, if it reaches us through singular reports, it is likewise, and its transmission through mass reporting is very rare. Even if it is assumed, Imam in al-Mahsool and al-Amidi in al-Ihkam and al-Muntaha al-Sul have affirmed that it is speculative. As for the Sunnah, singular reports from it only provide conjecture, while the mass-reported ones are like the Qur'an, their text is definitive but their indication is speculative due to the need to negate the ten possibilities" (3). __________ (1) Al-Asnawi, Nihayat al-Sul, 1/10. (2) The same source, 1/44 - 45. (3) The same source, 1/41. [Page 638] And based on that, the definitive evidence (qat'i) that they require for the proof is in the sense of the evidence that is a comprehensive source for legislation. As for other rules, principles, and rulings, they are speculative (dhanni) and are relied upon and followed in the Sharia, and no definitive evidence is required for their establishment or meaning. Rather, the condition is that they must be based on definitive evidence, that is, on the evidence that serves as their source, which are the four agreed-upon evidences. If there is disagreement regarding them, then the evidence (which is the source) must be definitive according to those who affirm it among the jurists. Al-Zarkashi said: "Then the intended evidences are the Book, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma), analogy (qiyas), and reasoning (istidlal). Imam al-Haramayn and al-Ghazali said: They are three: the Book, the Sunnah, and consensus, and they denied that speculative universal laws are part of the principles of jurisprudence. He said in the summary: What the scholars have accepted is that what cannot be known, such as reports and analogies, is not considered part of the principles of jurisprudence." (1) He then said: "If it is said: The reports of the singular narrators (akhbar al-ahad) and analogies do not lead to knowledge and they are among the evidences of the rulings of the Sharia, it is said to him: The principles are concerned with establishing evidences on the obligation of implementation, and that is what is understood through definitive evidences. As for the practice, it is derived from them, thus it pertains to jurisprudence rather than its principles. He said in al-Burhan: If it is said: Most of the legal issues are speculative, we say: Speculation is not jurisprudence; rather, jurisprudence is the knowledge of the obligation of action when speculation arises. Therefore, the scholars said: The reports of the singular narrators and analogies do not necessitate action by themselves; rather, action must be based on what necessitates knowledge of action, which are the definitive evidences regarding the obligation of action when the reports of singular narrators are narrated and analogies are established. He said: Although they are found only in the principles of jurisprudence, the role of the jurist is to clarify the definitive in acting upon them." (2) __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 1/18 - 19. (2) The same source, and see: Al-Juwaini, al-Burhan, 1/78 - 79, paragraphs: 4 - 5 - 6. [Page 639] In these previous texts, there are two matters: the first is that detailed evidences provide a presumption, and there is conclusive evidence that it is obligatory to act upon this presumption; the second is that presumption is acted upon in legal matters because it is based on conclusive evidence that has established, with certainty, the obligation to rely on it as a source or reference, and not every presumption is legal, but only that which is based on conclusive legal evidences. These two matters, along with the texts of the aforementioned imams, indicate al-Shatibi's deviation from the established methodology, and the error in what al-Shatibi has claimed, as these texts contain evidence for the obligation to act upon the presumptive without requiring that the presumptive meaning returns to a conclusive meaning; rather, the condition is to return to a conclusive source. If we add to this that al-Shatibi did not provide evidence for what he stated, nor did he clarify any errors in the statements of the imams, then this condition he imposed is invalid, especially since he claims that this is what the verses and reports have established and what the righteous predecessors acted upon. The inclusion of principles in beliefs is valid if the principles are those that do not depend on anything else; if they are dependent on something else, then they are branches of others, even if they are principles from which others branch out. In this case, if they are presumptive, there is no harm in that if there is conclusive evidence for the obligation to act upon them. The obligation to act upon the presumptive: What further confirms the error in al-Shatibi's view regarding the principles for which he required conclusive evidence, and the mistake he built upon that, is that the legal evidence must either be conclusive or refer back to something conclusive. The conclusive evidences for the obligation to act upon the presumptive, if its source is conclusive, do not require that its meaning returns to a conclusive meaning. [Page 640] The statements of the imams have multiplied regarding this matter, and reports have been transmitted in this sense, in response to those who deny the validity of acting upon the report of the individual (khabar al-wahid). This is despite the fact that the report of the individual is subject to doubt from two aspects: from the aspect of its authenticity and from the aspect of its indication. In contrast, the texts of the Qur'an are only subject to doubt from the aspect of their indication. As for consensus (ijma), in terms of its transmission, it is similar to the report of the individual, and in terms of its indication, it may be similar or stronger. Analogy (qiyas) relates to the three, and there are decisive and numerous proofs that establish the obligation to act upon the report of the individual that is deemed to be attributed to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) without any condition other than that it does not contradict a stronger evidence, and this is not the subject of discussion. Al-Zarkashi said: "Indeed, al-Shafi'i authored a book on the validation of the report of the individual (khabar al-wahid), and at the beginning he mentioned the well-known hadith: 'May Allah have mercy on the one who hears my words'(1). Abu Dawood objected and said: He established the report of the individual by the report of the individual, and a thing cannot be established by itself, like someone who claims something and is asked: Who witnesses for you? He replies: I witness for myself. The companions said: What he mentioned is invalid, for al-Shafi'i did not rely on a single hadith; rather, he mentioned around three hundred hadiths and indicated the ways of deriving evidence from them, and the totality is what supports it"(2). __________ (1) Narrated by al-Tirmidhi in the Book of Knowledge from the Messenger of Allah, under the chapter on the encouragement to convey what one hears with the wording: "May Allah brighten the face of a servant..." with the number (2582), and Ahmad (16153), and al-Darimi (230), and it is found with the same wording in the Great Dictionary of al-Tabarani, under the chapter on the letter zay. (2) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 3/321. [Page 641] Al-Juwayni summarized the many proofs by saying: "The usuliyyin (scholars of Islamic jurisprudence) have elaborated extensively on the ways to respond to the deniers, and our preferred approach consists of two paths: the first is based on a widely accepted matter that only a denier would dispute and only a stubborn person would reject. This is that we know with certainty from our minds that the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) used to send messengers and entrust them with conveying the rulings and details of the lawful and unlawful. He would sometimes accompany them with written texts, and their transmission of the commands of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) was on the basis of individual reports (ahad), and they were not necessarily infallible. Thus, their reports were subject to doubt, and this was established as a certainty, widely accepted without any refutation, as it is supported by the concept of tawatur (transmission of reports by a large number of people). Only something that is astonishing can refute the widely accepted. This is one of the paths. The second path is based on the consensus of the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them), and their consensus on acting upon the reports of individuals is transmitted widely. We do not doubt that in matters of events, they sought rulings from the Book of Allah, and if they did not find a mention for the matter at hand, they would turn to seek the reports of the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him), and they would hasten to rely on the transmission of the trustworthy and reliable without disagreement."(1) Al-Zarkashi also mentioned a similar statement.(2) The independence of the Sunnah in legislation: Al-Shatibi argued that the Sunnah (tradition) does not independently legislate based on the premise that the Qur'an contains clarification of everything, and that the Sunnah serves as an explanation of it. Accordingly, the Sunnah does not introduce anything that lacks a basis in the Qur'an, neither in terms of subject matter, meaning, or type. The commentary on this statement is that the fact that the Qur'an contains the explanation of everything, and that the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet) explains the Qur'an, does not mean that the Sunnah cannot independently legislate, nor that the Sunnah cannot introduce obligations that have no basis in the Qur'an. The indication of the Qur'an regarding the Sunnah and the obligation to derive rulings from it is part of the explanation and completes the explanation. The indication of the Sunnah regarding matters not found in the Qur'an does not contradict the fact that the Qur'an is an explanation. __________ (1) Al-Juwayni, Al-Burhan, 1/388, paragraph: 539 - 540. (2) See: al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 3/320. [Page 642] It cannot be said that the Qur'an contains an explanation of everything in this sense, which is that every meaning indicated by the Sunnah (tradition) is present in the Qur'an. Rather, it can be said that there is nothing brought by the Sunnah except that it has a basis in the Qur'an, and this is a point of contention. As for the assumption that the Sunnah does not bring anything that is not in the Qur'an, how can this be the case?! Does the Qur'an command prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and other matters that have been mentioned in a general way and clarified by the Sunnah? Is this clarified in the Qur'an? What the Sunnah has brought, is it not an independent legislation even if it has a basis in the Qur'an? The issue of the independence of the Sunnah in legislation or lack thereof is intended to address whether the Sunnah brings something that has no basis in the Qur'an or not, and not whether it contains additional clarification or not. The Sunnah certainly contains additional clarification; otherwise, how would we be guided in our prayer if it were not for the Sunnah?! All that the Sunnah has brought in terms of specification, restriction, and clarification of what is general in the Qur'an that is not explained therein is additional legislation that the Sunnah has independently established. [Page 643] As for what al-Shatibi (may Allah have mercy on him) cited from His saying, Exalted is He: { And We have sent down to you the Book as a clarification for all things } (1). And His saying, Exalted is He: { And We have sent down to you the Reminder that you may make clear to the people what was sent down to them } (2). This does not support his view. As for the first verse, the Book clarifies everything, and one of the means of its clarification is the Sunnah, for the Book indicates the Sunnah, and the indication of the Book towards the Sunnah makes the clarification of the Sunnah regarding things part of the clarification of the Book regarding them. If one person says to another: "Do such and such, and everything that so-and-so tells you," or "And everything I command you in an independent book," does his statement, "and everything that so-and-so tells you" or "and everything I command you in an independent book," constitute a deficiency in clarifying what he has commanded him, or do the commands that come from so-and-so or those that appear in an independent book count as part of the clarification of what the first person wants? Therefore, the fact that the Book is a clarification for everything does not contradict the Sunnah bringing forth what is not in the Qur'an or has no basis in the Qur'an. The Qur'an has linked the command to obey Allah, Exalted is He, and to obey His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him). He, Exalted is He, said: { O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger } (3). And He, Exalted is He, said: { Whoever obeys the Messenger has obeyed Allah } (4). And the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "I was given the Qur'an and something like it with it" (5). __________ (1) Surah an-Nahl, 89. (2) Surah an-Nahl, 44. (3) Surah an-Nisa, 59, and Surah Muhammad, 33. (4) Surah an-Nisa, 80. (5) Al-Shawkani, Nail al-Awtar min Ahadith Sayyid al-Akhiyar, Sharh Muntaka al-Akhbar, Book of Foods and Hunting, Chapter on the principle that the default ruling for substances and things is permissibility until prohibition is established. He mentioned the hadith in the wording: "I was given the Qur'an and something like it with it" and said: it is an authentic hadith, 8/111. Dar al-Ilm - Beirut, and it was narrated by Ahmad (16546), and it has variants in the wording: "I was given the Book...". [Page 644] And as for His saying, Exalted is He: { And We have sent down to you the Reminder that you may make clear to the people what was sent down to them }, it does not indicate that the Sunnah is not independent in legislation. Rather, it indicates that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) conveys, clarifies, details, and explains what has come in the Qur'an. There is nothing in the wording of the text or its implication that indicates that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) does not clarify anything other than what has come in the Qur'an. Allah, Exalted is He, revealed to His Prophet the Sharia of Islam, and this was through what He revealed to him from the Qur'an and from the Sunnah. Thus, he (peace and blessings be upon him) clarifies the Qur'an and clarifies the Sunnah, and both are revelation. Allah, Exalted is He, said: { And he does not speak from [his own] inclination (3) It is not but a revelation revealed } (1). This is confirmed by the texts that require obedience to the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) and clarify that Allah, Exalted is He, has given him the Qur'an and something like it with him(2). Therefore, the inquiry of whether the Sunnah is independent in legislation or not is essentially about whether the Sunnah brings forth a command that has no basis in the Qur'an or not, meaning whether it has no kind or type to refer to in its subject matter, that is, in meaning. The claim that the Sunnah does not come with that requires evidence, and there is no evidence; rather, the evidences allow for that. Thus, the evidences that rely on this matter are the extrapolation of the obligations of the Qur'an and the obligations of the Sunnah, that is, their occurrence or non-occurrence, and it has been established that they do occur. This is like the prohibition of the flesh of domesticated donkeys and every predator with fangs and every bird with talons(3). So, if the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) permitted these things, would the permissibility contradict a principle in the Qur'an? Is it not that if the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) had not prohibited them, their ruling would be permissibility based on the principle: the default ruling of things is permissibility unless there is evidence of prohibition? __________ (1) Surah Al-Najm, 3 - 4. (2) See: Imam al-Shafi'i, Al-Risala, pp. 79 - 104, paragraph: 258 - 308. (3) The hadiths mentioned earlier. [Page 645] As for al-Shatibi's (may Allah have mercy on him) statement that Allah, Exalted is He, has permitted the good things (tayyibat) and prohibited the evil things (khaba'ith), and that there remain things whose ruling is unclear to the jurist and it is difficult for him to determine whether they belong to the good things or the evil things, this is an attempt to adapt the issue to align with his methodology and has no basis in truth. For if it were not for the prohibition of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), no one would doubt that they are permissible based on the principle of permissibility, and thus they would be considered among the good things. The prohibition of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) is what rendered them among the evil things in the sense of being prohibited, and Allah knows best. Moreover, al-Shatibi did not inform us of the basis of the evil things and the basis of the good things. Al-Shafi'i (may Allah have mercy on him) said: "The Messenger of Allah established with the Book of Allah and legislated in matters for which there is no specific text in the Book" (1). Al-Zarkashi (may Allah have mercy on him) stated under the title (The Sunnah Independent in Legislation): "For this reason, the Imam of the Two Holy Sanctuaries did not separate the Sunnah from the Book, and he said: Everything the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) says is from the statement of Allah, Exalted is He, so there is no point in mentioning a distinction between the Book and the Sunnah. Al-Shafi'i explicitly stated in the Risala that the Sunnah is regarded as revealed like the Qur'an" (2). Among what he cited regarding the independence of the Sunnah in legislation is: "Such as the prohibition of the meat of the domesticated donkey and every carnivorous animal with fangs, which are not explicitly mentioned in the Book" (3). As for the hadith that instructs to present the hadiths to the Book, which al-Shatibi validated its meaning even if its chain of narration is not authentic, al-Shafi'i said about it: "No one has narrated this who has established his hadith in anything, whether small or large" (4). __________ (1) Imam al-Shafi'i, Risala, p. 88, paragraph: 293. (2) Al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 3/236. (3) The same source, p. 237. (4) Imam al-Shafi'i, Risala, p. 225, paragraph: 618. [Page 646] And it was brought to Professor Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, the verifier of the book Al-Risala, a commentary on the hadith "What comes to you from me, compare it with the Book of Allah; whatever agrees with it, I have said it, and whatever contradicts it, I have not said it." He stated: "This meaning has not been reported in any authentic or good hadith; rather, many phrases have been reported, all of which are fabricated or extremely weak to the extent that none of them is suitable for proof or citation" (1). He then mentioned that among those who reported it are those who are known for fabricating hadith, and he cited the statements of the hadith scholars that it is a false hadith with no basis and that it was fabricated by the heretics and is indeed fabricated (2). Al-Zarkashi said: "Ibn Abd al-Barr stated in his book Al-Jami' Bayaan al-'Ilm: Abdul Rahman ibn Mahdi said: The heretics and the Khawarij fabricated the hadith 'What comes to you from me, compare it...' " (3). He also said: "Some opposed it and said: We compare it with the Book of Allah and found it contradicting the Book, for we did not find in it that only what agrees with the Book is accepted, but rather we found the command to obey him and the prohibition of opposing his command is a ruling in all cases" (4). __________ (1) The same source, footnote, no. 4, p. 224. (2) The same place. Among what he said: "And the closest narration to what Al-Shafi'i reported here is weakened and made weak by the narration of Al-Tabarani in his Al-Mu'jam Al-Kabir from the hadith of Ibn Umar, which Al-Haythami cited in Majma' al-Zawa'id (1/170), and he said: 'In it is Abu Hadir Abdul Malik ibn Abdul Rabbah, who is known for fabricating hadith.' And he said in Awn al-Mabud 4/329: 'As for what some of them narrated that he said: "When a hadith comes to you, compare it with the Book of Allah; if it agrees, take it," it is a false hadith with no basis. Zakariya al-Saji reported from Yahya ibn Ma'in that he said: This is a hadith fabricated by the heretics,' and Al-Fitni reported in Tadhkirat al-Mawdu'at p. 28 from Al-Khattabi that he also said: 'It was fabricated by the heretics,' and he and Al-Ajluni reported in Kashf al-Khafa 1/86 from Al-San'ani that he said: 'It is fabricated.' " [Page 647] ... Ibn Hazm has a clear commentary on this hadith in al-Ihkam 2/86, explaining its defects and invalidity. (3) al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 3/237. (4) The same location. This is the meaning that al-Shatibi affirmed, disregarding its chain of transmission, considering it a definitive meaning in his view, and made it one of the pillars of his methodology. This is a meaning that the Imams of hadith and the Imams of fiqh reject. How can al-Shatibi claim that this methodology has been firmly established by the righteous predecessors and endorsed by the scholarly elite? This idea regarding the certainty of the principles and the return to the definitive, and the hesitation in considering the reports of the singular narrators (akhbar al-ahad) until a return to a definitive meaning is established, is one of the most important pillars of al-Shatibi's methodology. It is therefore fitting that this methodology should be buried in its cradle. Induction: Induction is the most important pillar in al-Shatibi's methodology; it is the only way to ascertain meanings and to understand the principles of the Sharia in his view. The certainty of the meanings of texts relies on the negation of ten premises, which is impossible. The meanings of rulings are speculative interests (masalih) that have no indication in the texts, so many rulings must converge upon them to achieve a useful induction that then acquires legal value and is considered as reasons (illa) for the Sharia. As for the claim that the texts do not indicate their meanings with certainty, this claim relies on unrealistic perceptions or logical assumptions. The texts indicate meanings that may be definitive, or they may be overwhelmingly apparent in a certain meaning, or they may allow for multiple meanings equally. Even if they are not definitively indicative in themselves, certainty may be derived from contextual clues or statements. Certainty is not conditioned in anything other than beliefs or the principles attached to them, which are sources of legislation. [Page 648] The ten possibilities that have been mentioned are not present in every example, and the absence of those that do exist is not impossible. For instance, His Exalted saying: { Establish the prayer } (1) does not necessitate induction to ascertain the certainty of the obligation of prayer. Understanding the transition of the meaning of prayer from its linguistic reality to its legal reality, and other objections that may arise, is not impossible. Likewise, the definitive rulings such as the obligation of faith, fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimage, truthfulness, justice, benevolence, and fulfilling trusts, as well as the prohibition of theft, adultery, usury, the killing of the soul which Allah has forbidden, and the prohibition of carrion, blood, and pork, are definitive and were not established through induction. Rather, they were derived from the texts, supported by the clarification of the Sunnah, the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them), consensus, and the transmission of the texts and actions in a mutawatir manner. A single text can be definitively indicative, such as His saying: { Prohibited to you is carrion, blood, and the flesh of swine } (2), and His saying: { And Allah has permitted trade and prohibited usury } (3). If certainty necessitates certainty in the meanings of words or the benefit from certain indications, then this is possible and actual, and not impossible. It is not correct that texts cannot indicate meanings with certainty, nor is it correct that certainty can only be achieved through induction. As for the induction of the meanings of rulings, its discussion will come separately under the title: the meaningful transmission (al-tawatur al-ma'nawi). The application of induction (istiqra) with the aim of reaching legal truths requires defining its meaning and how to apply it through agreed-upon examples or known rulings so that it can be utilized in the search for understanding what is unknown in terms of rulings. This is something that al-Shatibi did not do; rather, he imposed the method of induction without proving its validity and without providing a definition of it. __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 11, 43, 83, and others from the surahs. (2) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 3. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 275. [Page 649] And when the meaning of induction (istiqra) is understood, it becomes clear that it has no place where al-Shatibi placed it. The imams relied on deduction (istinbat) as a rational method for understanding and arriving at rulings, not induction. So, what is induction? Al-Asnawi said: "Induction is the inference of a ruling in particulars based on its establishment for the general rule" (1). He said: "It is divided into complete and incomplete; the complete is the establishment of a general ruling in a category for its establishment in all its particulars" (2). As for the incomplete: "It is the establishment of a general ruling in a category for its establishment in some of its individuals, and this does not provide certainty, as it is possible that the ruling of what has not been induced from the particulars is contrary to what has been induced from them" (3). An example of this is to say: in this box, there is a collection of pieces; if one examines them one by one and finds that they are all iron pieces, one can say: all the pieces in the box are iron. This is complete induction, and this ruling is general. If one takes a piece from the box randomly, it is certainly iron based on the general ruling. However, if one examines most of the pieces or all but one and finds iron, this is incomplete induction, and if one takes a piece randomly, one cannot rule that it belongs to the same category as the induced ones, and it is not correct to issue the general ruling at all. Thus, induction is the establishment of a ruling for the whole or the totality through its establishment for the parts one by one. If the subject to be induced is known and limited, complete induction can be achieved by examining all one by one. If it is not limited, then complete induction is not possible. Induction is different from deduction; induction leads to the general ruling based on the ruling on the particulars, while deduction leads to the ruling on the part based on the general or overall ruling. The general ruling resulting from complete induction is also considered deduction, because the general ruling is derived from the ruling on the whole. __________ (1) Al-Asnawi, Nihayat al-Sul, 1/361. (2) The same source, 4/377. (3) Al-Asnawi, Nihayat al-Sul, 4/377. [Page 650] Both induction and deduction are rational methodologies of knowledge, meaning they are ways of thinking aimed at reaching conclusions. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr said: "The reasoning that human thought typically engages in is divided into two main categories: one is deduction, and the other is induction. Each of the deductive and inductive proofs has its own methodology and distinctive path. By deduction, we mean any reasoning whose conclusion is not greater than the premises from which that reasoning is derived" (1). He also said: "By induction, we mean any reasoning in which the conclusion is greater than the premises that contributed to that reasoning. For example, it is said: this piece of iron expands with heat, and that one expands with heat, and this third piece also expands with heat; therefore, all iron expands with heat" (2). He stated: "In cases of induction, the inductive proof jumps from the specific to the general" (3). What all Muslims unanimously agree upon is that Islam has come with legal texts from which legal meanings are derived through deduction, including rulings. The rulings are general concerning the obligated individuals and actions, and they are universal through the causes that transfer them from one type of action to another. These causes are deduced from the legal proofs. When a text is presented, the meaning is taken from it, and the text or its indication is not considered a part of the meaning, nor is it a phenomenon that must be repeated in many texts and indications to establish the general meaning. This repetition is the consistency that benefits from induction, as al-Shatibi mentioned, and rulings are not derived in this manner; rather, they are derived from the indications of the texts, that is, from the detailed proofs. Therefore, jurisprudence (fiqh) is defined as the knowledge of practical legal rulings derived from their detailed proofs. __________ (1) Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, The Logical Foundations of Induction, p. 5, Dar al-Taaruf for Publications, Beirut, 5th ed., 1406 AH - 1986 CE. (2) The same source, p. 6. (3) Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, The Logical Foundations of Induction, p. 7. [Page 651] There is no process of induction that follows in order to arrive at universals from which the rulings of particulars can be derived, because the texts are present and ready to derive rulings from them, and the rules themselves are derived from the texts and may be speculative or definitive, and the rulings branch out based on them because they are originally legal rules derived from the legal texts. This induction, although it is a correct rational method, has no place in the indications of the texts. Al-Shatibi, by relying on induction, treated the legal texts as one would treat natural and material phenomena, as if the texts are phenomena that have attributes and characteristics that are their meanings, and these characteristics have causes or results that are the rulings and interests. Just as a researcher looks for the characteristics of things to discover them and for the causes and effects of phenomena to understand them and benefit from that and build upon it, through observation, testing, following, and induction, al-Shatibi did the same to understand the meanings of the texts and the causes of the Sharia and its principles. Al-Shatibi himself affirms this matter; therefore, after explaining the characteristics of the universals in his methodology, he said: "These are the characteristics of the rational universals, and also the rational universals are derived from existence, which is a conventional matter, not a rational one, thus they are equivalent to the legal universals in this regard, and the difference between them is lifted" (1). Likewise, when he spoke about causes and effects in the Sharia, he supported his view with the causes and effects in rational matters or in material occurrences, saying: "The establishment of the cause is like the establishment of the effect, whether that effect is intended or not. Because when it is made a cause in the course of customs, it is considered as if it directly causes it, and this is supported by the principle of customary practices, as the relationship of effects to their causes is like the relationship of satiety to food, and quenching to water, and burning to fire, and diarrhea to senna, and all other effects to their causes. Similarly, the actions that result from our earning are attributed to us even if they are not from our earning. And if this is customary and known, the custom of the Sharia follows the same measure in legal causes with their effects" (2). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/44. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/148. [Page 652] Based on this, the method of induction (istiqra) is not appropriate here, in addition to the fact that the legal texts are not material phenomena that can be induced; the legal texts have implications that must be acted upon, whether they are speculative or definitive. This method contradicts what the recognized imams have established, thus it is erroneous and cannot be acted upon. Moreover, this induction is incomplete and cannot be thorough; it does not allow for certainty at all according to the reality of induction. It is not an induction of most particulars, but rather, as al-Shatibi says, it is an induction of many particulars, and this many is not the majority. Therefore, it is not correct according to the method of induction to establish the universal through this incomplete induction and to give a ruling based on what has been induced for what has not been induced. Yes, the many texts that converge on a single meaning may emphasize the importance of this meaning or increase the degree of conjecture about it, and certainty may be attained regarding it. This is not induction but rather deduction (istinbat); meanings are deduced from the texts and may imply others. If there is a shared meaning in many texts, the abundance of texts leads to a presumption that it is the intended meaning, thus the meaning is established, but this is not induction. If induction were required, the meaning would not be established. It is not necessarily the case that this meaning is universal; this depends on the meaning itself. If there are many texts indicating the prohibition of adultery or the obligation of prayer, these rulings do not become universal because they are particular in their subject, even if they are definitive. If a single text indicates a general or universal principle, it should not be dismissed on the grounds that the indicator is a single or speculative text, such as his saying - peace and blessings be upon him -: "There should be neither harm nor reciprocating harm" (1). It is a report of singular transmission (khabar ahad) and it is also a universal principle; it does not need to be definitive to be so, nor does it require what al-Shatibi has gathered of evidence on the meaning, even though the abundance of evidence may affirm the meaning and potentially make it definitive. __________ (1) Its transmission has been previously mentioned. [Page 653] And indeed, there is a speaker who says that incomplete induction (istiqra' naqis) leads to certainty in the universal ruling and results in its application to what has not been induced, and in a decisive manner. For we find that iron expands with heat, and the observation is repeated without exception, thus the same ruling is applied to all iron. Wood floats on water, and this is ruled for all wood, and people die, leading to a ruling on the living and those who will be born. The sun rises every day and sets, leading to the conclusion that this will happen tomorrow and the day after, and that it was happening before our existence. We have a strong feeling that these rulings are definitive, even though what has been induced is much less than what has not been induced. Therefore, it is not correct to object to the validity of incomplete induction and its ability to yield certainty. The response is that induction in such cases can only be incomplete, and even if it may be extensive, it will not be majority-based. Nevertheless, it does provide a ruling on what has not been induced. Yes, but this is not due to the induction itself, rather it is due to something else in addition to this induction, and this thing is akin to the cause that leads to the extension of the ruling from what has been induced to what has not been induced, and to everything that contains this rational or logical cause (and not a legal one). This cause, along with induction, leads to the generalization of the ruling, and a ruling is made on what has not been induced by analogy. In the example of iron that expands with heat, the cause is the similarity or the absence of difference between what has been induced and what has not been induced. This leads to the establishment of the universal and its application, even if those who apply this cause here do not realize it. People carry the concept that what is established for one thing is established for its like, and this operates within them even without their intention, just as blood circulation occurs in the body; it exists within a person as their mind forms and grows. The failure to recognize the effect of this similarity or other potential hidden causes for the ruling is what leads to error, causing one to mistakenly believe that incomplete induction is beneficial, and the same can be said for all the other mentioned examples. [Page 654] The rising and setting of the sun and the moon, and their repeated occurrence in a regular manner, leads to the feeling that there is a system governing this movement, which is what causes it to recur regularly and without fail. This system serves as the cause for the occurrence of this regular movement. This cause or system is what prompts the ruling tomorrow or the day after, based on the perceived system. Since the cause present today will also be present tomorrow, the matter will repeat. If it were known that the one who established this system would change it tomorrow, and that the sun would not rise or would rise from the west, the ruling would change, which confirms that the generalization and its application to what has not been examined is not due to induction but rather to the cause. Two points affirm this interpretation: First: The examined particulars are very few and hardly worth mentioning compared to what has not been examined; it suffices for the examined to be a single individual or one particular so that the desired description or ruling can be understood from it, and then the cause (the logical analogy) thereafter becomes the reason for the general ruling to be applied to the rest. Therefore, the cause is the reason for the generality, not induction. [Page 655] The second: The general ruling that extends from what has been inferred to what has not been inferred does not extend to that which does not contain the cause. Thus, the ruling on iron does not extend to anything that is not like it. Likewise with wood, and with humans, as well as with the sun and the moon and the celestial bodies; one cannot rule on the moon tomorrow in the same way as one rules on the sun tomorrow, nor vice versa, because the cause in both cases, although it is the system, is different: the system of the sun is not the same as the system of the moon. The reason for the generality is the cause, not the inference. This is the incomplete inference in material phenomena, which is only beneficial if one knows that a cause exists. So how can it be applied to the texts of the legislator, which have multiple meanings? If inference requires a cause to be beneficial, and al-Shatibi uses inference to understand the causes, then each of the two requires the other and does not exist without it. Therefore, the method of incomplete inference is invalid and rejected, and it has no existence at all in the legal texts. These causes will not be found through this method, and if they are found, they will be found through deduction as legal causes, not as material or logical causes. The opposition of the particular (al-juz'i) to the universal (al-kulli): Al-Shatibi argued that the universal (kulli) is not contradicted by the opposition of the particulars (juz'i) to it, based on the fact that the universal has been established universally through induction, thus it is definitive, while the particular is speculative. Therefore, either the particular should be interpreted to agree with the universal, or it should be rejected. He also went on to state that it is necessary to apply both the general principles (kulliyat) and the specific cases (juz'iyat) together; one cannot do without the general principles in place of the specific cases, nor without the specific cases in place of the general principles. These two matters are correct in terms of their outcomes, but they do not hold up based on their methodology, meaning they do not hold up based on the fact that the universals are inductive universals derived from particulars. There is a contradiction in the matter that al-Shatibi tried to resolve. [Page 656] He said regarding the application of universals and particulars together: "It is impossible for particulars to be independent of their universals. Thus, whoever takes a text, for example, in a particular while disregarding its universal is mistaken; likewise, whoever takes the universal while disregarding its particulars. The explanation of this is that acquiring knowledge of the universal is only through the examination and observation of particulars. The universal, in its essence, is not known to us before knowledge of the particulars, and it does not exist in the external world; rather, it is contained within the particulars, as established in the intelligibles. Therefore, to focus on the universal while disregarding the particular is to stand with something that has not been established in knowledge without knowledge of the particular, and the particular is the manifestation of knowledge of it. Moreover, the particular is only designated as such because the universal is fully present within it and is what sustains it. Thus, disregarding the particular as such is, in reality, a disregard for the universal itself, and that is a contradiction. Furthermore, disregarding the particular altogether leads to doubt regarding the universal, since such disregard occurs only when there is a contradiction with the universal or a presumed contradiction with it. If the universal contradicts the particular, while we only derive it from the particular, this indicates that knowledge of that universal has not been established, as it is possible that the particular contains a part of the universal that the considered part does not include. If this is possible, there is no alternative but to return to the particular in understanding the universal, and this indicates that the universal cannot be considered in isolation without considering the particular" (1). He then said: "If a universal principle is established through induction, and then a text comes regarding a particular that contradicts the principle in one of the ways of contradiction, it is necessary to reconcile the two in consideration" (2). He then said: "In this case, it is not possible for the principles to be violated, and if this is established, the universal cannot be considered while the particular is disregarded" (3). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/3. (2) The same source, 3/4. (3) The same location. [Page 657] This text is important in the methodology of al-Shatibi. It contains several points, including that particulars (juz'iyyat) are the source of universals (kulliyyat), and without particulars, universals would not be known. There is no meaning in the universals that is not present in the particulars, and if a universal conflicts with a particular, this means that the universal has not yet been realized as a universal. Therefore, it is necessary to return to the particular to verify the true meaning of the universal and to regulate it in order to resolve the conflict. If the universal is firmly established as a universal and it contradicts the particular, then the contradiction must be resolved, and neither can be disregarded. The universal is firmly established and definitive, so its contradiction is not valid, and the particular cannot be disregarded for the sake of considering the universal. The universal, as he said, is sourced from the particulars, and doubt in the particular is doubt in the universal. But this differs in another context. He said: "The established principles are generalities, and the particulars cannot invalidate the generalities; therefore, the rulings of the generalities remain applicable to the particulars even if the meaning of the generalities does not specifically manifest in them."(1) And this is a contradiction with what has preceded, for how can the meaning of the universals (kulliyat) be applied to the particulars (juz'iyat) without that being evident, when the universals are known only through the particulars, and the particular is the manifestation of knowledge of the universal?! And he said: "If they oppose each other, then either both are to be applied together, or both are to be neglected, or one is to be applied without the other, meaning in the case of opposition. Applying both together is invalid, and likewise neglecting them both, because that is applying the opposition between the speculative (dhanni) and the definitive (qat'i), and applying the particular without the universal gives preference to the particular over the universal, which is contrary to the principle. Thus, the only remaining option is to apply the universal without the particular, which is what is required"(2). And this is a clearer contradiction with what has preceded, for here he says: "Applying both together is invalid," whereas there he said: "It is not possible to apply one and disregard the other." Here he says: "Applying the universal without the particular is what is required," while there he stated that doubt in the particular is doubt in the universal, and that one must consider how to reconcile between them. This contradiction is due to the methodology, which is induction (istiqra). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 3/149. (2) The same source, 3/150. [Page 658] It may be said: However, what al-Shatibi has proposed is the relied-upon and established position among the imams, which is the application of the legal rules and principles when applying the detailed texts, as well as in cases of conflict between the definitive (qat'i) and the speculative (dhanni), where the speculative is rejected if reconciliation between them is not possible. The response is that this is correct, but there is no contradiction in the methodology of derivation (istinbat) because the doubt regarding the speculative and its rejection does not imply skepticism about the definitive, as the definitive is not derived from the induction of the speculative or the particulars. Furthermore, if the universal (kulli) conflicts with the particular (juz'i) or the general (aam) with the specific (khass), one can specify one by the other, and this is not considered a contradiction or a negation of anything, because the universal is not derived from the induction of the particulars. Therefore, it was said at the beginning of the discussion of this issue that these two matters according to al-Shatibi are correct in terms of their outcomes, but they do not align based on his methodology. In addition to this contradiction in methodology, the negation also arises from two aspects: First: The particular that he suggested neglecting, if it conflicts with the universal and reconciliation is not possible, may be a text of a sound hadith or the meaning of a Qur'anic text. The universal he speaks of is neither truly universal nor definitive, as has been clarified, since the induction he refers to is incomplete and not comprehensive. Therefore, interpreting the meaning of the text or rejecting the hadith due to its opposition to this universal is not valid in an absolute sense. Second: This methodology necessitates reliance on the universals at the expense of the particulars, which is what al-Shatibi attempted to evade. This matter will be discussed, God willing, in the third section of this chapter. The moral transmission (tawatur al-ma'nawi): Al-Shatibi held that induction provides a transmission similar to moral transmission, and he likened the certainty derived from induction to the certainty of the bravery of Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) and the existence of Hatim, which is a certainty caused by transmission due to the abundance of reports that support it. [Page 659] The evidence provided by continuous transmission (tawatur) does not rely on induction but rather on abundance with conditions (1). Al-Zarkashi said: "Continuous transmission, linguistically: is the succession of things one after another with a pause, and terminologically: it is the report of a group whose collusion on a lie is impossible due to their number, about something perceived" (2). He also said: "Tawatur can be verbal or it can be conceptual, which means that those previously mentioned come together on reports that refer back to a single report, such as the bravery of Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) and the generosity of Hatim" (3). He then mentioned that some have disputed Ali's bravery because his bravery is continuously transmitted both verbally and conceptually (4). Thus, abundance in tawatur refers to a multitude united on a report. If the report is a narration from the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), it is a hadith of definitive authenticity, and it may be definitively indicative or it may not be so. If the multitude is united on several reports, some narrating one report and others narrating another, and so on, and each of these reports does not reach the level of tawatur, they all share a certain meaning. This meaning would then be considered continuous, and this is the conceptual tawatur, and the meaning is definitive. The particulars inferred by al-Shatibi are of two types: legal texts and legal rulings. If the induction is for legal texts, there is no issue regarding the result, and it may be the conceptual tawatur itself and not similar to it, as if it were an induction of the implications of singular reports, except that this is not induction but rather deduction from the texts. The discussion about the induction of particulars when they are legal texts has previously been addressed under the title: "Induction" in this section. The current discussion is about the induction of legal rulings and their meanings. __________ (1) See: Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 3/296 - 301. (2) The same source, 3/296. (3) The same source, 3/311. (4) The same location. [Page 660] The legal rulings (ahkam shar'iyya) are among the meanings of the legal texts (nusus shar'iyya) and their implications, as well as the legal principles (qawa'id shar'iyya). The words and texts are those for which a meaning is sought; once the meaning is known, the intention of the Legislator (al-Shari') behind it is understood. The legal meanings are those intended by the Legislator, and the servant has no knowledge of them except through revelation from Him, Exalted is He. The sources of Allah's revelations - Glory be to Him - are the Qur'an, the Sunnah, consensus (ijma'), and analogy (qiyas), and considering the differences, they are the Qur'an and the Sunnah and what they guide towards. These are the sources of the legal texts, and there can be no legal meaning unless it originates from the legal texts. Accordingly, if the meanings of the rulings that al-Shatibi refers to are the implications of the legal texts, then they are legal; if they are not, then they are not legal. If they are among the implications of the texts, then they are meanings of the texts, and thus they are considered valid. What al-Shatibi means by the meanings of the rulings are their purposes (hikm), or their causes (musaabibat), or their benefits (masalih), or their objectives (maqasid), or their reasons (illal), and he does not mean that they are meanings of the texts. [Page 661] The meanings of rulings do not exist; rather, there are meanings for the words and sentences that these words and sentences indicate in any type of indication(1). If the meanings are known, there is no point in searching for meanings for them, nor is it correct to say that these meanings are intended by the legislator, for if they were intended by him, he would have established a proof for them or set a sign for them. At that point, they would be among the indications of the texts, and there is no harm in allowing thought or imagination to roam regarding the reasons for the rulings, their causes, their objectives, and their wisdom, especially since there is something in the soul that drives one to this, leading to the assumption of meanings or rulings that one may find reassurance in or take delight in. However, it is not permissible in any case to attribute any legal value to these assumptions, nor to ascribe them to Allah - Exalted is He - by saying they are intended by Him, or that they are a cause for His ruling, for such assumptions are mere fantasies and are not based on any legal source, and since there is no evidence for them, they hold no significance. Al-Shatibi does not disagree with this; rather, he affirms it. He does not accept legal conjecture (dhann shar'i) at all unless it is based on a definitive meaning (ma'na qat'i). Such justifications for rulings are mere conjectures that hold no weight. However, if the rulings converge on a meaning and there is a comprehensive examination (istiqra'), then the meaning becomes definitive, and it serves as a benefit (maslaha), a cause ('illa), a principle (asl), and an objective (maqsad), all in a definitive manner. The objection is how this moral transmission, or the corroboration from individual rulings on this meaning, will occur, as there is no legal value for this meaning in any ruling, since rulings do not indicate meanings, and these meanings are not among the implications of the texts. __________ (1) The linguistic indication is confined to three: correspondence, implication, and entailment. The first: the indication of the word on the entirety of what it was designated for. The second: its indication of a part of the named thing. The third: its indication of what is outside the named thing but necessary for it. See: al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhit, 1/417 and 1/420. [Page 662] If there is no legal value to this meaning in each of the rulings that are being extrapolated, how will the meaning acquire legal value through their aggregation? If a person is tested, for example, with twenty questions and receives a zero on each question, how can their total be one hundred out of one hundred? How can one reach certainty about the meaning from the extrapolation of the particulars in which this meaning is imagined if it holds no legal significance in any of those particulars? This brings to mind the saying of the Hanafis mentioned earlier: "By the abundance of analogies, strength in description is not attained." As for al-Shatibi's example of the bravery of Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) and the generosity of Hatim, it does not belong to the category of extrapolating the meanings of rulings. The bravery of Ali and the generosity of Hatim are indications from the texts reported about them, not indications of the meanings of the texts. They are truly from the mutawatir (consecutively reported) in meaning if the texts are authentic; however, some have contested that the bravery of Ali is from the mutawatir in wording. Al-Shatibi's error here arises from two aspects: First: An error in methodology, which is the claim of specific objectives of the Lawgiver without any evidence. Moreover, he asserted certainty about them, not to mention the incomplete extrapolation and what it entails. [Page 663] Secondly: Al-Shatibi himself has established that these meanings do not have any legal indication; rather, they serve the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), which are derived from the texts (1). If they had a legal indication from the texts, they would be among its original objectives. Nevertheless, he has categorized them, based on his observations, as definitive general objectives, which is not sound. Consider his statement, for example: "What assures us from Allah's questioning us on the Day of Resurrection about how you understood from me that I intended such and such classification based on my statement: { And they think that they are doing well } (2), or my statement: { He said, 'Indeed, I am of those who are the warners' } (3), for to claim such a thing about the Qur'an and that it is intended by the speaker is dangerous; rather, it refers back to His statement: { When you receive it with your tongues and say with your mouths that of which you have no knowledge, and you think it is insignificant, while it is, in the sight of Allah, great } (4), and to the fact that it is an opinion in the Book of Allah" (5). Perhaps someone might say: The assertion of these objectives or causes—according to his view—is based on the premise that the original principle is the justification of rulings; therefore, he traces the rulings to verify their legal causes. The response is: This principle, even if accepted, permits justification, but the causes are numerous and the imaginations are more so. Identifying this cause or that without any guidance, indication, or sign from the Sharia that points to the type or nature of the cause is a claim without evidence. Therefore, alongside this principle, there must be a method for the cause or evidence for it. Thus, you find that the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence) who affirm the principle of justification also establish methods for the cause, such as analogy (qiyas), suitability (munasaba), similarity (shabah), examination and division (sabr wa taqsim), and extension and reversal (tard wa 'aks), among others. Section Three Discussion of Al-Shatibi's Idea Objectives and Causes __________ (1) See: al-Muwafaqat, 2/63 - 68, the fifth issue, and see: Section Three of Chapter Four of this book. (2) Surah Al-Kahf, 104. (3) Surah Ash-Shu'ara, 168. (4) Surah An-Nur, 15. (5) al-Muwafaqat, 3/248. [Page 664] The topic of this discussion: Here, we continue what we began in the previous section, which is the discussion of the concept of objectives (maqasid) according to al-Shatibi. What we will discuss in this section is the foundation of the idea, which is that His actions - Exalted is He - are purposeful, and that they are purposeful for their ends or objectives. This section will also address one of the important outcomes of this methodology, which is the independence of the jurist (mujtahid) from the particulars in jurisprudence (ijtihad) if they have comprehended the objectives in general and in detail. Al-Shatibi - may Allah have mercy on him - was not the only one who spoke about the principle of purposefulness or the objective behind actions, so we will briefly discuss those statements. It is worth mentioning here that this topic was presented in some detail in the first chapter. The principle of purposefulness: There are two directions in this research that may be confused by some, so it is necessary to distinguish between them. The first is that the actions of Allah - Exalted is He - are purposeful, for He does not act except for a purpose, and this is what wisdom necessitates. The opposite of this is frivolity, and Allah is far above that. If it is established that He does not act except for a wisdom or purpose, this applies to His rulings, so there must be an intention behind every ruling, which is the reason for the ruling, thus necessitating the purposefulness of rulings. The second is that the legal rulings (ahkam) are purposeful, based on the evidence indicating that the Sharia is a mercy for people and a healing. Also, based on observation, one finds that the rulings of the Sharia are aligned with interests or reasons for them, and one also finds rulings that are justified by reasons that indicate consideration of interests, which shows that the principle is the purposefulness of rulings based on interests. As for the first direction, it is a theological discussion that has no relation to the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), even if it is included in its studies, nor is it related to analogy (qiyas), although some have linked it to that. It has been clarified previously that al-Razi rejected the purposefulness of Allah's actions and the term "purpose" in relation to Allah's actions categorically, even though he supports analogy and the principle of purposefulness for rulings. [Page 665] The second direction is a methodological inquiry, provided that it is separated from the reasoning behind God's actions, regardless of the outcome, meaning whether the principle is reasoning or non-reasoning. Al-Zarkashi said: "Ibn al-Hajib transmitted in his discussion on classification and division the consensus of the jurists that a ruling must have a cause, and this was questioned based on the well-known principle that the actions of Allah are not attributed to a purpose"(1). He also said: "Know that the position of the Ahl al-Sunnah (People of the Sunnah) is that His rulings are not attributed to a cause in the sense that He does not do anything for a purpose, nor is He compelled by anything to do something; rather, He is Allah, Exalted is He, capable of bringing about benefits without their causes and eliminating harms without any motivators. The jurists said: The rulings are attributed to a cause, and they did not oppose the Ahl al-Sunnah, but what they meant by causation was wisdom. The Mu'tazila and those who agreed with them among the jurists restricted His actions with wisdom and narrowed them to the aspect of benefit"(2). Thus, it is common among Muslims to distinguish between the two matters, and that Allah, Exalted is He, does not act for a purpose. In the discussions of the theologians among the scholars of usul (principles of jurisprudence), there are arguments that support the position of those who oppose attributing causes to the actions of Allah, and indeed their evidence is conclusive, as al-Razi said. The response to the reasoning behind the actions of Allah, Exalted is He: The proponents of this idea differ regarding the methods of proof. The foundation of the concept for some of them is that Allah - Exalted is He - is wise in His creation. The consideration of purpose in His creation must either be obligatory or not obligatory. If it is obligatory, then it does not lack the intended purpose; and if it is not obligatory, then acting with a purpose is closer to being in accordance with reason than acting without a purpose(3). __________ (1) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/111. (2) The same source, 4/112. (3) See: al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, 3/250, and see: the third section of the second chapter of this book. [Page 666] One of the responses to this reasoning is that Allah is Wise in His actions and in His refraining from actions; He is Wise absolutely. However, what necessitates that Allah's actions be closer to what is rational must be based on knowledge and reason that only He possesses, which elevates His wisdom to that of Allah's, to the limitless. As for one whose wisdom is nothing compared to Allah's wisdom, what rationality is he speaking of?! Such statements reflect a negligence in comparing Allah to humans, which can be said about the actions of rational beings and wise individuals. Allah - Exalted is He - is Wise, and humans do not comprehend His wisdom because they only grasp some of the wisdom and rationalities that pertain to their tangible experiences, while the unseen world is concealed from people. What necessitates that the effects or manifestations of Allah's wisdom be related to human perceptions and tangible experiences, when Allah - Exalted is He - says: { And Allah knows, while you do not know } (1). __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 216. [Page 667] The limitations and shortcomings of human intellect, along with its inability to comprehend the essence of Allah and to investigate the unseen, prevent it from grasping Allah's wisdom in His creation and rulings without revelation from Him, Exalted is He. A person may perceive what is beneficial as harmful and what is harmful as beneficial, and may see what contradicts wisdom. If one were to compare the unseen to the tangible, they might arrive at conclusions that contradict established truths. This is similar to those who claim that Allah only acts for a purpose; they have likened Allah to a human being, arriving at a conclusion that implies Allah, Exalted is He, is in need of a purpose. Such statements apply to humans, not to Allah. If the logic of these individuals were applied to itself, it could lead to conclusions that contradict their own results and are flawed. For example, one of Allah's actions is creation, and it could be said: Allah existed alone before creating anything. He either created for a purpose or without a purpose. If He created for a purpose, that purpose must have existed eternally, yet He did not create them from eternity, leaving only the possibility that He created without a purpose, which is flawed. The source of this flaw lies in the application of reason to matters beyond its knowledge, similar to those who assert a purpose. Furthermore, the error itself permeates the conclusions they have built upon. They have stated: Allah does not act except for a benefit, and the benefit must either pertain to Allah, Exalted is He, or to the servant. Allah is free from harm and benefit, so it must pertain to the servant. This also delves into the unknown. By employing their own logic, one could argue: Allah does not act except for a benefit, and the benefit must either pertain to Allah or to the servant. Since His action, Exalted is He, is the creation of the servant, the benefit of this creation must either pertain to Allah, Exalted is He, or to the servant. It cannot pertain to the servant because prior to creation, he is nonexistent, and no benefit can be conceived for the nonexistent. [Page 668] It remains only that the public interest (maslaha) should return to Allah, Exalted is He, and this is invalid, as it involves employing reason in matters where it should not be applied, and taking ignorance as evidence for knowledge. If there must be a statement regarding the public interest and its return to some source, the most correct assertion is that the public interest either returns to Allah, Exalted is He, or to the servant, or to what we do not know, and thus this argument is invalidated. Some have argued that His actions - Exalted is He - are not subject to reasoning, yet the principle regarding actions is that they are justified by public interest (1), based on the observation of the correlation between rulings and interests. This reasoning is based on incomplete induction, and therefore it is not valid, as it has been established previously that incomplete induction cannot serve as evidence; rather, the evidence is the accompanying cause. Among the proofs that His actions - Exalted is He - are justified, and that He does not act except for a purpose or intention, is what al-Shatibi has posited, which is based on induction, but it differs from the induction mentioned above - that of al-Razi. Al-Razi conducted an induction of rulings to establish the principle of justification by interests, while denying the justification of actions. As for al-Shatibi, he conducted an induction of texts, by extensively citing the texts that mention intention, as in His saying: { so that He may test you }, { and that He may complete His favour }, { to worship Me }, { so that you may attain piety }, { so that there will be no argument for the people against Allah after the messengers }. And so on (2). __________ (1) See al-Razi's statements in the third section of the second chapter. (2) See al-Muwafaqat, 3/2, and see the details of this proof in the third section of the third chapter. [Page 669] This argument is invalid even if there are many such texts, because it is an incomplete induction that does not encompass every action or ruling. Just as there are many texts that indicate intention, there are also many texts in which intention is not apparent. Furthermore, the texts that al-Shatibi presented do not indicate causes, and it is not rational to link them to the reasoning of rulings based on their objectives. Additionally, much of what al-Shatibi used as evidence can be argued in the opposite direction of what he intended. Thus, al-Shatibi's proof regarding the principle of reasoning is refuted from several angles: First: This induction is incomplete, so it does not provide any benefit, nor does it achieve the desired outcome unless supported by a textual evidence. If such evidence exists, there is no need for the incomplete induction. Second: The existence of many texts in which the legislator did not mention an intention contradicts the claim of induction, such as His saying, Exalted is He: { And when We said to the angels, "Prostrate to Adam" } (1), and His saying, Exalted is He: { And when Moses said to his people, "Indeed, Allah commands you to sacrifice a cow" } (2). And His saying, Exalted is He: { For those who swear to abstain from their wives, there is a waiting period of four months } (3), and His saying, Exalted is He: { And the divorced women wait for three menstrual periods } (4), and His saying, Exalted is He: { And Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden interest } (5). It is no more valid to interpret these texts as supporting an objective than it is to interpret those as negating it. Third: Many of al-Shatibi's arguments regarding intention and purpose are based on conjecture and are not suitable for establishing reasoning for actions and rulings. These arguments fall into two categories: __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 34. (2) Surah Al-Baqarah, 67. (3) Surah Al-Baqarah, 226. (4) Surah Al-Baqarah, 228. (5) Surah Al-Baqarah, 275. [Page 670] One of them is like His saying, Exalted is He: {Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, that you may attain piety} (1). This text indicates the intention of achieving piety, and piety itself is the fear of Allah, obedience to Him, and not opposing His command while seeking His pleasure. This intention does not return except to control, and there is nothing in it that indicates that the rulings are justified; it is not something upon which that can be built. Among this is also His saying, Exalted is He: {And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me} (2). Such a statement also does not return to establishing an intention or purpose upon which the justification of rulings can be built, neither in a way that, if presented to minds, would be accepted, nor through causes or outcomes. The second is like His saying, Exalted is He: {To test you}, {So that there will not be}, {So that it will not be for the people}. These indications do not contain anything suitable to be built upon as a fundamental justification for rulings. They are news from the Legislator that conveys the obligation of worship and piety and that they should strive in that, warning them that they will have no excuse on the Day of Judgment regarding what has reached them from the message. So how can one connect and derive the justification of rulings from such texts?! Sheikh Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour has deemed all of al-Shatibi's arguments on this matter as invalid except for two. So what kind of induction remains after that? __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 183. (2) Surah Adh-Dhariyat, 56. [Page 671] The fourth: What al-Shatibi used as evidence for the objective can be turned around to argue against it. In His saying, { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me }. If someone asks: Why did Allah create people, and the answer is: So that they may worship Him. This does not satisfy what is in the heart if the goal is to know a reason or objective, and the question transforms into another question: Why does Allah want people to worship Him? What is the purpose of that? The text does not mention the purpose; rather, it commands worship without stating an intention or objective. Thus, in every proof presented by al-Shatibi, one could argue the opposite of what he intended, asking what the purpose is of testing people to see who is best in deeds, and likewise, what is the purpose of cutting off people's arguments on the Day of Judgment. Therefore, every text that al-Shatibi brought, which mentions intention or goal, also contains a lack of mention of that, indicating the invalidity of such reasoning. In truth, there is no answer to such questions except to say: { He will not be asked about what He does, but they will be asked } (1), { He does what He wills } (2), { He is the doer of what He intends } (3), { Indeed, Allah judges what He wills } (4). Therefore, those who argued about the prohibition of usury (riba), claiming it is like sales, were not given an answer that clarifies the differences between sales and usury, or explains the wisdom behind the prohibition of usury. Rather, the answer came as a decree, as He said: { Those who consume usury will not rise except as one rises whom Satan has struck with madness by his touch. That is because they say, "Trade is just like usury," but Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden usury } (5). Thus, what al-Shatibi used as evidence is not suitable for proving his claim. Objectives and reasons: __________ (1) Surah Al-Anbiya, 23. (2) Surah Al-Imran, 40, and Al-Hajj, 18. (3) Surah Al-Burooj, 16, and Hud, 107. (4) Surah Al-Ma'idah, 1. (5) Surah Al-Baqarah, 275. [Page 672] Al-Shatibi aimed to establish the principle of reasoning by affirming objectives (maqasid) for the legislator from the rulings, which are the causes and outcomes of adherence to the legal rulings. He considered these objectives as reasons without addressing or proving that the intended purpose of the ruling is its reason. According to what Al-Shatibi presented, the objective is a reason, and the objective itself is a cause, result, and outcome. The ruling is the cause that leads to the objective, and based on this logic, the legal ruling is the cause of its reason. An example of this is the ruling of cutting off the hand for theft. The legislator's intent behind the ruling is deterrence, so deterrence is the reason for the ruling, and the ruling is the cutting off of the hand, making deterrence the reason for the cutting. Deterrence is a result of the cutting, which is the ruling, thus the ruling is a cause for it, and the ruling is the cause of its reason. Is this correct? And is the reason for the ruling a result of it? Therefore, does the reason for the ruling exist after it? In other words, is the objective a reason? Another example from his evidence in proving the reasoning of the Sharia is His saying, Exalted is He: { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me } (1). Worship is an objective for the legislator, and it occurs after creation. Is it a reason for creation, making the reason exist after its effect? Is the depiction of the matter in this way in these two examples, the example of theft and the example of creation for worship, correct, or is there confusion and ambiguity in the matter? No, the matter is not as such, even if it appears straightforward at first glance. The objective is not a reason, and the reason is not an objective, and the ruling is not a cause for its reason, and the reason for the ruling does not exist after it; how could it, when it only exists with it and through it and ceases to exist with its absence! It is the motivator for it or against it. __________ (1) Surah Adh-Dhariyat, 56. [Page 673] Yes, indeed, there is a mixture and confusion in the matter, and the fact that the cause does not precede the ruling is an agreed-upon matter. It either precedes it or occurs simultaneously in time, without disagreement, neither in legal causes nor in rational causes. Al-Zarkashi said: "Know that there is no disagreement that the cause precedes the effect in rank, and they differed on whether it precedes it in time or occurs simultaneously, with the majority of the Mu'tazila and jurists holding that it occurs simultaneously, and they supported this with His saying, Exalted is He: { Allah takes the souls at the time of their death } (1)." Then he said: "The second view is that it is with it"(2). That is, it occurs simultaneously in time. He then said: "The rational causes occur simultaneously with their effects because they are inherently influential, while the situational causes precede the effect, and the legal causes are from the situational ones"(3).(4) Based on the consensus reported by al-Zarkashi, the methodology that is fundamentally based on this confusion between the cause of the ruling and its objective is rejected from its origin. To eliminate this confusion and disorder, it is necessary to clarify the point of error and its cause. As for the point of error, in the example of theft, the cause of the punishment is theft itself, not deterrence, as deterrence is a result or objective. Theft, which is the cause, occurs before the ruling or simultaneously with it, which is the obligation of cutting off the hand. The relationship between the cause and the effect does not fail; wherever theft is found, the ruling, that is, the obligation to cut off the hand, is found. As for deterrence, it is a result that may or may not exist, and this is the case with all punishments. In the example of creation for the purpose of worship, worship is an objective or result that may or may not exist, as in the case of the disbeliever or the sinner. There is no cause here, because creation is one of the acts of Allah, Exalted is He. It is worth mentioning that the cause is the cause of the ruling, not the cause of the action. Theft is the cause of the obligation to cut off the hand, not the cause of the cutting itself, because the action itself may or may not occur, as it depends on the choice of the accountable person, who may obey or disobey, as is the case with any ruling. __________ (1) Surah Al-Zumar, 42. (2) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/110. (3) The same source, 4/111. (4) Al-Zarkashi, Al-Bahr Al-Muhit, 4/111. [Page 674] The reason for this error is that those who confuse the cause (illah) and the objective (maqasid) divert their minds from considering the ruling and its cause to examining the method of the Legislator in legislation. They imagine that the Legislator has laws or a method for legislation upon which the rulings are based, and they attempt to discover these laws. Whether this is correct or not, the diversion of the mind to this direction and the attempt to uncover the principles upon which the Legislator legislates is an overstepping of human boundaries that involves a hidden analogy of the Creator to the created. Such a matter may be valid for humans and in rational matters, but it is not valid concerning Allah, Exalted is He. As a practical example for further clarification and distinction: If the person responsible for organizing traffic sees the need to place signs on the roads to organize the flow and eliminate its problems, and then does so and the flow becomes organized, he may ask: What is the reason for placing the signs? The answer is: organizing the flow. He may then ask: What is the reason for the organized flow? The answer is: the signs. Thus, these two answers present a confusion; one makes organizing the flow the reason for the signs, while the other makes the signs the reason for organizing the flow. The correct understanding is that if we are considering the ruling and its reason, this corresponds here to considering the organized flow and the signs. The signs are what led to the order, and if they are removed, problems arise. They precede the organization in existence; thus, they are the cause, and it cannot be that the order is the cause. [Page 675] As for the one who answers that the organization of movement is the cause of the signs, this is a mistake. The organization of movement is indeed the intended purpose of establishing the signs and a result of them. It is only thought to be a cause if one looks at what is in the mind or reasoning of the one who decided to establish them. This person observed the movement and found it needed organization, so he decided to set rules for that purpose and established signs that lead to the desired objective. Thus, if the purpose of organizing movement is considered a cause, it is not a cause for the signs or for establishing the signs; rather, it is a cause for the decision to establish them by the one responsible for that. The organization of movement, in reality, is a result and not a cause. If this result is considered a cause, it is a cause for what is in the mind of the decision-maker. When the answers differ, as mentioned above, the reason for that is that each answer pertains to something different from the others. If distinction is not made, confusion occurs. Therefore, the objective is not a cause, and the cause is not an objective, and the objectives of the Legislator (Shari) are not causes for the rulings. If we move from this example, that is, from the motivations of people and their objectives in their rulings and actions to the causes of the legal rulings and their objectives, two matters should be considered: First: The objective intended to be achieved by this decision may be attainable through means other than this decision, and this does not apply to legal rulings. If we know the intention of the Legislator behind the ruling, the ruling cannot be changed under the pretext of achieving the objective. For example, if we know that cutting off the hand for theft does not deter, this does not justify changing the ruling. This is not contradicted by al-Shatibi but rather affirmed by him(1). __________ (1) See: The second section of the third chapter, the study of causes and effects. [Page 676] The second: The intention of the decision-maker can be understood by following his statements and actions and through understanding his mentality and analyzing his psychology, as this falls within the limits of human perception. This cannot be applied to the Creator, so it cannot be said that He has an intention or a cause without revelation from Him. Attempting to comprehend a method for Him in legislation or laws involves an error in comparing the Creator to the created. This is what al-Shatibi did through what he called the universal laws, the fundamental principles, and the true interests (masalih). He built all of this on the objectives of the Legislator (maqasid al-sharia), which he sought to understand through induction and established as definitive causes. This methodology also responds from this perspective, which is considering the objective (maqasid) as a cause and what is built upon that from the analogy (qiyas) of the Creator to the created. This methodology has led to a dangerous outcome, and indeed it is a sign of the error in the methodology that necessitates a reconsideration of it, which is the reliance on the general principles (kulliyat) over the specific details (juz'iyat), which is the next topic. Reliance on the universals over the particulars: It is evident from al-Shatibi's methodology that legislation has objectives (maqasid) which are its reasons or general principles upon which the particulars are derived or for which they exist, and these particulars are the texts and rulings. The rulings are among the objectives of the texts, and both of them share those general principles as their objectives. The universals (kulliyat) can only be understood through the induction of particulars (juz'iyat), for they are their source and evidence. Were it not for the particulars, the universals would not be known. It is also clarified that it is necessary to apply both particulars and universals together, for applying the universal without the particular is an error, just as applying the particular without the universal is(1). It may be objected against al-Shatibi that what is the need to apply the particular (juz'i) if the general (kulli) has been understood from it, for the meaning of the particular is present within it, and examining the particular thereafter is a burden. If a contradiction is assumed between the particular and the general, or if there is a specificity of the particular that is not considered in the general, this means that the general is not truly general after all, which contradicts the assumption; thus, there is no need to apply the particular(2). __________ (1) See: the first section of this chapter. (2) See: al-Muwafaqat, 3/2 - 7. [Page 677] However, al-Shatibi explicitly responds to this objection and asserts the necessity of considering both the particular and the general together, saying: "The result is that it is essential to take into account the particulars while considering their universals, and vice versa, and this is the ultimate perspective of the jurists in general, and to this their opinions in the aims of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) ultimately lead" (1). Yet, the objection raised against al-Shatibi here is valid; the disregard for particulars is necessary for the methodology, even though al-Shatibi stated his rejection of it. In fact, some of what he said indicates this disregard, and it appears that al-Shatibi recognized this matter as a logical consequence of his methodology, leading him to become confused and to struggle with the issue, hesitating to dismiss opinions by neglecting particulars, which will become clear. Among the indications of this matter is his statement regarding the validity of ijtihad by someone who understands the objectives (maqasid) both generally and in detail, even if he does not have knowledge of Arabic. He said: "Thus, whoever understands the objectives of the Sharia from the establishment of rulings and reaches a level of knowledge of them, even if his understanding comes through translation in a non-Arabic tongue, there is no difference between him and one who understands them through the Arabic tongue" (2). He also said: "If ijtihad is related to deriving rulings from texts, then knowledge of Arabic is a necessary condition; however, if it pertains to the meanings of benefits and harms that are independent of the requirements of the texts or are accepted by the one exercising ijtihad in the texts, then knowledge of Arabic is not required in that case. Rather, knowledge of the objectives of the Sharia in general and in detail is what is necessary" (3). Thus, this jurist does not know Arabic, so he cannot consider the particulars; he does not examine the texts nor derive from them, but he only applies the general principles on the condition that he has knowledge of them in general and in detail. Knowledge of Arabic is a condition for the jurist who derives from the particulars in order to reach an understanding of the general principles, and unless he attains knowledge of the general principles in general and in detail, he cannot engage in ijtihad, whether he is knowledgeable in Arabic or not. __________ (1) The same source, 3/6; see: the first section of this chapter. (2) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/91. (3) The same source, 4/90. [Page 678] Knowledge of Arabic is for the purpose of reaching the universals from the particulars; once this is achieved, there is no need for Arabic, and there is no difference thereafter between one who receives it through translation while not knowing Arabic and one who understands it in Arabic. This statement indicates the possibility of dispensing with examining the texts for the sake of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning). What also points to this is his statement regarding the conditions of a valid mujtahid (one who exercises ijtihad): "The degree of ijtihad is attained only by one who possesses two qualities, the first being a complete understanding of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia), and the second being the ability to derive rulings based on that understanding" (1). One might think that the second quality includes the condition of applying the particulars, but this is not the case, because the second—according to al-Shatibi—is a means to the first. It is the one that demonstrates the attainment of understanding the objectives, and it is what shows the possibility of deriving rulings based on this understanding. He said: "The fruit of understanding only appears in derivation; therefore, it was made a second condition. The first is the reason for reaching this rank because it is the objective, while the second is a means" (2). These texts prompt a careful examination of the true intent of al-Shatibi regarding this matter, which leans towards the idea of dispensing with the particulars, especially since he emphasizes the complete understanding of the objectives: "Knowledge of the objectives of the Sharia in general and in detail," "Understanding the objectives of the Sharia in its completeness," as well as his statement: "When a person reaches a level where he understands the intent of the Legislator in every issue of the Sharia and in every chapter of its chapters, he has attained a quality that is the reason for his being placed in the position of the successor to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) in teaching, issuing fatwas, and judging by what Allah has shown him" (3). __________ (1) The same source, 4/56. (2) The same location. (3) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/56. [Page 679] What also indicates this is what he said when discussing the ranks of scholars (1), where he categorized them into three ranks: the first is one whose understanding of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) has not yet been established, so his ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) is not valid, and he must refrain and follow (taqlid). The third is the rank of those firmly grounded in knowledge, and there is no disagreement regarding the validity of ijtihad from such a person. The second rank is the one in question here, and it indicates the sufficiency of ignoring the particulars. He described the characteristics of the person in this second rank of knowledge, summarizing that he has a complete and thorough understanding of the general principles of the Sharia, but when he engages in ijtihad, he applies the general principles and does not engage with the particulars. Al-Shatibi then questioned whether a person in this rank is capable of valid ijtihad or not, stating that this is a matter of consideration and ambiguity, and it is a point of contention. He then mentioned the arguments of those who permit his ijtihad and the arguments of those who prohibit it, concluding that the issue remains problematic. The evidence that this methodology necessitates the validity of neglecting the particulars consists of two points: First: His statement that the issue remains problematic, and based on his assertions regarding the obligation to apply both particulars and general principles together, he should have sided with the prohibitors without hesitation. However, he did not do so, which suggests that the methodology aligns with neglecting the particulars for one who has completed the general principles. Likewise, he did not side with the permitters, as this would contradict his statements about the necessity of applying both particulars and general principles together, which led to claims of his inconsistency on this matter. Second: All the arguments of the prohibitors are refuted according to his methodology and his texts, as he asserts that the general principles are definitive and inductive, thus they cannot be opposed, violated, or specified. Nevertheless, he did not refute the arguments of the prohibitors here; if he had, it would contradict what he previously established about the necessity of applying the particulars, as they all revert to the neglect of the particulars by the person in this rank. The following provides evidence for the aforementioned: __________ (1) See: the same source, 4/127 - 132. [Page 680] As for the description of the one who possesses this rank, he said: "He should conclude by reflecting on the realization of the meaning of what he has attained according to what the legal proof has led him to, such that he achieves certainty and is not opposed by doubt; rather, doubts that arise for him become like the proofs indicating the correctness of what he holds" (1). Then he said: "However, his condition continued until his memorization slipped from his retention in a ruling, even if it was present with him, so he does not care about making definitive rulings on the issues whether he has stated them or opposed them" (2). Then he questioned: "If the student reaches this rank, is it permissible for him to exercise independent juristic reasoning (ijtihad) in legal rulings or not? This is a matter of consideration and ambiguity and one in which disagreement arises" (3). He then clarified what he sees as arguments for those who permit it, saying: "The one arguing for permissibility may say: If the legal objective has become clearer to this student than the sun, and the meanings of the legal texts have become evident to him until they cohere and some support others, and there remains no need for him in understanding their realities, then what he has attained is the entirety of the Sharia and the foundation of the doctrine and the source of obligation. Therefore, it does not matter whether he looks into its specific provisions or its particular issues or not. For his examination of that does not increase him in knowledge; if it were so, he would not have reached this rank, and we have assumed him to have reached it, which is contradictory. __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/127. (2) The same source, 4/128. (3) The same location. [Page 681] And a second point is that the examination of particulars and texts is intended to reach that general legal objective so that one can base their fatwas upon it and refer to it in their judgments of ijtihad. If this objective is already achieved, then descending to particulars is a pursuit of obtaining what is already obtained, which is impossible. And a third point is that the general legal objective is only realized through understanding the particulars and specifics, and by their meanings one ascends to what they aspire to. If the situation does not govern him due to the predominance of the general meaning, it is, in reality, governing because the general meaning is derived from it. For this reason, you will not find someone at this level issuing a ruling on a matter unless there are supporting and affirming evidences for him; otherwise, it would not support or affirm him. Thus, it is established that someone at this level is very capable of deriving rulings and exercising ijtihad, which is the objective(1). All the arguments of those who permit this revolve around the lack of necessity to consider the particulars, because the benefit of examining them is achieved through the examination of the universals. As for his clarification of what the opponents of the ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) of the one in this rank can use as evidence, he said: "The opponent can argue against the permissibility from several angles"(2). He mentioned three angles: The first: This involves neglecting the particular, which is an error, and one who does not consider the particular cannot rise to the level of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning), "for it has been established in the Book of Evidence that considering the universal while disregarding the particular is an error, just as in the opposite case."(3) __________ (1) The same place, and the reader can observe the strength and mastery of this mujtahid. (2) al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/128. (3) The same source, 4/129. [Page 682] The second: "That particularities have characteristics suitable for each of their respective contexts that are not suitable for other contexts, as in marriage, for example, it is not permissible for it to be treated like exchanges in every respect, just as it is not permissible for it to be treated like gifts and donations in every respect" (1). He said: "And for every particular there is a characteristic that is suitable for it and not suitable for others, as in the concessions in acts of worship, customs, and other rulings. If that is the case, and we know that all of them refer, for example, to the preservation of necessities, needs, and embellishments, then applying the preservation of these in every context in a uniform manner is not possible; rather, it is necessary to consider the particularities of circumstances, categories, and other specific particulars" (2). The third: "That this rank necessitates that if particularities are not considered, then their contexts, which are the actions of the accountable individuals, should not be considered either. Just as universals apply to every particular absolutely, it would necessitate that they apply to every accountable individual absolutely without considering their particularities, and this is not correct" (3). Then he said on behalf of the opponents: "The holder of this rank cannot descend to what is required by the rank of the mujtahid (scholar), so it is not consistent with this for him to be among the people of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning)" (4). Upon examining the arguments of the opponents, it becomes clear that they all return to the failure to apply particulars, and that particulars have their own specific characteristics, whether in actions or in the accountable individuals. __________ (1) The same place. (2) The same place. (3) The same place. (4) The same place. [Page 683] After presenting the arguments of both sides, he said: "And if it is established that each possibility has its basis, then the issue, according to true consideration, remains problematic" (1). This position is strange and confused, for based on what has been established regarding the necessity of applying both universals and particulars together, he should have rejected the arguments of those who permit without hesitation, rather than finding the matter problematic. Furthermore, based on what has been established regarding the method of obtaining universals, he should have refuted the evidence of the forbidders that discusses the specificity of particulars and the specificity of the obligated individuals, for this evidence does not only prevent the ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) of one at this rank, but it also undermines the methodology itself as it prevents the acquisition of universals from particulars. He had previously rejected it when the matter pertained to the correctness or error of his methodology. He said: "If it is said: extracting the universal meanings from particular occurrences is not clear from several aspects: one of them is that this is only possible in rational matters, not in religious matters" (2). "And the second: that the specificities entail, in terms of specificity, a meaning additional to that general meaning or many meanings, and this is clear in rational matters because what is shared is not the same as what distinguishes" (3). "And the third: that the specifications in the Sharia are many, so a place is specified by one ruling and a similar one by another ruling, and likewise, different matters are combined under one ruling" (4). The second and third aspects here are the second and third arguments in the evidence of the forbidders against the ijtihad of one who does not apply particulars. He responded to these three aspects by saying: "The response to the first is that it is possible in religious matters as it is in rational matters" (5). "And to the second, they did not organize the general meaning from the specific cases until they knew that the specificities and what distinguishes them are not considered" (6). "And to the third, it is the problem raised against the opinion of analogy, and what the usuliyyin (jurisprudential scholars) have said is the answer here" (7). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 4/129. (2) The same source, 3/170. (3) The same location. (4) The same source, 4/171. (5) The same location. (6) The same source, 4/172. (7) The same source. [Page 684] So why did he not use these answers or refer to them to refute the arguments of the prohibitors? Especially since they undermine his methodology, not just the validity of the ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) of the one in this rank. And why did he not refute the arguments of the permissors, especially since they assert the validity, indeed the necessity, of relying on the general principles over the particulars? Instead, he became confused and perplexed by the matter and refrained from accepting or rejecting either of the two opinions, preferring to leave the issue ambiguous and under consideration. He stated that the matter, according to true consideration, remains problematic. The least that can be affirmed is that considering the matter as open to discussion and problematic is a doubt regarding what has been established for him, which is the necessity of applying both particulars and general principles together, indicating his acceptance of the validity of applying general principles while neglecting the particulars. This is a dreadful outcome for the methodology and leads to its invalidation. Other observations: There are other observations and objections to al-Shatibi's methodology, such as his rejection of the specification of general principles and their restriction, and his rejection of exceptions to them, as well as his statements regarding what is permissible (mubah) and the concession (rukhsah). For instance, what is permissible is what the legislator has allowed between action and inaction, which contradicts the principle that the Sharia was established for the interests of the servants. This principle, according to his methodology, is a general and definitive one that does not change or falter; otherwise, it would not be general nor would it be a principle. Permissibility represents an equality between the desire for action and the desire for inaction, and according to the principle, the desire for action implies that there is an objective for the legislator in the action, while the desire for inaction implies that there is a harm resulting from the action, which the legislator intends to remove. Thus, the concept of permissibility contradicts this principle, which undermines the entire methodology. Therefore, al-Shatibi concluded that permissibility in this sense is permissibility in the particular. Permissibility in the particular must either be required in the whole or prohibited in the whole. Thus, he denies the existence of permissibility in the whole. This is merely an attempt to correct his idea or patch its shortcomings. In any case, this problem remains since permissibility in the particular is an existing legal ruling, which contradicts the idea of it being a general principle that does not change and is not subject to exceptions. [Page 685] The concession (rukhsah) also contradicts the foundational purpose of the Sharia in serving interests (masalih) if it does not pertain to a hardship that is truly significant, such as the travel of a wealthy king. This is because there is a conflict between it and the firm command (azimah); if the intent of the legislator is present in the firm command, then the concession undermines the original principle if it is permissible without necessity or need. Therefore, it has been argued that concessions should be classified under the category of what is permissible (mubah) as part of what is required to be abandoned entirely. However, the concession is a legal ruling that exists, and this does not align with the overarching principle according to his understanding of universality. Thus, al-Shatibi was compelled to oppose his own principles, stating: "What has been legislated from concessions is that the legality of concessions is partial, limited to the place of need; for when the traveler’s journey is interrupted, he must return to the original principle of completing the prayer and observing the fast" (1). He also said: "The conclusion is that the firm command returns to an initial universal principle, while the concession returns to a particular exception from that universal principle" (2). The evidence is that al-Shatibi was forced to accept exceptions from the universals, which contradicts the characteristics of universals in his view, and consequently, it contradicts the methodology. Conclusion __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/211. (2) The same source. [Page 686] The stance towards al-Shatibi's methodology is not the same as the stance towards al-Shatibi himself, nor should it be. Rather, the researcher feels, while presenting the concept of the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) as understood by him to researchers and those interested in it and in the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) in general, that the most significant person who critiques it is al-Shatibi himself. This is due to the affection that has developed within the researcher towards a man who combined genius and faith, knowledge and morality, ambition and piety. His intellect elevated him, and his soul, filled with fear and hope, urged him to rise, aspiring like the devoted and active worshippers. His psyche was exalted, and his intellect, filled with thought and wisdom, urged him to ascend, leading him to the asceticism of the grateful worshippers. The elevated intellect was coupled with the noble psyche in a believing person, which gave rise to a love for Allah, and the sweetness of faith bore fruit, guiding the seeker on his path. When the researcher saw the seeker stumbling and the paths becoming difficult, compassion and empathy were added to love and affection, as he witnessed the esteemed and enlightened scholar being obstructed by the ultimate goal from the path and being blinded to the subtleties of the truths. He wished he could be a student of his, a companion who would guide him with two eyes, sparing him from distractions that would divert him from perception or hinder his understanding. For great and pious individuals are rare and pass by infrequently, and there is no infallibility after the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) for anyone. Therefore, to assist them in obeying Allah and to serve in the service of Allah's commands is indeed an act of righteousness and obedience. To strive to correct them with etiquette, to enlighten them with wisdom, and to obey them and draw near to them sincerely for Allah and out of piety is a great endeavor, as great as their deeds, and beneficial as the fruits of their production, and it is a rarer opportunity than they are. The mistakes and missteps from them are a loss for those with them and for those around them, even if they are rewarded. [Page 687] The affection, esteem, and respect that the researcher holds for al-Shatibi makes him the first to critique his ideas. It also makes those who carry the concerns of al-Shatibi the first to present this research along with what they have concluded from the critique. What al-Shatibi undertook was an attempt to reform the science of usul al-fiqh (principles of jurisprudence) to correct what he sees as widespread errors, to emphasize what he considers neglected principles, to discard what does not belong to it, and to alert to areas where there is presumed disagreement but no actual disagreement. This was aimed at correcting and regulating discussions in usul al-fiqh that have grown, developed, branched out, and become detached from their foundations and controls. For example, his rejection of the prevailing concept of public interest (maslaha) and harm (mafsada) is notable; although he spoke of reasoning based on bringing about benefits and averting harms, and it initially appeared, as many uncritical observers thought, that he made public interest the foundation of legislation, he actually dismantled this understanding and shifted this reasoning from one path to another and opposing one. This is something he is attested to. It is one of the most important objectives in his book. Therefore, he referred to it at the beginning of the preface of his book, saying: "Indeed, before the rise of this light, we were groping about like the blind, and our minds were running in pursuit of our interests in a disordered manner, due to their weakness in bearing these burdens and participating in the immediate whims, on the battlefield of the self, which is caught between the two extremes of the worst. We would place poisons in the places of remedies, seeking healing like one grasping at water, and we continued to swim between them in the sea of illusion, drifting, and wandering in our ignorance of the evidence in a dark night, and we would deduce the barren analogy, and seek the traces of health from the sick body, and we would walk face down, thinking we were walking on the straight path, until the pure compulsion appeared in the face of fate, and the reality of the hands of necessity was raised to the One, the All-Prevailing" (1). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/2. [Page 688] He, by saying that the objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-sharia) came to correct a misunderstanding, saw the objectives of the Sharia as if they were merely the objectives or interests of the people as perceived by them. He came to distinguish between the two types and to say that the objectives of the Sharia are objectives of the legislator, derived from the Sharia itself, and anything else is mere delusion and imagination. The first objective of the Sharia, when a command or prohibition is issued, is submission and adherence. Thus, the primary objective of His saying, "Do" is to perform the action, and the primary objective of His saying, "Do not" is to refrain from the action. In this way, the servant, who is a servant by necessity, becomes a servant by choice. This is something that is evidenced by him. He, by saying that the Sharia was established for the interests of the servants in both abodes, and although this statement aligns with the views of many others, he, with his new understanding of interest (maslaha) and harm (mafsada), and with his methodology in how to determine what constitutes an interest and what constitutes a harm, has transformed the meaning of this statement to become consistent with the assertion that the servants were created for the sake of the Sharia. { And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me } (1), and thus he aimed to prevent the transgression of the limits of the Sharia under the pretext of interests and objectives, and this is something that is evidenced by him. He, by saying that the legal rulings established by the legislator as a means to legal objectives should not be taken as a means to other objectives than those which the legislator has designated as their goals, and that the legal objective should not be approached by any means other than what the legislator has made a path to it, has attempted to prevent manipulation of the religion under the pretext of its objectives, and has safeguarded his idea from being used for purposes other than what he intended. This is something that is evidenced by him. __________ (1) Adh-Dhariyat, 56. [Page 689] And despite the errors in his methodology, in its foundations and pillars, he did not build upon it any deviant branches. Whenever his principles led to results that were not acceptable, he would pause and not proceed, unconcerned, as his piety prevented him from continuing. Thus, when his methodology led him to rely on generalities over specifics, he halted and did not allow the fact that he had exerted his utmost effort in formulating his idea, which was the fruit of his lifetime, to push him toward a disgraceful statement; rather, he paused in contemplation, as if he anticipated that someone would follow his methodology and provide a solution to this dilemma. Similarly, when he determined that a report from a single source (khabar ahad) should be paused upon if it did not refer to a definitive meaning, it seemed that deep down he could not accept pausing on the application of a hadith that had no legal opposition, merely because it did not refer to a definitive meaning. Therefore, he stated that in this case, there is no harm in applying such a hadith, arguing that the scholars have applied the unusual analogy and associated this with it. Thus, despite the apparent corruption of the methodology, no deviant branches emerged in al-Shatibi's work. It was as if, despite his belief in his methodology and principles, he felt that safety lay in conforming to the predecessors among the righteous predecessors and the good scholars regarding what they issued in jurisprudence; he strived to avoid contradicting them, despite the accusations of inconsistency that this might bring upon him. [Page 690] Despite the critique of al-Shatibi's idea and methodology, the book al-Muwafaqat is almost a comprehensive work in the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh). Although it does not elaborate on the research and issues of consensus (ijma) and analogy (qiyas), what is presented therein serves as foundational principles for them, and a thorough examination of his book indicates his views on these matters. It is filled with foundational and jurisprudential benefits, well-structured in its expression, formulation, and arrangement. The author embarked on it earnestly and with determination, carrying a scientific and objective intent. His ideas are interconnected, with the latter built upon the former, and the depth of thought is profound to the utmost degree, featuring an exploration that only the diligent, patient, and broad-minded can achieve. This does not contradict the assertion of the methodological errors and contradictions. These errors and contradictions stem from incomplete induction and the illusion that it is complete, as well as from the piety that sometimes leads him to refrain from a ruling based on the methodology, either out of doubt or relying on the notion that the rare has no ruling. The errors of ijtihad (independent juristic reasoning) and inference do not diminish his scholarly status and intellectual capacity. Few are those who do not err, but the danger of his error lies in the principles rather than in the branches. Studying al-Muwafaqat is an analytical endeavor, following his ideas in various contexts while considering that his words, sentences, issues, and their arrangement are all intentionally chosen. This confirms that al-Shatibi carries a concern and aims for a significant matter—in his view—and that he spent many years contemplating ideas, during which he took the Qur'an as a companion, friend, and confidant, reflecting and pondering, yet he found no foundational principle upon which his ideas could stand nor any connection that could form them into a coherent entity or methodology, wandering in thought in search of evidence to support his ideas and breathe life into them. When he found none, he settled his thoughts on induction. [Page 691] It was indeed deserving of compassion, for the feeling of the greatness of invention, in isolation, due to the absence of supporters and followers, along with the lack of evidence and the passing of years, and the scarcity of those who discuss and advise, leads one to believe in fantasy and to free the mind from its constraints, like a thirsty person who sacrifices his life for a mirage. Perhaps al-Shatibi (may Allah have mercy on him and reward him for his efforts) came upon induction (istiqra) or induction came upon him, thus he leaped over the reality that if this is valid in rational matters, it is not valid in religious matters, so he was like one who jumped into the sea fleeing from death by burning to death by drowning, then began to weave from his imagination ropes to cling to. Al-Shatibi's discovery of induction was like breathing life into the body of his ideas. Therefore, he referred to induction as a spirit in more than one place in his book, and what indicates this is his description of the hardships he faced in writing his book: "Indeed, I have traversed in pursuit of this objective paths that are both pleasant and unpleasant, and I have endured the trials of my journey, both good and bad, and I have encountered from its opposing faces both frowning and smiling, and I have suffered from its differing riders, both prohibitive and permissive. If you wish, you can find it to be a toil of travel, or a result of the hardships that have laid me low, or from battling the hindrances that have left me wounded; there is neither a pleasant life nor a comforting death. In summary, the most difficult thing that the traveler on the path encounters is the loss of guidance, with a mind that is dim due to the lack of the light of discernment, and a heart afflicted by the shocks of illusions, so he walks without a path and belongs to no tribe, until from the Generous Lord, the Kind Benefactor, the Guide of whom He wills to the Straight Path, the spirits of those bodies were revived for him, and the realities of those forms appeared, and the meanings of those labels became evident" (1). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/6. [Page 692] Al-Shatibi believed that there were others who were confused like him, and he expected them to embrace what he had brought forth and to follow him in it. He took great pride in this, which matched his struggles and efforts in that regard, so he refined his idea and called for its completion, not realizing that he was stifling it at its birth. He said: "As for what follows, O seeker of the truths of the highest sciences, aspiring for the most splendid results of dreams, thirsting for the sweetest sources of understanding, hovering around the sanctuary of the apparent decree, hoping to grasp its hidden meaning, meanings intertwined in the unraveling of those decrees, it is time for you to listen to one whose desires align with yours, and to engage with the sorrow of one who shares your grief, and to return, as you share with him the essence of his whispers, until he conveys to you his complaint, so that you may walk with him on this path as he has walked, and traverse in its murkiness, where its light mingles with darkness as it flows, and in the morning, if Allah wills, you will praise the outcome of the journey" (1). He also said, describing his book to those who would approach it: "Let this book be, O pure friend and loyal companion, a support for you in traversing the path, and an explanation of the meanings of harmony and success" (2). He said: "Indeed, it has brought you closer in your journey, and informed you how to ascend in the sciences of the Sharia (Islamic law) and where to proceed, and it has guided you from the paths of the travelers on the back, and has sought for you the brides of wisdom and then granted you the dowry, so take a step of determination, and by the grace of Allah, you will arrive" (3). Then he said: "At that point, it is the right of the contemplative observer, if he finds a deficiency in it, to complete it, and to have good thoughts about one who has endured the nights and days, exchanging toil for comfort and wakefulness for sleep, until he has gifted him the result of his life and bestowed upon him the orphan of his era" (4). __________ (1) Al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, 1/5. (2) The same source, 1/8. (3) The same location. (4) The same source, 1/9. [Page 693] Regardless of al-Shatibi's methodology or his idea, what he intended is indeed worthy of pursuit, which is returning to the roots, refining them, and reconciling them by removing the disagreements based on differing terminologies and misunderstandings, and by eliminating foreign ideas that bear no fruit or that have no relevance to the foundations of jurisprudence but were inserted into its discussions due to speculative theology (kalam). This reform can only be carried out by true scholars who return to the roots, to the Qur'an and the Sunnah and what they guide towards, learning from them and acting upon them, liberating themselves from the constraints of Western thought and its conformity, giving no weight or consideration to customs that are not endorsed by Islam, even if widespread, nor to thoughts or rulings that do not stem from its creed, even if dominant. They are neither ashamed nor disturbed by the contradiction of Islamic rulings that have become alien to the ideas and concepts of the backward and degraded Western civilization, whether they are prevalent or new; they strive for the supremacy of Islam as a creed and system, not to reconcile it with others under the pretexts of false flexibility and spurious development. This reform is carried out by true scholars who liberate themselves from the alien understandings of terms such as moderation (wasatiyya), objectives (maqasid), renewal (tajdid), moderation (i'tidal), dialogue (hiwar), freedom (hurriyya), and similar concepts, which are taken and called for with truncated meanings that deviate from what Islam has brought and from the understanding of the noble companions (may Allah be pleased with them) and the righteous scholars. This reform is carried out by true scholars who realize that they ought to be the heirs of the prophets, so they rise with zeal and determination, moving forward confidently and speaking truthfully, to bear witness to humanity, { And thus We have made you a just nation that you will be witnesses over the people and the Messenger will be a witness over you } (1). Yes, the Sharia has objectives, but they are the objectives of the Sharia and the objectives of the Legislator, not the whims of souls. The meaning of the objectives of the Sharia is not the flexibility of Islam or its rulings that can be folded, twisted, expanded, or contracted to conform to any reality or to be shaped in a way that pleases this party or that, and then it is said: this cannot be denied, for Islam is evolving! __________ (1) Surah Al-Baqarah, 143. [Page 694] The Sharia came with analogical reasoning (qiyas) and reasoning (ta'leel), and the basis in transactions or customs is reasoning, while in acts of worship it is devotion and lack of reasoning. However, the reason is what has been established in a legal context or indicated by legal evidence, and it must meet the conditions of reasoning; it is not the figments of the imagination or the proposals of minds, let alone the claims of the distorters. In conclusion, I ask Allah, the Exalted, for mercy and abundant reward for al-Shatibi, and I ask Him to make this work of mine sincere for His noble face and to benefit others through it. I also ask Him for forgiveness and pardon for anything my pen may have strayed into, or my tongue may have slipped on, or my thoughts and imagination may have exceeded. Furthermore, I ask Him for abundant reward and recompense for everyone who taught me, advised me, and benefited me in this knowledge and in this book, and to forgive me, my parents, and the believers. * * * Sources and References The Noble Qur'an. "Etiquette of Fatwa, the Mufti, and the Inquirer," by Abu Zakariya Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi, edited by Bassam Abdul Wahab al-Jabi, Dar al-Bashair al-Islamiyya - Beirut, 2nd edition, 1411 AH - 1990 CE. "The Mastery in the Sciences of the Qur'an" by Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (may Allah have mercy on him), Dar al-Fikr - Beirut, with the book "The Miraculous Nature of the Qur'an" by Qadi Abu Bakr al-Baqillani (may Allah have mercy on him) as a footnote. The impact of the disputed evidence in Islamic jurisprudence, Mustafa Dhib al-Bagha, Dar al-Imam al-Bukhari, Damascus. 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[Page 698] - Al-Qamus al-Muhit, Majd al-Din Muhammad ibn Yaqub al-Firuzabadi, Dar al-Risalah, supervised by Muhammad Naim al-Arqoussi, 4th edition, 1415 AH - 1994 CE. - Qawaid al-Ahkam fi Masalih al-Anam, Izz al-Din ibn Abd al-Salam, Dar al-Rayan - Beirut, revised new edition, 1410 AH - 1990 CE. - Kashf al-Asrar 'an Usul Fakhru al-Islam al-Bazdawi, Alaa al-Din Abd al-Aziz al-Bukhari, edited by Abdullah Mahmoud Muhammad Omar, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah - Beirut, 1st edition, 1418 AH - 1997 CE. - Lisan al-Arab, Jamal al-Din ibn Manzur, Dar Sader - Beirut. - Al-Lamha al-Badriyah, Lisan al-Din ibn al-Khatib, edited by Muhyiddin al-Khatib, Al-Matba'a al-Salafiyyah - Cairo, 1st edition, 1374 AH. - Al-Mabsut, Shams al-Din ibn Abi Sahl al-Sarakhsi, Dar al-Ma'rifah - Beirut, 3rd edition, reprinted in offset, 1398 AH - 1978 CE. - Majma' al-Zawa'id wa Manba' al-Fawa'id, Ali ibn Abi Bakr al-Haythami, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi - Beirut, 3rd edition, 1402 AH - 1982 CE. - Al-Mahsul fi Ilm Usul al-Fiqh, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, edited by Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Dar al-Risalah, 2nd edition, 1412 AH - 1992 CE. - Al-Mustasfa fi Ilm Usul al-Fiqh, Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, Al-Matba'a al-Amiriyyah bi Bulak, Egypt, 1322 AH. - Al-Maswada fi Usul al-Fiqh, compiled by three from the family of Taymiyyah: Majd al-Din, Shihab al-Din, and Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyyah, compiled by Shihab al-Din al-Harani al-Dimashqi, edited by Muhammad Muhyi al-Din Abd al-Hamid, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi - Beirut. - Mishkat al-Anwar, a collection of letters from Imam al-Ghazali, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah - Beirut, 1st edition, 1414 AH - 1994 CE. - Al-Mu'tamad fi Usul al-Fiqh, Abu al-Husayn al-Basri al-Mu'tazili, introduction by Sheikh Khalil al-Mays, Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah - Beirut, 1st edition, 1403 AH - 1983 CE. [Page 699] - The Objectives of Islamic Law and Its Noble Traits, Allal al-Fasi, Islamic Unity Library - Casablanca, 1382 AH - 1963 CE. - The Objectives of Islamic Law, Muhammad al-Tahir ibn Ashour, Tunisian Distribution Company - Tunisia, 3rd edition, December 1988 CE. - The Selected Comments on Usul, Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, Edited and Commented by: Muhammad Hasan Hayto, Dar al-Fikr, Damascus, 2nd edition, 1400 AH - 1980 CE. - The Method of Reaching the Science of Usul, Qadi Nasir al-Din ibn Umar ibn Ali al-Baydawi, along with Nihayat al-Sul for al-Usnawi and Sulam al-Wusul for Muhammad Bakhit al-Mut'i, Alami Books. - The Explanation of Sahih Muslim by Ibn al-Hajjaj, Imam Muhyi al-Din al-Nawawi, Edited by: Khalil Mamoun Shihah, Dar al-Ma'rifah - Beirut, 1st edition, 1414 AH - 1994 CE. - Al-Muwafaqat, Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, Volume One contains Parts One and Two, Edited by: Muhammad Hussein al-Khidr al-Tunisi, and Volume Two contains Parts Three and Four, Edited by: Muhammad Hasnain Makhlouf, Dar al-Rashad al-Hadithah - Casablanca. - Al-Muwafaqat, Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, Edited by: Abu Ubaidah Mashhoor ibn Hasan al-Salman, Dar Ibn Afan - Arab Republic of Egypt, 1st edition, 1421 AH. - Al-Muwafaqat, Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, Edited by: Sheikh Abdullah Daraz, Dar al-Ma'rifah - Beirut. - Nasb al-Rayah for the Hadiths of Guidance, Abdullah ibn Yusuf ibn Muhammad al-Hanafi al-Zaili, Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi - Beirut, 3rd edition, 1407 AH - 1987 CE. - The Theory of Objectives (Maqasid) According to Imam al-Shatibi, Ahmed Rayesouni, International House for Islamic Books and the International Institute for Islamic Thought, 4th edition, 1416 AH - 1995 CE. - The Fragrance of the Good in the Branch of Moist Andalusia, Abu al-Abbas Ahmad al-Maqri, Edited by: Ihsan Abbas, Dar Sader - Beirut. [Page 700] ¨ The end of the message in explaining the methodology of the principles, by Jamal al-Din Abdul Rahim al-Isnawi, Dar al-Kutub, with a marginal commentary on the end of the message by Sheikh Muhammad Bakheet al-Mut'i. ¨ The attainment of joy through the embellishment of the embroidered, by Ahmad Baba al-Tanbukti, (with a marginal commentary on the embroidered by Ibn Farhun), Library of Happiness - Egypt, 1329 AH. ¨ The attainment of the goals from the hadiths of the Master of the Chosen Ones, an explanation of the selected reports, by Muhammad bin Ali al-Shawkani, Dar al-Qalam - Beirut. ¨ The compact disc (C.D) program of the Encyclopedia of the Noble Hadith, by Sakhr Company, second edition, with global numbering, and contains the following nine books: - Sahih al-Bukhari, by Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Ismail al-Bukhari. - Sahih Muslim, by Abu al-Husayn Muslim bin al-Hajjaj bin Muslim al-Qushayri al-Naysaburi. - The authentic collection, Sunan al-Tirmidhi, by Abu Isa Muhammad bin Isa al-Tirmidhi. - Sunan al-Nasa'i, by Abu Abdur Rahman Ahmad bin Shu'ayb al-Nasa'i. - Sunan Abu Dawood, by Abu Dawood Sulayman bin al-Ash'ath al-Sijistani al-Azdiy. - Sunan Ibn Majah, by Abu Abdullah Muhammad bin Yazid al-Qazwini. - Musnad Imam Ahmad, by Abu Abdullah Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Hanbal bin Hilal bin Asad. - Muwatta Imam Malik, by Abu Abdullah Malik bin Anas bin Malik bin Abu Amir. - Sunan al-Darimi, by Abu Muhammad Abdullah bin Abdur Rahman al-Darimi. ¨ The magazine (Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqim), America - Virginia, issue: 59, year 1417 AH. ¨ The newspaper Al-Hayat, issue: 12615, September 13, 1997 CE. Index of Verses The verse or part of the verse ... its number ... the surah ... the page { Do you argue with me about names you have named, you and your forefathers, for which Allah has not sent down any authority? } ... 71 ... Al-A'raf ... 635 [Page 701] { When the victory of Allah and the conquest comes } ... 1 ... Victory ... 452 { When you receive it with your tongues and say with your mouths what you have no knowledge of, and you think it is insignificant, while it is great in the sight of Allah } ... 15 ... Light ... 283, 663 { When harm touches him, he is despairing } ... 20 ... The Ascending ... 358 { Permission is given to those who are fought against because they have been wronged } ... 39 ... The Pilgrimage ... 218, 223 { Do you think that We created you in vain } ... 115 ... The Believers ... 318 { Have you seen the one who takes as his god his own desire, and Allah has led him astray despite his knowledge } ... 23 ... The Kneeling ... 293 { Is he who is upon clear proof from his Lord like one to whom his evil deed has been made attractive, and they follow their desires } ... 14 ... Muhammad ... 293 { Establish prayer at the decline of the sun } ... 78 ... The Night Journey ... 69 { Establish prayer } ... 11, 43, 83 ... The Cow and others ... 171, 620, 648 { Except seeking the countenance of his Lord, the Most High } ... 20 ... The Night ... 361 { Except as a reminder } ... 3 ... Ta-Ha ... 175 { If you do not go forth, He will punish you with a painful punishment } ... 39 ... The Repentance ... 306 { Who created death and life to test you as to which of you is best in deed } ... 2 ... The Sovereignty ... 161, 217, 222 { Those who consume usury will not stand on the Day of Resurrection except like the standing of a person beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, "Trade is just like usury," but Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden usury } ... 275 ... The Cow ... 671 [Page 702] { The adulteress and the adulterer, lash each one of them with a hundred lashes } ... 2 ... An-Nur ... 281 { Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes, we bear witness, lest you say on the Day of Resurrection: Indeed, we were of this unaware } ... 172 ... Al-A'raf ... 218, 224 { * Allah, who has subjected the sea for you to sail the ships therein by His command and to seek of His bounty } ... 12 ... Al-Jathiya ... 341 { Allah is the Creator of all things } ... 62 ... Az-Zumar ... 440 { Allah takes the souls at the time of their death } ... 42 ... Az-Zumar ... 673 { This day I have perfected for you your religion } ... 3 ... Al-Ma'idah ... 186, 446, 447, 452, 617 { * Indeed, mankind was created anxious (19) When evil touches him, he is impatient (20) And when good touches him, he withholds (21) } ... 19, 20, 21 ... Al-Ma'arij ... 358 { Indeed, the judgment is only for Allah. He has commanded that you not worship except Him } ... 40 ... Yusuf ... 2 { Indeed, those for whom has preceded [the decree of] good from Us } ... 101 ... Al-Anbiya ... 437 { Indeed, those who do not believe in the Hereafter name the angels female names (27) And they have no knowledge of it. They follow not except assumption, and indeed, assumption avails not against the truth at all } ... 27, 28 ... An-Najm ... 634 { Indeed, those who harm Allah and His Messenger, Allah has cursed them in this world and the Hereafter } ... 57 ... Al-Ahzab ... 468 { Indeed, Satan is to you a enemy; so take him as an enemy } ... 6 ... Fatir [Page 703] { Indeed, prayer prohibits immorality and wrongdoing } ... 45 ... Al-Ankabut ... 218 { * Indeed, Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and giving to relatives; and He forbids immorality, wrongdoing, and oppression. He advises you that perhaps you will be reminded } ... 90 ... An-Nahl ... 303 { Indeed, Allah judges what He wills } ... 1 ... Al-Ma'idah ... 671 { Indeed, We sent down the Reminder, and indeed, We will preserve it } ... 9 ... Al-Hijr ... 186, 247, 616 { If you fear Allah, He will grant you a criterion } ... 29 ... Al-Anfal ... 516 { Go forth, light and heavy } ... 41 ... At-Tawbah ... 306 { Indeed, you and what you worship } ... 98 ... Al-Anbiya ... 437 { Indeed, you and what you worship besides Allah are the fuel of Hell } ... 98 ... Al-Anbiya ... 437, 439 { Indeed, intoxicants, gambling, stone altars, and divining arrows are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it } ... 90 ... Al-Ma'idah ... 281 { J* Indeed, the alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to collect them, and for bringing hearts together } ... 60 ... At-Tawbah ... 72 { Indeed, Satan only wants to cause between you animosity and hatred through intoxicants } ... 91 ... Al-Ma'idah ... 103 { Indeed, this Qur'an guides to that which is most upright } ... 9 ... Al-Isra ... 446 { It is nothing but revelation that is revealed } ... 4 ... An-Najm ... 644 [Page 704] { Indeed, they are nothing but names you have named them, you and your forefathers. Allah has not sent down any authority for them. They follow nothing but conjecture and what the souls desire. And there has certainly come to them from their Lord the guidance. } ... 23 ... al-Najm ... 634 { They follow nothing but conjecture and what the souls desire. } ... 23 ... al-Najm ... 293 { Or you have touched women. } ... 43 ... al-Nisa ... 469 { Or He takes them in fear. } ... 47 ... al-Nahl ... 275 { You desire the pleasures of this world, but Allah desires the Hereafter. } ... 67 ... al-Anfal ... 361 { A reward for what they used to do. } ... 17 ... al-Sajda ... 71 14 ... al-Ahqaf 24 ... al-Waqi'a { Until the white thread of dawn becomes distinct to you from the black thread of night. } ... 187 ... al-Baqarah ... 279 { Prohibited to you are dead animals, blood, and the flesh of swine. } ... 3 ... al-Ma'idah ... 281, 648 { Prohibited to you are your mothers. } ... 23 ... al-Nisa ... 599 { Creator of all things. } ... 62 ... al-Zumar ... 440 { Taste! Indeed, you are the Exalted in Might, the Honorable. } ... 49 ... al-Dukhan ... 418 { My Lord, show me how You give life to the dead. } ... 260 ... al-Baqarah ... 467 { Our Lord, and lay not upon us a burden like that which You laid upon those before us. } ... 286 ... al-Baqarah ... 289, 295 { A conjecture by the unseen. } ... 22 ... al-Kahf ... 466 { Messengers as bringers of good tidings and warners. } ... 165 ... al-Nisa ... 544 { Messengers as bringers of good tidings and warners, so that there will be for the people no argument against Allah after the messengers. } ... 165 ... al-Nisa ... 217 [Page 705] { The love of desires has been made alluring to people, from women and children, and heaped-up sums of gold and silver, and fine branded horses, and cattle and tilled land. That is the enjoyment of the worldly life, and Allah has with Him the best return. } ... 14 ... Al-Imran ... 357 { So believe in Allah and His Messenger, the unlettered Prophet who believes in Allah and His words. } ... 158 ... Al-A'raf ... 271 { Then bring a chapter like it. } ... 23 ... Al-Baqarah ... 418 { And when the prayer has been concluded, disperse throughout the land. } ... 10 ... Al-Jumu'ah ... 432 { So now go to your wives. } ... 187 ... Al-Baqarah ... 279 { As for those in whose hearts is deviation, they follow that of it which is unspecific. } ... 7 ... Al-Imran ... 424 { And the freeing of a believing slave, and a compensation to be paid to his family. } ... 92 ... An-Nisa' ... 489 { He is the doer of what He intends. } ... 16 ... Al-Buruj ... 671 17 ... Hud { So do not make equals to Allah. } ... 22 ... Al-Baqarah ... 460, 463 { And do not say to them a word of disrespect. } ... 23 ... Al-Isra' ... 121, 431 { So what is the matter with these people that they can hardly understand a statement? } ... 78 ... An-Nisa' ... 452 { So whoever wills, let him believe; and whoever wills, let him disbelieve. } ... 29 ... Al-Kahf ... 469 { So whoever does an atom's weight of good will see it. } ... 7 ... Al-Zalzalah ... 431 { So turn your faces toward it so that there will be no argument against you from the people. } ... 150 ... Al-Baqarah ... 218, 223 { And they insult Allah in enmity without knowledge. } ... 108 ... Al-An'am ... 544 [Page 706] { He said, "Indeed, I am among those who dislike your work." } ... 168 ... Ash-Shu'ara ... 283, 663 { He said, "Did you not believe?" He said, "Yes, but I want my heart to be at peace." } ... 260 ... Al-Baqarah ... 467 { * The Bedouins said, "We have believed." } ... 14 ... Al-Hujurat ... 467 { They said, "We were not among those who prayed (43) and we did not feed the poor." } ... 43, 44 ... Al-Muddathir ... 466 { Say, "Believe in it or do not believe." } ... 107 ... Al-Isra ... 428 { Say, "My Lord knows their number; none knows them except for a few." } ... 22 ... Al-Kahf ... 466 { * Say, "Be stones or iron." } ... 50 ... Al-Isra ... 418, 428 { Say, "You did not believe, but say, 'We have submitted,' while faith has not yet entered your hearts." } ... 14 ... Al-Hujurat ... 467 { Say, "Bring forth your proof if you are among the truthful." } ... 111 ... Al-Baqarah ... 635 64 ... An-Naml { Say, "This is my way; I invite to Allah with insight, I and whoever follows me." } ... 108 ... Yusuf { Say, "Do you have any knowledge that you can bring forth to us? You follow nothing but conjecture, and you are not but guessing." } ... 148 ... Al-An'am ... 635 { Fasting has been prescribed for you as it was prescribed for those before you, that you may attain piety. } ... 183 ... Al-Baqarah ... 218, 223, 544, 670 { Fighting has been prescribed for you, and it is a thing that you dislike. } ... 216 ... Al-Baqarah ... 545 { So that it does not become a privilege among the rich of you. } ... 7 ... Al-Hashr ... 71 [It was impossible to extract the rest of the index of verses from the source due to text damage, so it has been omitted.] [Page 707] Table of Hadiths Part of the Hadith ... Page - If a ruler exerts effort and makes a mistake, he has one reward, and if he is correct, he has two rewards ... 509 - If any of you wakes up from his sleep, he should not dip ... 279 - When a hadith comes to you, compare it with the Book of Allah ... 646 - Free a slave ... (for the man who said: I had relations with my family during Ramadan) ... 105 - Actions are judged by intentions ... 365, 376, 389 - Actions are based on intention ... 362, 365 - Indeed, the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) made his testimony with two testimonies ... 55 - Indeed, actions are judged by intentions ... 366, 376, 380, 389 - Permission was made for the sake of looking ... 70 - Among the greatest sins is cursing one's parents ... 591 - Whoever kills a believer intentionally ... 489 - I was sent to an unlettered nation ... 271 - I was not sent with Judaism or Christianity ... 289 - I fear for my nation from three actions ... 511 - I was given the Qur'an and something like it with it ... 643 - Beware of injustice, for injustice is darkness ... 487 - Islam began as something strange and will return as something strange ... 24 [Page 708] - I was sent to an unlettered nation ... 271 - I was sent with the easy Hanif (haneef) religion ... 289, 539 - Islam is built upon five ... 367 - Complete your fast, for indeed Allah has fed you and given you drink ... 579 - Shake hands, for it removes grudges, and exchange gifts, for it fosters love ... 287 - One of you may spend half her life without praying ... 279 The subject of the hadith ... page - Exchange gifts, for it fosters love ... 287 - Modesty is a branch of faith ... 335 - Let people be, for Allah provides for some through others ... 567 - Gold for gold and silver for silver ... 74 - May Allah have mercy on a person who hears my speech ... 640 - Permission was given for salam (salam) ... 578 - Mistakes, forgetfulness, and what one is forced to do have been lifted from my nation ... 391 - Wrap them in their shrouds, for they will be resurrected ... 71 - He was asked, "Which deeds are best?" He said: "Those who remember Allah..." ... 517 - He was asked, "Which deeds are best?" He said: "Faith in Allah..." ... 517 - He was asked (peace and blessings be upon him), "Which deeds are best?" He said: "Prayer at its appointed time..." ... 517 - He forgot and prostrated ... 73, 350 - Adhere to fasting, for there is nothing like it ... 517 - Adhere to my Sunnah and the Sunnah of the rightly guided caliphs ... 475 - So when you see those who follow what is ambiguous of it ... ... 513 - For if you do that, you will sever your ties of kinship ... 487 - The killer does not inherit ... 352, 413 - The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) ruled regarding the fetus of a woman from Banu Lihyan ... 490 - He (peace and blessings be upon him) used to refrain from killing the hypocrites ... 591 - He wrote to the people of Yemen a letter ... that whoever kills a believer ... ... 489 - Any action not in accordance with our command is rejected ... 389 - We were commanded to make up missed fasts but not to make up missed prayers ... 355 - I had forbidden you from saving the fat of the sacrificial animals for the sake of the guests ... 70 - Be like Abdullah the murdered, and do not be like Abdullah the killer ... 286 - Do not sell what you do not possess ... 578, 580 The subject of the hadith ... page [Page 709] - Do not rush him. (to the Bedouin who urinated in the mosque) ... 548 - Do not throw the goods until he brings them down to the market ... 567 - Do not die while you are an oppressor ... 286 - There should be no harm nor reciprocating harm ... 148, 184, 185, 352, 567, 614, 622, 652 - There is no harm nor reciprocating harm in Islam ... 148 - The blood of a Muslim person is not lawful except in one of three cases... ... 83 - Allah does not accept the prayer of any one of you if he becomes impure until he performs ablution ... 351 - A judge should not rule while he is angry ... 75, 352 - Whatever comes to you from me, present it to the Book of Allah... ... 622 - How ignorant you are of the language of your people, O boy ... 437 - Whatever comes to you from me, present it to the Book of Allah... ... 646 - He was never given a choice between two things except that he chose the easier of the two... ... 289 - You have control over yourself, so choose ... 73 - Whoever introduces something into this matter of ours that is not part of it, it is rejected ... 377, 389 - Whoever revives dead land, it is his ... 73 - Whoever among you converts to Islam, let him do so with a known measure ... 578 - Whoever entrusted a deposit and it perished, he is not liable ... 566 - Whoever changes his religion, kill him ... 327 - We are an unlettered nation; we do not calculate nor write ... 271 - The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade selling a resident to a nomad ... 567 - He (peace and blessings be upon him) forbade praying at the two ends of the day... ... 351 - He forbade eating every predator with fangs... ... 506 - He forbade eating the flesh of domesticated donkeys ... 506 - He forbade every bird with talons ... 506 - It is the Sunnah, O nephew... (regarding the matter of equalizing the fingers in blood money) ... 355 - O youth, whoever among you is able to marry... ... 375 Contents Subject ... Page Introduction ... 1 Al-Shatibi and His Era ... 8 Introduction to Al-Shatibi and His Era ... 8 Introduction to Al-Shatibi ... 8 His Era ... 10 The Political Situation ... 15 The Economic Situation ... 18 The Scientific Situation ... 20 The Cultural Climate of Society ... 23 [Page 710] Al-Shatibi's Teachers ... 30 His Students ... 32 His Scholarly Standing ... 33 His Works ... 35 Chapter One: Introduction to the Emergence of the Idea of the Objectives of the Sharia ... 41 Introduction to the Emergence and Development of the Science of Usul al-Fiqh ... 41 Section One: Qiyas ... 41 The Concept of Qiyas and Its Discussions ... 41 Its Authority ... 52 The Pillars of Qiyas ... 54 Its Conditions ... 54 The Illa ... 55 The Cause ... 61 The Manat ... 63 Establishing the Manat ... 65 Refining the Manat ... 66 Deriving the Manat ... 67 The Subject ... Page Section Two: The Paths of the Illa and Its Conditions ... 67 Introduction ... 67 The Paths of the Illa ... 69 On the Conditions of the Illa ... 79 Section Three: The Path of Ikhalah and Munasaba ... 87 Introduction ... 87 Clarifying the Meaning of Ikhalah and Munasaba ... 88 Categories of Munasaba ... 93 The Considered ... 93 Types of Consideration ... 94 Categories of the Considered ... 96 The Influential ... 97 The Suitable ... 99 The Strange ... 102 The Abrogated ... 104 The Sent ... 105 Conditions of the Suitable Description ... 115 Chapter Two: The Emergence of the Idea of the Objectives of the Sharia ... 116 A Brief Overview of the Emergence of the Idea ... 117 Section One: The Arguments That Led to the Idea of the Objectives ... 119 The Evolution of the Debate from the Path of Munasaba to Istidlal ... 119 The Meaning of Istidlal ... 122 Evidence from Those Who Advocate Munasaba and Istidlal ... 126 Responses from Those Who Refute the Path of Munasaba and Istidlal ... 129 Section Two: The Emergence of the Idea of the Objectives of the Sharia ... 132 The Intensity of the Debate ... 132 Classifying the Rulings According to Their Outcomes or Their Maslahi Objectives ... 137 Section Three: The Introduction to the Idea of the Objectives According to al-Shatibi ... 145 The Subject ... Page A Brief Overview of This Section ... 145 Evidence from Those Who Advocate the Principle of Ta'leel ... 147 Evidence from the Refuters ... 150 Is the Principle of Ta'leel Obligated by the Path of Munasaba ... 154 The Position of al-Shatibi in Brief ... 156 [Page 711] The meaning of the objectives (maqasid) according to al-Shatibi ... 158 Chapter Three: The criteria of the objectives according to al-Shatibi ... 165 The subject of this chapter ... 165 Section One: On the introductions ... 166 The subject of this section ... 166 The principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) are definitive ... 166 Induction is the only path to certainty ... 167 Primary objectives and secondary objectives ... 174 Characteristics of the universals ... 176 The meaning of returning to a definitive origin ... 180 The particular and the branch and the difference between them ... 185 Section Two: On the sources ... 187 Introduction ... 187 Permissibility (mubah) ... 189 The depiction of the particular and the universal in rulings ... 191 Permissibility is of two types ... 193 The rank of pardon ... 200 License (rukhsah) and obligation (azimah) ... 201 Causes and their effects ... 207 Section Three: On the results and the concept of public interest (maslaha) and harm (mafsadah) according to al-Shatibi ... 209 An introduction to the subject of the research ... 209 The cause ... 210 The wisdom ... 210 The subject ... page The effect ... 212 The reason ... 212 Meanings of the rulings ... 213 Public interest and harm ... 214 Al-Shatibi's concept of both public interest and harm ... 215 An analytical discussion of al-Shatibi's arguments ... 216 Some texts regarding al-Shatibi's intent with public interest and harm ... 226 Chapter Four: The intention of the Legislator in establishing the Sharia (Islamic law) from the outset and in its understanding ... 229 Introduction ... 229 Section One: The intention of the Legislator in establishing the Sharia from the outset ... 232 The meaning of this type ... 232 The objectives are of three categories ... 232 An introduction to these three categories ... 232 The application of these objectives in all obligations of the Sharia ... 234 Complements or supplements to the objectives ... 236 The varying ranks of the objectives ... 237 Section Two: The infallibility of the Sharia ... 246 The meaning of this expression ... 246 It is not permissible to violate the rulings under the pretext of the objectives ... 249 Interpretation of some texts of al-Shatibi ... 251 Al-Shatibi's discussion of some opinions on public interests and harms ... 262 [Page 712] The third section: The intention of the Legislator in establishing the Sharia for understanding ... 269 The meaning of this type ... 269 The Sharia is in the Arabic language and style ... 269 The ignorance of the Sharia ... 271 The meanings are the ultimate objective of the texts ... 274 The original meanings and the subsidiary meanings ... 276 There is no ruling for the subsidiary indication ... 281 The subject ... page The fifth chapter: The intention of the Legislator in establishing the Sharia for obligation By its requirements and the entry of the obligated under its rulings ... 284 Introduction ... 284 The first section: The intention of obligation according to the Sharia ... 284 The meaning of this type ... 284 Obligation and ease ... 286 Obligation and hardship ... 287 The original principle of not imposing obligations with excessive hardship ... 288 Hardships are evils ... 290 Usual hardship is not called hardship ... 291 Considered hardships or those intended to be alleviated ... 293 The meaning of concession ... 294 Reasons for concessions ... 296 Conditions for concessions ... 299 The moderation of the Sharia ... 302 The varying degree of usual hardship according to different actions ... 305 The second section: The intention of the Legislator in the entry of the obligated under the rulings of the Sharia ... 307 Introduction to this type ... 307 The original of compliance or worship ... 310 Benefits and harms are known only by the Sharia ... 314 The conflict between reasoning with benefits and the supremacy of the Sharia ... 317 The legal objectives are of two types: original and subsidiary ... 322 The third section: Between the Sharia and its objectives or between worship and following the meanings ... 329 The subject of this section ... 329 The universality of the Sharia and its stability ... 329 Custom and its consideration according to al-Shatibi ... 333 Obligation by rulings is not an obligation by its objectives ... 337 The legal correlation between the cause and its effect ... 344 The subject ... page Customs and acts of worship between following the meanings and worship ... 347 The meaning of following the meanings ... 348 [Page 713] Acts of worship are not subject to reasoning ... 348 The original principle in customary practices is reasoning ... 351 It is necessary to consider devotion in customary practices ... 355 Chapter Six: Objectives of the Obligated ... 356 Introduction ... 356 Section One: Objectives and Intentions ... 358 Intention and purpose and the difference between them ... 358 The effect of intention on actions ... 362 Principle: Matters are judged by their intentions ... 366 Sincerity and associating partners in objectives ... 369 Section Two: The Actions of the Obligated and Their Objectives ... 377 The effect of the objectives of the obligated on actions according to al-Shatibi ... 377 Agreement and disagreement with the intent of the Legislator ... 384 Section Three: Legal Devices ... 393 Definition ... 393 The ruling of Sharia on legal devices according to al-Shatibi ... 396 The ruling on what is based on legal devices ... 403 The right of Allah and the right of the servant ... 405 The effect of intention in what is the right of Allah or the right of the servant ... 408 Chapter Seven: Al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding Sharia ... 409 Introduction ... 409 Section One: Al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding Sharia ... 410 The subject of this section ... 410 Al-Shatibi's view on the indications of legal texts ... 411 It is necessary to consider both particulars and universals together ... 415 The universal is not invalidated by the opposition of individual particulars ... 418 The subject ... page Precision and similarity ... 420 Interpretation of the ambiguous ... 423 Abrogation ... 425 Commands and prohibitions ... 426 General and specific ... 432 Clarification and ambiguity ... 442 Section Two: Al-Shatibi's Methodology in Understanding the Qur'an ... 444 The subject of this section ... 444 The Qur'an contains clarification of everything in Sharia ... 445 The need to interpret the Qur'an based on opinion ... 447 The Qur'an has an apparent and a hidden meaning ... 450 How to understand the apparent meaning ... 454 How to understand the hidden meaning ... 456 Issues related to al-Shatibi's methodology in understanding the meanings of the Qur'an ... 458 Examples of al-Shatibi's methodology in understanding the meanings of the Qur'an ... 464 [Page 714] The methodology of al-Shatibi in deducing meanings in the Qur'an ... 469 Section three: The methodology of al-Shatibi in understanding the Sunnah ... 473 The subject of this research ... 473 Definition of the Sunnah according to al-Shatibi ... 473 The Sunnah is an explanation of the Book ... 475 The Sunnah contains an explanation of everything from the legal rulings ... 479 How the Sunnah explains the Qur'an ... 480 Responses to objections ... 486 Explanation by word, action, and approval ... 491 Consensus ... 494 Analogy ... 494 Chapter eight: Ijtihad and taqlid ... 495 Introduction ... 495 The subject ... page Section one: Controls of ijtihad ... 497 Definition according to al-Shatibi ... 497 Conditions ... 497 Types and ranks of ijtihad ... 501 Legally recognized ijtihad ... 504 Differences among the mujtahids ... 508 Error in ijtihad ... 509 Signs of recognized ijtihad ... 514 Ijtihad cannot be completely discontinued ... 520 Section two: Controls of taqlid and fatwa ... 523 The subject of this section ... 523 The mujtahids' evidence for the muqallids ... 524 Preference among the mujtahids ... 526 Rejected principles in fatwa ... 533 Section three: The principle of the outcomes of actions ... 540 Its importance in al-Shatibi's methodology ... 540 Its evidence ... 543 Its meaning and application ... 545 Discussion of a misunderstanding regarding the principle of considering outcomes ... 553 Explanation of a text regarding the consideration of outcomes of actions ... 553 Chapter nine: Applying the idea: Three general principles ... 557 The subject of this chapter ... 557 Section one: Al-masalih al-mursala (unrestricted public interests) ... 558 Meaning of al-masalih al-mursala ... 558 Al-masalih al-mursala according to the imams ... 558 Al-masalih al-mursala according to al-Shatibi ... 562 Areas of applying the principle ... 563 Categories of interests ... 568 The subject ... page Conditions of the principle ... 570 Section two: Istihsan (juridical preference) ... 574 Istihsan and the positions of the imams on it ... 574 What is istihsan ... 577 [Page 715] Sections of Istihsan ... 578 Istihsan according to al-Shatibi ... 583 The difference between masalih mursala (public interests) and istihsan ... 586 Topic Three: Closing the Means ... 587 Definition ... 587 The position of the schools of thought on closing the means ... 588 Evidence for the principle ... 590 Controls for applying the principle of closing the means ... 593 The principle of removing harm ... 601 Issues or branches of the principle of removing harm ... 606 Chapter Ten: The Concept of Maqasid (objectives of the Sharia) according to al-Shatibi: Presentation and Discussion ... 606 The subject of this chapter ... 606 Topic One: A Brief Presentation of the Concept of Maqasid according to al-Shatibi ... 610 The meaning of al-Muwafaqat (the agreements) ... 610 Certainty in the principles according to al-Shatibi ... 612 Characteristics of the principles ... 615 The universals are not invalidated by the opposition of particulars ... 618 Induction is the only way to certainty ... 619 The implications of the legal texts ... 620 The implications of the rulings ... 623 The justification of the Sharia by its objectives ... 625 The objectives ... 627 Al-Shatibi's concept of benefit (maslaha) and harm (mafsada) ... 627 The meaning of justifying the Sharia by benefits ... 629 The subject ... page Ijtihad (independent reasoning) and Taqlid (following) ... 631 Topic Two: Discussion of al-Shatibi's Idea: Universals and Induction ... 632 The subject of this topic ... 632 The condition of certainty in the principles of jurisprudence ... 633 The obligation to act on the speculative ... 639 The independence of the Sunnah in legislation ... 641 Induction ... 647 The opposition of the particular to the universal ... 655 The moral transmission ... 658 Topic Three: Discussion of al-Shatibi's Idea: Objectives and Causes ... 663 The subject of this topic ... 664 The origin of justification ... 664 Refuting the justification of the actions of Allah, Exalted is He ... 665 Objectives and causes ... 671 Sufficiency of the universals over the particulars ... 676 Other observations ... 684 Conclusion ... 685 Index of Sources and References ... 694 Index of Verses ... 700 Index of Hadith ... 707 Index of Contents ... 709